In my opinion, Yom Kippur is among the very small group of games which successfully manage to portray the furious nature of armored combat and maneuver warfare at an operational scale without having to use a long and difficult set of rules. A lot of games designed with this objective in mind are really fun, but fail miserably when you try to get the feeling of maneuver warfare (of far deeper impact than just the glamour of saying "Hey, I'm moving the Leibstandarte here to blast your infantry with my panzers!"). They fail because you can use your mobile units in a non-mobile way or your infantry units as pseudo-maneuver task-forces, and no great damage is inflicted to your army. I think this happens because of a lack of differentiation between the types of units in the game; in fact, we could play lots of games without looking to the symbol portrayed in the counters.

Fortunately for armored buffs, this is not the case in Yom Kippur. No matter what side you are playing, you must use your armored units as armored units and your infantry units as real riflemen-doing otherwise leads to disaster. The ATGM surprise rules, the SAM umbrella, the fluidity of situation, and the slow and restricted non-clear terrain combine in a good cocktail directing us to be well aware of each side's peculiarities and of the different characteristics of each type of unit if we want to manage a victorious result. Nevertheless, I think realistic results can still be improved with slight changes in the rules. Here are some suggestions I have successfully tested to improve the historical feeling of Yom Kippur.

Don't hide! ATGMs Will Still Find You

That historical data are an essential tool to design wargames is axiomatic. Precise maps, well researched OOBs, and detailed timetables are the strong roots on which we must base our games if we want to achieve the historical feeling that differentiates wargames from other boardgames. But sometimes basing rules on raw historical data, forgetting about the why and the how of those data, makes our games suffer the paradox of portraying historical facts giving a completely ahistorical result. Please note that when I say ahistorical result I don't mean ahistorical operations or an ahistorical winner, but situations that can never be expected in a given situation. For example, I don't consider ahistorical, in game terms, a German victory in EatG, but I would consider ahistorical all Katyusha units firing all their barrages with no effect.

In my opinion ahistoricity results from the "First Use of ATGMs" rule in Yom Kippur. The historical fact is that Israeli armored units suffered very heavy losses during the first days of war due to the Egyptian infantry's unexpected use of Saggers and RPG-7s. After a few days these anti-tank weapons lost an important part of their effectiveness, and tank losses dropped dramatically. Knowing this and making a study of such losses, we can accept as a historical fact that the third turn must be the last one with highly effective Saggers. Yom Kippur was designed this way and everything looks perfect, but then sneaky Israeli players decide they don't want to suffer extra tank losses, hide their steel behemoths, and patiently await the arrival of the third turn to risk their best tank units in not-thathigh-odds attacks. (Let he who is free of sin can throw the first stone.)

As you can imagine, this leads to a completely ahistorical result with almost useless ATGMs and RPGs because their surprise is completely gone and an overcautious IDF armored force suffering no ill effect because it completely ignores the usual armored counterattack doctrine of the IDF.

I think this can be addressed with a careful study of the antitank weapons' impact. At the start of the Yom Kippur war the effectiveness of those weapons was a great surprise to the IDF units in the Sinai (not so in the Golan), and that surprise was magnified by the Israeli doctrine of fast and furious armored counterattacks against enemy forces. As the war progressed and losses climbed, Israeli crews developed effective countermeasures against the nightmare, but this evolution was only possible because of repeated combat experience against the anti-tank weapons.

Therefore initial armored losses were a sine qua non condition for being able to deal with the menace. No tank-vs-infantry combat means no experience and no evolution, so surprise must still be there. Furthermore, combat is not enough; losses are required, since if the IDF had not suffered high losses due to ATGMs, tactics to avoid such losses would not have been needed and so would not have developed. This "blood" factor was ignored when Yom Kippur was designed and historical time needed to develop new tactics was the only variable considered.

A second important factor which was also ignored is the nature of the tactical solutions used by the IDF to face the problem. Reduction of tank losses against concealed infantry teams entailed the use of combined arms tactics to a degree not usually seen in Israeli armored forces, who were used to operating with far less mechanized infantry support. Thus, I think suppression of ATGM surprise must also be subordinated to the use of correct solutions by the Israeli player.

All three factors (time, blood, and combined arms) have been summarized in the following variant for the "First use of ATGMs" rule:

3.6a On turns 1, 2 and 3 or until the Israeli player has suffered 4 extra losses due to ATGMs, whichever comes later, the following is in effect. (The rest of the original rule goes here.)

3.6b After turn 3 or after the IDF has lost 4 tank units due to ATGMs, all Israeli tank units attacking along with any type of infantry are immune to ATGM effects, but attacking all-tank stacks still suffer the ATGM effect. If an all-tank stack attacks along with a combined arms stack and an extra loss is called, this loss must come from a tank unit included in the all-tank stack.

3.6c Defending tank units are never affected by ATGMs when conditions in rule 3.6a are no longer valid.

Besides a more historical ATGM surprise result, this rule will also breaks up the almighty Israeli armored superstacks (a relic of the past glorious 1967 days), making the IDF player use more balanced stacks such as the one built with one mech and one armored brigade.

Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammo... but Not Climbing

Passes through all that rough terrain in the middle of the Sinai have always been of the highest importance in ArabIsraeli wars as they are essential, not only to stop enemy reinforcements, but also to keep one's own units supplied at the "other side of the hill." Both sides have therefore always carefully prepared operations to seize the passes. Unfortunately, soft supply draw rules for the IDF make the seizure of the passes not all that important in Yom Kippur. Furthermore, such rules also ignore the effect of sand, and we are not talking about beach sand but about "seas of dunes" full of traps making their crossing a difficult task for tracked vehicles and an impossible nightmare for wheeled trucks.

The following addition to rule 1.6a can be used to increase the strategic interest of communication lines:

"HQ trace must be made through clear or road hexes and exit the map at a road hex."

This addition only affects HQ supply draw. HQ supply throw to units can be made through any kind of terrain as long as MP cost can be satisfied. If the rule seems too harsh, you can ignore the road exit of the map restriction, allowing trace through any clear mapedge hex.

There's No Fish Without Wet Feet

One of the main concerns people have shown about Yom Kippur is the relative ease of obtaining an Israeli victory. I tend to agree with this objection, as an Egyptian victory against an experienced Israeli player is, according to my experience, almost impossible unless the goddess of fortune blesses the Arab community with a very early cease-fire.

People have usually tried to deal with this imbalance by accelerating the appearance of Egyptian reserves, dropping the random system and making them intervene in the third game turn. In my opinion this procedure may balance the game a little, but kills one of the most exciting features in wargames: uncertainty. Nevertheless, if the cease-fire arrives late, the Tsahal, using a correct hit and run tactic, will have time enough to blast the Egyptians out of the Sinai, thus being able to gain, at least, a minor victory. No matter what the Egyptians do, US resistance in the UN will win the game for the Israeli player.

After extensive thought and some playtesting I think the reserve release is not the balancing tool the game needs, and it can even damage the Egyptian effort if the use of reserves must follow the historical constraints suggested in other forums.

According to my playtesting the most effective solution is to make no change in the game rules, but convert the Chinese Farm Victory Point into an Egyptian one. This little change has extensive strategic and balancing implications without adding a new rule to the game. With this VP turnover tension grows to the highest level as the Israelis are now hard-pressed to clean the Sinai and make a cross-canal attack to win the game; otherwise, the most they can accomplish is a draw. On the other hand, the Egyptians must also keep a big and consolidated foothold on the Sinai to win the game, as the possession of the Chinese Farm is not enough alone for the Egyptians to win the game (the Israeli VP in Zrakor Heights will cancel its effect, thus giving a draw).

To further increase the replayability value of this variant and the pre-game uncertainty of the evolution of the game, you can roll a die at the start of the game to determine which Israeli VP will be converted into an Egyptian VP: either Chinese Farm or Zrakor Heights (but never both as it would unbalance the game in the Egyptians' favor). A last possibility could be to allow the Egyptian player to secretly determine at the start of the game which of the two objectives he wants (something like the Ardennes German Massive Victory condition).

With this variant no fish will enter your net. You'll have to wet your feet in the canal to take prevail.

I hope you enjoy these variants and find they enrich the exciting experience of being an armored commander in the middle of an extremely mobile campaign.

For Further Reading

Although games released by The Gamers often include a list of sources for further reading, this is not the case with Yom Kippur. Trying to fill the void, here's an annotated list of books regarding the Yom Kippur War:

Duel for the Golan. The 100-Hour Battle That Saved Israel. by Jerry Asher and Eric Hammel. William Morrow and Company, New York, NY. 1997. 288 pages

Though limited in scope, this is by far the best book I've ever read about the Yom Kippur war. It extensively covers the Syrian offensive in the Golan Heights and the desperate defense by Israeli tankers and riflemen during the four most crucial days in the State of Israel's history. Both sides' operations are explained in great detail and both tactical and strategic scales are considered.

The authors have used a number of both sides' first and second hand sources to write the book, and this is reflected in a more detailed than usual coverage of the Syrian Army, its officers and their decisions, its units and its operations.

Unfortunately, operations beyond the first 100 hours are dealt with in a very superficial way and the Sinai is barely mentioned. I wish I could find a similar book to cover the Egyptian onslaught.

Elusive Victory. The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974. by Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, US Army, Ret. Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, Dubuque, Iowa. 1992. xxv + 669 pages

This is a hefty but really interesting book about the major engagements between Israelis and Arabs since the independence of Israel. The overall quality of the book is excellent, ever increasing as the book goes on, and the Yom Kippur pages are, in my opinion, the best of the book. I found of special interest for the design of these variants the description of Egyptian antitank methods and the IDF countermeasures.

Though absorbing, this book is not easy to read. Don't expect either glorious tank rides or thrilling close combat stories. Tons of data (and I really mean tons of data) are continually used in the book, and you have to be very attentive not to lose important details. The book is not only hefty but it is also a "high density" book. The author made a great effort to synthesize all the data in the book, and there's almost no "useless" page, as everything is grain and there's no place for straw. I can think about a lot of writers who would have needed twice the number of pages to explain the same facts. All this means the book is not written for casual reading, but for detailed and careful attention. The effort really pays.

I own the 1992 third edition. Nevertheless, it is evident that the book was written sometime between 1975 and 1977. This is why the final conclusions are phased out. They might have been right when the book was written, as the author had no crystal ball to know about the future "turn to the west" made by Sadat's Egypt and Camp David negotiations, but they lost their validity when Egypt and Israel signed a peace agreement. Nevertheless this is only a little flaw and does not detract of the overall quality of the book.

The War of Atonement. The Inside Story of the Yom Kippur War, 1973. by Chaim Herzog. Greenhill Books, London. 1998. xx + 300 pages

The late president of Israel wrote this book just after the war. A general overview of the war, it is not as detailed as Elusive Victory in certain subjects, but it deals quite extensively (though in a dispersed way) with relations and discussions between Israeli commanders in the Sinai, constituting a good complementary work to that of Colonel Dupuy. Although somewhat biased in certain places, and committing a few mistakes (surely due to the short lapse of time between the war and the book's release), this work gives a good and generally balanced account of Israeli military operations, ending with an interesting though sometimes controversial chapter about lessons and implications of the war.

Unfortunately this work deals exclusively with the IDF's operations, so following the general development of Arab operations, to say nothing of their details, is not easy due to the book's lack of coverage.

The Heights of Courage. A Tank Leader's War on the Golan. by Avigdor Kahalani. Praeger Publishers, New York, NY. 1992. xxx + 198 pages

The Heights of Courage is to Elusive Victory like night is today. Kahalani explains his experience as a tank battalion commander making a last ditch defense against the Syrian onslaught and building the legend of the 7th Armored Brigade as the "Saviour of the Country" in the Valley of Tears.

The book, specially centered in the first days of the war, gives an excellent grasp of being there. Abundant tank combat descriptions, plenty of dialogues, and some introspective analysis, though superficial, help the reader feel the anguish of war.

Unfortunately, the book is exclusively limited to Kahalani's battalion's point of view and very little attention, if any, is given to the rest of the Golan front, to say nothing of the Sinai. If you want to be on board a tank, this is your book; if you prefer to be informed about the Yom Kippur war, you'd better go to more general works.

After the war, Kahalani became 7th Brigade Commanding Officer and reached important assignments in the IDF, turning afterwards to the political world, where he has also been an important man.

Fire & Steel. by Samuel M. Katz. Pocket Books, New York, NY. 1996. xiv + 289 pages

This book explains the story of the 7th Armored Brigade, the first and most famous armored unit in the IDF, from its creation in 1948 and through all wars in which Israel has been involved. Even though somewhat sketchy, the book is easy and fast to read. Coverage of the "major wars" is acceptable, but the most appealing chapter is, in my opinion, the one devoted to the IDF intervention in Lebanon (1982). Even though centered on the 7th Brigade, the book correctly shows the difficulties generally encountered by Israeli units in Lebanon, difficulties never found before and greatly annoying for the IDF effort. Armored buffs will enjoy the pages devoted to design and development of the Merkava.

Unfortunately I've not been able to put my hands in any source written in the Arab countries, so I cannot comment here any book about the Ramadan War instead of the Yom Kippur war.