The Sun Never Sets

Khartoum Revisited

by Charles Vasey

Mike Siggins and I got the opportunity to try The Sun Never Sets (Decision Games) and elected for the Khartoum scenario. Granted a woeful degree of planning on either side (pretty accurate for the topic) we found a number of odd things happened. I trust we have not missed vital rules, but the position seemed less satisfactory than in the Chinese and Zulu scenarios.

Facing a Sudan occupied by the infidel in nasty little fortresses one had a choice; either starve them out by siege (a sieged fortress does not count as a supply source) or charge over the ramparts and slaughter them. Given that the supplies in a besieged fortress are better than those available to the besieger outside (when he is being supplied in the desert by water-borne transport) the starvation option appeared weak, especially when demoralisation from this cause can be handily cured much of the time by Gordon (who rallies pretty well). Since most of the garrison are Rabble being demoralised often does not have much effect either.

The steady and inevitable collapse of morale that should arise from such a siege is not going to happen in the game which leaves the second choice - charge! Attacking a fortress inflicts a -3 modifier, but blessings be upon him The Expected One is present with a +3 Tactical Modifier to deal with this and over the top one goes, You might suffer a few losses, but the 2D6 of reinforcements received when your victory is known will soon cure those ills. In reality, the siege lasted for most of a year ending in the last turn of the Khartoum scenario, but it ended on turn two with us! (And would have ended on turn one had I been bright enough).

Having done this the Expected One then moved up and stormed Berber, leaving Osman Digna to drive north towards Egypt, and awaited the Suakin Force under General Graham. The Brits rather foolishly attacked the Mahdi and all his forces at Berber and were completely slaughtered (two awful sixes in a row). Now glorious as is this victory, for which this sinner can claim little credit, it seem a trifle extreme.

Number One Problem

Number one problem was the captured rifles rule. If I kill a 4 SP regiment of Egyptians I can equip a 10 SP ansar unit, that's pretty much the same fire power as the pashas had with their 4 SP unit. The Egyptian and British troops were continually facing entirely rifle-armed forces of ansar. Given that the Expected One has a better strat rating even better the ansar got to fire first. Not unsurprisingly the infidel were slaughtered by volume of fire. However, the Mahadiya did not have a practice of using its troops as riflemen, apart from a few elite Jihadeya (the negro rifle formations seen at Kalari). Some degree of rearmament should be possible (one of the major criticisms of Hicks Pasha's expedition was that it armed the Mahdists) but not to the degree I achieved. It is also my suspicion that this combat system does not work historically where both sides are rifle-armed.

Number Two Problem

Number two problem was the ability of the Mahdi to move around the map in a way which he (and his successor the Khalifa) never did. They stayed in Omdurman or Khartoum and used their lieutenants to fight the enemy, both having (after all) administrative and religious duties to complete. With a 3 Tactical Rating the Mahdi can often out-general the other side, so his ability is a pretty vital factor.

Number Three Problem

Number Three problem is that the game depends on who gets tactical superiority (see above). This lucky lad goes first in each Round of Battle and inflicts losses before the other side fires or fights. There is nothing wrong with this as a model - whoever sets the agenda in battle does exactly this, However, let's say the Mahdi (a three level leader) is leading 100 rifle-armed ansar against Graham (a two leader) with 20 breechloader veteran British. If Graham gets Tactical Superiority over the Mahdi (let's rationalise he is warned of the approach and forms square) then he will get a round of fire in first hitting 3.67 units (and demoralising as many - which could be seven units out of the Mahdist ten dead or demoralised). The remaining three ansar fire and cause 2 units to be eliminated (and two to be demoralised) - probably as much as 80% of the British, and he still has his demoralised units to fire. Imagine that in reverse with all the ansar firing first influenced by the Mahdi; I reckon the average kill will be over seven units so the British will be engaged and destroyed without opportunity to fire if Graham cannot outscore the Mahdi.

This can be particularly odd when attacking fortresses where the opportunity for clever stuff is less pronounced. In my view attacks on fortresses should give a +2 Tactical Superiority advantage to the defender, he can still be surprised but not as much as might be indicated. Secondly, I wondered whether the firing in the various rounds should be done by weapon type. Thus in the old Rifle Round both sides should fire magazine rifles before either side can fire breechloaders and so on. This probably favours the Brits too much so one might allow poorer weapon classes with Tac Superiority to be simultaneous in the loss application. I also wondered whether the leaders should not be allowed to act as negatives on the other side instead of just pluses on their own. Having two good generals does not mean that the losses are going to increase, it might mean the reverse.

Despite these topics we had a very interesting game that was full of incident, much of it fitting the history of the actual campaign very closely. We look forward to the French Foreign Legion game eagerly. (See Old Duffer's review of Fuzzy Wuzzy by Bryan Robson later).


Back to Perfidious Albion #97 Table of Contents
Back to Perfidious Albion List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1998 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com