Tom and Grant Dalgliesh for Columbia This has been in my possession for only a few days. It is a tactical game (units are brigades, command at divisional, corps and army levels) covering the three days of Gettysburg. It had an interesting history being originally a campaign game which was then transmogrified into a game of the battle. I really do wonder whether Columbia needs to reconsider their production style. Their rules have been, frankly, piss-poor for some time. Fortunately it appears as if this is simply the result of not testing them as to clarity enough. It has not reflected on the underlying game. This game however has had a much shorter cycle and was still being altered until very recently. But let us not rush to judgement. The map is not the prettiest one I have seen but is admirably clear. As with most Columbia games the use of hexside terrain permits a lot more detail to be put into the reduced number of hexes. A number required by the size of the Columbia wooden blocks over counters. The game uses an interesting sequence: Command Phase: Divisional HQs are tipped over for activation they can move a single hex. Fire Phase: this requires the expenditure of command. It can be distant for artillery or adjacent for infantry. THE DEFENDER DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY FIRE. Movement: this does not need command but you must stop on entering a ZOC so cannot go straight into a melee. Melee: if you entered an enemy hex (one unit per hexside then you melee) Supply Phase: HQs transmit command to the lower orders and rebuild strength. Command is an important feature. Every time an HQ is used it loses one SP in the usual Columbia fashion. However its command points are always the same whatever its strength is. The Confederates have fewer leaders than the Union but they are much better (and strength also masquerades as range) so Old Pete Longstreet at 4 makes most union commanders (2s and 1s) look sick. The result is to make the Union rather thin in activation even if it is very numerous. This is pretty much as it was on the day. The other effect of command is that even the CSA cannot keep going forever it will run out of command over the course of the hourly turns (command is replenished at night). The result is that other effect of Gettysburg as entire divisions stand around doing nothing having played themselves out. Fire is, as noted, only available with command and does not automatically suffer a response. As such it does not look very historical. The favourite example of this is as follows. You should know that in melees the combat is defender then attacker in each morale class. So the attacker with A morale dices before the defender with B morale. Off we go. The Rebs are closing on Cemetery Hill they move up next to the Union defence lines moving second. Although they could then receive fire if the Union had any command in fact they win the initiative and immediately go first (denying the Union any chance to fire). They fire their artillery (which had presumably galloped up under the Union’s nose and gone into action) and the spare infantry. Then they send in the CSA supermen (the A2 strength 4 brigades). These outrank the Union morale and so melee first and finish off the Union. The hill has fallen without any counter action being possible - a remarkably silly scenario. The Ethiopian in the fuel supply is the double move (although note if the Union lack command this can still happen), Why not just use a fixed turn option? Well on Day 1 this can have just as daft a scenario. The Union is led by Fabius Q. Foppington. He awaits the onset of the Rebs. They close up next to him ready to fire next turn and then melee. But Fabius decides he is not keen. He withdraws one hex in his turn leaving the Rebs to repeat the mixture as before. This death by a thousand retreats is, of course, tipped on its head by a double move as the CSA get their claws into the Union. I reckon (with practice) the determinant of Reb victory on Day One is the number of double turns. Fire becomes a variety of super-attack with melee perhaps being the final push. But the Union has the benefit of terrain. The best units (Berdan’s Sharpshooters) have a hit rating of 3. Firing across streams and into woods reduces this by 2. Indeed the streams around Gettysburg seem to be surrounded by dense bamboo groves keeping LOS down to low numbers. In some areas (say the Round Tops) most units (which are 2s) can forget firing. It becomes a hunt for ones at best. Without fire the melee (even at three rounds) can be difficult as the Confederates can only put in one brigade per hex-side. To balance this in woods they will only face three defenders. The Union though has weaker units with less punch and very prone to being limited in retreat. Although the CSA is going for territorial VPs it will cheerfully accept one for every enemy brigade killed. This brief discussion cannot do much to come to conclusions on the game. There is a great deal that is odd or foolish and much that is spot on. For example the prevention of what I call Starship Troopers Syndrome (Everybody fights) as command runs out and the guns fall silent is very good. The scenarios are also very tight even if you need to play the rules rather than the history. Columbia’s reputation is good but I do wonder if this one got out a little too early. Back to Perfidious Albion #104 Table of Contents Back to Perfidious Albion List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Charles and Teresa Vasey. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com