There are a number of inter-related factors which governed and controlled the fighting ability of the warriors of all the armies known to mankind and at every period of history. These factors outlined in the Fighting Assessment Chart probably apply to any period of military history but they are all certainly relevant when considering the soldiers of the Ancient and Medieval worlds. Every nation, every army and every force was controlled and affected to varying degrees by the qualities listed in our chart. Coordinated, the sum total of all these qualities made him the good, bad or indifferent soldier that history records.

In an endeavor to reflect those qualities on paper to provide a workable system of comparing abilities or qualities, one army or nation against another, the standard of each quality has been determined as follows:

First Class 3 points
Reasonable 2 points
Little (Average) 1 point
None 0 points

The last five factors (numbers 16-20) are considered to be detrimental qualities so the points values are reversed - that is to say 'First Class likelihood of demoralization would score no points, whilst 'no' likelihood of demoralization would score 3 points. The detailed Fighting Assessment Chart is as follows:

Worksheet
Factor	Rating	Points
1. Ability to assault in controlled order	.	.
2. Bravery	.	.
3. Control	.	.
4. Defensive Ability	.	.
5. Desperation	.	.
6. Discipline	.	.
7. Ferocity	.	.
8. Maneuverability	.	.
9. Mobility	.	.
10. Movement, speed of	.	.
11. Order	.	.
12. Tactical Sense	.	.
13. Training and Drilling	.	.
14. United Action, capability for	.	.
15. Weapon Handling	.	.
16. Demoralization, likelihood of	.	.
17. Impetuous Action, likelihood of	.	.
18. Panic, likelihood of	.	.
19. Reluctance to take definite action	.	.
20. Unscheduled Maneuvers, likelihood of	.	.
Total = Fighting Assessment:		.

Based on the belief that the Roman Army, in its' hey-day, was most likely to achieve almost 100% scoring in the majority of these factors, a Fighting Assessment Chart has been made out for (a list of) nations armies or forces. This means that every nation or army has a Fighting Assessment Figure, serving as a means of grading that army and so indicating its chances against another force of the Ancient or Medieval world. For easy reference, the Fighting Assessment Figures of the Ancient nations are as follows:

Nation or Force	Fighting Assessment Figure
Sumerians	10
Persians	31
Macedonians	44
Romans (All Periods)	55
Germans	24
Carthaginians	51
Gauls	20
Goths	30
Britons	16
Barbarians (Cavalry)	39
Huns	47
Mongols	50
Saxons	23
Vikings	45
Normans	28
Byzantines	51
Chinese	23
Franks	32
Japanese	19
Indians (Hindu)	12
Crusaders	30
Saracens	39
Ottoman Turks	35
Swiss	54
Landsknechte	50
Scots (14th Century)	23
French (14th & 15th Centuries)	Infantry 7 Cavalry 23
English (14th & 15th Centuries)	48

As it might not be entirely clear as to the reason for the inclusion of some of the factors or qualities that go to make up the Fighting Assessment Chart, there follows a briefly detailed explanation of each factor.

Ability to assault in controlled order

For a force to obediently move forward at the word of command or at the sound of a trumpet and, often in the face of missiles, advance steadily in an unbroken formation such as a phalanx or even in lines with each man keeping a set distance from his neighbor, not only requires great control, training and drill but also has a shattering morale effect upon the enemy. It has a big military bearing in separating the men from the boys and plays a vital part in systems of alternative orders and moves explained elsewhere.

Bravery

Bravery is the ability to carry oneself defiantly and to encounter danger with courage - qualities inseparable from the good soldier. With such a vital bearing, its inclusion in this chart requires little further explanation.

Control

In a military sense, control means to dominate, to command, to direct or hold in check. These factors which repeatedly show up prominently in warfare of Ancient or Medieval times as they do in battles between disciplined troops and savages. That all these factors are inter-related is borne out by considering the often wasteful and fruitless bravery of undisciplined warriors when confronting the controlled bravery of well trained troops.

Defensive ability

This can be discussed in the terms of (1) a unit in a defensive role or (2) as the basic tactics of an army or force. It is in the latter sense that I should be considered here because a force or army noted for courageous if disorderly fighting methods ( such as the Crusaders ) displays poor defensive ability when under stress.

Desperation

It is not unreasonable to assume that, when faced with opponents noted for their ferocity, and with a stark realization that torture and death are the only alternatives to victory, that a force will fight with desperation, resisting beyond its normal capabilities. Although desperation is usually invoked against 'ferocious' opponents, it could apply when one or both sides realize that quarter is unlikely to be given. A typical example of such a situation could be the battle between Suetonius Paulinus' Roman army and Boudicea's Britons at Staines in 61 AD when the Romans were very conscious of the terrible things done by the Britons to Roman soldiers of other legions and the Britons knew that the Romans would exact the fiercest revenge.

Discipline

Discipline is mental and moral military training which brings soldiers under control and trains them to obedience and order. The discipline ingrained in a soldier through hours of drill and training is the greatest factor in making him stand when the going gets tough. It is also one of the most singular differences between trained and untrained warriors.

Ferocity

Throughout history certain warriors and nations have been held in the greatest dread by their opponents. In some cases their ferocity was a natural attribute whilst in others it was purposefully used as a military tactic. The first recorded people of the type were probably the Assyrians, others have been the Vikings (and their Berserks); the Huns and Mongols and, because they gave no quarter, the Swiss pikemen of the 15th century. Ferocity and the dread it inspires is a military factor that could have a battle half won before even the first blow had been struck.

Maneuverability

Generally considered to mean adroit and rapid movement of military formations, maneuverability can also be taken to represent the slow-moving, almost ponderous but excellently ordered and trained assault of the phalanx, the Scottish schiltron, the wedge of the English bowmen or the spear point bristling formation of the Swiss pikemen. As opposed to the courageous but disorderly dash of tribesmen, the maneuver is an operation flowing fluidly in any direction and performed with order and control.

Mobility

Armies of Ancient times and the Middle ages were not noted for the speed at which they moved around en masse. Consequently, those armies who displayed mobility were sufficiently few in number to be prominent. Among them were Attila's Huns and the Mongols of Genghis Khan and Tamerlaine who were reputedly vast in number, whereas it is now known that they were so mobile as to appear in one area when thought to be miles away, thus giving the impression of having numbers of armies wand men scattered all over the place. Nomadic peoples, these cavalry armies, accompanied by their families and flocks, moved swiftly from place to place confounding and defeating their foes through their ease of movement coupled with their ferocity and fighting ability.

Movement, speed of

In 53 BC at Carrhae a Roman army commanded by Crassus was wiped out by the hit and run tactics of Parthian cavalry and later, in the Holy Land, the ponderous and slow moving Crusaders were bewildered and dazzled by the swooping and wheeling of the Saracen horse archers. Speed of movement was a rare attribute in the wars of the Ancients and those nations who possessed light cavalry capable of carrying out these hit and run tactics chalked up a number of notable successes.

Order

When considering an army it is almost automatically thought of in good order or regular array, in a condition where every part or unit is in its right place. For obvious reasons, this state of affairs did not automatically apply with every army or force in the period we are now considering, and because order was more the exception than the rule, it is considered to be an asset of sufficient importance to merit a place in this chart. Military arrays capable of keeping good order were not always triumphant but they had a better chance than those in disorder.

Tactical sense

The ability to dispose military and naval forces in actual contact with the enemy so that they achieved some planned end was an art well known to many armies of the Ancient world but equally unknown to others. It is interesting to work through the armies set out in this book and note how tactical sense and ability is dotted about with chronological order. Armies were fighting to reasonably intelligent tactics in the years before Christ and yet (with possible exception of Arsouf) the Crusaders displayed none whatsoever and even nearly 200 years later the French showed little tactical sense for the majority of the Hundred Years War.

Training and drilling

Whilst much of the art of war and handling of weapons came naturally to the warriors of the Ancient world such as the Barbarian cavalry hordes utilizing their natural ability in the saddle, the most successful armies were those who had been trained and drilled. The Roman army is perhaps the best example of this and the hours of training spent by the English archer at the butts paid big dividends in actual warfare.

United action, capability for

In Ancient times and during the Middle Ages there were numerous instances of countries and tribes allying together for a common cause. Because of petty jealousies and pride, these alliances rarely worked and more often than not the commanders were trying to out-do each other rather than cooperate in bringing down the enemy. On a lesser scale can be seen centuries of contempt shown by cavalry for infantry and little attempt was made for cooperation or mutual support. On innumerable occasions even the most primitive plans were ruined by premature attacks or lack of movement by part of an army. Those nations and forces so bonded together by spirit backed with training and discipline making them capable of united action were usually the ones that came out on top.

Weapon Handling

In the period under discussion it was natural for a man, particularly if he was of good birth or breeding to be accustomed from birth to handling weapons. Even the peasant became adept with his spear and bow and arrow through the sheer necessity of hunting his food and it was not a very far step from stabbing or shooting a man as opposed to a deer. Roman proficiency with the pilum and the short stabbing sword, Saxon prowess with the battleaxe, English ability with the longbow and Swiss excellence with the pike made them masters of their craft and warriors to be feared.

Demoralization, likelihood of

If the soldiers of an army are well trained and drilled, accustomed to discipline and control and are led by commanders with a reasonable tactical sense and ability in man handling, then that army is unlikely to ever become demoralized. However, under certain circumstances such as that undergone by the Romans at the hands of the Parthian horse archers at Carrhae or against the Germanic Tribes in the Teutoburger Wald in 9 AD., even troops so highly trained as the Romans had their discipline, cohesion, courage, and endurance destroyed. Obviously, the less organized force, lacking discipline and training, will become demoralized quicker than the trained soldier army.

Impetuous action, likelihood of

Perhaps the greatest examples of this are those demonstrated by the Crusading knights as they took off 'into the blue' against the elusive Saracen light cavalry. Similarly, the feudal knight, spurred on by his code of honor and his notions of chivalry, never failed to crash into action at the mere sight of the enemy. A typical example is that of the French knights at Crecy in 1346 when they actually rode down their own Genoese crossbowmen in their attempts to get at the English. Impetuosity, particularly when displayed by high-born and hard to control knights, presented commanders with a terrible problem because, like the boxer who loses his temper in the ring, the impetuous soldier leaves himself wide open.

Panic, likelihood of

Akin to demoralization, panic is perhaps better able to be checked, and is also more likely to occur among ill-trained, poorly disciplined and badly led troops than among well controlled forces. A sudden infectious alarm leading to hasty measures, panic, causes unreasoning and excessive fright so that a force that has been fighting bravely will suddenly wilt and break with disastrous effects upon their comrades on either side of them. A typical example is that of the cavalry on the right wing of the Roman army at Adrianople in 378 AD wheeling away and fleeing from the field, leaving the legionaries to their fate. Most armies had a body of elite troops who never panicked and could be used to check that sad state of affairs in other units.

Reluctance to take definite action

As with so many other factors in this list, a reluctance to take definite action frequently stemmed from poor leadership, lack of control and order. And little tactical sense. On the other hand, it can obviously arise from a dread or fear of the opposition, to be particularly expected when the enemy are 'ferocious' warriors such as the Vikings or Huns, etc. It would seem that the strongest factor in countering the reluctance to take definite action on the part of troops is good leadership but often this same reluctance arises in the mind of a commander particularly if he is in awe of the man who leads the enemy against him.

Unscheduled maneuvers, likelihood of

An unscheduled maneuver is more a matter of timing than distance or direction. For example, a unit, part of a force or even the whole force may, particularly if coupled with a high 'impetuosity' factor, take off before their commander intends and at an unpropitious moment. Both may be effected by their commander's rating and his degree of control. An unscheduled maneuver may consist of a force deviating from its ordered line of attack, again this can be associated with other factors in this list.

Note:

It must be borne in mind when considering Fighting Assessment Figures of armies that they must, perforce, be of a rather nebulous nature. This is due to the fact that one Fighting Assessment Figure is being given to cover, in the majority of cases, the armies of a number of centuries. Of course, Fighting Assessment Charts can be made out for any specific army in any specific period but, in giving one figure to cover a nation's ability throughout its history the reader is stimulated and guided into deeper fields.

For example, the Chinese in some periods of their history were power to be reckoned with and extended their sway well to the west of China, driving and breaking the nomads before them and keeping up this effort for about a hundred years. In the same way, the Mongols were only the force that they became when under the rule of someone such as Genghis Khan and his immediate successor. Without such leaders, while they still remained deadly fighters, they tended to dissipate their strength in ceaseless feuding and raiding amongst their own kind and were not averse to joining forces with an invader if they thought that by doing so they could gain the advantage over their local enemies. Therefore, in such periods their Fighting Assessment would be reduced accordingly as their capacity for United Action, Order, Discipline would become low with tribe fighting tribe and clan against clan. Similar arguments can be advanced for most of the other types and races.

In working out Fighting Assessment Figures given an attempt has been made to assess trends, record and ability over the entire period in question. At the same time, there must inevitably be the temptation (which is confessed has been freely succumbed to) to judge the army as it was at its peak.

Some of the Fighting Assessment figures may be considered with a skeptical eye in the sense that, when compared with other nations at distances of even centuries, they would appear to have been equally effective fighting forces. It must be borne in mind that, when assessing the fighting value of an army, that figure must inevitably be colored or affected by its known opposition.

Perforce, these Fighting Assessment Charts are worked out on the basis of a 'neutral' terrain. It has been suggested that it would be interesting to see how they could be amended in many instances when one side was operating in terrain more suitable to itself, with perhaps the advantage of a friendly local population. A supreme example is the destruction of Varus's Legions in Germany where the German forces would have little chance of a straight-forward battle with the legions on anything like open ground. This question of favorable terrain could be almost decisive where cavalry armies are concerned as even the best of them lost a major part of their effectiveness when they tried to operate on unsuitable country whereas infantry-based armies could be equally unhappy in this period when opposing them in open country.