We the People,
The politics of personality,
Flodden

and more...

We the People In PA92 Earl Gareth questioned the Washington rule whereby the Americans lose the game if he is captured, and the French navy's ability to blockade a port of choice without the Royal Navy being able to do anything about it. I have chewed over both subjects with various opponents and, while in game terms the Washington rule is essential to play balance, we just do not know enough about the Rebels to decide whether the Cherry tree axe man was as indispensable as the game suggests.

If Chuck's AOL buddies agree that the great man was that important, then who are we to argue? Incidentally, the effect of the rule is not, as might be supposed, that the British win their victories by stringing up the traitors' leader. While I have seen a few games end that way, what normally happens is the American player behaves relatively cautiously with Washington, not wanting to hazard him near coastal cul-de-sacs where he could be boxed in. The danger of losing Washington (along the shores of New England especially) prevents all but the most aggressive and/or desperate players making full use of the best American leader. (CHV: This rule is an extreme distorter, British units ahistorically receive orders to Seek And Destroy while Washington is cocooned in a way that stops him being as important as he was. It is one of the poorest pieces of work in the game).

The French fleet rule is less defensible on historical grounds, but I have not found it more than a minor irritant when playing the British. I think the rule exaggerates the capability of the French navy. Cornwallis was defeated because the French managed to achieve a temporary local superiority in the Chesapeake, not something they were able to repeat. On the other hand, no-one has yet managed to repeat Yorktown in any of our games. A better way of handling the French fleet might have been to have say, half-a-dozen cards in the strategy card pack which had the same effect as the current rule. (CHV: Or use them as "Toggle on-Toggle off" for French Fleet presence, there is a single card to cover the Fleet going AWOL one turn in the new pack)

Singles bar morality and the nation state

CHV observed that games on the Thirty Years War seem to equate 17th century international relations with modern singles bar sexual mores (take extra precautions when dealing with the French?). Such 'simulation of perceived reality" as it was described probably dates back to the traditional British view of the continentals as a bunch of treacherous gangsters, prepared to cheat, lie and back-stab at the drop of a hat. (CHV: Except that the worst perpetrators are Americans)

Any suggestion that such behaviour continues to the present day will be reported to the Euro Thought Police (writes that mad old cynic B.S.E. Drury). However, it does raise the point that there are several periods of military history in which there is a definite 'wargame' view just as there is a 'Hollywood' view. In some cases, they are as wildly inaccurate as each other. A recent example of the 'wargame/Hollywood' view triumphing over historical reality is the Command game When Eagles Fight. This continues to peddle the long out-dated view that the Russians had no shells because they did not have the factories, the infantry did not have rifles etc.

Norman Stone buried all this in what has become the standard work on the subject (titled, with that flair for catchy headlines that is the hallmark of academic presses, The Eastern Front 1914-17). The idea that Russian naval expenditure had surpassed that of Germany before 1914 gives some idea of the real strength of the Russian economy. Russian economic growth was phenomenal from the Russo-Japanese war to 1917: German anxiety over the Tsar's increasing strength played no small part in the decision to go to war in 1914.

Incidentally, the source of the 'Backward Russia' myth could be the massive Dupuy & Dupuy encyclopaedia which, judging by its sales figures, is owned by most American wargamers. Needing to check some dates for the Russo-Japanese war, I looked up the conflict, only to discover a line about Russia's fleet of 'seven elderly battleships' at Port Arthur. None of them were 'elderly': they were laid down in the late 1890s and were just as modern as the British-built battleships of the Japanese navy. But 'elderly' fits the legend better.

Few WW2 games (and no WW1 games) allow for anything like the degree of tension between allies that existed at the time. Few games allow anything like the range of alternative foreign policies by various nations that might have radically changed the course of either conflict. So while the players can try to change the course of history by better or worse handling of their military strategies, the historical diplomatic possibilities are downplayed. This is partly because gamers like -- or designers assume they want --lots of operational level detail, and there is therefore no time for diplomatic relations other than a bit of chrome added here and there. I also suspect it also comes from game designers reading too narrowly about military operations at the expense of political history. It is more fun to read about sweeping military manoeuvres than the machinations of politicians. And it does not help that following the changes in say, Turkish foreign policy 1907-1918 is not easy without access to a university library: but rather important if you are developing a grand strategic game on WW1.

The politics of personality

At grand strategic level, we also face the problem of who exactly the player(s) represent. Are victory conditions 'national' (objectives a nation's political leaders or even the people themselves generally agree upon) or 'personal' (something a dictator, absolute monarch or tyrant wants himself, but is not necessarily desired by his subjects or even his subordinates). The distinction is crucial should a leader with very personal objectives die during the course of the war.

For instance, in the light of the numerous assassination attempts on Hitler it seems to me essential that a grand strategy game on WW2 allows for the possible death of the Fuhrer. Depending on at what point in the war it happened, the increasing gulf between his aims and those actually supported by the Wehrmacht, the leading Nazis or the industrialists. Again, while Britain would probably have followed similar policies with or without Churchill after 1940, without him in that critical year a compromise peace with Germany was not entirely inconceivable. Roosevelt was not a well man when elected for his third term, and he could have lost the election to his isolationist opponents. No WW2 game should blithely assume that the USA will so actively support the UK in 1940-1, or that it would end up at war with Germany. (Hitler's quixotic declaration of war on the USA was very much a spur-of-the-moment decision).

I have encountered another difficulty developing my WW1 game: the vacuum at the top created by Kaiser Wilhelm. How do you determine Germany's objectives when it became increasingly unclear who was actually governing the country? The rise and fall of favourite generals (Moltke, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg/Ludendorff) led to dramatic swings in strategy and political objectives until the latter combination ended up as virtual dictators of Germany. 'Virtual' is the key word here, since although the First Quartermaster General exercised enormous powers in Germany and its occupied territories, there were real constraints on his control of the economy, work force etc. and he could be (and was) effectively dismissed at the whim of the monarch.

I do not pretend I have any answers to how we simulate any of this. I just think we should get away from grand strategy games where political leaders (and their policies) inevitably follow their historical path.

Flodden a Dead Horse with Gerry Haggerty

I was "shocked, absolutely shocked" that Sir Richard of Berg could confuse Flodden's array (which is clearly a rather nifty spatial model of the map counter's "situation on the ground") to a mere 3D roster, such as the Kevin Zucker Nappy strength tracks he cited. Jet-lag from the Columbus, Ohio sojourn? I was mentally preparing a pointed riposte for the BROG board when I scrolled upon yours, which succinctly redressed RHB's error.

Anyway, what prompted my naive question ("whither the Flodden array?") was my impression that what was happening on the arrays was as interesting as what was happening on the map. My only regret was that Flodden's scale and period could not realistically permit "manoeuvre" opportunities within the arrays themselves to exploit passing opportunities ("Archers forward! No, back!", that sort of thing; 1513, not a good year for fancy footwork, alas). [CHV: I have some good news and some bad news Gerry. The scale does permit it, but as you note the skill levels do not. But you see precisely how I intended it for a Swiss Pike battle.]

It occurred to me that much game-within-the-game potential in the array system remained to be exploited by moving the subject up in scale and forward in period.

Recalling your mention of the Napoleonic game, my array-obsessed mind suddenly envisioned corps markers on the map and brigade units on the arrays, with corps leaders rated for their ability to reconfigure their brigade arrays (e.g., to shift reserves, relieve engaged units) in combat.

Array frontage would express the leader's capacity to effectively commit and control his units (e.g., if Ney's array is 2 boxes wide, Davout's might be 5) rather than represent true groundscale deployment as in Flodden.

Thus, thought I, the array system might provide the long-sought alternative to the usual method of resolving combat in simple, strategic games (the "line 'em up off the map an' roll dem bones" theory of battle, ala A House Divided).

Yea, verily, All this appeared to me in a vision, whilst the Kynge of Scottes owne battaill did roll 1's and 2's when joynd in fightyng, then 9's and 10's to check morale...


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