One of the most interesting uses of wargames is as historical tools, to investigate various turns that battles could have taken -- outcomes that were well within the realm of possibility. Alternative history scenarios may posit different strategic/operational approaches (more units or fewer, varied entry times for reinforcements), specific attributes (morale levels and training), or sets of historical circumstances (this order wasn't lost, that general wasn't shot). Although playing the historical game "straight" is a satisfying way to measure yourself against the original commanders' performance, if the game is a good simulahon it often results in a replay of history.

A case in point is Longstreet's assault on the second day at Gettysburg. The Little Round Top scenario in Thunder at the Crossroads recreates this attack which is considered, in retrospect, the Confederates' best shot at a victory. In the game, the Rebels can certainly wreck the Union 3 Corps, as they did historically, but the reinforcements from 5 Corps, 2 Corps and possibly 6 Corps are simply too much to handle. That, plus the highly obstructing and defensible terrain, dooms the attack in advance. Usually the most that can be achieved against a competent Union player is a minor victory. As this is the historical result, it is a good validity indicator for both the scenario and the game system.

Where does alternative history come in here? What combination of circumstances could have occurred to allow this attack to take place with a big Confederate victory a very real possibility?

Obviously, we could use any of the game's optional variants giving the Army of Northern Virginia non-historical reinforcements, or tinker with Longstreet's deployment (e.g. recreating Jackson's Chancellorsville flank assault, this time from the south), or inhibit Union action or deployment. This will alter the correlation of forces and change probable outcomes -- but how likely were these things to happen? It seems to me that these kinds of variants are best used to resolve a perceived imbalance, either between the two armies or between players, and not to explore historical probabilities. A more faithful perspective will eschew the least likely alternatives and will offer scenarios that reflect a high degree of historical probability.

Military historians have always regarded Gettysburg as the Confederates' battle to win or lose. Many explanations have been offered for their defeat. One notable theory holds that Jackson's absence precluded victory on the first day. TATC players may explore this alternative with Scenario 11. Another theory is that Stuart's absence kept Lee in the dark, forcing him to act too cautiously. This view deserves some attention. What if Stuart had joined up with the army two or three days earlier -- a very distinct possibility -- and had been on hand for Longstreet's knockout blow on 2 July? What we need is a highly plausible scenario that allows for a second-day assault with improved chances. JEB's early arrival would have meant more than just three additional brigades of Southern cavalry.

Scenario Background

On 27 June, 1863,a desk jockey in the War Department takes heed of rumors about an impending Rebel raid into Maryland, and postpones departure of a Washington-to- Frederick supply convoy. Stuart crosses the Potomac on the 28th, does not intercept this wagon train (which, in reality, slowed him greatly), and proceeds north by forced marches. The evening of the 28th finds him in Cooksville, MD; the 29th in Hanover, PA. he leaves Hanover just ahead of Kilpatrick's Union cavalry division. Stuart finally links up with Early's division during the afternoon of 30 June and bivouacs for the night at Heidlersburg. The next day the battle begins.

Lee learns of Stuart's return in the evening of the 30th. Relieved from worry about his cavalry, and with a better idea of the Army of the Potomac's position, as outlined in Stuart's initial report, Lee orders Longstreet to recall Pickett from his rear guard duties and march to Gettysburg at daybreak. At Gettysburg the next day, Stuart's tired troopers arrive in the afternoon with Early's division.

They skirmish with Buford's men throughout the day, and do not accomplish much offensively however, their scouting of the Union position is superb. With good knowledge of the enemy dispositions, Lee decides by midnight on a coordinated assault spearheaded by 1 Corps. Longstreet's three divisions (which arrive during the night), supported by Anderson on the left and Stuart on the right, will attack the Union left flank and roll it up. Massive victory here will lead to the fall of Washington and independence of the Confederate States of America.

Tactical Notes

CSA With 14 brigades on map instead of 8, and 8 hours of daylight instead of 4, General Longstreet has the opportunity to replay Second Manassas and rout the enemy off the field. Stuart's horsemen have effectively screened the deployment and have allowed for a quick approach march to assault positions. Although the Union flank is not strong, it is very strongly anchored by Big Round Top. Therefore, your main tactical decision is going to be how to deal with this. You can choose to extend your line southward with Pickett, and have him advance directly on the mountain with a view to flanking Little Round Top.

You could send him on a wide turning move via divisional goal on the road from Kern's through Bushman's Woods and then north on the Taneytown Road axis, supported by Stuart. Or he can be held north of Big Round Top, in close support of Hood and McLaws, ready to break through when and where the enemy line weakens. (This last approach, holding the supporting brigades in depth behind the assault, was Longstreet's specialty. See Dave Powell's "Assaulting with Success" articles in Operations 7 and 9.) The advance also can be staggered, with brigades going in at 30-minute intervals, in order to achieve a true echelon attack.

Whatever the plan, you are going to have heavy losses. The terrain is mostly a mess and you're not fighting Girl Scouts. Buford's deployment will have a big influence: those two brigades side by side can really hold you up. Stuart must neutralize them, either by direct flank attacks or by threatening movement around the entire Union flank. You have a slight initial advantage in artillery: make sure that the guns are brought forward as the action progresses for counterbattery fire and concentrated fire on infantry.

The Peach Orchard area makes an excellent fire base for massed artillery battalions. however, remember that you have only 50 rounds everything in the limbers and caissons, the trains being well to the rear -- for an entire afternoon, so frivolous shooting is definitely out. (When playing the full battle I always limit each army's daily ammunition expenditure to 50% of its initial total, in order to simulate battery replenishment abstractly, and I subtract a round from the Artillery Ammo Track for each gun point lost.)

You must keep the pressure on. You want to break the Yankee defense as early as possible, keeping in mind the fact that Sedgwick must be nearing the field. however, even if 6 Corps does show up, it will be several hours before it can deploy for a fullscale counterattack. A line of battle along Cemetery Ridge with plenty of guns, a few fresh infantry brigades in reserve, and defensive orders, should be able to repel it before nightfall. If that can be done, half the Army of the Potomac will be virtually pocketed on Map A.

USA: Thanks to Stuart's screening, General Sickles has been slow to discern the threat to his Corps, but Buford's reports now indicate a big attack. 3 Corps is still in position back on Cemetery Ridge and there is no time to move forward to occupy the Peach Orchard, Devil's Den, and Rose's Woods. But you must get up on Little Round Top immediately.

A quick move forward to a line along Plum Run is usually in order, but don't expect to stay there long. Your main position along the ridge is a good one -- it must be held "at all hazards" and pray for reinforcements. Some 12 Corps units shifted from the right during the real battle are not available, as it is assumed that Ewell mounts a more credible diversionary attack in broad daylight. At least you might have the army commander later to give some orders: the Confederates have to rely on initiative.

Little Round Top is the key. Place at least two good brigades preferably a division -- on the hill. You can expect to be assaulted there in short order, initially by one or two brigades but building up to a full division. If the attack can be beaten back, possibly wrecking some Rebel units, victory may be in sight. But it's a long afternoon. The line may collapse anywhere.

You must try to maintain a credible reserve force (2-5 Division is a good choice) to guard against breakthroughs/ flanking moves. Rotate your brigades as they take casualties, but keep the guns up and firing. Buford is a great asset. I assume that he would not have been withdrawn to guard the army's supply base, as he was historically on 2 July, if Stuart had been in his front.

His most effective deployment is probably west and south of Big Round Top, preventing an easy end run by Stuart/Pickett while representing a threat himself. It is probably not a good idea to split the brigades, as they can be overwhelmed by Stuart in turn. If Stuart does after 1-Cv, fight in retreat, let him get extended and out of range of the infantry supports, and then counterattack. (Correction to the Union Standard Order of Arrival: 2-Cv and 3-Cv did not arrive via the Baltimore Pike on 2 July; they should arrive at entry hexes H and G respectively, with orders to defend the army right flank.)

Suggested Optional Rules

Terrain: Consider the summit of Big Round Top (B24.22) to be at elevation level 12 and surrounded by extreme slope hexsides. Hexes of Little Round Top (B25.26) and Devil's Den (B22.25 and B22.26) are rough terrain: normal in-hex terrain costs are doubled for all units. No more than 2 gun points may occupy a single rough hex at any time, except for B22.25 (the "Slaughter Pen"), from which artillery is completely prohibited.

Big Round Top's commanding height is great for sightseeing but useless for artillery. A special rough terrain rule accounts for the extremely rocky, constricted terrain at these sites.

Artillery: Artillery may fire at up to 14 hexes range. Add an "11-14" column totheArtillery Fire Point DeterminationChart: 5 gun points yield 1/2 point, 4 or fewer yield 0. Also, Confederate long-range artillery fire gets a negative dice roll modifier (not a column shift):

Range	DRM
7-8	-1
9-10	-2
11-14	-3

And artillery firing from non-adjacent hexes may not combine gun points for an attack on the same target hex without specific orders, except for Union Reserve Artillery units.

This makes good artillery positions like the Peacn Orchard and the northern slopes of Little Round Top even more valuable, especially if you expand the scenario to include the whole battle with both maps. On 3 July, Union cannon at LRT enfiladed Pickett's brigades near Codori's, inflicting severe casualties at over 2500 yards range, while the Confederate guns northwest of the town, firing at similar or longer ranges, could not silence the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill. Rebel gunners could nof fire as effectively at long range due to their having fewer heavy rifled guns and poor ammunition, and they did not have a General Henry Hunt to successfully coordinate their artillery at the army level.

Cavalry: Cavalry units run low on ammunition when they roll 4 or 8, as well as 11 or 12, on the Fire Combat Table (all the shaded rows on the table).

Increased likelihood of ammo shortage will reduce the "staying power"of the cavalry. Cavalry carried fewer rounds than infantry but fired in more frequent, patrols, etc. Yankee breechloaders had a high rate of fire; the Confederates had a hard time supplying differing weapon types and catching up with their fast-moving troopers. There wer every good reasons why cavalry was not expected to engage in any sustained combat..

JEB Stuart Scenario Information