Writing Your Orders:
What Do They mean?

American Civil War Wargame

by David Powell


The CWB series is not, by and large, a complex beast learn or play. It does contain an element that may give man potential players pause-written orders. While not a hex-by-he plotting system (with all of the slow play that entails), it i necessary to issue to your corps concise instructions for movement and attacks. In effect, this is a free-form orders systen governed by that ominous phrase: "use common sense..."

The series has been around several years now and man gainers have found that they can use the system without fear o. loathing. Others, however, have written to us seeking aid or a least further exposition. For these players, let me try to provide further insight into the "common sense" factor in more detail than is possible in rules booklets or designer's notes.

First of all, we have rewritten the CWB series rules cleaning them up and correcting them where necessary. Certain abuses have been corrected (e.g. the excessive use of initiativeusing initiative to get orders which failed acceptance in the same turn, etc.) These changes have been summarized in an addenda sheet in Barren Victory with the full-rewrite to appear in Bloody Roads South next April.

In general, we have made initiative more difficult to obtain. No order may be checked for acceptance and then, failing that check, use initiative to attempt to get that very same order. A player may try for a different initiative order, but-failing that roll-the original order remains uncancelled and he is still obligated to make acceptance rolls for it.

Note that the receipt (not acceptance) of an order will automatically cancel any orders in delay, but currently a accepted orders remain in force until a new order is accepted. The most recently accepted order always supersedes other instructions. A force may only have two sets of orders (at most) at one time: one currently accepted and being followed, and one in delay which is undergoing the acceptance process.

Furthermore, a given formation may have only one leader in its chain of command can be used to check for initiative in a single turn. If a corps leader is used and fails, then division commanders under him may not then be used to negate the failure of the corps leader. The player should select which level of leader he wishes to use to get initiative for a given formation. For example, if Longstreet is commanding the divisions of Hood, McLaws, and Pickett, the player may use either Longstreet or Pickett to obtain initiative for Pickett's division-but not both in a single turn. Note that if a player does use Pickett, he may then use Longstreet to obtain initiative to use for McLaws and Hoodbut such use will then preclude the use of McLaws and Hood in the same manner as above with Pickett.

As an added kicker, we have included a further possible penalty triggered by excessive initiative use: a rule we like to call the "Loose Cannon" effect. Beware of rolling too much, because with a roll of 2, the enemy will get to issue your force an orderup to and including foolish attacks! (BUT, not against your own troops, etc.) This effect last only one turn and you get to conduct the actual execution of the treacherous command. A loose cannon order at the wrong moment can be quite upsetting and embarrassing.

Still, common sense is required. We do not subscribe to the old saw that common sense is anything but common. We, instead, maintain that gainers are intelligent and once the understand the thrust of a concept they can apply it to individual cases with ease.

Command in the Civil War had yet to become the science that's taught today in war colleges world-wide. Compared to the operations orders of the modern military, Civil War instructions between a commander and his subordinate were much more informal. Approaching Gettysburg on July 1st, 1863, Ewell and A.P. Hill (CSA Corps Commanders) were simply ordered to concentrate their troops in the vicinity of Gettysburg and "not to bring on a general engagement before the rest of the army [was] up."

Another example is Lee's infamous Special Orders 191 This is the order which was lost and fell into the hands of McClellan during the Antietam Campaign alerting him to Lee's dispositions. This order, which covered the various movements of all the major elements of Lee's army down to the division level, was only a couple of pages long--9 short paragraphs in all. Yet this order controlled the to movements of more than 40,000 men, accomplishing no less than three different operations, and included logistical instructions.

In short, Civil War orders were usually informal, quickly jotted notes, which ideally covered the commander's full intent. (An ideal that was frequently not attained with the resulting confusion that implies.) Players should try to match this same goal.

The most frequent abuse of the command system is not poor y order writing, but rather stems from the fact that units are allowed to move and fight freely within command radii. Units within command radius can find themselves doing all sorts of things simply because there is no reason to move the HQ. After all, everyone is in command range-so why not attack? Command radius abuse is easily solved. In short, two criteria should be applied-command radius and requirement for orders. Not only must the player check for command range, but must also ask if the involved units need orders to be able to undertake the desired actions. If the answer to the second question is yes, then the next step is to ask if, indeed, these units have orders (either from higher command or via initiative) allowing units to undertake the action in question. If both of these needs are not met, the activity should not occur.

For clarification, I will attempt also to provide more in -dep the definitions of various order types:

Complex Orders should be very broadly interpreted. Not only do complex orders cover easily defined attacks such as frontal assaults-Pickett's charge is a very clear-cut case of an attack orderbut also movement that could bring about an encounter with the enemy. Any movement towards an objective not currently or last held by friendly units should be construed as a complex order and handled appropriately.

For example, assume that neither player has occupied Little Round Top. If either player wishes to send troops to that location and defend it, such orders would still be complex orders since the hill was not previously held by friendly forces and such movement might initiate combat. If there is any real doubt about the combativeness of a particular movement, make it complex. Imagine that the same doubt is mirrored in the real-life commanders those orders are issued to and that they are preparing to meet the enemy.

Simple Orders will be less frequently used. Simple orders are designed to allow troops to be shifted from one position to another within friendly lines, etc. Arriving reinforcements, for example, often are ordered simply to report to the army HQ. Assigning these units a position in a defensive line, so as to shift other troops elsewhere, is a simple order.

The key questions to ask here are: 1. Is the end point of the route still in friendly hands, and 2. Does the route specified involve conflict? An order directing a command to move between friendly controlled points, but specifying a route that is blocked by enemy forces, requires a complex order, not a simple order. As a rule of thumb, a simple order that has its instructions negated by enemy activity is considered unfulfillable and new orders must be issued. Also, simple orders prohibit offensive not defensive combat.

No Orders is a condition rather than a positive order. Troops without any orders should be considered to be defending in place. [Ed. Note: See also the Defensive Orders article in this issue.]

Forces without orders are still allowed considerable latitude in order to fight off attacks. Implied in this condition is the ability to counterattack on a limited scale, which is why the rules state that units do not need orders to move and fight. It is fully within the scope of the rules to allow units, once attacked, to counterattack to recapture lost ground. Of course, units under orders (complex or simple) in this situation are still obligated to try to fulfill (or alter) previous instructions. The mere act of being assaulted while under orders does not automatically void existing commands. Once attacked, however, units without orders should be free to move and fight without restriction up to the limits of command radii. Of course, any action which calls for the Moventent of the Corps HQ must be triggered through orders or emergency corps retreat. In trying to decide if a given combat is legal in the current framework of a unit's orders, remember that a no-orders force cannot initiate attacks in the larger sense of that word. They can fire during "offensive" fire and conduct close combats. They can conduct counterattacks and other such limited offensive actions needed to defend their position.

Divisional Goals represent a different kind of order and are most useful for detached missions. In many cases, players won't want to send an entire corps off on some flank protection or other such mission, but will still want a force to guard against emergcncies. Divisional goals should contain more detail than a corps order. A corps is always limited because its HQ is unable to move without positive orders and, therefore, operations are ultimately limited by command radii.

A divisional goal has no such self-governing mechanism. Therefore, a division with a goal to attack or defend a certain locale should have specific geographic limits placed upon its operations. For instance, a division assigned to defend a road between points X and Y would be unable to advance or retreat past X or Y without new orders, initiative or an emergency corps retreat.

Issuing orders is only part of the job. Once implemented, the player is expected to carry them out--even if events have changed enough to make a player regret his earlier choices. The varying amounts of pressure a player brings to bear while carrying out such orders can cause controversy at the game table. However, we do not want to impose any mandatory restrictions on exact percentages engaged or loss levels-rejecting these solutions as "gamey."

No Civil War general sat down with some master chart that told him how much pressure to bring to bear on an objective. He would tend to press the issue as much as he could without endangering his command.

[Ed. Note: Thereby leaving himse6f open to bitter debate and fingerpointing after the war...]

In game terms, the player is obligated to make sonte effort to put troops into combat as long as the order holds. Piecemeal brigade attacks or several brigades engaging only at two hex range seem to me to be a fine re-crcation of foot-dragging. In my own reading, I can find several instances where such 'attacks' were 'pressed,' usually to the dismay of the higher command. However, this caution may not suit some players. For those players, I suggest the following:

When any order is written, indicate with a number from 1 to 3 how aggressively it is to be followed. For instance, a player who assigned a I to an attack is allowed to press very lightly perhaps one brigade at a time or the two-hex range option. A player who commits himself to a 3 is doomed to a full scale assault, no matter what the odds. A 2 would commit a player to the middle ground, perhaps using 50% of his force at a time. This number doesn't affect acceptance in any way. Changing intensity value would require a new order or initiative.

[Ed Note: For the rules lawyers out there who are now planning to issue 1's to everyone in order to have maximum flexibility, not that the above is also the hardest a force can attack at a given level. Giving a force a 1 does not allow it to attack from the one brigade level all the way upit confines the attack to the light pressure and the light pressure alone.]

Alternatively, a player could jot down a descriptive word or two indicating the intended ferocity of his assault. These would range from "probing attack" to "all out attack." Using a word as opposed to a number would still limit the player to some prearranged guideline, but allows somewhat greater latitude in interpretation.

In closing, a few words need to be said about trust as it applies to the game. A certain minimal amount of trust is expected from all players-to obey orders, etc. Many die rolls are to be made in secret and players should feel comfortable concerning the honesty implied in these rolls.

Personally, I care very little for playing a game where tension of suspicion exists, and make it a point not to repeat games against such opponents. There is no mechanism in our games to prohibit cheating and it is easy to circumvent the system if one intentionally tries. It has been our experience that this presents little problem for the vast majority of our customers.

Our hbby purports to "put you in the driver's seat" (so to speak) and give you some sense of the commander's job. While board games can succeed at this goal only in a limited fashion, much can be done, and I think the CWB accomplishes much in this direction.


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