On 16 June 1940, six days after the Italian declaration of war against France and Great Britain, a motorized column of "Raggruppamento" size was destroyed by British tanks and armored cars near Ghirba, about 15 kms southwest of Ridotta [Fort] Capuzzo.

The column was the Italian XXI Corps mobile element, deployed along the Egyptian border, and was lead by Colonel D'Avanzo, a former cavalry officer, who died during the action. Later, a Gold Medal for Military Valor was awarded to him posthumously.

Other fallen officers of the column were also decorated: Lt. Stellato, the Bronze Medal for Military Valor and Lt. Mirto, the Silver Medal for Military Valor. Although fought by relatively large forces, the action was to follow the pattern of the skirmishes between Italian mobile columns, formed by light tanks (Cv.35s), truck-borne infantry and artillery, and British armored patrols, formed by tanks (light Mk. VIBs and medium A9s) and armored cars (Rolls-Royce M24s), fought from June to September 1940, in which the inadequate Italian columns were almost regularly defeated by a combination of superior British equipment and better tactics.

While interesting in itself, what follows is an attempt to demonstrate how difficult it is to research historical facts, even when widely documented by a plethora of primary and secondary sources. The greater part of the information contained in this article was published in the April '98 issue of the Italian magazine Storia Militare, in an article written by Nicola Pignato.

The Commonwealth Account

We will start with the British sources.

Liddel Hart, in "The North African Campaign, 1940-43," wrote that "all the Italian tanks and guns were destroyed or captured, the whole column was cut to pieces without a single British loss."

MacGregor Knox, in "Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-41," wrote about how the action was seen in Rome: "Three hundred armored cars overwhelmed two Libyan infantry companies, 14 light tanks and one battery of artillery. The Italian truck drivers, impressed by the fire of the armored cars, abandoned the field." Knox also wrote: "Marshal Balbo was intended to stop the British raids... conquering Sollum and the area around it, but Marshal Badoglio refused to give the necessary authorization."

Dudley Clarke, in "The Eleventh at War" (the war history of the 11th Hussars Rgt), wrote (paraphrased here):

On 16th June, B Squadron had three troops in Libya, South of Ridotta Capuzzo, the remainder was still in Egypt, 16 kms away, under the squadron commander, Geoffrey Miller and the 11th Hussars commander, Lt Colonel Combe.

At 07.50 hours Lt. Gape, a platoon commander, radioed that he was in sight of a column, composed of 12 Cv.35 and 30 trucks, moving North toward Ridotta Capuzzo. Miller ordered Gape to stop it.

A few minutes later, Lt. Dier, commanding another platoon, signaled to report he had sighted 300 men and 40 trucks, with 17 Cv.35.

Miller, after consulting the map, was then sure that the "two" enemy columns were close together and converging. Thinking that his two isolated platoons were too few to fight against a so numerous enemy, ordered to Dier and Gape to retire and asked to Combe for some AT guns from 4th Armored Brigade.

His order arrived too late. Gape, with his "two" armored cars attacked the "first" column, machine gunning the trucks. The trucks halted, and consternation reigned among the hapless infantry.

The 12 escorting Cv.35 closed to attack, but the Rolls-Royces quickly destroyed two of them.

One of the armored cars received a punctured wheel and was forced to reduce speed ['limping on a punctured wheel'], while the other dropped back to protect it. Gape tried to retire, but, while the 10 surviving Cv.35s were maneuvering to cut his escape route, the three armored cars of Lt. Dier arrived.

Dier immediately put another Cv.35 out of action. At that point, the remaining light tanks, fearing an ambush, retired among their infantry, now supported by a single artillery piece.

While the Italians were "forming square" in the open desert, Gape and Dier retired to a small knoll nearby and kept an eye on the Italians, while waiting for reinforcements. Gape signaled to Combe, now at 4th Armored Brigade HQ, that there were still 24 Cv.35s supporting the infantry.

Switching to another source, GMO Davy, in "The Seventh and Three Enemies" (the war history of the 7th Hussars) wrote:

[A]t that point, 4th Armored HQ decided to 'order up':

• "A" Squadron 7th Hussars (equipped with cruiser tanks)
  
• a 2-pdr AT section from "J" Battery RHA

The rest of the brigade was put at fifteen minutes notice to move.

The 7th Hussars received the order at 08.42 hours. At 0950 hours, "A" Squadron and the AT section arrived at the "wire" ["were on the move"] and met with Combe and Miller. After a briefing, Miller lead the squadron to Gape's knoll. Another three armored cars platoons were closing on the Italian "square": one from the north, from the area South of Bardia, and two from the south, from Ridotta [Fort] Maddalena.

At 11.00 hours Combe ordered the attack and the 7th Hussars, under the command of Delma Seymour-Evans, advanced toward the Italians, with the five light tanks (Mk.VIB) and two medium tanks (A9) which survived the 30 miles long march in the desert.

One of Combe's Rolls-Royces was sent with the tanks, because their radio was not compatible with those of the armored cars.

At 11.50 hours, "A" Squadron neared the Italian square. The single Italian piece started to fire, without any effect, while seven Cv.35s advanced to meet the British tanks.

In a few minutes the Cv.35s were all destroyed. At that point, the British tanks started to circle around the "square," firing against it. Combe was watching the fight and was in constant radio contact with 4th Armored HQ, which was receiving a detailed "live" account of what was happening.

After a second passage of the tanks around the square, the Italians unveiled a further five artillery pieces. Soon the battle was a duel between the tanks and the artillery. The Libyan artillery men fought with courage, but in the end they were all killed or wounded beside their pieces.

After the loss of the artillery, the infantry's morale broke down and some men tried to escape using some trucks. The Rolls-Royces intercepted the fugitives and soon captured 12 trucks and 100 men. The surviving Cv.35s tried another charge against the British tanks and several of them were destroyed.

Bryan Perret, in "Wavell's Offensive," underlines the gallantry with which Colonel D'Avanzo, a former cavalry officer, led his last charge against the British tanks. The war history of the 7th Hussars also points out that many of the Cv.35's crews were former cavalrymen.

Colonel D'Avanzo, the enemy commander, was killed in his car. In his greatcoat men from Hussars found a copy of the orders he had received from General Sibille (commander of the 1st Libyan Division). The orders were to 'destroy the enemy elements which have infiltrated across the frontier , and to give the British the impression of our decision, ability and will to resist.'

At noon all was over.

The 11th Hussars history says that the regiment destroyed one infantry Bn, two Cv.35 companies and one motorized artillery battery. Seven officers, 94 men, one Cv.35 and five trucks were captured and sent to Egypt.

The 7th Hussars history states that 200 men, two guns, one Cv.35 and five trucks were captured and twenty enemy killed.

From these sources, it is impossible to ascertain how many of D'Avanzo's men (400?) succeeded in escaping the encirclement in their trucks.

From what we read, the casualties amongst the Cv.35s were:

2 destroyed by Gape's platoon;
1 destroyed by Dier's platoon;
9 destroyed by the "A" Squadron 7th Hussars;
5 destroyed by the 11th Hussars;
1 captured.

This suggests a force of at least two companies.

Mr. Pignato, after an extensive research in the Army historical office archives, found the exact composition of the D'Avanzo column's tank component:

The IX Light Tank Bn, mobilized during November '39, was sent by ship from Brindisi to Derna. It was composed of three companies. Its commander was Captain Rizzi.

The 3rd company was present at the action of 16th June, supported by another platoon from the Bn HQ, giving a total of 16 Cv.35.

After the destruction of the 3rd company, the Bn was reorganized as two companies and was later destroyed during January '41."

The battle was fought at Ghirba, but according to:

Playfair, near Nezuat Ghirba, with 300 survivors;
Forty ("O'Connor's Desert Triumph"), South-West of Ghirba, without any survivors;
Verney, at Ghirba, without any survivors;
Davy, about 16 kms South-West of Ridotta Capuzzo;
Perrett, at Ghirba, with 101 survivors, all captured.

The Italian Point of View

Now let us examine the Italian sources.

"La preparazione al conflitto e l'avanzata su Sidi Barrani," published in 1955 by the Army historical, office doesn't mention the action at all.

"Le Operazioni in Africa Settentrionale - Vol.I, Sidi el Barrani," published in 1984 by the Army historical office and written by General M. Montanari, says that:

[D]uring the night of 16th June, a Raggruppamento from 1st Libyan division, formed by a Libyan infantry Bn, two Cv.35 companies from IX Light Tank Bn and one motorized artillery battery (probably equipped with 77/28's) was sent from Gabr Saleh toward Sidi Omar-Ridotta Capuzzo to clear the area of any raiding British elements. Unfortunately, this action turned out badly: the column, surprised during the morning near Sidi Omar by enemy armored units, was badly mauled and its remnants retired to Tobruk.

The commander, Colonel D'Avanzo was killed during the fight. The column lost 200 men, 4 guns, 30 trucks and 12 Cv.35s.

Control of the column exerted by higher headquarters was poor. The only mobile element of XXI Corps, it was moved under direct order from 10th Army HQ. XXI Corps was informed only after the column was on the move when the fact that the Raggruppamento was under 10th Army direct control was also underlined.

A few hours later, when General Dalamazzo was informed that the column was under heavy attack and virtually surrounded by British armored units, the Raggruppamento was returned to the command of XXI Corps, which now became responsible for its rescue.

Unfortunately immediate action was impossible, for the only real help available was from the Regia Aeronautica, but this was under the direct control of Comando Superiore HQ.

This last point, concerning the RA is debatable for between 8:00 and 11:00 it should have been possible to arrange for air support from Tobruk's many airfields.

The decision to form "square" in the open, knowing the ability, mobility, coordination and aggressiveness of the British armored units was a great mistake too, especially considering how these aspects were regularly emphasized by the Italian commands at the time.

How did the CV35 compare with the 1924-pattern Rolls Royce? The armored car was armed with a 13.9mm AT rifles and a 7.7mm machinegun, it had an armor thickness of about 6mm and, according to a 1938 document of the Italian General Staff, it could be penetrated at a range of up to 600 meters by the 8mm machineguns of the Cv.35.

The Rolls-Royce was considered solid and with an actual maximum speed of about 40 km/h. It was 2.31 meters high vs. the 1.30 meters of the Cv.35 and thus a better target than the lower Italian light tank. In addition its tires were very vulnerable, and a puncture was enough to virtually immobilize it.

The Boys AT rifle had a maximum range of 450 meters; at 90 meters it could penetrate a 12mm armor plate. Thus the Cv.35 was vulnerable to it only from the rear and the sides. The Cv.35 could close frontally, firing with its two MGs, without any risk.

"Storia dell'Artiglieria Italiana - Vol. XVI" says that the Italian column was composed of:

• one Libyan infantry Bn;
  
• one Cv.35 Bn;
  
• one 77/28 section (4 guns) from the Libyan 17th battery/VI Group

  In total: 200 men, 4 77/28, 12 Cv.35, 30 trucks.

Ceva and Curami, in their "La Meccanizzazione dell'Esercito fino al 1943," published by the Army historical office in 1989, wrote:

"... some of the survivors reached Bardia. 14 Cv.35 were destroyed and one was captured."

Now, we will examine some unpublished documents.

Former Lt. Ponce de Leon, then commander of a tank platoon in LXI Light Tank Bn, wrote in his memories:

[T]he Vickers tanks (Mk. VIBs) were more or less in the same category with the Cv.35s, but when the first A9 medium tanks arrived things started to become difficult for us.

The first unit to experience problems was the IX Light Tank Bn. It had fought well during the fighting for Ridotta Capuzzo, taken and lost many times. During a recon mission South of Trigh Capuzzo, at Gabr Gaerfi, IX Bn , under Colonel D'Avanzo, was surrounded by superior motorized forces (armored cars, A9s, 88mm guns, actually 2-pdr).

The Bn formed a circle, with the Cv.35s facing outwards. The enemy started to circle around firing against the Italians. The Bn fought hard until the end, refusing to surrender, until the last Cv.35 was destroyed and the Colonel D'Avanzo was killed.

I commanded a little recon party in the area and I took some pictures of Cv.35s destroyed, still positioned in a circle and with some crew bodies still in the tanks.

The motivation for the citation for the award of the Gold Medal to for Military Valor (the highest Italian decoration) to Colonel D'Avanzo mentions the location of the action: Gabdz-Gdeif-Ghirba and says, "He improvised, under enemy fire, a defense of infantry and artillery, counterattacking with the last light tanks under his command."

On the German map (1:400.000) the location is called Bi Chafit Ghirba, and what on the Italian map is called El Saga, becomes Ghirba. General Luigi Sibille, in "La 1.a Divisione Libica dal 4 maggio all'8 luglio 1940," an after the action report written for higher HQs, wrote:

On 15th June, at around 16.00 hours, at Gabr Saleh a superior officer from 10th Army HQ arrived. He had an order concerning a small column which was to begin operations at 20.00 hours the same day. The order contained the route, the composition and the objectives of the column. As the column was supposed to clear the area along its route and to capture some prisoners, it was necessary to give it adequate infantry support.

Colonel D'Avanzo was the only superior officer available to lead the column. He made adequate provision for water, ammo, food, etc. At 22.00 hours, the column left Gabr Saleh. At Bir Gibni, some men from the local garrison acted as guides for the column. At 5.00 hours the column rested at Sidi Omar. At 6.30 hours the advance resumed. The column was organized thus:

On the right was a tank company (until Sidi Omar the Cv.35s were transported by trucks), which had to follow the track, keeping close to the "wire";

On the left of the tanks, a platoon of four Cv35s, with a motorized infantry company, acted as an advance guard;

At the rear of the advance guard was the remainder of the column.

It was these dispositions that led the British to believe that there were two distinct armored columns.

From this point on there followed an incredible succession of Italian mistakes.

The advance guard (formed by the infantry company and the tank platoon) signaled the presence of some British armored cars, but Colonel D'Avanzo at first thought they were the tanks of the Cv.35 company on the right.

Soon it was clear they were really enemy armored cars and two infantry platoons (under the command of Lt. Perini and Lt. Vitelli) of the advance guard left the trucks. The armored cars went after the trucks, now empty. The drivers, thinking their role was finished, retired westward, to evade the armored cars.

The remainder of the advance guard and part of the main column, now confused, started to follow the empty trucks. Colonel D'Avanzo, worried from what he was seeing, ordered Captain Andolfato, commander of the Libyan infantry Bn, to stop that movement.

Andolfato reached the trucks with the artillery battery first, due to their load they were slower than the others. Immediately, the guns were unloaded and began firing at the armored cars. The Cv.35s tried to intercept the Rolls-Royces, which being faster, ignored them and surrounded the main column.

In a few minutes it was chaos: the main part of the column (the artillery battery, the infantrymen and some light tanks) was immobile and surrounded by the armored cars, another part was retiring, subdivided into three groups, followed by other armored cars.

Before Captain Andolfato could reach the three groups, more than 20 minutes had passed and some trucks were already at Sidi Azeiz, about 15 kms from the area of first contact with the enemy.

It is interesting to note that the Rolls-Royces, considered very fast, weren't able to catch the Lancia 3RO trucks, capable of a maximum road speed of 45 km/h.

The three groups were reunited and reorganized by Andolfato. They included some trucks still transporting food, water, ammo and about 70 men.

At this point, Andolfato tried to reach Colonel D'Avanzo and the main body near Ghirba, but the actions of the armored cars obliged him to give this up and to go North, toward Amseat. Before starting the movement, he informed 1st Libyan Division HQ of the situation of the column. Near the airfield of Amseat he found further enemy armored cars and changed direction, following the Trigh Capuzzo. At Gambut he reached the coastal road and, after a few kms towards Bardia, again found enemy units. They were from "C" Squadron 11th Hussars and had just destroyed 27 empty Italian trucks and captured General Lastrucci, 10th Army's commander of the Engineers.

Changing direction again, Andolfato decided to return at to Gabr Saleh, via El Adem. Along the way he was ordered to go to 10th Army HQ at Tobruk. At Tobruk Captain Andolfato reported to the HQ and, the following day, at last returned to Bir Saleh. Returning to the immobilized part of the column, it fought with honor: the artillery men had fallen beside their pieces, all the tanks were destroyed in action and many infantrymen died fighting.

General Sibille closed his report with some questionable considerations: With his aggressive posture, D'Avanzo's column tested the enemy's mettle. Considering the superiority of the enemy and the inadequacy of the Cv35s for deep penetrations, the defeat was inevitable, regardless of the officer in charge. This action was examined in great detail by many superior officers, determined to find a responsible party at all the costs. The fate of the D'Avanzo column was inevitable because of the impossibility of coordinating the action of light tanks with a column composed of lorried infantry, with a so far reaching objective.

Lessons learned from the action:

• our light tanks aren't apt to be employed in a way different from the norm;
  
• our light tanks aren't apt to move for more than 5 kms in desert terrain: they tend to develop mechanical problems and to break down;
  
• our light tanks lack radio links with the lorried part of the columns with which they are called upon to operate;
  
• the machine guns of our light tanks aren't able to penetrate the armor of the armored cars, which, on the contrary, are able to penetrate our armor (it is interesting to note that D'Avanzo didn't order the Cv.35s to be equipped with AP ammo);
  
• our artillery should be operated from on board, not transported on, the trucks so as to be faster in deploying and changing position;
  
• the truck sections should be commanded by trained officers, so as to avoid problems when emptied by the transported infantry.

General Sibille's considerations, written to ease the responsibilities for the failure of the action, don't all stand up to closer examination. Firstly, D'Avanzo employed the Cv.35s exactly by the book. It wasn't true that the Cv.35 couldn't move for more than 5 kms in the desert before breaking down: during some exercises in Libya in May '38 their performance was considered "good." The same was true in Somalia in '36.

Regarding the artillery, the pieces were carried on the trucks instead of being trained by them because they were mostly old WW1 Austrian pieces, whose wheels did not permit them to be trained. Besides, in the Libyan divisions they were usually mounted on fast trucks (the "Dovunque"), capable of 45-50 km/h on road, faster than the ones used by the infantry. The Libyan divisions were also equipped with good 20mm AA/AT pieces mounted on the "Dovunque" truck. It is not clear why D'Avanzo didn't add 2-4 of these pieces to his column, knowing that an encounter with British armored cars was very likely. Surely, they could have exacted heavy toll from the attacking armored cars.

However D'Avanzo's failure wasn't without some positive consequences. Marshal Balbo ordered XXII Corps to the Egyptian border and asked to Mussolini for some German tanks and armored cars. The British raids continued, but without the same degree of freedom and success.

Some Final Considerations

The intention of my article was to inform those who have never attempted historical research how difficult it can be to ascertain the precise historical facts.

Although only a minor episode, this action provides a useful example to support my argument. While a reasonable picture of the events is presented in almost all the accounts, some small, but important, details are divergent, absent and/or conflicting.

The level of detail discussed here isn't usually important for operational games, but could be crucial for tactical ones, where the exact composition of any force is essential to present an historical OOB.