Just a few thoughts on Craig Ambler's observations concerning 1807: The Eagle Turns East. I am restricting my comments to what he has to say about attrition, artillery and combat since the other stuff is now covered by errata. If you want said errata get on the mailing list by using a response card from one of our games. (CHV: If you want the errata but do not have any of Clash of Arms' games send me £10 and I will waste it). I am a bit incredulous with Craig's report on the attrition he suffered after eight weeks of play (he says one point after all that time). This assumes a Herculean effort on his part to co-ordinate troop movements with climactic conditions. It also implies march rates comparable with the Thirty Years War. I suppose it is possible to find an opponent who will comply with this pace of action, or degrees of mutual respect bordering on paranoia, but to stand by and watch your opponent ever so methodically shorten his supply lines without taking advantage of them? Sounds like paralysis. Both Napoleon and Bennigsen forced the other to manoeuvre when it was disadvantageous for them to do so. The mud to the west of Pultusk was covered by discarded equipment and stragglers from each army, and, of course, the French left the bulk of their artillery beside the roads approaching Eylau. Each commander traded tremendous hardships for fleeting operational advantages. If Napoleon and Bennigsen had been as frugal as Craig and his opponent I am afraid they would have set the science of warfare back a century. You can play chess the same way, but if this is endemic to your style of play an aggressive player will eat you alive. You will never gain the initiative. Having played the game I found the attrition losses so staggering something had to be done about them. That's where the hospital tracks came from. At least, I thought, they can still drop like flies but the bulk of them will return as replacements later. Regarding Artillery Regarding artillery and the difference between French and Russian gun strengths: I suggest Craig consults the testimony of the survivors of the French VII Corps on 9 February (the day after Eylau). Recalling the above attrition, Bennigsen's drive to the west in January prompted Napoleon to launch his counter-stroke in decidedly bad weather; appalling, in fact. The stuff that was difficult to move, namely the cannon, fell behind. Once Bennigsen became aware of Napoleon's riposte, however, he reversed his direction. This enabled him to fall back on his gun train which he reunited with on 5 February. Thus Bennigsen was able to meet the French with the bulk of his heavies whereas the French were forced to leave many of theirs behind. This tactic benefited the Russians so well that one is tempted to see premeditation on the part of Bennigsen. When we see him leave his prepared positions later that June for a similar drive on Güttstadt prompting a like response from the French, one is tempted to see the same motive. (Murat led a willy-nilly pursuit right into the teeth of these same guns... the battle of Heilsberg the result). The Imperial Guard artillery at this time consisted of maybe 18 guns and howitzers. The Allies (who had joined their reserve batteries in January) sported 15 batteries of mobile heavy artillery (and I mean heavy) and at least 7 horse-batteries - about 290 guns all told. The trick was only getting them to the right place at the right time, and feeding all the horses. This is nasty stuff and reflected the traditional Russian infatuation with this arm. I would trade this on the battlefield for the French Guard artillery in 1807 any day. In no way did the "French artillery hold its own" in these campaigns. Senarmont's artillery at Friedland was an exception in keeping with the French flexible response to warfare. It took six months for Napoleon to learn how to deal with these Russian guns. Even then, it was more a matter of fortune than planning when he manoeuvred the Russians out of their Heilsberg position by threatening Konigsberg (getting the Russians into a foot race, their guns left behind or on the wrong side of the river). Of Casualty Rates Regarding the "casualty rate being far too large" in combat: let's use the example Craig gives. Napoleon with 47,000 men meets Bennigsen with 41,000. Let's assume ground advantage is even. After a day wherein both commanders refuse to yield Napoleon will be left with 16,000 and Bennigsen with 14,000. Sound excessive, sure it does but let's look at a historical example. Napoleon began Eylau with approximately 44,000 men. Bennigsen started with 65,000. We know the French were reinforced by maybe another 25,000 men although Ney's were too late to do anything) while L'Estocq reinforced Bennigsen with 9,000 men. Craig's loss percentage yields 65% for the French and 66% for the Russians. I put it to you on the evening of 8 February there were fewer than 15,000 effectives left from the 44,000 French who began the day on the field (35% of 44,000). Of the Russians who could have had to fight on 9 February, if there had been a battle, I doubt they could have mustered 25,000 (34% of 74,000). Napoleon would have had the advantage of half of Davout's III Corps, say another 7,000 men, and nearly all of Ney's 10,000. "What a massacre, and without result!". The key here is exactly what does a casualty represent. An increment of one thousand infantrymen. Does this mean (as Craig thinks) one thousand dead or wounded men on a few acres of ground? Or does it represent several hundred dead or wounded, but another 700 or so scattered to the winds, being gathered by gendarmes and sergeants, and the necessity to seek shelter and sustenance, but certainly not capable of conducting military operations for the next several days. What about all those dead horses; what good are cavalrymen or cannon without horses? How do they figure in the equation? Craig's example confirms what we can expect from an extreme example of combat. The numbers are excessive. But not because they did not occur. They are excessive because they could and did occur. If you are going to fight a stand-up, no holds barred battle, do not quibble if you end up wrecking your army. As Napoleon said upon viewing the carnage of Jena, "It'll be fixed by all the screwing of just one night in Paris". Kevin published his first Napoleonic game over twenty years ago. He has been researching, albeit with varying degrees of intensity the era for at least as long. He is not a dabbler with a game this week on The Crusades and next week Gross Deutschland meets Godzilla the next. I am inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt. Back to Perfidious Albion #92 Table of Contents Back to Perfidious Albion List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1996 by Charles and Teresa Vasey. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com