Baronial Warfare in England - the Battle at Burton Bridge 1322 (Dr Philip Morgan) This was a fascinating lecture about what was actually a significant action but was hardly reported. Chroniclers adopted a biblical structure for their narratives which incorporated a moral element - the main one in this campaign being the death of Lancaster after Boroughbridge. The action at Burton marked the commencement of Edward's campaign, or rather this phase of the campaign against the rebels. The lecturer reconstructed the events around the battlefield using the following sources: Royal accounts showing where the royal household was each evening, Official newsletters in which the king justified his cause against the rebels, Local court records which revealed civil actions by citizens seeking to recover property plundered after the battle, Looking at the terrain. He supported his talk with a set of four maps, including the oldest he could find of Burton-on-Trent and the surrounding area and a schedule of the Royal Army's movements. This latter gave some good insights into how medieval armies mustered and moved for example: 13 Feb: Edward orders Army to muster at Coventry 18 Feb: Edward changes muster venue to Burton-on-Trent (he is in Gloucester) 27 Feb: Edward arrives Coventry 5 Mar: Edward reaches Telford, Staffs and orders another muster at Lichfield for the purpose of breaking bridges over a tributary of the Trent. The Royal accounts indicate the "Purveyor-General" moving well ahead of the Royal household to secure provisions and accommodation. And indeed we see the Army ordered to muster in the No Man's Land between Lancaster in the north and the King's lands in the south. The Trent was a very significant obstacle, especially as it would have been in flood, and came to represent a sort of boundary between the two sides. Burton's importance was as the site of a very significant bridge. There is little information on the size of the Royal Army but we do have the expenses claim of one knight, William Roos of Helmsley [CHV: But a few miles from the caput of the Honour of Vasey at Appleton-le-Street] who received the summons on 18th Feb, left his castle on 25th Feb and arrived at Burton on 1st March. His retinue consisted of 26 hobilars (light horse), 60 men-at-arms and 71 squires. This indicates good local administration and fast movement by any standards. Soldiers did not just appear fully equipped out of nowhere; the accounts show that sums had to be expended on the repair of armour, clothing and weapons and the purchase of carts, horses and supplies - one infers that Mr Roos must have been looking for Royal favour. During this time the King was issuing writs justifying his actions in that the rebels had "blocked the king's passage" and were "waging war against him with banners displayed". By 7th March the Royal household had reached Caldwell in Derbyshire, a few miles south of Burton and skirmished with the rebels at Burton Bridge on the 8th and 9th. On the 10th a small diversion was led against the bridge by a single knight and his retinue while the main army crossed the Trent at a few miles downstream at Walton ford. The rebels flee northwards and 'fire the town of Burton' although the King camps there that night. The following night he stays at Tutbury castle and issues writs against the rebels. This effectively gives carte blanche for anyone to take any action they want against anybody they think is a rebel. Investigation of these points reveals clearly that the Royal Army was effectively led and turned the rebels out of the Burton position. The old maps revealed that Burton was not burnt in its entirety but probably only a single street, being the suburb nearest the bridge - the main town was several hundred yards away. Rent rolls and other sources reveal gaps in the houses two or three hundred years later which no-one had bothered to rebuild. A significant amount of source material lay in local court actions after the battle when local citizens indicted men who had attacked them on the excuse that they were rebels. There were hundreds of such actions, spread over several counties and the plundering included entire churches down to a man whose bag was taken but was found to contain only rubbish! As usual in these circumstances the king's writ of "total war" on the rebels gave an excuse for all sorts of local disputes to be resolved in a more robust fashion that would have been acceptable in normal times. The author's thesis was that although the battle had been a very minor affair, the effects of recruitment, plundering and purveying were probably both significant and widespread. For example the Tutbury hoard dates from this time - it is a find of around 2,000 silver pennies found in the Trent near Tutbury, possibly being savings / taxes or plunder being removed from or taken to a place of safety. Another point related to Edward's actions against those who had not served in response to the summons. Yet the Royal Army was sizeable and effective at carrying out its task. If service, under Edward II or anyone else, was unpopular, that the numbers of non-attendees did not seem to be such as to have a critical effect on the Army's effectiveness. The speaker therefore took the view that Edward's chasing up of non-attendees reflected a close attention to administrative detail rather than a response to unpopularity per se. One wonders, though, if chasing up senior military defaulters in the early 14th century was not likely to be a little counterproductive. All in all, a fascinating piece of detective work showing many aspects of campaigning in the middle ages. "My Plundered townes, my houses devastation", The Civil War in the North Midlands 1642-1646 Dr Martyn Bennett In theory this should have been a remarkably boring lecture but actually it was a fascinating case study of the effects of the ECW in the Midlands - the focal point of the war. [CHV: hmn!] After all, the war started in Nottingham and ended four years later only a few miles away at Southwell. As I listened, I recalled the trip to these places a few weeks ago with Terry and Brian. We visited a major earthwork at Newark called the King's Sconce. This, like all the other earthworks thrown up during the siege, should have been levelled shortly after it. But because of an outbreak of plague, this work was ceased as the local populations stayed in their villages. The title of the paper came from a poem by a lady in 1642 and referred to what she and her friends thought would happen in the event of war. No doubt, news of the depredations of the wars in Germany were common. The paper was a study of the amounts of money levied from the populations of the five counties of Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire, Staffordshire, Derbyshire and Rutland. The source was the accounts kept by local constables. These were not a type of policemen but a sort of tax collector. In those days local government was obviously much more 'local' than it is today and involved a much greater proportion of the population. The rates of tax were set by committees of local officials like the Sheriff and JPs. During the ECW it would seem that the rates were based on former taxes such as Ship Money. This would tend not to be on income; income tax is quite a recent invention after all. Rather it would be on, say, a penny on every 20 sheep, or on the size of the house. The amount of tax was varied by means of the rate for example by setting it a one and half pence. Once assessed, the taxes were then collected, usually weekly, by constables who were simply local people, either elected or who served on a rota basis. The Royalists contribution fell in latter years after the defeats at Marston Moor and Naseby. It was interesting to hear, though, that after the King withdrew from Nottingham late in 1642 he tried to send local supporters back in to raise money. This produced a patchwork of local allegiances so that strongly Parliamentarian counties might still send money to the King, and vice versa. The Royalists apparently were less efficient at using their money because their regiments tended to be very understrength - but with a full complement of officers and officers pay was half the bill. A factor in raising The New Model Army was seemingly to get over this problem. It was in the interests of both sides to keep the money flowing and so in disputed areas the two sides came to an agreement in collecting taxes. Obviously, the increase in taxes had some economic effect and it seems largely to have been in the amount of rents which fell during the latter part of the war. Another indicator was that contributions were levied in foodstuffs or goods as well as money as the war went on. By the end the balance was about 50/50. Violence tended to flare when the organised routine was disrupted. Obviously, the arrival of an outside army would lead to more plundering. Troops withdrawing from an area, or raiding into it, would also tend to grab what they could. Given that even in peacetime tax collection was carried out weekly (fortnightly in winter) it will be appreciated that the armies must have spent most of their time in this activity. Regiments tended to base their operations on local administrative areas, such as parishes, hundreds or wapentakes. It was why counties were always garrisoned - troops were the local government in many areas. If, as a wargamer, you strip out all your garrisons you immediately cease to collect money! It was clear that although the war caused considerable social disruption, the war took place in a country where contributions were certainly levied but goods and services were paid for and not merely plundered. For example, labourers were conscripted by both sides to dig earthworks at Newark but they were paid. And labourers were paid well, not only by comparison with civilian workers but particularly with soldiers. The speaker wondered why there had been no risings of clubmen in the North Midlands, despite the intense military activity in the area although they were widespread in other parts of the country. 'Clubmen' were organisations of local people who banded together to protect themselves against the depredations of the armies. In brief, he decided that the very concentration of garrisons enabled order to be kept and contributions to be levied in an organised way. The people did not like paying high taxes but they disliked irregular and arbitrary ones even more and this is what would have occurred in some areas. Additionally, there was discontent if too high a proportion of local taxes was remitted elsewhere rather than being spent locally. After all, much of the money went straight back into the local community for goods and services! Midlands Territorials at War, the 46th (North Midland) Division 1914-1918 (Dr John Bourne) John Bourne is an excellent speaker and I suspect that most of the audience found his talk to be the best of the day. He lectures to a good many audiences and it is clear that WW1 is now attracting a great deal of popular interest. As Jon said in the October MilMud, his recent book Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 seems to be regarded as a standard work. He is concerned to show that the British Army evolved during 1916 to 1918 into probably the best army we have ever fielded. I suspect that students of the Peninsular War might put in their own candidate but the British Liberation Army of WW2 seems, by most accounts, to have been ready to drop by war's end. The nuts and bolts of British Army doctrine are more fully described in Paddy Griffith's Battle Tactics on the Western Front, Yale Univ Press 1994, approx £20 and reviewed in a past MilMud. Incidentally, Bourne thinks that Kitchener's decision to raise the New Armies rather than use the Territorial Force was the right one in the circumstances. He feels that while the TF organisation may have offered an ideal method of expanding the army in theory, in practice it possessed significant deficiencies. A good deal of research has been done on individual British divisions in WW1. 46th Div had an unusual career. After it lost 5,000 men on 1st July 1916 in a particularly abortive operation at Gommecourt it was not entrusted with a major role again. The dubious honour of taking part in further assaults on the Somme, at Arras or at Passchendaele was not accorded to it. The consequent tours of trench holding duty imposed significant wastage but even by mid 1918 Bourne estimated that half its personnel were still Midlanders. It is therefore something of a mystery that on 29th September 1918 it was selected to attack the Hindenburg Line near the village of Bellenglise - it's strongest point. A breakthrough was not anticipated (the elite Australians were expected to achieve that in a different sector) and Bourne's speculative view is that the Division was regarded as expendable. The Official History refers to the subsequent action as The Passage at Bellenglise. 46th Div broke the Hindenburg Line at Bellenglise in five hours for the cost of 250 casualties. It took over 4,000 POW's and captured over 70 guns. It was a classic assault employing all the tactics, techniques, equipment, junior leadership and training which, arguably, the finest army in the world then possessed. Marshal Foch referred to the battle as one from which there could be no recovery by the German Army. The vaunted Australian Corps, incidentally, failed to break through. So much for the myth of gung-ho colonials versus stodgy, dogma-ridden 'Imperials'. An excellent talk. Here are some quotes from it. "60% of British heavy gun production was in the last 12 months of the war." "Kitchener faced the same problem as most British senior commanders in WW1 - Lloyd George." [CHV: hear hear] "The image one has of Kitchener is a cross between a lighthouse and a buddha. He sits cross-legged in the gloom with a joss-stick up his nose emitting blinding shafts of light at periodic intervals." Back to Perfidious Albion #94 Table of Contents Back to Perfidious Albion List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by Charles and Teresa Vasey. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com