Heretofore our games have been characterized by one thing: a command system which forces the player to operate his units as if by remote control. The command systems in the CWB and TCS- games add what might be called "realism" (whatever that might be ... ) to the game by utilizing a command system that mimics the methods used at the time portrayed in history. As a side benefit, they add the element of "limited foretell" which inflicts a degree of fog of war painlessly on the game as players grapple with the uncertainty of what will happen--a struggle which automatically reduces the utility of the gamer's allknowing eye of what is happening. One of the best things about this automatic uncertainty is that it affects solitaire play almost as well as multi-player play.

These things being true, players used to our games will undoubtedly raise an eyebrow when confronted with the OCS system in Guderian's Blitzkrieg. At first glance, there is no command system. A more accurate statement would be that there is no command system in the form of the earlier games. It has what might be loosely termed an "un- command" system.

Aside from coining another potentially useless phrase, what is "un-command"? Basically, a relationship between the delay effects generated by command systems become insignificant at certain time and space scales. A point is reached where the amount of time needed by units, staffs and commanders to prepare for combat becomes meaningless beside such issues as force movement, logistical build-up, and the limitations imposed on the two of these by the amount of transportation and other assets available. As the scale in ground, units and time increase, the delay inflicted in the traditional command systems we have used tends to approach zero.

For example, in a CWB game, the time taken to issue battlefield orders and to execute those commands is very significantorders might take several hours to be put into action. As one moves outward into operational and strategic realms, the amount of time taken in the issue and preparation of battlefield commands becomes almost meaningless-especially when viewed in the context that a turn might be a couple of weeks long or longer. The same effect holds true in the scale change from the TCS to the OCS.

So if the preparation, issue, and implementation of battlefield commands is not a limiting factor in operational level simulations, what is? I contend that it is logistical preparation and the use of finite transportation assets. An operational simulation should not allow players to instantly change the axis of the main effort as the logistical pre- positioning was done to support one direction and cannot be easily moved to another location.

Likewise, to develop a good base of operations for a massive command should take at least a few turns of forethought and buildup. While a player might be able, with the assets on hand, to suddenly shift his axis of advance or to go on some sort of local foray into a sudden opportunity, he should be hindered by his abilities to make any shifts he might want to make. In effect, players must decide before hand what they want to accomplish, pre-position the required assets to do it, and live with the consequences of poor choices.

In the OCS players must prepare for and support their operations-neither of which can be counted on "just happening." The player must plan ahead to be sure the "stuff" is on-hand to do the job when he wants to do it. Since no player will ever have unlimited assets in transportation or even in raw supply available, players will not be able to take operational planning for granted. OK, they might attempt to do so, but they will be setting themselves up for a major catastrophe! Given the assets on hand, a player might be able to react to the enemy, but such a reaction will take time. If too much is required--a shift all the way across the map for instance-the player may find himself completely unable to fix what started as a mistake in his thinking.

An extreme example of this effect occurred before the large World War I offensives. Over a course of months, the rail feeder lines-some of which were built as part of the preparation for the offensive-would dump millions of tons of supply at the railheads. Once on the ground, the stuff was almost impossible to move if the GHQ decided to shift the offensive to another part of the line. Nor could the incredible effort at buildup be hidden very well from the enemy. In the OCS, players will not be forced to contend with this degree of immobility-they have smaller amounts of supply and better transportation assets-but still choices must be made and priorities established.

So, how does a player use the un- command system to make his opponent dance to his tune? Basically, both players will have to establish priorities based on the assessment of the situation at the time. What does a player want to do and where? What is the enemy expected to do and where? The players will have to balance these questions to the best of their abilities-there will not be enough resources to cover everything well. This is when one player (or the other) will find that he has committed a strong concentration of assets against an enemy weakness.

The other player will be forced into the position of having to scramble to rearrange his incorrect priorities to control the damage caused by his mistake. The daring player will devote a high percentage of his assets to his main effort leaving the rest of his troops to eke out a living while the main effort wins the war. Of course, he may also find his head in a noose should it turn out that the main effort is in the wrong place and the enemy is tearing up his poorly supported units. As always (more than ever?) the correct appraisal of the situation, proper economy of force, weight of main effort, and maintance of objective will be richly rewarded.

As in most games, the concentration of units is also critical. A player's "good" units can't be in two places at once. What is somewhat different here is that while the raw units might be able to quickly transfer from one area to another, moving their logistical network won't be so easy. A player who attempts a rapid shift of units without giving some thought to their support might find his best units hung out to dry with a "no supply" status-little ammunition and less fuel-subject to destruction by enemy counterattack.

The wrong way to approach this "un-command" system would be to attempt to cover all the bases equally and to use the limited transport you have to shift logistical bases about as the enemy makes his moves. In the end, you will have defended nothing strongly and have used your limited transportation assets to dance to his tune and they will have done nothing to further your own cause. A player has only so much-transportation, supply, units-to do the job.

He might be able to keep his line undercontrol and avoid "too much" damage, but in the end he will be liable to find an irresistible force of enemy strength pouring through a small hole, a force which will go deep disrupting his logistical networks. Without priorities, he will waste much of his assets in willy-nilly efforts to bring the chaos under control. One turn he might decide to hold at a given city. He'll reinforce that city with troops and supplies only to find that he really wanted to defend somewhere else.

This cycle will repeat faster and faster as the indecisive player falls further and further behind what the decisive one is doing. As this process speeds up, the player "at the rear of the power curve" will tend more and more toward panic. This "panic" will take the form of distorted thought, mistakes, and frustrated decisions--all of which will contribute to the increasing avalanche about his head. An extreme case? Maybe, but it is certainly possible, even probable, given players of uneven skill and experience in the OCS. My friends, that is a blitzkrieg.