Civil War tactical proficiency is mostly a lost art. After all, it is a skill with little use in the 1990's. Still, there are those of us who do pursue it, if only to gain a greater understanding of what our simulation games are actually recreating.

Because it is at brigade level, the CWB obscures most of the tactical finesse required. Formations are abstracted, and regimental handling,etc., is resolved at a level beneath the player's control. You don't need to be proficient with the complexities of columns, lines and skirmishers, since your brigadiers do that for you.

But what is happening at that level just below the surface? Discussion by gamers within these pages and on GEnie, as well as via direct correspondence, leads me to believe that many people aren't at all sure. This article is meant to clarify tactical operations at the sub-brigade level, and explain some of our justifications for abstraction.

The infantry in the CWB has only two choices: Road Column or Line. As mentioned before, these formations are abstractions for a more complex series of tactical deployments. Road Column is actually pretty straightforward, and simply represents the four files wide formation all units adopted on the march. Line is better defined as Combat formation, since it represents more than just the two rank line that was the starting point for all Civil War combat activity. Tactical columns, skirmishers, and tactical innovation (such as wave assaults or single line deployments) are all absorbed into the standard game formation. Within a 30 minute time span, a brigade would actually adopt a variety of tactical formations, as well as mix them by regiment.

Line of Battle

So why did we call it line? Because, by the middle 19th century, U.S. army tactics recognized the combat supremacy of the two rank line. The line became the building block of all other formations, and the standard technique in either attack or defense. It was the standard battle formation of the war on both sides.

Offensively, the primary tactic is an attack delivered by a succession of lines. Usually, a brigade would advance in line, supported by a second brigade, also in line, anywhere from 100 to 300 yards behind it (Fig 1). Variations occurred such as both brigades side by side, but on a compact enough frontage so that each brigade would form it's own second line (Fig 2). Davis' Mississippi Brigade at Pickett's Charge provides further illustration of variety. Each regiment advanced abreast, but they were split into battalions and formed their own second support line (Fig 3). A number of other variations were seen as well, but the basic concept remained the same: an initial battleline supported by one or more follow-up lines.

By the time of the war, the line had proven to be the best resolution of conflicting tactical stresses pulling in different directions. The rifled musket as the standard weapon encouraged dispersal, since longer range meant attackers endured a much greater degree of punishment in their approach. Dispersal was good since less losses were incurred. It was also bad, as it meant decreased firepower. These weapons were single shot muzzle loaders, and anything less than an absolute minimum density of about 1 man per yard couldn't deliver a sufficient volume of fire to stop a determined close order assault. Advancing infantry sometimes took as many as 25-30% (occasionally even 50%) losses in a single charge without breaking, and it still took concentrated firepower to disrupt a determined attacker.

Further argument against dispersal was loss of tactical control. A regimental commander was expected to command his unit by voice alone, and had little help. Drum and bugle calls were aids, but limited ones since they could only convey pre-determined ideas. Given this problem, dispersal spelled loss of control. Most attacks were actually halted by increasing confusion and disorganization, finally forcing advancing formations to halt and regroup.

Stepping up to the brigade level exacerbated the situation, since the brigade commander's primary communications method was his own voice as well. Most brigadiers had a couple of aides available to run simple messages, but never enough of them. In fact, the brigadier had none of the modem trappings of a command unit, such as a staff, etc.

A classic example of this tactical degradation was Jackson's famous flank attack against the Union 11th Corps at Chancellorsville. Jackson's leading formations were almost as disrupted by their success as the Federals were by defeat, and Jackson himself was wounded trying to restore control and press home the attack. Tactical control remained a problem throughout the war.

The Elusive Column

One of the most confusing aspects of Civil War tactics is interpreting the word column.

Period accounts are full of references to "assault columns", advancing or retreating "columns of enemy infantry", etc. In virtually all instances, what these writers are referring to are actually troops in line. For instance, Upton's famous attack at Spottsylvania is referred to, throughout his and his subordinates' accounts, as an assault column. In a larger sense, that's what it was. In detail, however, it was a formation of 12 regiments, all deployed in battleline, in four separate lines of three regiments each. Upton utilized a traditional attack formation with three supporting lines instead of just one. The real innovations of this assault were that Upton chose his point of attack carefully, rehearsed it with the subordinate commanders, and crafted a detailed plan of execution after the initial defenses were stormed. Pickett's Charge was not a column assault either. Pickett, Pettigrew and Trimble's men all advanced in battleline. One, and in some spots, two, supporting lines followed the first, an organization that broke down upon reaching the Union positions. The latter stages of the attack saw the rebels deployed only in a milling mob, (in some places 15 or 20 men deep!) with commanders arbitrarily assuming control of local groups.

Even when not using column in a generic sense, the term is still a slippery one. Aside from road column, tactical columns consisted of columns of platoons, companies, divisions, and battalions. In each case, the regiment formed a battle line, and then split into the indicated width, (one platoon, one company, two companies, or half the regiment) and formed one behind the other. For instance, a column of companies would be a series of battlelines one company wide by ten companies deep. Each company was split into two platoons, and the term "division" used here refers to a two-company sub-organization within the regiment, not the larger, multi-brigade formation we're all used to. Additionally, all columns could be either "closed" or "open" order. A closed column left no space between the battlelines, in effect creating a solid block of men. An open column left room enough to deploy between the lines, providing more tactical flexibility.

The most common use of column is deployment in column of divisions, (again, the two company version) usually by a regiment or brigade not yet posted in a defensive position. The column of divisions was preferred for units in this reserve status because it massed troops in a small area and yet still provided maximum flexibility to move in almost any direction quickly. As an example, the 11th Corps at Gettysburg was initially deployed by regiment in column of division, as they awaited developments on July 1st.

Actual use of columns in combat is a much rarer phenomenon. Defensively, of course, line was the formation of choice, since it delivered maximum firepower. Offensively, columns were occasionally used, mostly later in the war as commanders experimented in order to overcome increasing defensive advantages.

In 1864, at Kennesaw Mountain, Sherman launched a series of simultaneous attacks at the Confederate defensive works. Each assault was a true column, spearheaded by a brigade formed in regiments in column of division. With a two company frontage (probably 50 men ) and a depth extending back for the entire brigade, followed by other supporting brigades in a more traditional line deployment, the concept was that of a spear-point that would penetrate the enemy line much more easily than a linear approach. Unfortunately, the simple laws of physics don't account for morale, fear, and other non-quantifiable conditions, and each of these attacks was a bloody failure. They were preceded by heavy artillery preparation, which had little effect on the Rebel earthworks, and the approaches were over good fields of fire. In most cases, the head of the attack faltered once it reached some relatively sheltered spot, and the troops went to ground and couldn't be urged forward anymore. Largest Column Attack

The largest column attack of the war occurred at Spottsylvania. Grant, observing the relative success of Upton's initial attack, chose to duplicate the feat with an entire corps. At dawn on May 12th, 1864, the Union 2nd Corps advanced in a huge block of troops. Each regiment was deployed in a closed column of divisions, and the whole force massed. Birney's 3rd Division was deployed in line on the flanks, to provide protection of the main column. The mass overwhelmed the first line of Rebel defenses, and was finally stopped by determined CSA counterattacks. The Union troops were in turn flung back to the initial CSA defenses, and one of the most grueling struggles of the war ensued. For a full day, Union and Confederate troops held opposite sides of the same defensive line, and fought viciously.

Grant's initial success was due to several outside factors. First, the bulk of rebel artillery had been withdrawn the night before because Lee thought his opponent was maneuvering again and wanted to be able to leave quickly. Most of these cannon were only returned to the line in time to get captured without firing hardly a shot. Second, the Federals advanced under the cover of a dense fog that protected them from Rebel sight until the last 50 yards or so, ensuring surprise. Third, many CSA regiments' ammunition was rain-soaked, greatly reducing their fire. The Federals faced only sporadic enemy fire, and suffered comparatively few losses on the initial advance.

Disorganization was oneof the problems Grant hoped to solve by the use of the massive column formation yet it was disorganization that ultimately stopped the Union advance. The Rebel counterattacks were delivered by a severely inferior force, but one that retained its tactical organization. The Union formations were so tightly packed together that sub-units couldn't maneuver or deploy. In effect, Grant's column could only be handled as one huge unit.

A massed series of lines of this strength would have probably moved much slower than normal, given the vast density of the formation. An advantage of the close proximity was a increase in the ability of the officers to control their regiments and thus maintain the quiet needed to keep the element of surprise. The main drawback lay in the fact that such a block was virtually incapable of changing formation or direction without lots of time and plenty of room.

From a simulation sense, while this attack did use a column formation, it still possessed the frontage and firepower of several brigades (at least) in line, and the net effect on volume of fire was not very significant. In the CWB this formation would be better simulated by stacking and massing as many units as possible together in adjoining hexes, rather than using a column formation. Note that Grant did notrepeat this particular experiment again, signifying, I think, the ultimate failure of the tactic.

Antietam and Burnside's Bridge

One other famous column attack bears examination, especially since this one was delivered in road column. At Antietam, two regiments of Federal infantry stormed the Lower (Bumside's) Bridge in road column, the widest formation that could move across the bridge. This example has been used at least once to call for a revision of the CWB to make column attacks more favorable for the attacker. A closer look, however, fails to justify the change.

In effect, 350 Georgian infantrymen (only half of Toombs' Brigade was there, for you owners of In Their Quiet Fields) held off no less than 3 Union brigades - some 4500 to 5000 men - for three hours. Serious attacks commenced about 10:00 a.m., and finally about 1:00 p.m. the two Federal regiments rushed the bridge. It took no less than four separate charges to gain just the east end of the bridge from which the assault across could be made. ne Union assault column was greatly aided by the suppressive fire of some 2000 other troops in their final charge, by the fact that the Rebels were running out of bullets, and by a Union flanking column that crossed the creek into the Georgians' rear about the same time. In the action overall, the two Federal regiments-the 51 st New York and 51st Pennsylvania-lost 207 of the 670 men engaged, most of them on the rush across the bridge itself. The two Georgia regiments--the 2nd and 20th--lost about 80 of their 350 engaged. This loss was spread out over the full three hours of action. The facts speak for themselves.

For a final dose of confusion, the larger tactical formations also used column formations. For example, in the Wilderness, may 5th 1864, Hancock intended to attack with his Union 2nd Corps with divisions abreast in column of brigades (Fig 1). More simply put, each division was to attack side by side, on a one brigade frontage, three brigades deep. The regiments, however, would all be in line. Given the tangled condition of the Wilderness, this would have been the best assault formation for tactical control, but circumstances and command confusion prevented Hancock from fully deploying his men before he had to advance. Instead he moved most of his divisions on at least a two brigade frontage, and suffered accordingly in terms of loss of control.

Our Friends, the Skirmishers

The other major formation for infantry was the skirmish line. Some gamers misunderstand skirmishers' purpose because of the inherent limitations of the games themselves. Most of the historical works I've read miss the point of skirmishers entirely, regarding them as a combat formation. The primary purpose of skirmishers was tactical battlefield reconnaissance, a completely unnecessary function in a game without hidden movement.

Skirmishers were deployed to provide defenders early warning of an attack, or to find the enemy's main defensive positions when advancing. Once contact was established, the skirmishers were reabsorbed into the main line. On occasions, skirmishers would be detached to screen a flank, something both sides did in the fight for Little Round Top. The reason for their lack of battlefield decisiveness is simple: firepower. Doctrine called for a skirmisher density of about 1 man per 5 yards, meaning that a battleline advancing on a skirmish line would have a 15 or 20 to 1 advantage. John K. Mahon quoted a telling statistic, claiming that lines held their ground even after suffering 40% losses, while skirmishers retreated after losing 2%. Of course they did. They completed their task of finding the enemy and promptly reformed into the main formation.

Skirmish fights were common in between the armies' main lines, as both sides probed for information. Sometimes, fights erupted over buildings, clearings, etc., which would give a side an advantage in their intelligence mission. Most skirmish actions involved at most 100-200 men, and are insignificant in the larger scope of a game at brigade level. In games where 100% intelligence prevails, skirmishers are a formation without a purpose and tend to detract, rather than add to, an effective simulation.

The First Modern War

Much has been written about how the Civil War presaged the tactical deadlock of WWI, and how some Civil War era commanders began to search for alternatives to the traditional battleline. For instance, as early as February of 1862, a Union command at Fort Donelson advanced on the enemy fortifications using short rushes. Dividing his forces into two wings, the Union commander bounded the men forward in a series of strengthened skirmish lines. They captured the Rebel initial defensive line, convincing the Rebels that their tactical situation was hopeless. Of course, the Rebel defenders held the line only with skirmishers as well, since the bulk of the Confederate troops were sent to the other flank to aid in a breakout attempt. Hence the resistance to the Union advance was very weak.

A more intriguing glimpse of tactical innovation appears in the Wilderness, May of 1864. On the morning of the 6th, Longstreet's Corps arrived just in time to counterattack Hancock's Union assault and repulse it. Longstreet claimed in his memoirs that the Union forces, once thrown into retreat, were pursued and held at bay by six Rebel brigades using "reinforced skirmish lines" as their main combat formation. Longstreet said that these lines were greatly strengthened, and then continuously reinforced by the remainder of the brigades'men, held some distance to the rear in reserve.

Unfortunately, no contemporary battle reports from the Wilderness either corroborate this statement or explain it in more detail. I hope that some other source (Confederate Veteran Magazine, the Southern Historical Society Papers, or some regimental histories) can elaborate on this event, and will continue to look for such.

If Longstreet's recollections are correct, this would be a significant and large scale effort to convert the skirmish line into a primary combat formation. However, certain important factors, unique to the situation, aided Longstreet's efforts at innovation.

Longstreet's initial counterblow was delivered across relatively clear ground, and id traditional battleline. The Federals, already disorganized by their own advance, were thrown into major confusion by the timely Rebel attack. Once in retreat, it proved impossible to rally the disorganized Union regiments and form an effective line short of their own breastworks (which were erected immediately by the Union troops, before they began their attack).

Hence, a relatively weaker Rebel line could maintain enough pressure on the retiring skirmish line to hold the Federals in check while he prepared a flanking attack which struck in the late morning. The skirmishers were called upon only to hold for about two hours before a stronger, more powerful blow was delivered by other Confederate troops, who were deployed in a traditional two-rank line. As with Grant's massed column above, Longstreet's skirmish techniques were not repeated at the same multi-division scale he described.

This did not mean tactical innovation was dead. The most significant strides forward came from, of all places, the Federal mounted arm. In 1864 and especially in 1865, Sheridan's Union troopers began to take an increasingly aggressive role on the tactical battlefield. Cavalry began to deliver dismounted assaults in dense skirmish lines, sometimes coupled with mounted charges to further disrupt defense. At Nashville, Thomas relied on his veteran Yankee cavalrymen to attack Hood in the rear, utilizing their superior tactical mobility to outflank the Rebels. In the Appomattox campaign, there are several instances of dismounted cavalry driving back regular battle lines of formed infantry. Firepower Density

All of these above examples share certain significant tactical similarities, namely in firepower density. Instead of the above noted 1 man per 5 yards' density, these later experiments developed a much greater mass of roughly one man per yard. Now, a regular battleline's advantage was reduced to 3 or 4 to 1. Of even greater significance was the fact that, for the Union cavalry at least, greatly increased firepower was achieved by widespread use of 7-shot Spencers, or better yet, 16-shot Henry rifles.

The reinforced infantry skirmish lines tended to only succeed against weak or disorganized resistance because a solid defensive line still maintained firepower superiority. The cavalry lines, with their better weapons, managed to best formed infantry due to their actual advantage in volume of fire.

The defense developed an innovation of its own more rapidly and far more universally than the offense - trenches. No one figured out how to defeat an adequately manned full defensive line once entrenchment became the order of the day. Grant's ultimate tactic was to simply stretch his opponent's lines until there weren't enough defenders to go around. This solution could only work when the attacker possessed the massive manpower advantage the Federals held by the spring of 1865.

These tactical experiments were brought to an end by the collapse of the South before any sweeping offensive trends emerged, and so they achieved relatively little notice at home or abroad. Later European wars took center stage, and much of the innovation displayed in 1865 never got the examination it should have.

The CWB overtly ignores these trends for several reasons. First, the system is designed to portray only the combat of the first part of the war, before the advent of full trench warfare. Second, the main tactical weapon remains the muzzle-loading single shot rifle, against which skirmish lines remained inferior in terms of firepower. Third, some tactical adjustment is assumed within the brigade counter itself, as described above in discussing battlelines. The real tactical innovation would have placed multi-shot breach-loading weapons into the hands of infantry units on a massive scale, something only the Union could have achieved. Unquestionably, this would have drastically impacted on the fighting and the war as a whole, but is not a speculation the CWB is designed to address.

The Density Question

Much debate has centered around the need for a density adjustment modifier to fire combat, a concept with which I vehemently disagree. Fire combat is not some random distribution of projectiles over a given specific area, but rather a controlled, aimed and directed action against the enemy.

Suppressive and area fire concepts belong in the modem age, companion to the "empty battlefield" phenomenon. Civil War combat occurred between formed units who could see each other, or at least knew each others' approximate locations. As I previously pointed out in my article on woods effects (OPS #1), units who couldn't see each other tended to close in until visibility was possible, and hence so many actions in trees occurring at ranges of 10 yards or less. Finally, units in combat are not assumed to automatically spread out to fill all available area, but instead maintain unit and battleline integrity. They are not random molecules, but rather combat soldiers who understand the importance of tactical control.

The most common mistake gamers make about the CWB is to assume that all of the men a brigade represents are automatically deployed in a single line, no matter how strong the unit. In reality, the maximum number of men in line that can fit into a standard CWB hex is from 700-800, the lower end of an A fire level. Within the counter, the excess troops are considered to be deployed in supporting lines, or in adjacent hexes if using extended lines. If an "AA" fire level unit extends line and occupies an adjacent hex, it hasn't reduced its front line density at all, but instead now occupies double the distance with the same density, and having twice as many men in the front line. Excess manpower (assumed to be in regiments forming the supporting line) is far less likely to suffer fire losses.

When the front line loses men, these supporting troops step in to fill the gap. Effective commanders even tried to rotate frontline duties between regiments wherever possible. Men of the Union 12th Corps at Gettysburg, defending Culps' Hill on the night of July 2nd- 3rd, did just that.

Conversely, units with less than 800 men (a "B" or "C" fire level, for instance) do not automatically spread out so that there is a uniform man per yard density across the length of the hex. Instead, the units remain in close order formations, since this is the only formation that can hold or take ground against other formed infantry. Some spacing between formed regiments may well occur, as a brigade commander struggles to hold the ground assigned him, but each element of the unit would still present a formed, close order target.

Squares

What better note to end on for infantry formations than in discussing the ubiquitous square. A holdover from the age of Napoleonic Glory, it soon fell into disuse in the Civil War. (Sir Arthur Lyons Freemantle, of Her Majesty's Coldstream Guards, was greatly put out that American infantry regarded the square as an archaic formation.) The Union Regular Battalion employed it at First Bull Run while covering the collapse and retreat of the volunteers, but it soon fell into disuse, mostly because mounted cavalry had little battlefieldrole. Mounted men proved too vulnerable to long range fire from rifled weapons, and charges rarely occurred. Still, there are occasional examples of its employment throughout the war.

Digging In

It was not that the theorists weren't aware of the tactical implications of the rifled musket, or the increased advantage it gave defenders, especially entrenched ones. Foreign observers from the Crimea noted both, most significantly George B. McClellan. The problem was that they failed to find a tactical combination to restore offensive action to primacy.

It was still assumed by everyone that a spirited bayonet charge could capture entrenchments quickly, before the attackers suffered too heavy a loss. (This theory was the primary motivation behind both Upton's and the 2nd Corps' Spottsylvania attacks, for instance.) A great degree of blame can be found in the Mexican war, where, time and again, U.S. troops overwhelmed entrenched Mexican defenders. Ultimately, these successes had more to do with better U.S. morale and training than anything else, and when more equal troops met in battle, such tactics usually failed to carry the day.

Of course, the bayonet charge did have successes, but this more often depended on mitigating circumstances than on the spirit of the attack. Both of the Union assaults mentioned above, for instance, achieved initial success because they came as complete surprises to the Rebs. Upton had less than 100 yards of approach to cross, and 2nd Corps closed to within 50 yards before being discovered.

Entrenchment was an ongoing learning process as well. As the war progressed, more elaborate defensive works became the norm rather than the exception, until the trench arrived in all it's dismal glory. See OPS #2 for a more detailed look at defensive works.

We Have Our Sources

Civil War tactics have received much less notice by historians than other aspects of the war. Still, some excellent works have examined the topic, and in far more detail than I have laid out here. The following are among the more readily available. John Kisner, in Operations #3, discusses an article by John K. Mahon entitled "Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics", from Military Affairs magazine. Mahon's article is a quite useful analysis, though limited. The best recent book that addresses the subject is The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare, by Edward Hagerman, published in 1988 by Indiana University Press. Hagerman discusses a variety of aspects about the war, notjust tactical applications, and reaches well supported conclusions.

McWhiney and Jamieson's Attack and Die is more bizarre, but still useful. Their tactical analysis is quite good, and they're correct, I think, in pointing out that the South attacked too much, but I have trouble buying into the Celtic bit. Both sides failed to grasp the fundamental shift in war, and launched foolish attacks, but it had more to do with West Point than genetic memory. Read the first half, throw out the second.

George R. Stewart's Pickett's Charge, widely available, does a fine job of examining a specific attack in detail. There are some other efforts out there, but I found them too general to be very useful. The period tactical manuals, while dull to extremity, are the only way to thoroughly understand the doctrine. The most comprehensive is Casey, Infantry Tactics, published in 1863, and covering everything from the school of the soldier up to brigade maneuvers. Some turn of the century works exist, but they are rare and hard to find. For instance, Organization and Tactics, by A.L. Wagner, published in 1895. In all honesty I have only read excerpts from it and cannot comment on the full content.