I have a few comments on Al Sandrik's third installment on the weapons of the Yom Kippur War. Understanding how many SAMs were deployed by the Egyptians requires a brief explanation of how the SAM units were organized.

The V-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline) deploys in firing batteries of six single-rail missile launchers surrounding a single "Fan Song" tracking radar. The Egyptians had about 70 firing batteries (called battalions by the Soviets), for a total of 420 launch rails. At least 1500 missiles were available for the Dvina units. The "Fan Song" radar is capable of tracking several aircraft at once and can target one with up to three missiles. The 190 kg warhead has a proximity fuse or may be command detonated. The Egyptians' systems had a maximum range of about 20km.

The S-125 Pechora [Neva in Soviet service] (SA-3 Goa) deploys in firing batteries of four double-rail launchers in front of a single "Low Blow" tracking radar. The Egyptians had some 50 firing batteries (again called battalions), for a total of over 200 ready missiles. Hundreds of reloads were available. The "Low Blow" functioned much like the "Fan Song," but had significantly better low-altitude performance. However, its combat performance seems to have been no better than the V-75 Dvina. Its warhead also used both proximity and command fusing. The Pechora's maximum range was roughly 20km.

The 3M9 Kub ["Cube"] (SA-6 Gainful) is a mobile system with all the firing elements mounted on tracked chassis. The Kub deploys in firing batteries of four launch vehicles each carrying three missiles with single Straight Flush tracking and acquisition radar. The Straight Flush can only track one aircraft at a time, but because the 3M9 missiles are semi-active homers (i.e. they home in on the radar signals reflecting off the target rather than been "remote controlled" by firing unit), a virtually unlimited number could be fired at a single target. Practical considerations mean that only two or three missiles would be in the air at any one time. Interestingly, the 3M9 Kub is not primarily rocket powered Ñ the missile is a ramjet. The Kub is also considerably more maneuverable than either the Dvina or the Pechora, able to make 15-G turns, which is almost exactly equivalent to the American HAWK missile, as was its range of some 24 km.

Because the 3M9 used a completely different type of guidance and radar tracking from the Dvina and Pechora systems, American jamming systems at the time were completely ineffective against it. This was quickly remedied and some ECM pods able to jam the Straight Flush may have reached Israel before the end of the war. In any case, the Kub seems to have been much more effective than the Dvina and Pechora systems, although not enough so to shift the balance in the air war.

Overall, the most important effect of the threat of the Egyptian SAM batteries was not the neutralization of the IDFAF's ground support ability. During the 1967 war, the Israeli high command virtually moved into the Air Force HQ because that was were the intelligence gathering was occurring. IDFAF pilots flying over the battlefield simply looked down, saw what was going on, and called into the HQ. In 1973 the pilots were faced with a severe SAM threat, which forced them down to very low altitudes. As a result the pilots couldn't see much of anything. HQ didn't get any reports, and the battlefield intelligence didn't flow to the units on the ground. As a result, the IDF found itself fighting mostly in the blind. For example, no one knew where the Egyptians had bridged the canal, and aircraft dispatched to attack the bridges had to simply fly along the canal searching for targets.

The success of the Kub (SA-6) in the Sinai is still a matter of some speculation. Some estimates put the Kub's kill rate at one per 42 missiles fired, scarcely better than the older Dvina and Pechora systems. More recent analyses put the kill rate as high as one per four or five missiles fired. Of course, this higher rate includes perhaps 44 Arab aircraft killed in "own goals" (friendly fire to Americans) along with the more desirable 15-30 Israeli aircraft credited to the Kub.

Whatever the real kill rate, it is clear that Israeli pilots considered the Kub a very dangerous opponent and its presence affected Israeli air operations accordingly. The American MIM-23A HAWK (Homing All-the-Way Killed) deploys in fire sections with High-Powered Illuminator targeting radar and three three-railed launchers. Battery organization usually includes two or three fire sections, an "Assault Fire Platoon" (another version of the fire section), and a variety of target acquisition radars. HAWK flies at a speed of about Mach 2.5 to a range of up to 32km. Early versions of HAWK were capable of turns of up to 15 Gs. The size of the HAWK's warhead is a matter of confusion, with references giving an astonishing variety of numbers. 50Kg is a good estimate, erring on the low side.

HAWK was fairly effective during the Yom Kippur War. Roughly 75 rounds were fired for about a dozen kills, including a pair of helicopters. Reportedly a damaged Israeli aircraft was destroyed by a HAWK battery when it approached an Israeli nuclear facility in the Negev. HAWK did not appear to perform much better than the Soviet Kub. Compared to the Kub, HAWK batteries also had the disadvantage of being towed rather than having the fire elements mounted on tracked self-propelled chassis. HAWK was probably more mobile than the Dvina and Pechora batteries, but the Israelis had much less need for mobility than the Egyptians, since the Egytian Air Force was relatively inactive.

Players might want to throw in some fog-o-war rules reflecting the intelligence problems the Israelis suffered while the SAM umbrella was effective. Perhaps 15-20 dummy counters for the Egyptians and "stack caps" on each stack prohibiting the Israelis from inspecting any stack not adjacent to an Israeli stack. after the SAMs are suppressed, or outside their coverage, the Israelis can inspect any Egyptian stack freely. Since I don't have Yom Kippur, these rules are necessarily a bit vague...

References

Kreis, John F. Air Warfare and Air Base Defense, 1914-1973. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988.
Yonay, Ehud. No Margin for Error. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1993. [Yonay also happens to be the author of the article about the Navy's Fighter Weapons School that inspired the movie "Top Gun."]
Zaloga, Steven J. Soviet Air Defence Missiles. Coulsdon, Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group Limited, 1989. Ethan McKinney Sherman Oaks, CA