Enemy at the Gates has been my favorite game since I first opened the box. The OCS is a very realistic system, and the campaign in Southern Russia from November 1942 to March 1943 is one of the most compelling of World War 2. It took me a while to become proficient with the Soviet forces, but with a little practice and considerable help gleaned from the pages of this journal, I got to the point where I could usually effect an encirclement along generally historic lines. Then I read Dean Essig's article on how to conduct the initial Soviet attack in Operations 24. That is one clever and beautiful plan! I certainly agree that it should lead to the results he stated. However, the result, which Dean accurately stated "cannot be stopped by German actions or poor dice rolls," began to bother me. If I was the German player and had that method unleashed on me, I hope I wouldn't whine, but I would conclude that I was at somewhat of a disadvantage. The range of outcomes in the game is more favorable for the Russian than was historically the case. Since I believe that the OCS can realistically simulate the progression of the campaign, I concluded that the initial conditions in the game differ from those that really existed in November 1942. I am a very strong proponent of the OCS. I believe it accurately simulates operational level combat in WW2. The system is strong enough that once a scenario is unfolding, the players will be reasonably constrained to what is realistically possible. That certainly doesn't mean that they will take the same actions that were taken historically. A major offensive against 6th Army itself had a good chance of failure. Players can achieve results better (or worse) than those achieved by the participants. But the results they achieve will fall within the realm of what was reasonable given the situation at the start of the campaign simulated. Therein lies the rub. The system will reasonably control actions and intelligence once the game begins; it cannot erase from players minds the "superintelligence" they already have. This superintelligence takes two forms. The first is the benefit of hindsight, the second is game knowledge. Any German player who has studied history knows that if the 6th Army had immediately counterattacked the southern pincer with everything they had, the Russian encirclement would probably have been averted. The OCS wouldn't prevent a player from benefiting from that hindsight, so game-specific rules are needed. These rules strive to recreate the actual unique factors that were integral to the Germans'actions being what they were. Superintelligence can also exist because the game knowledge a player has at the start is far in excess of what his historical counterpart possessed. This is the real problem in EatG. Specifically, the Russian player has perfect information on German locations, the German player has no reaction phase, and the Soviet player knows the German has no reaction phase. I believe that realism can be increased in the initial EatG scenario simply by putting two facets of the OCS into play at the start, limited intelligence and a full reaction phase. Before going into specifics I will explain my understanding of the situation that existed at the initiation of the campaign. November 19, 1942 Situation When Zhukov and Vasilevskii (the two Stavka representatives who planned and coordinated the Soviet offensive) summed up preparations for the offensive to Stalin on November 11, they stated that: 1. Soviet and German strength in the Stalingrad theater was about equal, but the Soviets had significant superiority along the axes on which they would mount their attacks. 2. The bulk of the German forces in the operational area were in the vicinity of Stalingrad itself; the forces facing the Soviet attacks would be Rumanian. 3. The Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts should effect junction on the east bank of the Don River in the Kalach/Sovietskii area on the third or fourth day of the operation. 4. This operation would provide an internal front to encircle the forces in Stalingrad. The external operation was even then being envisioned (it eventually became Saturn). The two pronged counteroffensive was conceived by the two Soviet leaders after visiting the front in September. The most important element they discovered was the presence of only Rumanian units guarding the flanks. The Russians specifically wanted to pit their strength against German weakness. They planned to hit the Rumanians and attack as far from the major German forces as possible. They had mounted heavy attacks in the land bridge between the Don and Vol a throughout the autumn Their singular lack of success convinced them, correctly I believe, that a major offensive against 6th Army itself had a good chance of failure. On the German side, two factors are most important in their initial actions. 1. The German high command made virtually no preparations to stop a powerful Soviet offensive. Most did not believe that such a blow was possible. Hitler lamented the fact that long thin lines of allied armies protected the flanks of 6th Army. Despite that, in September he got rid of the Army Chief of Staff, Halder, who had continuously argued that the Stalingrad operation should be called off because of the danger to its flanks. The commander and the chief of staff of 6th Army (Paulus and Schmidt), though aware of Russian concentrations on their flanks, likewise refused to believe that the Soviets could possibly mount a major offensive that would threaten their position. 2. In the operational arena, however, many Germans believed an offensive was coming. From its position in the 11 Corps area, the 44th Division had OPs that could see to the Volga. They observed and reported a steady stream of Russian movements to the front of the Rumanians. The Rumanians for their part, were very aware of the Russian buildup in their front, and expected an offensive as early as 7 November. The commander of the Luftwaffe force in the area, von Richtofen, noted in his diary on the 11th that a Russian offensive against the Rumanians was imminent. He withheld aircraft from supporting another attack on Stalingrad on the 11th in order to monitor Soviet movements. His air units were constantly busy trying to interdict the columns moving forward. The 4th Panzer Army commander, Hoth, reported the identification of major new enemy formations to his front and predicted that an offensive south of the city was imminent. Limited Intelligence and Reaction Moves In terms of intelligence, the Russians did not realize the strength of the forces they pocketed until more than a month after they had done so, much less know exactly what they faced on 19 November. Their greatest fear was that the Sixth Army would completely capture Stalingrad, and then send German divisions from the city to bolster the flanks. This was in fact the German intent. This fear frequently caused major reinforcements to be earmarked for the defense of the fragments of the city that the 62nd Army clung to. Yeremenko, the Stalingrad Front commander, was even severely reprimanded by Stalin for retaining some of those reinforcements for the southern pincer of the counteroffensive, rather than placing them in the city. The Soviets have already won a major victory before the game even starts. The German's demonstrated what would, in game terms, be a strong reaction move. The 29th Motorized Division counterattacked within literally a few hours of the Soviet southern attack. The Soviet 4th Mech Corps had not even been committed when 4th Panzer Army sent the 29th Motorized to attack the 13th Tank Corps. The panzer divisions of the Sixth Army moved battlegroups across the Don into the German 11th Corps sector by November 20. On the left, the 48th Panzer Corps'two divisionsboth launched attacksbefore Soviet forces ever reached their positions. In game terms, the local capability to conduct reaction moves was excellent. The key word is "local." The Soviet Army had a huge advantage when it initiated the offensive; it had achieved strategic surprise. In the 6th Army area though, constant Soviet attacks had been soundly repulsed and the Soviets entertained no false notions about their ability to launch an attack into the teeth of German strength. Given the situation that existed, the Russians should expect that a competently managed offensive will pocket the 6th Army on around the second turn. To paraphrase from Dean Essig's article, the "Russians need to beat the Germans operationally." At the start of the game, they have already achieved that for the first few turns. By massing huge forces and supplies against completely inadequate Rumanian forces in two decisive areas, the Soviets have already won a major victory before the game even starts. Playing EatG really measures the ability of both sides to respond to this victory. The one possibility the Germans had for stopping this offensive was to position major mobile forces of the 6th Army in reserve positions from which they could strike attacks against their extended flanks. Since the German high command, down to and including the 6th Army command, utterly failed to do this, a German player should suffer some similar constraint. Adjustment These considerations lead to the following proposed changes to EatG. The Germans should be allowed a free setup in accordance with rule 4.0a. German corps must retain their boundaries, which means that units along the front line must come from the corps which holds that part of the line in the setup. Reserves can be anywhere within five hexes of their listed location. The Soviet player should go first, but the German gets a normal reaction phase no matter what. However, his units must remain within their army boundaries during the entire first turn. You have to use a little judgement to determine these, especially 6th Army's. I use the area on Map Con and east of hexrow C39xx (11th Corps' left boundary), the Don and Karpovka rivers to D47.34, and then the railroad from there to Stalingrad. One exception to the Army boundary limit is that the German player may chop 4th Corps to 6th Army during his own turn (not in the reaction phase- historically, 4th Corps and the 29th Motorized were chopped to 6th Army on the 21st). A final modification you might employ is to make the attacks of 48th Pz Corps problematical. That unit experienced numerous difficulties prior to and at the moment they counterattacked. Before moving any 48th Pz Corps unit in the reaction phase, throw a die and give them a 50% chance of actually moving. These changes should have the following effect: 1. The Soviets will not know the exact strength and location of forces unless they recon. This is realistic; they knew there were Rumanians in front of their attacks, but didn't have precise detail on German locations. 2. The German forces cannot launch a massive armored attack against either of the Soviet spearheads. The German high command was unable to provide the necessary direction and coordination required for operations that include rapid changing of army boundaries and major change of mission at an army level. Using this start, and implementing the general plan Dean provided, the end of the first turn should find the Soviets with some level of encirclement established. The lead units will be mostly in move mode and more vulnerable, but outside the actual 6th Army area the Germans will not have too much to throw at them. The Russians will probably have only attacked the 6th Army enough to try to fix some of its units, locate the mobile formations, and cause some disruption. In the second turn, the Soviet player should choose to go first again and should get a good ring of units around the pocket in combat mode. The German player should have the same three choices the Germans faced historically. He can go into a hedgehog, abandon the pocket and breakout to the southwest, or try to both hold Stalingrad and keep a supply line open to the southwest. In my opinion, either of the first two are worth pursuing and lead to excellent simulations. The benefits and drawbacks of the first are well known. The second is also an interesting scenario. If the German cuts and runs, the Russian will kill a lot of 6th Army's strength, but the German should also get a lot out to use elsewhere. However, the Russian can realistically have a railhead around Krugliakov about the time he launches his next offensive, and that creates a huge problem for the German. The third option is the least promising. The troops in the pocket use very little on- map supply if the fortress is declared. The moving and shooting necessary to open a trace will likely consume as much as is saved. The Russian should be able to cut the rail, so the German would have to use extenders and garrison them; even a loose Russian encirclement would make driving columns of trucks or wagons in and out of the pocket a questionable operation. As an aside, if the second option is tried, players should forego the sudden death victory options, at least for the first ten turns or so. In a game like this, victory conditions are really best determined using the philosophy stated in DAK, "you'll know who won at the end." I personally find the sudden death conditions in EatG frivolous; in no case would the Germans or Russians have quit based on sudden death. I do like the point system, however, as it enables and controls certain important factors unique to this campaign. For instance, the extra points for the Stalingrad fortress nicely counterbalance the advantages the fortress provides, and the unit restrictions reflect the high command attitudes. Possibly the most important aspect of the points system is the control it places on German alert unit generation. In summary, EatG is the best game produced on the most critical campaign fought on the Eastern Front. Both sides have numerous opportunities to rewrite history as the campaign unfolds. In the years since its release, however, Russian players have developed the opening offensive to the point where it is always more successful than it actually was, and the German player can do nothing to prevent this. The relatively simple changes I have outlined above will restore a more historic initial situation. The title to Dean Essig's article, "The Two Turn Lock in EatG" should describe results that are a strong possibility, but not a certainty. Note from Dean: Mr. Paulo's conceptions are accurate and very interesting. I fully recommend the conclusions he has reached above as a good expansion of the detail of the actual situation. I chose a more meat-cleaver approach to that first turn situation. Mr. Paulo's shows more finesse than I put into it. While there is a cost in complexity that might go against the grain for some, I feel he makes a good case and that these ideas are well worth a look. Give it a try! Back to Table of Contents -- Operations #32 Back to Operations List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master List of Magazines © Copyright 1999 by The Gamers. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com