A lot has been written over the years about an assortment of design concerns (the most windy being the ill-conceived debate about complexity vs. realism, a false comparison in my mind). But, for all this verbiage little has been dedicated to actually establishing a design theory that can be used to support additional development.

In the same way as science learns from its past to build toward the future by testing and improving older theory (as well as occasionally tossing out theory that has been disproved), wargaming could benefit greatly from such an established framework of knowledge. As was the case before scientific methods were established, game designers are simple artisans who apply rules of thumb based on experience to accomplish their jobs. Also, as was the case in the Swedish warship, The Vasa, where shipwright artisans incorrectly loaded the ballast into the base of the ship (relaying on experience as they had no analytical idea of what they were doing) causing the ship to capsize and sink within minutes of launching, sometimes game designs blow up in the artisan designer's face (as well as sink on some poor customer's game table).

I believe the development of a real theory of design is perhaps 25 years overdue. SPI attempted to do this to a minor degree in their small book on Wargame Design. Unfortunately from the theorist's point of view, this volume was little more than a collection of an assortment of artisan rules of thumb combined with the design methodology SPI used to crank out vast numbers of titles efficiently. This did not do the trick.

A good theoretical underpinning for a wargame design theory requires two things. First, the basic theory of warfare must be understood and synthesized to the extent that viable wargame theory supporting it can be created. This is unfortunately complex in its own right, as theories of real warfare abound and often contradict each other. For my own purposes, I have worked toward a broad understanding of the precepts of maneuver warfare theory as the basis of my personal theory of warfare. Even it (in isolation) is fraught with differing schools of thought.

I had the privilege of having the years of study of numerous classic works on the theory of warfare as a base to draw on as well as my years of military experiences of leading troops (and being led) in an assortment of conditions. With that basis, I was able to build a reasonably viable theory for my purposes. Not all will agree with my conclusions, but I feel the school of thought is sound.

The other pillar supporting a correct theory of wargaming is a need to assess both the tools of wargame design and how they reflect the various principles of the theory of warfare. All too often, some goofy design mechanic is added because it is cute, sounds nifty, or the it is the designer's pet concept -- not because it contributes anything to showing a viable theory of warfare in any way. Good game mechanics have several requirements. They must be playable in and of themselves. This requires the mechanic to be easily played by average wargamers and (a frequently forgotten requirement) absolutely must be readily integrated into the whole of the game design so that its workload addition is far more than offset by the addition of war theory for the players to see. In effect, a cost vs. benefits analysis.

It may be that a seemingly good mechanic breaks down and becomes far more effort than it is worth when applied dozens or hundreds of times across the game board. An example of this in my own learning period was the original TCS artillery system. It worked fairly well in limited situations, but became very balky when applied to the much larger Omaha game. Many game mechanics seem great on paper, work reasonably well in limited and constrained tests (where they are looked at in isolation), but come completely unglued when players are forced to apply them in more than a handful of cases.

Other mechanics fail this playability test simply because there is really no noticeable difference between the game with the mechanic than without, but every mechanic (no matter how seemingly simple) exacts a price in playability. In other words, the simple mechanic which adds little or nothing to play is still too complex for its gain. I just recently had to remove a set of rules I had high hopes for because of this very reason. Gazala had an assortment of Desert Navigation rules which promised much but delivered very little. After a time, I decided that the difference in the game between the game with those rules and the game without amounted to little more than the players having to struggle with the rules when they were in play. I solved the issue by making them optional so that those who wanted to see the rules' effects could do so, but the rest of us could ignore them.

Another requirement of a mechanic is that it actually reflects some issue in real war (as outlined by the best theory of warfare available). For example, some concepts in modern warfare simply cannot be shown by mechanics reflecting only attritional warfare (such as Blitzkrieg warfare). A game attempting to model such warfare limited to mechanics showing simple attrition will be forced into a heavy overlaying of special rules required to force the square mechanics into the round hole of theory. Many games suffer from this one as they are built on attritional warfare theory models...if indeed the designer had any theoretical background at all.

Some mechanics exist simply because they existed before in some older game. It is as if there is some "Old Game Mechanic Grandfather Clause" that keeps them alive and in use long after their day is over. Old mechanics must be ruthlessly eliminated if there seems no valid support for them. They should not simply carry on out of some sort of habit.

Once the two underlying pillars of theory are built, a valid theory of warfare and a valid set of wargame design tools reflecting that theory in a manner consistent with the chosen theory, one can be in the position to develop a more consistent theory of wargaming itself that future designers can turn to, examine, and build on. Since there is unlikely to be an academic study of these concepts any time in the future, it is incumbent on the designers to ensure that they do the legwork of warfare study and a critical examination of the tools they choose to use. To do otherwise (operate without a basis in theory of war, any theory of war, or a careful examination of design technique based on that theory) is irresponsible and an affront to the gaming public.

Now, wargame design is indeed an art and not a science, so one can question the validity of forcing this theoretical model on it. This is the case to an extent, so the tool kit pillar must be pliable and designers should not hesitate to add or delete from that body of knowledge those tools deemed important (or unimportant) to their version of the theory of war.

That said, it also must be recognized that a wargame is a system or a process that must function well and correctly. It must be internally consistent, playable, and the total picture of warfare the game shows must encourage the player to get a vision of warfare as the designer sees it -- something the player might not have considered. In this, a wargame is actually an engineering problem. As such, it must have some basic truths that can be learned and applied to make the design a better machine.

To do this should be a goal of each designer, since it is unlikely that any sort of corporate effort to analyze the matter between designers is unlikely to happen. It is hoped that all designers ponder these issues as they create the games we will be playing in the 21st Century.