The following is an article whose topic is the OCS. Specifically, I will be looking at the systems recreation of mobile or maneuver warfare. The game experience here is derived chiefly through playings of Enemy at the Gates and Tunisia, and as such deals with series rules version 2.0i.

Given the releases of Hube's Pocket and DAK, a few words about the current state of the OCS supply system are in order as well. Let us begin on the topic of supply.

Is That "Guns and Butter" or "Guns are Butter"?

In the OCS 2.0i rules, supply points are primarily intended to represent fuel and munitions. The consumption of victuals is handled via a trace system, whose workings seem intended to simulate the movement of victuals to the units which need sustinence. This system works quite well in most situations, only encountering trouble when troops which have access to supply points are unable to use trace supply.

The nature of the problem is that troops who cannot trace supply in the Supply Phase must either consume supply points (which according to the designer's notes represent fuel and munitions -- meals like that could lead to frightening indigestion) or roll on the Attrition Table, which frequently results in step losses. [Ed note: Actually, rule 11.6a: begins, "Most on-map supply is only for ammo and fuel purposes."] With each turn representing 3 1/2 days, I feel that this lacks historicity, for the following reasons:

1) The average combat unit surely carries some rations with it. The soldiers do not march around with no provisions at all. Even if they did, it takes longer than 3 1/2 days to get hungry enough to cause serious trouble.

2) According to all of the reading I have done on both the psychology of war in general and the Eastern Front in particular, lack of food was not the principal factor in the disintegration of isolated forces (which is the basic effect of the Attrition Table). The primary factor seemed more along the lines of panic from the knowledge of enemy troops in the immediate rear.

3) With the current system, it's difficult for First Panzer Army in Hube's Pocket to make it out of the pocket without suffering much higher losses than were in fact the case. Please remember that historically the Germans broke out not only without massive casualties, but also without having to abandon their heavy vehicles and equipment (as they had to do at Korsun). It was a notable operational victory for the Germans at a late stage of the war, but with the current supply system it cannot happen without "rigging" the initial unit deployments (see Scenario 5).

While understanding the rationale behind the changes made to the supply system in version 2.0, I feel that there must be a better answer to this. One possible answer, which I have tried on small scale situations, is described below. I hope that it will provide a basis for thought and discussion which possibly can lead the way here.

First, we must state that under no circumstances can on-map supply points ever be consumed as victuals. Second, we must differentiate between units unable to trace because of weather, terrain or other such effects and those unable to trace due to enemy units blocking all possible trace routes. Having done so, let us set forth the rules, as follows:

1) Any unit which cannot trace supply, or be exempted, must roll on the Attrition Table.

2) The manner in which units roll on the Attrition Table is as follows:

Cannot trace because enemy units block all possible trace paths

First Turn: Use Action Rating 5 column with a -2 DRM.

Second consecutive turn: Use Action Rating 5 column, no DRM.

Third turn and later: Normal procedure

Cannot trace for reason which does not fit above case

First Turn: Exempted- no roll made

Second consecutive turn: Use Action Rating 5 column with a -2 DRM.

Third consecutive turn: Use Action Rating 5 column, no DRM.

Fourth turn and later: Normal procedure

3) In addition to the reasons listed above, a unit may be exempted from rolling on the Attrition Table if it received air or sea supply. To convert the current system for airlifts to this supply system, use the following procedure:

a) Create a track numbered 0 thru 9, and two markers (ones and tens). This is used to track deliveries.

b) To fly "food" to an isolated unit, perform the transport or airdrop mission without loading any physical supply markers on the air unit. Record the number of whole tokens which successfully arrive on the track. A single air unit may not transport both "food" and munitions in the same trip; if using the rules allowing multiple flights to a sufficiently close airbase, one trip could be "food" and the other could be munitions at the players' option.

c) When all deliveries have been made, the player uses the normal supply charts for Supply Phase supply to buy exemptions for units in that isolated area. Each unit or stack exempted in this manner is marked with any suitable blank/unused marker.

d) Repeat the above steps for each isolated force on the map which has "food" flown to it.

Success

This system has proved successful in the trials I have conducted so far. Please note that much of the change serves to bring the trace supply system into what is known as internal consistency. Since the on-map supply points now represent only fuel/ammo, gone are the gamey happenings which hampered the system in accomplishing Mr. Essig's stated intention, that of focusing the players attention to planning operational situations.

No doubt there are flaws in it, but that is the great thing about a journal such as Operations: by writing about it a large number of intelligent people can look at it and perfect it. This is one of the things which sets The Gamers apart from other publishers, they are willing to listen to the people who play the games, and do not consider themselves the last word of wisdom on wargaming.

Part 2: The OCS and the "Annihilation Concept (Vernichtungsgedanke)"

This section deals more specifically with how the OCS portrays the principles of both maneuver warfare in general and of the annihilation concept in particular. I believe looking at the annihilation concept is important because central theme of German military thinking is key to understanding why the Germans did things (more so in the early part of the war than after Hitler assumed command) as they did. The following is a thumbnail sketch of the annihilation concept and how it operates.

The concept of the "battle of annihilation" had its origins in the work of the Prussian reformers during the Napoleonic age, in particular the work of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Its basis, as related by Bruce Gudmundsson in the essay Maneuver Warfare: The German Tradition, was, in a single battle or series of battles, to destroy or render useless enough of the enemy's main army to render further resistance futile. This concept was a logical continuation of the principles of war of Frederick the Great, the difference being that Frederick usually had to be satisfied with incomplete victories.

To this was added the lessons learned from Napoleon at Austerlitz and Jena-Auerstadt, where the French were able to create the necessary conditions for the annihilation battle.

The result of the theorizing of the Prussian reformers was the creation of the General Staff as a unitary system of command and control. This, plus the retraining of the Prussian infantry to fight in open order, made possible the campaign which culminated in the battle of Leipzig. The outline of the campaign had been designed by the General Staff to create the conditions for the "annihilation battle," and it did so. While the French won battles such as Leutzen, these had no real effect on the campaign. Napoleon was finally compelled to fight at unfavorable odds, in a situation where losing the battle and losing the campaign were one in the same for the French. Losing the battle for Prussia, however, had no such repercussions. The result is history.

This campaign, and the Prussian victories in 1866 and 1867 versus Austria and France, had certain things in common. One of these was the creation of the conditions for success prior to the start of the operation. In other words, when the Germans were at their best, some type of victory was all but assured before the first soldier crossed the start line. Another was the emphasis on envelopment, which is also seen in the Leipzig campaign. By the way, this doesn't mean the small envelopment of the tactical scale, but large strategic envelopments. The third emphasis was on speed, being able to exploit the initial gains faster than the enemy could respond. This formula worked well until WW1.

Brick Wall

In WW1, the German theory of war ran into a brick wall called the continuous front. This removed the open flank so integral to previous successes. What also happened, due to the Allies in the West being able to operate on interior road and rail networks, was that the Germans lost the operational mobility essential to being able to exploit faster than the enemy response. Two solutions were tried to correct this impasse. The first one, the development of Stosstuppen (infiltration) tactics, was tactically successful in that it gave the Germans an answer of sorts to the trench problem. The Allies still had the rail and road advantage, however, making the Stosstupen tactics unable to achieve a strategic decision.

The second attempt, which occurred in WW2, was the mechanization of Stosstuppen tactics known as Blitzkrieg. This was a synthesis of the annihilation concept and the ideas of armoured warfare espoused by such figures as JFC Fuller, whose Plan 1919 had a significant impact on this process. The Blitzkrieg concept can best be described as follows:

Ground troops with air support employing their mobility to secure an attainable objective, the loss of which will paralyse the enemy's command system, destroy his morale and lead to the disintegration of his army. The actual method consists of concentration in overwhelming strength at the point of impact during the break-in phase, deep penetration beyond the zone in which the enemy is capable of response, and attainment of the objective by means of an indirect approach; the whole accompanied by a braking or holding operation intended to involve the main mass of the enemy's force.
Bryan Perrett Knights of the Black Cross

From this, we can see that classical German mobile operations tended to be structured as follows:

Phase 1: The main enemy force is engaged or its attention drawn by a limited operation designed to get their attention. This operation was usually designed to look like the main effort.

Phase 2: The panzer forces then execute an attack with overwhelming strength at the selected point of contact.

Phase 3: Once past the point of attack, the panzer forces accelerate towards the objective(s), which are usually deep in the enemy's rear. Enemy forces at or near the initial point of contact are bypassed and left for follow up troops to clear out.

Phase 4: The panzer forces secure the objective(s), usually in the process disrupting the enemy's lines of supply and command. With the enemy army now having its command and supply functions severely impaired, it is compelled to fight at a disadvantage, and risks destruction if it loses.

I apologize for the length of the "thumbnail sketch." Having completed it, let us proceed to how all this relates to the OCS.

The Annihilation Battle in the OCS

This section of the article covers the application of Vernichtungsgedanke to the play of the German side in the OCS. While the information below applies to some extent to any side, the German Army is the only one presented thus far in the game system which has the correct organization and/or capabilities to fully carry out these concepts. The presentation has been organized into topics to make for ease of comprehension.

The first topic is the selection of the objective of the offensive operation. While this objective may be the possession of a geographic area on the map, there should be other benefits accruing from its accomplishment. Some of these are as follows:

1) The objective should result in at least an interruption of trace supply to the main enemy force, or a significant portion of it. An example of this from Enemy at the Gates is a late game German attack which gets behind Soviet forces which have crossed the Donets, and recaptures the bridges over the Donets. This cuts all trace supply to the enemy forces.

2) If possible, the objective should be something required by your opponent to win. This will compel him (her) to come to you to retake it. This idea goes back to causing your enemy to fight at a disadvantage.

3) Lastly, but extremely important, the objective absolutely must be attainable. Tailor your offensive around the size and type of force you have to work with, as well as the available supply points and your ability to move these supply points into enemy territory. The last two are a direct measurement of how long and how deep you can drive.

The second topic will be the selection of the "break-in" point. This is a location or section of the battlefield which meets the greatest possible number of the following characteristics:

1) The distance from the break-in point to the operational objective should be such that the break-in force can reach it before significant defending forces can get there. Significant is defined as being more than the break-in force is capable of defeating in one turn. If this condition is not met, the whole thing will bog down into a killing match between your elite (and irreplaceable) units and his second line troops.

2) The break-in point should be far enough away from the main mass of the enemy's reserves that they cannot take effective blocking action in the Reaction Phase. If this condition is not met there is no breakthrough.

3) The break-in point must be able to be overwhelmed in a single sequence of Overrun/Regular Combat by the attacker. Again if this is not met there is no breakthrough.

The third topic is the determination of what forces are required to carry out the offensive. The first step here is to divide the offensive force into two categories. The first one is the "break-in" force. This is the force charged with attaining the objective of the offensive, as related in topic one. The second one is the "braking" force. This force is responsible for fulfilling the holding or braking of the main enemy force, as specified under Phase 1 of German mobile operations earlier in this article.

The Break-in Force

The break-in force by the very nature of its mission requires units with a high movement allowance. In German terms, this means every panzer and motorized division you can concentrate and supply should be assigned to this force. Remember, you can never be too strong at the decisive point, and the break-in force will be fighting at exactly that point by the very nature of its mission.

When working on this, also remember point one under selecting an objective. The break-in force must be strong enough to both seize and hold all objectives. Also, since the break-in force will be moving into the enemy rear, it will in effect be isolating itself. Because of this, the break-in force will need supply points delivered to it en route to the objective, and probably won't be able to use trace supply for part of its mission. Two methods of doing this are available, both should be employed if possible.

The first is having supply points loaded on trucks accompanying the break-in force, with the trucks being stacked with a strong formation for safety. The second method involves the aerial transport of supply points to the units in need. Ideally the break-in force will have captured an enemy airstrip for the planes to land at, but be ready to airdrop supply if need be (and to keep dropping it until the right quantity is delivered).This situation underscores another necessary element of a good break-in force: a HQ with motorization (Panzer corps type). This unit is vital for two reasons:

First, your precious supplies are easier to protect if kept in one place. The HQ allows the use of supply throw, which allows for a more extended deployment of your break-in force. The HQ stays in move mode, as its throw range even in this mode is sufficient, and you have to keep moving or fail anyway. The trucks with the supply points stay in the same hex as the HQ , along with the escort, which is usually a full regiment of either panzers or motorized infantry.

Second, HQs are the only units in the game system which automatically are engineers. Whether it be facilitating a river crossing, or possibly building a level-1 airfield to expedite supply delivery, you want to provide the break-in force with engineer capabilities. By the way, if you have motorized units which are defined as engineers in the game-specific rules, send them with the break-in force. Don't send leg movement engineers: they can't keep up. This constitutes an overview of the recommended composition of the break-in force. We will now proceed to a force on whose mission the success of the break-in force hangs. That is the braking force.

The Braking Force

The makeup of the braking force will be fundamentally different from that of the break-in force. This is due to the fact that, while the essential quality needed for the break-in force to perform its mission is speed, the braking force is primarily concerned with holding the main enemy force in place, thus rendering it irrelevant to the decisive battle being waged by the break-in force. In the terms of Robert Leonhard's brilliant book The Art of Maneuver, the mission of the braking force is to hold the main enemy force in place, thus causing its positional dislocation.

To accomplish this mission, the braking force will require the following components:

1) All available infantry. These units have sufficient combat and staying power to get and keep the attention of the enemy. Remember that you must have a good chunk of supply here, or there isn't any threat.

2) Artillery. This unit type is invaluable for giving your infantry the extra teeth necessary to fight and win. Once again, remember that your mission is to hold the enemy's attention while you quietly move the break-in force into position. Infantry without artillery support is once again not the type of threat the enemy will feel compelled to respond to.

3) Non-divisional armor (Assault Guns): This serves the same basic purpose as the artillery. The point of all this is that the braking force needs to appear capable of fighting a decisive battle, or it has no credibility.

The final topic covers how to set up the offensive, after doing all of the above. First, you don't want to advertise your intentions. This not only applies to whether you're attacking, but where. Deception always figured prominently in successful German offensives, and this is no exception. Here are some pointers on doing this:

1) Use those divisional substitution markers. Remember that only the top action rating unit in a stack is liable to inspection. If you have sufficient small units scattered about. it is possible to mass the break-in force with some secrecy. Since units may move as a stack, so the opponent never sees the divisional marker underneath. Forward supply dumps can be amassed in like manner, by using the highest denomination supply markers available.

2) Stick to your plan: Once you've got your offensive designed, carry it out in the intended manner, unless events render your plan inappropriate. In fact it might be a good idea to write down your plan so as to be able to refer to it and remember what your intent was (old age creeps up, doesn't it?).

3) Stay focused: Once the offensive begins, the cat is out of the bag, so to speak. Therefore, don't get distracted with events or opportunities which detract from your plan. The only excuse here is an opportunity to win the game outright.

4) Know when to stop: This is an extension of the previous point. Remember that you're using supplies at a pretty ferocious rate in a full-blown offensive. So shut it down immediately upon achieving the objective, and go on the defensive. Don't play around with "just one more turn, and I can get that division". You'll need the wasted supply to hold the objective, not to mention carrying out Phase 4 of German mobile operations. If you have something the enemy cannot win (or his forces will die) without, you do not need to chase him down. He'll come to you, and have to fight in a situation where you are better prepared. If he loses, it's all over. You, on the other hand, usually can afford to fight another day if things start not to break right. This is the essence of the "battle of annihilation."

This concludes my thoughts on conducting the "battle of annihilation" in the OCS. I want to thank you for your interest (and stamina) in reading this treatise. Having begun this article with proposing a variant to the supply rules, I think its appropriate to end it by proposing another one.

Hold On

While the OCS as stands is a superlative piece of design work on WW2 operational combat, I believe the system could be enhanced in how it portrays that essential ingredient of operational warfare, the holding attack. Having read once instance after another of units being held in place by enemy activity, I long to see it happen on the map.

I agree with Dean that traditional ZOC rules are neither realistic or appropriate at the game scale, and in fact usually distort reality by giving units the ability to strongly defend an excessive frontage. What I propose is the creation of a third type of combat in the OCS, the "holding attack."

A holding attack is executed in the following manner:

1) The Holding attack (it can be an overrun) is declared.

2) Attacker and defender pay 1/2 normal combat supply costs. If using internals,cost is normal not 1/2 (game has no 1/2 low/depleted counters, so we abstract).

3) Combat values and surprise determined normally, roll combat dice.

4) Ignore all combat results except "Defender Option." If there is any defender option result, the holding attack is successful. Mark the defending unit with any suitable counter (I use CWB extended line markers, with the arrow pointing to the holding unit). The defenders do not have to carry out the option result. All it means is a successful holding attack.

A holding attack has only one effect. Neither unit can leave the hex they are in until the hold is broken. Holding attacks can be broken (removing the arrow counter) in any of the following manners.

1) The holding unit is DG'd.

2) The holding unit is destroyed, or retreats from the hex it is in.

3) The holding unit leaves the hex. The hold is removed the instant it happens. Another unit cannot come in and take over the hold.

Note that the unit being "held" can expend MPs to overrun the unit holding it. It just can't leave the hex unless it's successful.

I have tested this on both Guderian's Blitzkrieg and on all of the EatG scenarios. So far, so good. I did find it necessary to increase by 5% (Round up) the results on both sides' supply tables.

One last thought. I have discovered that the OCS 2.0i surprise table results in a bit too much defender surprise happening in regular combat, especially when the Soviets attack in the combat phase, as recommended in the designer's notes. To remedy this, I suggest reducing by one the chances for either type of surprise. The Overrun surprise table stays the same. The Regular Combat one looks like this:

Defender Surprise: 4 or less
Attacker surprise: 11 or more

This maintains the integrity of the surprise mechanics while making Soviet and American regular combats that critical little bit more effective.

This really concludes my look at the OCS. Despite my proposals, I think this system is the best thing currently going in the hobby on operational warfare. Please direct any comments on proposed variants to me through The Gamers. Thank you, and good gaming!