The following is a short treatise on the role of non-divisionals in the OCS 2.0. These remarks here are based on playings of Enemy at the Gates as well as on historical sources (see the Bibliography). Please feel free to disagree with the conclusions drawn (after all, that is the purpose of a forum).

For the purpose of this treatise, non-divisionals can be classed into the following categories:

Fire Support, which includes artillery units of all types
Logistical units, whose primary function is to facilitate movement and/or supply of units and include Railroad Repair and bridging units. HQ and truck/wagon units are not considered non-divisionals.
Combat Units, for example Soviet independent tank, mechanized, and infantry brigades and battalions. On the Axis side, this category covers a wide range of different formations from the Lehr motorized infantry regiment to the battalions of the Sturmartillerie (assault guns). This third category is the focus of this treatise.

The first point concerns how these units are currently employed in the OCS. Play experience and playings discussed in Operations suggest that these units tend to be grouped together into ad-hoc multi-unit divisions. This is especially true of the Soviet tank brigades and the German assault gun battalions. These "divisions" normally consist of a number of units with good combat strength but low Action Ratings teamed with one or two units with high Action Ratings. A good example of this approach is pairing some of the less competent Soviet tank brigades with one of those cavalry units with a 4 Action Rating. This allows the raw power of the lower-rated units to be combined with the higher proficiency of a weaker unit to produce a much more effective fighting force.

So far, so good. When used during the Combat Phase, this actually lends support to the historicity of the game system in that elite units of this size were often used to bolster weaker units, both in attack and defense. In fact, the German Sturmartillerie units were specifically formed and trained to support infantry operations. The Soviets would use tank brigades and battalions in a similar role. However, these ad-hoc divisions often wind up being employed in the Movement and Exploitation Phases for overrun attacks. This use poses game and historicity problems.

The game problem revolves around the effects of the additional maneuver warfare capability that this technique gives both sides. With a little ingenuity, the Soviet play can assemble at least four of these formations to back up the tank and mech corps. These formations, because they can do everything the multi-unit divisions can (admittedly they use more fuel), have a very disruptive effect on both the Stalingrad relief attempt and the defense in front of Rostov.

[Ed. note: See the sidebar for a discussion of fuel costs.] The German version of this approach usually takes the form of pairing something like an assault gun battalion with, say, the Hungarian panzer division to transform this inept unit into a real threat to the Soviet operations which evolve somewhere around the Chir. These are just isolated examples; other exist.

The historicity problem concerns doctrine and training. First, let us consider what the overrun attack is supposed to represent. In terms of maneuver warfare, an overrun in the OCS would more properly be thought of as a "hasty attack." This is a scenario where the attacker sacrifices preparation time (deploying into battle formation as well as preparing artillery support) and gambles on achieving tactical surprise in order to achieve the objective without upsetting the timetable of the operation in progress. [Ed. note: Robert Leonard describes hasty attacks as attempts to use "preemption."] Such an attack relies more on the training and cohesion of the unit (how well the components of the unit work together) than on raw firepower or mass.

The German panzer and motorized divisions were very good at this style of attack because the components of these units were tight-knit teams. While it is true that the Soviet corps were not tight-knit teams at the time represented in Enemy at the Gates, they did possess the advantages of having worked together before and of being tactically directed by a common corps (in effect, division) HQ. In contrast, the independent tank and mech brigades lacked the training and doctrine necessary to engage in cooperative operations without a fair amount of preparation time.

On the Axis side, most of the non-divisionals were either units which doctrinally operated alone (Lehr and those like it were intended as flank guards to moving armored forces) or units which by doctrine and training were employed in the infantry support role (assault guns).

To remedy these problems, the following rules amendment is proposed:

Add to rule 7.1a: "Only stacks consisting solely of units from the same multi-unit division [or Soviet corps] may combine their attack strengths in an overrun attack. Stacks of non-divisionals can move together in an overrun, but only the Action Rating unit counts towards the attack strength of the overrun; all other units are treated as tag-alongs (7.1e)." The addition above, when tested in play, was found to handle the problem without placing either side in a bad position. However, the more testing the better. Please try to find problems with this rule, as I would be happy to hear about them.

Let me finish with a play tip concerning those German assault guns. On the attack, stack them with infantry, as they will frequently be at double strength attacking, and keep them in Combat Mode. On defense, put them in Move Mode in Reserve directly behind the infantry you want them to support. That gives them enough MPs to move right through their infantry partner, overrun an attacker (usually at double strength), and in some cases withdraw back behind the infantry after doing their damage. At worst they wind up in the same hex as the infantry defender, which is good.

Thanks for your consideration of this treatise. I believe the OCS to be the first historically valid operational system the hobby has seen. Think of the above suggestions along the lines of fine-tuning a Stradivarius violin. May we all enjoy this fine system.

Bibliography

Bryan Perret. Knights of the Black Cross. This is a must-read, as it is a good operational history of the Panzerwaffe.
F. W. von Mellenthin. Panzer Battles. (for obvious reasons)