A Desperate Fight
Part 1

Barren Victory

by Dave Powell


Barren Victory has the advantage of a great historical setting. The Battle of Chickamauga presents two balanced armies each with their own defensive and offensive opportunities. In December of '91, I locked horns once again with my perpetual opponent, 'Sticky' Combs. This time we were in the confining forests of North Georgia.

As usual, we elected to play the campaign game. We decided to use all the troop options as well. This added 10 Rebel and 6 Union brigades to the contest. However, Bragg remained in charge. I took the Confederate forces, and once again Sticky set out to restore the Union in Federal Blue. For additional spice we used the defensive orders variant (by now de rigueur) and, for the first time, the Hidden movement option. (See OPS #2 and #3, respectively).

I confess that I entered the fight with no initial plan of action on the first day. Too many of the best Southern troops had not yet arrived. This prohibited any major attack. I elected to respond to my opponent's moves, and look for openings.

The action started predictably enough. The Federal 14th Corps moved against Forrest's Rebel Cavalry around Jay's Mill. At 8:30, the lead Yankee unit- I/14--attacked and the battle was on. For more emphasis, he brought up the Union Reserve Corps (now swelled to seven brigades due to options) to aid the 14th.

As if to provide a graphic warning about the dangers of piecemeal attacks, Forrest's troopers showed some teeth. At 9:30, one of Forrest's Rebel brigades CC'd a Union unit, trashed it, and went on to CC a Federal gun unit in the flank. I promptly destroyed the cannons, greatly annoying Sticky. This action left 1/14 wrecked, and he used initiative to halt Thomas in place, electing to let the Union Reserve Corps carry on alone.

The resultant slugging match was mostly toe to toe stuff. By 10:30 a.m., Forrest was wounded and his Corps failed its defensive order. This forced an emergency retreat. The Union Reserve Corps had also lost heavily in the reciprocal frontal attacks, but continued to assault the Confederate Reserve Corps (who had filled in for the departed cavalry) until about 1:00 p.m. before they rolled an attack stoppage.

By mid-morning, his forces were somewhat scattered. I decided that one of those previously mentioned opportunities had popped up. Crittenden's 21 st Corps was still down south, defending Lee and Gordon's Mill and vicinity, leaving his center stretched pretty thin. The 14th Corps was deployed well east of the Lafayette Road, and were extending a connecting hand to the Union Reserve Corps. I decided to advance Buckner's Corps (augmented to three divisions by Stevenson's optional command) and Hood's First Corps. Bucknerwas to attack and capture the Lafayette Road along the Northwest corner of the Brock Field, where the Union 14th Corps was anchored to that primary communications route and the rest of his army. Hood was ordered to advance and capture the Lafayette Road near the Brotherton house, as well as interdicting the secondary routes just west of that spot. Ideally, this move would cut the battered 14th and Union Reserve Corps off from rapid reinforcement by the fresh 20th and 21st Corps, allowing me to have my way with them.

At about 11:00 a.m. the CSA First Corps, under Hood, and Buckner's Corps, swelled to three divisions by the attachment of Stevenson's optional command, began their advance. Hood marched due west to the Brotherton House, where Wilder's lone brigade disputed the ground. Wilder's is a big, well armed brigade ("+" weapons) supported by its own two cannon, so I pressed him cautiously. I wanted to wear him down without doing severe damage to my own units, which were all understrength and subject to wrecking quite easily. This action lasted about an hour before Wilder yielded and backed off, wrecked himself.

Meanwhile, Buckner's command marched northwest towards the Kelly House and the five-road junction in hex B21.3 1. Thomas's right flank rested along the road running due east from the junction. I aimed to turn it. However, fresh Yankees arrived to hold the Kelly Field just as Buckner became heavily involved in the woods around the crossroads. I took the hill at the east edge of the field for a turn, but fell back behind it once I discovered the bristling line of Union guns arrayed along the north and west edges.

By 1:00 p.m., the fighting ended. Hood had cut the Lafayette Road, fulfilling his objective. Buckner, now outnumbered by the Federals, was directed to halt and defend along the road between Kelly and Brock fields. The Union Reserve Corps had battered itself against the confederate Reserve Corps whom I reinforced with my other optional division- Loring. Forrest's Cav withdrew to the east side of the Chickamauga to recover stragglers and avoid more confrontation.

Still, the line was a long one. The Federal Reserve Corps was deployed in the woods north of Jay's mill, facing my Reserve Corps south of it. A sizable gap existed between Granger's Reserve and Thomas' left flank of the 14th Corps, which defended aline facing south, and extending back to the Lafayette Road. More troops under Thomas's command (1/21 and 1/20, attached to the 14th Corps) held a line south from the Kelly House, angling east of the Lafayette Road, and back around the Dyer House. The rest of the 21st Corps remained in place along the Lafayette Road south from the Vinyard House to the open ground west of Hall's Ford. Sheridan's 3/20 division held Lee and Gordon's Mill.

Losses to Date:

Union

    1/14 (8), 3/14 (14), 4/14 (7), l/Res (10), 2/Res (1), Wldr (6)

CSA

    W/Res (5), L/Res (7), S/B (9), P/B (1), A/FCav (5), P/FCav (8), St/- (attached to Buckner) (5), H/1 (4), JPD/1 (3)

Union Loss-5500 Rebel Loss--4500

Between 1 and 3 p.m., a lull developed. Sticky shifted the Union Reserve Corps back west to link up with the 14th, closing the gap. The Union Reserve now formed the northern flank of the army. Two more divisions, 2/20 and 2/2 1, were added to 1/20 and 1/21 facing Hood around the Brotherton House and Buckner's right flank. The 1, 3, & 4/14 faced south against Buckner's other flank. The 2/14, newly arrived, was not yet in line to attack. The two other corps commanders--McCook of the 20th and Crittenden of the 21st--were brought up to take charge of their forces.

An attack was obviously coming. Sticky was determined to regain the full extent of the Lafayette Road and drive back my line. At 3:30, the storm broke. Hood's six small brigades faced the six larger (and fresh) brigades of the two 21 st Corps divisions in line, and fell back under pressure. The two 20th Corps divisions hit Buckner's line where it linked with Hood south of Kelly Field. The 14th Corps troops pressed due south against the other end of Buckner's line. The Reserve Corps of both sides sat out the fight, as did Forrest's heavily straggled Cavalry.

I would be negligent in omitting the activities of Polk's troops. I left Hindman's Division (H/P) to defend the Confederate side of Lee and Gordon's and brought up Cheatham's five brigades (C/P) to protect Hood's exposed southern flank. by holding a line north of Hall's Ford. By blocking both of the secondary.roads running northeast behind Hood's line, Cheatham prevented any unfortunate turning movements. None of Polk's troops were engaged at all on September 19th.

By 4:00 p.m., I was growing nervous. Hood was hurting, and Buckner had given ground as well. In fact, both my HQ's were now in the front line. Any further withdrawal could only be done thiough ECR. A grim situation indeed. I formed my final line in the dirt down the middle of the Brock Field. Bragg scurried around, issuing instructions that no-one was inclined to obey. I ordered the Confederate Reserve Corps to move southwest and replace Hood's damaged command. I also told Forrest's Cav to move southwest and replace C/P around Hall's Ford with the intent of moving the latter force further north to bolster the Brock position, since it was still unscathed. However, all of these moves required a lot of time given Bragg's rating and his wonderful relationship with his subordinates which precluded effective command via initiative.

Imagine my relief when Combs started to fail his Corps Attack Stoppage rolls. My final line was well supported by guns, and his 4:00 p.m. attacks cost him heavily. At 4:30, both the 20th and 21st Corps stopped, all four divisions wrecked. Catching the drift, Thomas quickly rolled initiative and halted his advance as well. Three of the four 14th Corps divisions were also wrecked. This event marked the end of the first day's fighting.

Final losses-September 19th:

Union

    1/14 (14), 2/14 (3), 3/14 (18), 4/14 (14), 1/20 (7), 2/20 (4), 1/21 (11), 2/21 (5), l/Res (11), 2/Res (10), Wldr (7)

CSA

    W/Res (5), L/Res (8), S/B (11), P/B (11), St/- (attached to B Corps) (7), JPD/1 (10), 1-1/1 (8), A/FCav (5), P/FCav (8)

Union loss-10,400 Rebel loss-7300

In addition to the above, both the Union Reserve Corps and the 14th Corps had lots of stragglers.

A Plan

It was time for a plan. Longstreet would arrive soon. I needed to choose my wing structure and settle on an offensive maneuver. I wanted to take advantage of the Hidden Movement option as well. We both drew out of range to collect stragglers. As the lines settled for the night, I noticed that he was keeping the Union Reserve Corps in the front lines.

The 14th Corps had formed a final line between the Lafayette Road and about the 27.XX hexrow, facing due south. The Union Reserve Corps formed at right angles to that line, protecting Thomas's exposed flank. However, Granger's seven brigades were spread out quite widely along the north-south road from the intersection of A29.02 to the High ground around A29.09. I knew that both the 14th and Reserve Corps had seen heavy fighting, with little chance to recover stragglers.

I decided that the blow must fall on these Yankees first. Next, I needed the troops.

I had D.H. Hill's fresh Corps, two crack divisions. I had previously directed them to move to Jay's Mill and defend, and they were now in perfect position for my northern swing. The Reserve Corps (CSA) had now replaced Hood's troops, who fell back to recover stragglers. Even though these six First Corps brigades were shot up, I could count on the fact that Longstreet was bringing five fresh units (optional) with him. This would restore much of the effectiveness to the command. Finally, I decided that H/P, down by Lee and Gordon's, should join the Left wing. Now Longstreet had six divisions, for a total of 21 brigades (all fresh except for Hood's original six) ready to strike.

Polk got the remaining seven divisions for the Right Wing. Buckner and the Rebel Reserve Corps had three each, and held the center of the line. C/P remained in its original position around Hall's Ford with a revised Divisional Goal to defend the flank and retire to the northeast if pressed. Cheatham had about ten hexes of running room before he would have to trigger an ECR.

Now for the plan. Polk's job was easy. He would defend in place until Longstreet attacked. I hoped Sticky would weaken his own center to aid Thomas and Granger at which point Polk would join in. I scheduled Longstreet to open the attack at dawn. At that time I would give Polk the attack order, counting on his inherent delay to give Sticky several turns to shift forces. I figured, once Polk didn't go in right away, he would decide that Polk wasn't a threat and shift focus to other areas.

Longstreet would use hidden movement. My original intent was for Hood's First Corps, using divisional goals and hidden movement, to go up the road past the McAfee House, take the road to A30.14, and turn due west to the Lafayette Road. Once there, the force would attack south toward the rear of the 14th and Union Reserve Corps. The rest of the Left Wing would drive the Reserve Corps due west, rolling up the 14th Corps flank in the process.

At dark, Sticky killed that plan, fortunately before my orders were issued. He moved his cavalry up towards A30.14, blocking the road and preventing my move. I settled for plan B.

To be continued in OPS A...
Will Sticky be able to pull out?
or Is he doomed to dead- stick into the ground?????
Send your sympathy cards to Stick via this magazine...


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