Richard Kane on Manzana.com came up with the following on We The People Several things I didn't like about the game.
1.The "Go" like method by which to stamp out political control--while a nice game mechanic--has no real correspondence with reality, forcing players to do things that wouldn't have crossed either side's historical mind.
2.Continental Congress dispersing in perpetuity to an obscure backwoods area for safety just wouldn't happen and there's no advantage in having them be in a more accessible place; it actually gives the Americans some strategic flexibility to get Congress safely out of the way early on.
3.The penalty of not being able to place PC markers while Congress is dispersed is exaggerated and basically a fictionalisation of that body's role; political control was a much more regional issue.
4.Selection of American leaders is obvious and arbitrary; Arnold and initially Lafayette and Greene just weren't that important in a strategic sense (should have a card for Arnold like for Knox; perhaps Lafayette and Greene as independent commanders later on); and where is Sullivan and Schuyler?
5.If a Combat Unit can move only with a leader, how is something like St. Leger's move against Stanwix from Oswego to be recreated?
6.Placement of PCs at the start of play or during the game does not correspond to historical regional support (New England--strongly patriot; South--less strongly patriot; mid-Atlantic--about 50/50) although I recognise the number of small states gives New England in general a higher concentration of Committees of Correspondence.
7.Generals should be allowed to be kept on the board once they are brought into play even if collocated with another friendly general at the end of a turn; entirely too rigid to be forced to bring them out of play, it's ahistorical, and could discourage a player from concentrating separate columns.
8.British should be allowed to enter the theatre of operations via Florida.
9.Performance of the French Navy is entirely too dependable for the Americans.
10.If the Americans control a port, the British can't break into a region via amphibious landings as Clinton tried to do against Charleston; this forces the British to have to maintain a coastal PC foothold just to open a campaign in an area (forcing them to do things they wouldn't really have done).
11.The key role of the Caribbean is not recreated; the European War card does not force the British to do anything vis a vis the French and vice versa.
12.Militia control of an area always gives a player two extra cards whereas militia were an unknown quantity (e.g., Camden or Long Island [bad] vs. Guilford Courthouse, Saratoga, Bennington, or Cowpens [pretty good]).
13.A key dimension of the war--fighting between opposing militias, especially in the South--is reduced to "PC fighting" which is too abstract for my taste.
14.Why tie British Regulars advantage to an American win involving three British strength point losses?; after all, where was British prestige after Concord and Bunker Hill?; keep it tied only to the professionalisation of the Continental Army via von Steuben.
15.Vital role of logistics is generally pretty obscure in the game whereas it is central to strategy at this level.
16.If the American player plays the European War card or if he plays the Galvez Spanish Offensive card, he can overthrow British control of an area which is outrageous; surely the selection of Combat Units to be diverted elsewhere should always be a decision for the British player.
17.How is Sullivan's Indian expedition to be prompted, if at all (this was a major American effort)?
18.Petty complaints: Glover's Marblehead Regiment card should be used only once (they turned privateer early on); George Rogers Clark card should cause loss of PC (e.g., along western edge) rather than a card loss; a Nathan Hale card? (his role is hardly tantamount to gaining a PC marker); British amnesty overtures I believe had little impact and do not warrant loss of two American PCs; impact of Continental Line Mutiny, while a serious event, should not result in the loss of American Combat Units (perhaps just loss of an Operations Strategy Card).
In short, WtP as a game is pretty good, very elegant and innovative in many of its mechanics, and a laudable attempt to integrate political issues into play. However, even within the scope of simplification and abstractness it stakes out for itself, it is entirely too "gamey" and inaccurate to be even remotely definitive on the subject.
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© Copyright 1997 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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