Few military leaders have evoked as much debate, study, and outright emulation as "the Corsican General." In fact, the point can be argued that Napoleon Bonaparte was the greatest military mind in history. Whether one agrees with this or not is not the point; his greatness as a combat leader is indisputable. From very obscure beginnings, he enjoyed a meteoric rise in fame and powerÑa rise that was due solely to his martial abilities. This commentary will attempt to review the genius of Napoleon and hopefully shed some light on the what it was that made him the undisputed military master of Europe for close to 20 years.

The first hint of Napoleon's exceptional talents came during the siege of Toulon. Capitalizing on his new found notoriety, Napoleon began to set in motion a series of events that would land him as the absolute ruler of France. Although he was jailed for a short period following Toulon, the nascent French Republic was in dire need of good generals, and Napoleon was given command of the Army of Italy.

Through a subtle series of political machinations Napoleon was then able to secure for himself the position of "First Consul for Life." Once his political position was secured he could exploit his military successes. His unprecedented military triumphs electrified the French public, and he had himself proclaimed Emperor with nary a voice of opposition. Napoleon was now the undisputed political and military potentate of France. Napoleon's unique position offered him a unity of purpose and command that was not enjoyed by his adversaries. As will be seen, he was able to transfer this uniqueness into strategic advantage with impressive regularity.

Once hostilities began Napoleon relied on two operational concepts: central position and rear maneuver. It may seem surprising that someone of Napoleon's brilliance would rely on two elementary concepts. Yet Napoleon himself once said "like all beautiful things.... the simplest maneuvers are the best." How was it that these concepts were so brutally effective? The components of Napoleon's operational concepts will now be examined in detail.

Central Position

More often than not, Napoleon would employ a strategy of central position against a numerically superior foe. He would position his army between two or more allied forces, allowing him to defeat each of the allied forces in detail before mutual support could be rendered. A location that was the hub of several road networks would most often be chosen, for this would facilitate the rapidity of movement that such a strategy required.

Because he would be operating on "interior lines," Napoleon's ability to implement his plans, i.e. issue orders and see them carried out, would be much greater than that of his foes. In short, he would be able to concentrate and defeat one force, then turn on the remaining force before the allies knew what hit them. He would do this by sending a portion of his army, usually a corps or two, to "pin" one of the enemy columns.

With the bulk of his army he would attack and defeat the other enemy column. Napoleon would then further divide his forces, detaching a small force to pursue the recently defeated enemy. With the remainder of his army he would turn to the aid of his now hard pressed "pinning" force. In the nick of time, he would fall on the flank of his unsuspecting enemy and complete the victory.

Two good examples of Napoleon's use of central position are Dresden and Waterloo. During the Dresden campaign, Napoleon chose the central position of Gorlitz. From there he could march north to tackle Blucher's Army of Silesia, or southwest towards Schwarzenberg's Army of Bohemia.

Initially, Napoleon perceived Blucher's drive into Saxony as the primary threat and left one corps in Dresden to keep an eye on the Austrians while he marched north. As events unfolded, however, he realized that Schwarzenberg's drive on Dresden was the true allied objective. Accordingly, he left Marshall MacDonald to keep an eye on Blucher while he hurried south to Dresden. His subsequent defeat of Schwarzenberg was offset by Blucher's rout of MacDonald.

The campaign of Waterloo was very similar to Dresden. From the central position of Charleroi, Napoleon could strike towards Wellington or Blucher. As it turned out, he chose to attack Blucher, while he sent a small force under Ney towards Brussels to keep Wellington busy. After defeating the Prussians at Ligny, he left two corps of infantry under Grouchy to finish the job, while he marched with the bulk of his army to unite with Ney. Napoleon's defeat on the fields of Waterloo can be attributed to the timely arrival of the amazingly resilient Prussians. In both of these campaigns, it was Napoleon's subordinates, not his plan, who were found wanting.

Rear Maneuver

Napoleon employed this concept most often when he enjoyed a numerical edge over his adversary. The cornerstone of this approach was to cut the enemy off from his base, thus compelling him to attack at the time and place of Napoleon's choosing. As with central position, the first step would be to engage the enemy frontally with a portion of his army to fix it in place. With the main body, Napoleon would the march around the flank of the enemy force, with this movement covered by a dense screen of cavalry and/or a natural obstacle, such as a river or forest.

Once firmly astride the enemy's lifeline (a main supply route, line of communication, or avenue of retreat), Napoleon would be in a position to dictate where and when the decisive battle would be fought. In addition to being completely isolated, the enemy army faced the additional dilemma of having a hostile (and usually highly aggressive) foe in both the front and rear. If they turned to confront Napoleon and the main body, the holding force would harass them. If they attempted to eliminate the holding force, Napoleon and the main body would assail them from the rear. What often happened was that the enemy would attempt a breakout, with both forces grinding them down.

The campaigns of Ulm (1805) and Jena-Auerstadt (1806) are excellent examples of rear maneuvers. During the campaign of Ulm, Napoleon marched the Grand Armee from the coast, across France and into Germany, in response to a buildup by the Austrians.

Once the main Austrian body was located, Murat moved forward to "fix" the Austrian 1st Army under Mack. Napoleon, using a screen of light cavalry to cover his movements, moved around the Austrians to cut them off. Realizing his plight, Mack attempted two unsuccessful and bloody breakouts. Seeing the writing on the wall, he surrendered the 1st Army at Ulm; 50,000 Austrians were lost.

The campaign of Jena-Auerstadt unfolded in a similar manner. Receiving intelligence that the Prussians were massing for an offensive, Napoleon decide to strike first.

A demonstration by the nominal forces of the King of Holland kept the Prussians' attention fixed to the west while Napoleon, using the Thuringer Wald as strategic cover, pushed the bulk of his army on a wide southern arc. Emerging from the dense German forests, the French columns successfully seized the crossings over the Saale River, severing the Prussians' links with their bases of Leipzig and Dresden. Desperately, the Prussians moved north in an attempt to reach Berlin.

In the dual battles of Jena and Auerstadt, however, Napoleon inflicted crushing defeats on the Prussians. The French victory was so total that it would be another seven years before any Prussian forces would take the field against Napoleon. Like his approach to operational art, Napoleon's tactics followed a prescribed methodology. The study of Napoleonic tactics can be further divided into grand tactics and tactical methods.

Grand Tactics

This level concerns how the battle would be conducted; the scheme of maneuver for the army. Except for rare instances, Napoleon's grand tactics were always the same. It must be stressed that there was a natural transition from the operational to the tactical level. Once an enemy was "fixed" operationally the army would concentrate. On the eve of battle Napoleon would position his forces according to terrain and enemy dispositions. Once the fighting began he would conduct the battle in four distinct phases.

Phase 1: Preparation for the Main Attack

The quintessential Napoleonic battle opened with a massive French bombardment. Once the enemy formations were sufficiently weakened, the French would launch a frontal assault. The objective of this attack would not be to break the enemy's line, but rather to force him to commit his reserves.

Phase 2: Envelopment

As the frontal assault was progressing, Napoleon would send another force to envelope the enemy's flank. This envelopment would be aimed at a sensitive part of the enemy's line so as to provoke a rapid reaction. Any reserves not committed to the frontal assault would be sent to respond to the French threat. Furthermore, the enemy's lines would now be perilously thin as they extended in the direction of the envelopment. Invariably, a gap or weak spot would result. Again, the envelopment was not designed to win the battle but simply pave the way for the main attack.

Phase 3: Main Attack

When the time was right, Napoleon would launch the main attack. This was the point in the battle when Napoleon would send in his carefully marshaled reserves. The objective of this attack was to break through the enemy's lines. Throughout this phase Napoleon would adhere to the principle of concentration: massed artillery batteries firing on a fixed point prior to the assault, and dense formations of infantry (masse de rupture) tasked with smashing through the enemy ranks at bayonet point.

Phase 4: Exploitation

Once the main attack achieved a breach, massed cavalry would pour through to wreak havoc among the fleeing enemy. A general advance would simultaneously be ordered all along the line to prevent the enemy from attempting to stop the fatal hemorrhage. As the enemy army fled from the battlefield, Napoleon would send his remaining cavalry to conduct a strategic pursuit. The battle of Bautzen, fought in May of 1813, stands as a classic example of Napoleon's grand tactics. Napoleon found himself facing a combined Russo-Prussian force under the command of Wittgenstein.

The battle opened around 3:00 pm of the 20th with the usual French bombardment. Late in the afternoon the corps of Oudinot, MacDonald, and Marmont stepped off with their frontal attacks. The resultant fighting was particularly fierce, so much so that Wittgenstein was compelled to commit his reserves to stabilize his front. As night fell the allied front had stabilized, but a storm was brewing on their right flank in the form of Marshall Ney.

Early the next morning Ney was to advance with three infantry corps to turn the allied flank and sever their route of retreat. Although he was ultimately unsuccessful in this endeavor, he did succeed in extending the allied line and reducing their strength. In addition to Ney's efforts, the French frontal attacks of the 20th had resumed. Fatigued from the previous days' efforts, all three corps found progress difficult. Marshall Oudinot was extremely hard pressed and sent a courier to Napoleon begging for reinforcements.

"Tell your marshal that the battle will be won at 3:00 pm and that until then he must do the best he can," was the laconic reply. As both sides fought themselves to exhaustion, Napoleon sent in the Imperial Guard supported by 60 guns for the main attack. The result was predictable. The fresh and motivated veterans of the Guard smashed through the allied infantry. Had it not been for Ney's failures, the allied army may well have not escaped. As it was, the Russo-Prussian army was sent fleeing headlong towards the east.

Tactical Methods

As successful as Napoleon's grand tactics were, this success would not have been possible were it not for the proper coordination among the various elements of his army. Napoleon was a master at devising tactical methods that would allow the infantry, cavalry, and artillery be mutually supportive in combined arms attacks.

As mentioned earlier, a battle would normally open with a French artillery bombardment. It should be noted that French artillery tactics were infinitely more aggressive than their adversaries. It was not uncommon for a French general to open the attack by sending as many as 100 guns forward, with absolutely no preparatory fire whatsoever, to a distance of 500 yards and open with canister on the enemy infantry. Once the artillery bombardment was under way, swarms of voltigeurs (infantry specially trained in skirmishing) would be sent forward to harass the enemy and screen the advance of the main body.

As the enemy confusion mounted, Napoleon would launch an initial cavalry charge. This charge had a twofold objective: defeat the enemy cavalry and force the enemy infantry into squares. While this attack was progressing the French infantry would advance, usually in columns of battalions. Since the enemy infantry would formed in square, their ability to bring effective fire down on the advancing French infantry would be greatly diminished. At the last possible moment the infantry would deploy into line formation and pour a destructive fire on the hapless enemy.

If the advancing infantry constituted the main attack, their offensive punch would be augmented by artillery. During the battle of Friedland Marshall Victor sent 30 guns forward to support the main attack. These batteries initially unlimbered at a range of 300 yards, then progressively closed the distance to under 100 yards; the proud ranks of the Russian Grenadiers were reduced to gory heaps. Teetering on the brink of destruction, the re-formed French cavalry would be sent to smash through and complete the victory.

How could this fiercely effective methodology be defeated? The answer lay in the ability to upset the delicate choreography between the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. The most successful practitioner of this was the Duke of Wellington. Not only was he able to dull the rapier of Napoleon's military machine, but he stands alone as the only general never really be defeated by the French. His solution to Napoleon's tactical methods was quite simple. (Remember, "like all beautiful things.... the simplest maneuvers are best.")

Wellington's initial deployment would place most of his army behind natural cover, most often on the reverse slope of a hill, in order to greatly diminish the effectiveness of the French artillery. Only the British artillery, protected by a heavy screen of skirmishers, would be visible. As the French cavalry advanced, the unseen British infantry would form into square while the British gunners poured fire into the mounted Frenchmen.

Just before the French closed the distance, the British gunners would run inside an infantry square. The French cavalry would harmlessly swarm around the squares, getting shot down all the while. As they withdrew, the British gunners would run back to their pieces and resume firing while the infantry deployed into line. By this time the compact French infantry columns would be advancing. However, since the bulk of the British infantry was hidden from sight, the French would be unsure as to their exact location. As the column crested the ridge, the waiting British would fire volley after volley into the French ranks as the vainly tried to change formation.

As the French attack wavered, the British infantry would raise a cheer and chase the French back down the slope. This was exactly the scenario of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo. Wellington's ability to effectively counter the French notwithstanding, Napoleon's operations and tactics resulted in close to 15 years of uninterrupted victories. Against a successive stream of Prussian, Austrian, and Russian armies, Napoleon was able to employ these methods en route to victory. The fact that Napoleon could be defeated (and occasionally was) should not detract from his military brilliance.

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