I must apologise. The game suffered from my perhaps overly ambitious desire to put quite a bit into it (my first published design) in the limited DTP format allotted. This game could definitely have used illustrated examples of play, more designer and player notes, etc. In truth, what was mainly on my mind was great delight in finally having something of mine published somewhere, in some fashion.
I did put the Cambodian incursion scenario in as sort of an introduction. This is a good scenario to learn the game, and it is also an interesting study. By that time, NVA operations were textbook in precision and integration of all-arms for campaigning in Southeast Asia. Perhaps would have been better if it were used as an illustration of the various rules etc.
Please allow me to attempt amends by offering a few clarifying points and general notes;
I. Overruns and combat in general
Overruns are conducted the same as normal combat except for the following;
1. Only one stack may do an overrun, and all units in the stack must start the land movement phase stacked together.
2. There is no bombardment phase prior to the combat resolution.
3. Stacks with Armour may only overrun in clear terrain, Mech in clear or jungle.
4. Air units and helicopters may support the same as standard combat.
5. The opponent does not have the opportunity to conduct reaction movement.
The way this has worked is that the US with his powerful units and air support is generally able to attack virtually any target hex he desires, and typically at least clear the hex. The US is limited in how many large units are available and how much air support may be assigned. To try and run too many of these operations with diluted strength runs the great risk of hitting very strong enemy units with weak forces from time to time, and suffer accordingly.
Most combat will be of overrun type. There are still occasions for set-piece affairs, as when the objective is simply to clear a particular hex, when the enemy force is surrounded, or if compelling reaction movement would result in a tactical disadvantage to the enemy.
There are two important nuances to remember about reaction movement;
- Reacting units can still be attacked during the normal combat phase by units that are adjacent to them.
- If reacting units leave a hex vacated, at the END of combat friendly units which had been adjacent to the empty hex can move into it as if advancing after combat, though they may not then attack the reacted unit(s) (rule 17.2.7)
Detecting moving NVA and using firebase, artillery, naval and air to launch disruption attacks is a favoured tactic of the US side to limit the NVA ability to take decisive action. It takes time and careful planning to be able to do this, and assets (especially the powerful air units) have to be husbanded carefully for unexpected contingencies.
Search and Destroy and Hearts and Mind operations can also hurt the NVA player, especially with even slightly better than average luck. These are usually economical to use.
Against a US player with anything like the historical commitment of forces, the NVA player will eventually find standard conventional operations prohibitive. The NVA side must decide early in the game to adopt a very subtle frame of mind regarding strategy, and must always seek to use the psychology of the opponent against him. This is true both in combat and higher strategy.
II. General Notes on the Campaign Game
These notes reflect general observations of the flow of play from game's I've been involved in or have noted regarding my play-testers. Games won't take the identical course every time, but I've identified trends that usually appear.
Typically during the first four or five turns the NVA player will run wild while the US builds up strength. If the US does not commit ground elements in '64 or declare Vietnamisation, the NVA will be limited to infiltrating one division per turn south. Thus, the earliest part of the game has VC building up quickly, perhaps making a limited assault or two by the second or third game turn. The important thing for the NVA during this period is to increase the VC as fast as possible, and for the US to garrison vital ports, airbases, Saigon, and hold a 'speed bump' up around Da Nang and Hue.
Early commitment of ground force is not my personal favourite US stratagem, though it can work I guess. I like to launch a huge air campaign around the third or fourth turn, mining the harbour at Haiphong and inflicting severe attrition on the North's infrastructure and units. From that point on, I come back every so often for a new 'treatment' of the north. Reducing the NVA menace is vitally important to later US success in the campaign. I gladly pay the VP for unrestricted military bombing and interdiction of the north, the Chinese and Soviets be damned!
If the US side keeps to correct operational thinking and pursues the strategy of attrition, by sometime in the second half of 1966 things will suddenly appear to be turning around. The VP track, reduced probably into the 30's by bombing, guerrilla action and the commitment of US forces, will gradually start creeping back up. It is a very interesting thing, but I notice US players often getting too optimistic during this time, and not seeking for additional strategic gambits to help them win. TET is always available to the NVA player to remind them of reality, and TET can be played almost anytime (not just in '68).
Some of the US gambits I'm speaking of, which I have used, include invading the north or going into Laos to cut the trail.
The invasion scenario makes for a very lively and often dicey campaign. Chinese or even Soviet entry might be triggered, and things can possibly get quite 'red hot' indeed. This move generally induces the NVA player to place VC units in the north, which helps the US as the communist is not garnering VP for having as many VC down south. Both sides will feel their assets stretching to the limit as the titanic struggle appears to approach a climax.
The Laotian option is somewhat safer for the US and appears very good in achieving a cost-effective decision early on. Prof Chuck Kamps of the US Air Force Air Command and Staff College tipped me to this when he sent an article he wrote my way hypothesising such a move by the US in November 1966. So far, I have not been able to craft a successful countermove for the NVA side.
Whatever happens, if the US side pays attention and does not fall asleep the NVA really starts to feel the pain around 1969. This is especially so if the Operation Phoenix rules are in place. The VC are going to be whittled away and largely spent at some point. Some reprieve might be offered if the US initiates Vietnamisation early, but usually by the early 70's the VP track will be climbing, not falling.
If the US has not earlier taken the strong and violent measures of mining Haiphong and initiating serious bombing of the north, the NVA should easily be able to launch a spoiling offensive at some point, much as they did in '72. With a US player who has used the strong measures, this will be a bit of a problem. If the Laotian gambit is in place, it will be nigh impossible! Typical NVA players might well concede game at this point (or indeed, much earlier). I included a nasty surprise however for the US player. If the VP track falls to 0, the game ends in ARVN collapse that turn; a US defeat, period! If the track goes to 99, a stubborn NVA player can refuse to concede, and force the game to play all the way to '75!
I recall vividly an argument I had with some friends when I came home from the Air Force in '73. They claimed the US had won the war, and I said South Vietnam would fall to the north within five years...two different viewpoints, which equally seemed quite true and self-apparent to differing parties!
At this point in the game (or earlier) the NVA player has a negotiating option. The goal of his efforts should be to get the US player to withdraw US forces in turn for a vapid promise of NVA compliance to a cease-fire, then to toss the cease-fire when appropriate and hope the US is not able to roll back in! In game terms, this might end with the US side conceding a lesser victory in return for peace, which works well in tournament play when points are assigned for victory level etc.
This is why I put the optional 'sudden death' victory conditions in, so that players wouldn't have to face the real frustrations the war brought, unless they are a bit masochistic like myself and want to experience the unendurable!
The nukes were included for players who have the tendency to overturn the chessboard when things go badly.
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© Copyright 2001 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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