In the preceding 17 months of war (Feb.41/Jun 42) there was a monthly average of 73,300 tons of deliveries (see Table 2):

Table 2: Average deliveries Feb.41/Jun 42 (tons)
Receiver	Fuel	Vehicles	Weapons/Ammo	Other	Totals
German Army	6,100	3,500	1,700	14,000	25,300
Italian Army	10,000	6,400	3,000	16,100	35,500
Italian Navy	2,100	50	100	1,000	3,250
Civilian needs	300	50	-	8,900	9,250
Monthly totals:	Feb 18,500	March 10,000	April 4,800	May 40,000	June 73,300

During this months there were no supplies shortage, so we can assume that such arrivals were sufficient to meet the needs of the fighting forces.

From the following tables we can analyze the exact amount of deliveries in the 2 crucial months before the battle of Alam Halfa (see Table 3).

Table 3: July 2 - Sept. 2 deliveries (145,167 tons)

From mercantile ships:
44,498 tons fuel
130 tanks (1,819 tons)
3,521 vehicles (14,783 tons)
15,439 tons weapons & ammo
63,313 other supplies (for a total of 139,852 tons)
From warships:
1,326 tons fuel
137 tanks (2,210 tons)
97 vehicles (639 tons)
63,313 1,140 tons weapons & ammo
(for a total of 5,315 tons)

If we compare this data with the average of the preceding 17 months we see that there was a significant improvement in the performance of Italian Navy, not the worsening affirmed by some historians (see Table 4).

Table 4: Average monthly deliveries
Type	Feb. 41 - June 42	July 42 - Sept. 42
Fuel	18,500 tons	22,912 tons
Weapons & Ammo	4,800 tons	8,289 tons
Tanks & Vehicles	9,725 tons	10,000 tons

Once arrived in North Africa some of these supplies were sent by coasting vessels from Tripoli/Benghazi to Tobruk/Mersa Matruh.

In the 2 months were sent 43,466 tons, 38,775 were delivered (11% were sunk), according to the following distribution (see Table 5):

Table 5: Supplies delivered to the ports through cabotage (tons)
Location	Tripoli	Benghazi	Tobruk	Matruh	Total
From Italy	36,669	60,500	47,071	1,927	145,167
Loaded on Coastal Vessels	19,015	13,980	10,471	-	43,466
Left on Piers	16,654	46,520	36,600	1,927	101,701
Arrived from Cabotage	-	11,090	17,655	10,030	38,755
Delivered to Commissioners	16,654	57,610	54,255	11,957	140,476

In the 63 decisive days there was no shortage of fuel, thanks to 5,000 tons of weekly deliveries with a peak of 7,000 tons/week in July (the weekly data are more relevant that the monthly one: since troops move and fight every day...). The same is true for weapons & ammo: 2,000 tons/week in the period.

Tobruk, conquered on June 21, received the first shipment on July 3: a total of 64,726 tons of supply were delivered there (with 70 ships directly from Italy). Even Matruh received 11,957 tons of supplies: every day 250 to 300 tons were delivered, under constant air attacks, on the only existing pier.

Returning to the Rommel requests, we can see that he received practically everything he asked for: it was delivered a total of 8,000 tons of fuel (request for 5,000); 479 vehicles against a request of 322; by the 25th of August 483 tons of ammo were ready (500 requested). The only request voided was that for 2,000 tons of ammo in Benghazi and Tobruk by August 30: he received only 1,163 tons, all in Benghazi. But considering the delivery time we can think that such supplies were planned for the advance after the battle (that never happened). Actually at the beginning of the battle Rommel had supplies sufficient for 108 hours of fighting but he desisted after only 60 with a lot of supplies left, without considering the "phantom stocks" (the supplies that every respectable military unit forgot to report to HQ) and what the Axis troops had gained in the last advance (according to Italian records its units captured 500 vehicles and 1,700 tons of supplies).

Reason for Defeat?

So what is the reason for the defeat? The answer to this question has to be found in another facts: the front was 500 km away from Tobruk and 1,000 from Benghazi, with the only available road exposed to constant air attacks and with insufficient vehicles. Every truck consumed 10% of the fuel loaded with an average wear and tear of 30% (yes: for every 10 truck started 3 were lost due to maintenance problems and mechanical breakdowns, without considering enemy air attacks etc.). The Italian Army sent all it could get from the Italian factories: in these 2 months 3,600 vehicles arrived in North Africa but they were not sufficient considering that the ferry along the Via Balbia alone needed 1,000 trucks.

But the most important reason is another: let's remember that from the 17th to the 30th of August, when the overextended Italian Navy delivered 20,000 tons of supplies in North Africa, at Alexandria (100 km behind the British lines) 500,000 tons of supplies were delivered to the Commonwealth troops.