Due diligence requirements: I am an EatG fanatic where I generally wind up playing the Germans. Yes, I belong to the Cult-of-Dean and conduct my daily affairs in accordance with OCS 3.0 blah-blah-blah.

The Operational Combat System is very robust. It allows a surprising amount of tinkering by part-timers and still manages to generate historically plausible outcomes. In Tunisia there are several major variants for Enemy at the Gates (EatG): (1) send the Tunisia reinforcements to Army Group South (AGS), (2) send the entire Panzer Armee Afrika (basically every German unit in the Med. Theater) to AGS and finally (3) send all the reinforcements from AGS to Tunisia. While options (2) and (3) may be interesting in a fantasy context (pixies, hobgoblins, Dean dressed as an elf etc.), there was little chance that Hitler would have abandoned Italy or surrendered to Stalin. I chose to focus on what effect the Tunisia reinforcements would have had on the Stalingrad battles.1

Having played EatG a few times, I am interested in various historically plausible variants. I sulked when the Dean Ultimate 1st turn Soviet move came out (Ops 24) and rejoiced when Mr. Paulo came up with his modification (Ops 32). Oddly enough, I found that the system still managed to adjust.

Dean's killer first move has two consequences

(1) it leaves more units alive outside the pocket (not many more but a few) and

(2) almost guarantees that the German player will not waste supply trying to force a breakout.

The biggest mistake the German can make against a well-executed Soviet envelopment is to try to break too many units out of the pocket. While the German player should always force the Soviet player to commit maximum effort to create the pocket, the primary goal is to keep the biggest credible threat in existence once the pocket is created. Mr. Paulo's solution forces the Soviet player to really plan and execute his own envelopment. It doesn't make it easier for the German player, if anything it offers the German more opportunity to overextend himself. However the basic strategic situation remains unchanged; the Soviets have to conduct complicated offensive operations while reducing a large pocketed force. As Dean mentioned in the rational for the variants, the TORCH and URANUS offensives began at almost the same time. Could the forces sent to Tunisia have altered the battle at Stalingrad?

My initial reasoned analysis of the Tunisia variant was 'Oh boy! What a pile of new units the Axis gets.' The Germans get the equivalent of a Panzergrenadier division at start and the 10th Panzer Division on turns 4 and 5. The biggest addition is to the Luftwaffe with 3 additional fighters and 4T worth of airlift capability by turn 2. As I was gloating over the new powerful Army Group B Reserve, fellow gamer Bill Quoss brought me back to the strategic reality of the Mediterranean Theater.

As 'historical' gamers, we're interested in the historical context of a particular the game. Bill observed that the North Africa situation developed just before operation Uranus and, at best, any forces from Tunisia would be in some sort of strategic reserve in Germany or Italy.

Starting with that premise, I examined the November 42 situation and tried to determine what forces would have released and what a likely Allied response would have been to a complete Axis withdrawal from North Africa.

Axis withdrawal from North Africa in November 1942

The critical question the Tunisia variant poses is the withdrawal's effect on Italy's willingness to remain in the war. The North African Theater was the pillar of Mussolini's claim to be the inheritor of the Roman Empire. Tunisia's collapse in May of 43 had a tremendous negative effect on Italian public morale. Would abandoning Africa in November of 42, but preserving the DAK and the majority of the Italian Expeditionary Army as a force-in-being, have improved or reduced the Italian Will-to-Fight?

Italian Will-to-Fight

The Italian Will-to-Fight was based on the belief in an ultimate Axis victory. While it is impossible to describe all the possible alternatives, the following criteria narrow the potential outcomes substantially:

• The threat of an invasion of the Italian mainland
• Overall Balance of Forces in the Mediterranean Theater
• Relations with the Allies: Peace Overtures
• Relations with the Germans: Commitment to defend Italy

The Threat to the Italian Mainland

Fascist Italy pursued an unconscionable war of aggression. By early 1943 it became clear to the Italian High Command that the result would be massive conflict in the Italian homeland. The military government that deposed Mussolini in July of 1943 and attempted to join the Allies, did so with the intent of avoiding any combat in Italy proper; the threat of battle on the Italian homeland (and perhaps judgment if they were deposed) figured foremost in their calculations.

This fear of conflict must be viewed in the light of the string of defeats that occurred just prior to the invasion. The Italian forces fought well, despite suffering several handicaps (leadership, equipment etc.). It was the destruction of the entire Axis force in Africa, on top of the losses in Russia that broke the Italian Will-to-Fight.

Balance of Forces

Approximately 275,000 Axis soldiers were captured or killed in the Tunisian Campaign, the bulk of them surrendering when the bridgehead collapsed (about 120,000 Italians and 130,000 Germans). One of the most difficult military operations is an amphibious withdrawal under fire, such as at Dunkirk or Sicily. Tunis and Bizerte were too far away and Allied Naval and Air Superiority too overwhelming for the Axis to withdraw from Tunisia.

Compared to this final debacle, the losses at El Alamain were approximately 35,000 to 40,000 of the over 100,000 Axis forces involved, including most of the heavy equipment. The DAK had been savaged but was still a viable force as was proven at Kasserine. While the Allies also lost forces in the Tunisian campaign, they were far less than those of the Axis.

More importantly, the American forces were able to gain combat experience against a skilled yet very weakened enemy. I agree with Dean's assessment of American fighting ability in early 43 as reflected in the Tunisian action ratings. The Kasserine offensive was bad, but at least American forces had depth and Rommel didn't have much supply. Imagine if the initial American battle experience had been a beachhead with Allied, not Axis, supply lines vulnerable to interdiction?

Forcing the Allies to destroy the DAK and the Italian expeditionary force in Italy would have been a major shift in favor of the Axis. Given that it would have taken several months to organize an invasion of Italy, the bulk of the formations savaged in November could have been rebuilt, adding the following forces to the Italian Theater:

• Three Panzer Divisions, the 15th, the 21st and the HG (the 10th was in France)
  
• Two Panzergrenadier Divisions, the 90th and the 164th
  
• One Italian Armored and one Motorized Division, the Centauro and the Pistoia
  
• Four to six Italian Infantry Divisions or equivalents
  
• A large number of aircraft, especially transport aircraft, destroyed while operating at long range against locally based Allied aircraft.

A withdrawal would have affected the Allies as well:

• The greatest effect would have been to release the Allied forces to conduct major offensive operations sometime in April or May.
  
• The Trans-Atlantic transport demands on the Allies would have been reduced, no need to support combat operations, which would have allowed for a faster influx of American forces to the Theater.
  
• The American units would not have been as seasoned by Sicily as they historically were, but they would have improved. Just like Rommel and the DAK, the Americans trained in Tunisia prior to the Italian campaign. The lack of combat in Tunisia would have allowed units to work many of the kinks out.
  
• Allied aircraft would be forced into operating at long ranges against Italy at the same time the US 8th Airforce was trying to gear-up for the daylight bombing campaign in England.

Relations with the Allies

The goal of the Allies was to knock Italy out of the war and open a 2nd Front in Europe. Churchill felt that a direct assault on Northwestern Europe was impossible in 43 and very risky in 44. Eisenhower felt that, given the Italian experience in the Austrian Theater in World War 1, no front of any consequence could be opened by attacking the "soft underbelly of Europe." *

(* I've climbed in the mountains along the World War I front lines in northern Italy. The 'trenches' still exist, carved into rock faces that average around 1,000 feet in vertical drop. No attacker was going anywhere, especially given the increase in firepower and coordination from 1916 to 1943. Remember at Caporetto the Austrians were attacking from the mountains.

Realistically, the "Italy First" proponents hoped to knock Italy out of the war, have bomber bases in northern Italy sometime in late 1943, perhaps liberate Greece, and threaten southern France via land and sea. Overland communication with the Yugoslavian partisan armies would have been a bonus. In spite of Churchill's Italian focus (which he quickly changed given the events in September-October 43) the overall goal was to thin-out the defenders confronting the Allies across the English Channel.

The Italians wanted to enter the war as an active cobelligerent on the Allied side. The idea was to coordinate attacks in such a fashion that the Germans would be expelled or captured before they could organize significant resistance on Italian soil. In return, the conspirators wanted a variety of guarantees and concessions from the Allies; hardly an unconditional surrender.

A large German presence on Italian soil would have made such an outcome very unlikely. Historically, the Germans were able to stabilize the front even without the forces lost in Tunisia. Thus the Allies would have been forced to negotiate with Italian conspirators that knew that any invasion would almost certainly insure that major fighting would occur on the Italian mainland. This is assuming that a Mussolini with a quarter of a million soldiers more than he had historically, would have been as faint-hearted in a crisis as he turned out to be.

Insert humorous commentary concerning the 'morale stiffening effects' of the 15th Panzer Division parked in Rome here.

Relations with the Germans

Uniformly German officers from the Med. Theater place much of the blame for their failure on the Italians. I must have read the same source material that Dean and others have, because my view is that the Italian fighting man was decent and that many Italian formations were comparable to the Germans. As good as the Germans were in a military sense (tactical anyway), they were correspondingly terrible in the logistical and diplomatic realms.

The Germans never really made an effort to integrate with their Allies and completely neglected hard-won Italian battlefield experience (see OCS DAK). The perception that the Italian GHQ was insecure was due in part to very creative British efforts to pass off information gained through ULTRA as that leaked from Italian sources. If the Italians had security problems, Kesselring maintained that he never knew about Rommel's supply difficulties until after the war. Withdrawal of the Tunisian forces probably would have allowed the Germans to carry over the de-facto command structure in North Africa back to Italy, namely German military commanders nominally reporting to Mussolini. I think that the German willingness to put themselves in front of the invasion would have offset much of the bad feeling engendered by so many Germans in Italy.

Effect of the Withdrawals

An early victory in North Africa would have allowed the Allies to open a Second Front in Sicily in April or May of 43. While the Allied invasion probably would not have been thrown back, there would have been a good possibility of a stalemate right from the beginning, instead of when it historically occurred during the winter of 43-44.

An earlier invasion of Italy would have simply brought about an earlier stalemate. If the Italian government weathered the initial shock of an Allied invasion, the Germans probably would have been able to prop-up the Italian Fascists into early 1944.

Invasion of Southern France in 1943

The Allies were determined to knock Italy out of the war. Churchill and Eisenhower felt (correctly) that a quick invasion of Italy could force the issue. Allied sea-control was too tenuous to allow a major landing on the North Shore of Sicily in July, even after the Axis Air Forces had conveniently allowed themselves to be ground down close to Allied bases in Tunisia. Given the Italian focus and the increased Axis air threat, it is unlikely that an earlier success in Corsica (historically liberated by French forces in October 43) could have changed Allied priorities from Italy to southern France in 1943.

Despite this, I feel that the Allies could have launched a smaller expedition against Italian occupied territory in February or March of 43. Retaking some peripheral territory such as part of the Yugoslavian coast, Corsica, or Crete would have provided air bases to threaten Eastern Italy and Romania and might have drawn off some Axis forces (Hitler being obsessed with threats to Polesti).

Effect on Enemy at the Gates

Although the withdrawal from North Africa would have freed up substantial forces for use in other Theaters, the degree of operational surprise achieved by the Soviets would have prevented most of them from being forward deployed. Any released reserves would have had to enter the Stalingrad battle as reinforcements.

The key issue is released reserves. A withdrawal from Tunisia also would have added to Hitler's belief that the Army OKH was ideologically uncommitted to the Reich and increased the influence of Goring and the Luftwaffe; a new service, considered to be a product of National Socialism, and hence more loyal.

Hitler considered the Army a haven of reactionary Prussian aristocrats who didn't understand or believe in National Socialism. The Navy had been a haven for communists (they were the first to revolt in October of 1918) and in any event inconsequential to his understanding of how the war should be won.

A worried Mussolini met with Hitler in April 43 and requested that the Axis make peace with the Soviets in order to concentrate on the incipient attack on Italy. Hitler would have insisted that enough force be maintained in the Theater to insure that Italy stayed in the war. Furthermore he probably would have strengthened the role of Kesselring and the Luftwaffe ground forces to insure that no further retreats occurred. Assuming an Allied invasion of Italy in April- May, a Tunisian withdrawal would have the following the effects:

1. Maintenance of a substantial reserve for commitment to Italy, especially anti-shipping aircraft
2. Arrival of any released reserves to AGS (AG 'B') sometime post 23 November (Turn 2)
3. Increased reliance on G6ring and the Luftwaffe, at least initially
4. Increase in replacement and supply levels to the Eastern Front
5. Potential for an Italian collapse sometime in May or June 43 following an earlier Allied invasion of Italy.

Although the last effect occurs after EatG, the threat of a potential Italian collapse in the spring of 43 would effect the later stages of the campaign game. Assuming no collapse and a stalemate on the Italian Front, potentially there would be the release of additional reserves in the summer of 43. This assumes that Axis losses in Italy would be commensurate with what they were historically.

An interesting variant would be the effect of a Tunisia withdrawal on OCS Sicily: more Axis forces, better Italian ARs, no Italian automatic surrenders, earlier Invasion date, higher Sicily VP values (forcing the Axis to defend more rigidly and for much longer), additional Allied 'flanking' invasions, perhaps even a VP 'tripwire' forcing an Italian surrender.

Timeline

1942

3 September: The DAK offensive grinds to a halt 40 miles west of Alexandria at El Alamain.

23 October: British 8th Army counteroffensive begins. Following the British breakthrough on the 2 November, the DAK is in headlong retreat back towards Tripoli.

8 November: U.S. 2nd Army begins the Torch Landings in Vichy Algeria. Despite the Petain Government's protestations that the Vichy collaboration with the Allies in French North Africa was against orders, German forces occupy all of Metropolitan France.

19 November: at 06:30 Italian local time, Operation Uranus begins.

23 November: Commander of the 6th Army von Paulus informs Hitler that he no longer has a tenable supply line with the rest of Army Group B. Army Group commander von Weichs states that given the 20 Divisions in the Pocket, only 1/10th of the necessary supply can be flown in under the current situation and weather.

24 November: Despite the Army Group B assessment, Hitler orders the 6th Army to stand fast and that additional Aircraft will provide the necessary supply. Against the recommendation of the local Luftwaffe Commanders, Goring asserts that the 4th Luftflotte can deliver 500 tons of supplies a day. Paulus calculates that he needs a minimum of 300 tons a day just to preserve the force and over 600 tons to conduct breakout operations. The actual average delivered was a little over 100 tons. Approximately 266 Ju-52s, 42 Ju86s and 165 He-111s acting as transports were destroyed in the process.

26 November: Zhukov launches MARS the companion and larger offensive to URANUS against the German 9th Army in front of Moscow.

16 December: Operation LITTLE SATURN begins. The Italian 8th Army is virtually annihilated within a week.

20 December: MARS is called off. Zhukov's forces suffer 335,000 casualties in less than a month.

Glantz, David; Zhukov's Greatest Defeat; Kansas, 1999

1943

January: Elements of the Italian Fascist governing council begin plotting against Mussolini. Mussolini is informed and reforms his government with supposedly loyal Fascists including a new Commander-in-Chief General Ambrosio.

Comando Supremo; Italy at War 1940-1943 (on the Web)

2 February: German Forces at Stalingrad surrender.

March 5: Workers at the Fiat Aeronautics plant in Turin strike. This is the first instance of labor unrest since Mussolini assumption of power in 1922. Mussolini calls on his Fascist paramilitaries to break the strike; they refuse. Other strikes erupt, hindering Italy's war industry.

April 6: Mussolini meets with Hitler in Austria. Mussolini requests that Germany and Italy attempt to make peace with the Soviets in order to restore the deteriorating situation in Africa. Hitler dismisses the idea of peace and assures Mussolini of eventual victory over the Soviet Union. Mussolini returns to Rome with renewed resolve. General Ambrosio begins plotting the removal of Mussolini.

May 13: 260,000 Italian and German forces surrender in Tunisia.

July 9: The Invasion of Sicily begins.

July 25: The Italian King, Victor Emmanuel, declares in a meeting with Mussolini that Italy no longer wants war or 11 Duce. Surprised and depressed, Mussolini resigns and is arrested. Pietro Badoglio is proclaimed the new Prime Minister. The new Badoglio government promises to honor Italy's alliance with Germany and continue the war. Sensing the end, many Fascist supporters flee Rome.

August 17: The bulk of the Axis force withdraws from Sicily as resistance ends.

September 8: After much last minute maneuvering Italy surrenders.

September 9: Allies invade at Salerno and Taranto. Badoglio orders his military to stop any hostilities and the Germans begin to disarm the Italian Army. Of the over 615,000 Italians soldiers disarmed, only around 1 % offer to join the Germans. The bulk are interned.

Alternative Timeline

1942

3 September: DAK offensive at El Alamain ends. Rommel returns to Germany via Italy and actually convinces Kesselfing that it is the dismal supply situation that is the cause of failure.

8 November: TORCH Landings in Algeria begin. Given the new realism about what supplies are actually getting to the DAK, Kesselring concedes that there is now no realistic chance to maintain a tenable supply line to North Africa. Together with Rommel they convince Hitler that Axis forces should be withdrawn from North Africa until such time as 'the Anglo-American Air and Naval forces are smashed and the invaders hurled back into the sea in an unsuccessful attempt to attack the Italian mainland.'

16 November: Axis North African forces begin embarking at Tripoli for Naples.

18 November: Hitler meets Mussolini at Verona and pledges German support for the defense of Italy. Hitler waxes poetic on a new "Fortress Sicily" as an "unbreakable bastion on which Churchill's hopes for a foothold in Europe will shatter."

23 November: Goring orders the creation of the Kampfversorgungsfiotte (combat logistical group) KvsgF and vows that a Luftbahn statt Rollbahn (Skyway not a Highway) will pave the way for a new kind of Blitzkrieg. All transport aircraft from all other Theaters are directed to the 4th Luftflotte as well as 3 Fighter Gruppen from the Mediterranean.

Odds and Ends

EatG Axis Air Transport: Supply Delivery Capacity

For those systems analysts here are some rough comparisons.

The chart does not add the He-111 capacity to the totals. Given Soviet fighter defenses, the Transport missions have to be escorted and Axis fighter assets are limited. Remember that aircraft reinforcements enter 'flown.' The German transport aircraft have the following stats: Ju-52, capacity 1T, range 62; the Me-323, capacity 2T, range 8 1; and the He-111 capacity 1/2 T range 128.

EatG Air Transport: Air Network and Airbase Capacity

Ranges are all calculated to Gumrak.

Holding on to Gumrak is tough enough. If a German player still has the Level two Airbase at D48.35 (Pitomnik) after turn 4 then he probably also has an overland supply route.

Given that the pocket doesn't have the supply to activate air units, it makes sense to use rule 14.10d, drop-off supplies only, and de- activate at the starting airbase. Since the receiving airbase can accept only up to 2T per level, per phase Gumrak (a level one base) can accept a maximum of 6T per turn. With the standard EatG, the Axis has enough Ju52s to transport 6T per turn out of Morozovsk on turn 5. The variant gives the Axis the same capability on turn 3 , Needless to say, Morozovsk is going to be at the center of things and should be defended (air, flak and ground) accordingly. I find that there are seldom 2 consecutive flight turns in a row so a large number of aircraft can be serviced there.

Balanced 6th Army Set-up Option

Included as a reference, the modification by A. Leo Paulo in Ops 32, Spring 1999.

1. Axis Free set-up for all Axis Units per the EatG Optional Rule 4a (within 5 hexes of listed position)
1.1. All set-ups must stay within their army boundary.

1.2. Units on the line must be from the corps that held it historically (i.e. per the set-up)

2. All Axis units must remain within their Army boundaries on the 1st Turn.

3. A full Axis reaction move (within the parent Army boundary) on the first turn

3.1. Except for 48th Panzer Corps units which successfully react only 50% of the time (1-3 d 6).

6th Army Boundaries:

C39xx along the Don and Karpovka rivers to D47xx then the Railroad to Stalingrad.

4th Panzer Army Boundary Change:

The 4th German Corps and the 29th Motorized Division may be subordinated to the 6th Army on the 1st German-Player turn (not in the reaction phase).

Rational for the Modifications

As much as I'd like to open the cornucopia of units for the Germans at Stalingrad, the Soviet strategic advantage is too overwhelming. That said, the proposed Tunisia Variant Mod 1, does give the Axis something to work with. Compared with what was sifting idle in Army Group 'A in winter quarters, it is a relatively modest force. (Hitler's refused to believe that the situation was dire enough to order its withdrawal).

Italians:

With an Allied Invasion of the Italian mainland in the offing, no Italian forces would have been sent to reinforce the Italian 8th Army. The 229,000 strong Italian 8th Army (9 Divisions including the elite Alpini Corps) was all but destroyed during Operation LITTLE SATURN in December 42. The 8th Army lost over 80,000 KIA, WIA and missing over a two week time period. Before being withdrawn in April of 43, it suffered a total of 60% casualties, 138,000 personnel including almost all of its 18,000 trucks and 1,000 pieces of artillery. The 8th Army would not have been rebuilt for the same reasons.

March Battalions

and the Alert units are very inefficient uses of combat power.

For example, during the Dec. 42 time frame the army-level tank repair organization in AGS was essentially sent to the front, reducing the ability to repair tanks and other vehicles; in game terms generate 'Eq' Points.

Such formations were usually generated during local emergencies. Since there is no longer an emergency in the Med. Theater (a need to contest the American Torch Invasion), I'm assuming that the March Units were never formed. However, the personnel concerned take longer to get to 'their' units so I delay their arrival an additional turn. Those arriving later are assumed to be joining the Med. Reserves.

334th and 999th Divisions

were specialized formations pulled together for the very fluid conflict in North Africa. I have them essentially being converted into more standard Wehrmacht formations that the service replacement pipelines were generating. Since the 999th was formed as a punishment unit sent for duty in a (by then) very inauspicious Theater, the Axis player can choose to take either the division or the replacements.

Luftwaffe Ground Formations:

I have the Hermann G6ring Panzer Division forming in Sicily in November 42 using the 5th FallschirmjAger Rgt., the Barenthin ad hoc Rgt. and KG Witzig. The HG would remain as part of the bolstered Italian Theater defense force. The 90th Corps HQ is assumed to be leading that effort as the renamed 5th Panzer Army.

von Konen Commando Unit:

is assumed to stay in the Med. Theater given that this particular Brandenburger Unit was staffed entirely with North African experts. In a Sicily variant it could be treated like a less effective SAS (see DAK) for use against Allied bases in Tunisia.

10th Panzer Division Entry:

Given a late- November withdrawal of the DAK to Italy (Sicily) there would be no emergency need to move forces to the Mediterranean Theater. Thus the rail assets would be available to move the 10th Panzer to AGS earlier and en-masse.

Aircraft:

In the Med. Theater, the primary goal is to hinder any Allied invasions; perhaps even a potential April 43 Allied invasion of Sicily. Those aircraft remaining in Theater are primarily the best anti-shipping platforms available, the Ju88. The at start Tunisia aircraft reinforcements are delayed to Turn 2 on the assumption that the additional transport aircraft and accompanying fighters wouldn't have been released unless the Soviets have pocketed the 6th Army and Goring had committed to aerial re-supply on 24 Nov. All the Ju- 87s are relegated to the 'Ost-Front' where they were not completely outclassed by Allied aircraft. I assume minimal Army Group Center (AGC) needs as the weather was poor during the MARS offensive that effectively ended on turn 11 (Dec 20th, 1942). The Turn 31 German fighter withdrawals are part of Kesselring's response to Allied Invasion preparations in the Med. Theater.

Supply:

Supply in Tunisia is a factor of available shipping, with an average capacity of about 3 SP per turn. Given the main force in Tunisia of the 90th Corps, DAK, and 1-2 Italian Corps, I calculate a 2SP 2T flow per turn. Adjusting for the need for continuing operations in the Med. Theater, I added 2SP to the German totals in EatG. This conforms to what the Mareth Line Scenario grants for what is essentially a Corps offensive. Remember the SPs arrive at the West map edge and the Axis player does not get any more Rail Capacity.

Replacements:

I assumed some of the replacements go to AGC and the 1 st Panzer Army.

Tunisia Axis Reinforcements to Enemy at the Gates

I've placed the modified entry next to the Tunisia reinforcement chart for ease of comparison.

Forget Tunisia Charts (slow: 215K)