One of the distinguishing characteristics of Hitler's generalship is that he failed to realize the critical importance of maintaining reserves. While he displayed some natural talent as a commander, he often dispersed his available forces on too many extraneous missions, pursuing overly ambitious goals. The various theaters of war, especially the voracious Eastern Front, certainly needed more troops than Germany could provide. However, the OKW and OKH worried constantly about Hitler's penchant for employing idle troops.

On several occasions, Hitler built up reserve forces in the face of seemingly overwhelming disaster. Prior to the Anglo-American landings in 1944, Hitler built or withdrew at least 10 panzer divisions from Russia and brought them up to strength to await the invasion. These forces took longer than expected to reach the battle zone in Normandy. Nevertheless, they represented a serious effort to apply decisive mass at the critical point. Later, in France, August 1944, the remnants of the 7th and 15th Armies were fleeing the disaster of Falaise and pursuit by the Allies. Hitler husbanded enough armor and men to create several new panzer brigades. Each was almost the equal of a 1944 panzer division. Unfortunately, he promptly frittered this force away in foolish counterattacks in mid-France, and soon destroyed the reserve. Undaunted, Hitler stubbornly refused to over-commit men to the Westwall battles in the fall. This allowed him to create the 6th Panzer Army and refurbish several panzer and infantry divisions-which he immediately threw away in the Ardennes offensive.

In Russia, the situation always seemed worse. Units tended to withdraw as they burned out. They retired to the West to rebuild and be committed again as new crises arose. In 1942, before FALL BLAU, the offensive forces only came up to strength by stripping the other two army groups of significant forces, especially tanks. In 1943 forces massed for the Kursk offensive, but ground down in that disastrous attack, leaving the East bereft of reserves again. In 1944 and after, there was a succession of crises that left no time to mass a decisive force.

However, there were opportunities. In July of 1942, upon the successful conquest of the Crimea, Erich von Manstein became a Field Marshall. He commanded an excellent infantry army, the 11th, during that campaign. It subsequently went to various distant points to further the over-optimistic goals of the OKH and OKW for the rest of 1942. Some troops went to the Caucasus, others north to Leningrad. The 22nd Air Landing Division even returned to Crete for garrison duty! All this at a time when FALL BLAU, the main German effort for 1942, had begun and was already running into troop shortages.

Almost five months later, new assignment thrust von Manstein headlong into the maelstrom of Army Group Don. His orders were to stabilize one of the worst crises in military history. He deeply regretted the frittering away of the 11th Army, since it was Hitler's only potential significant reserve on the Eastern Front in 1942. Certainly, the Leningrad operation Hitler envisioned never came off, nor should he have seriously contemplated it given the situation that summer and fall. By November, just before the Soviet storm, the sole German operational reserve south of Voronezh consisted of one Hungarian panzer division, one Rumanian panzer division, and the half-strength German 22 and 27 Panzer Divisions. This latter formation was really just one panzer division, since half of the 22nd had gone to form the cadre of the new 27th. Neither unit was even near full strength.

What if Hitler had paid a little more attention to military wisdom? What if he had positioned the 11th Army, rested and ready after Crimea, to react quickly to a Soviet breakthrough? Some have said that the judicious use of reserves, at the proper moment, is what wins battles. Certainly it is an idea worth a look.

Available Units:

All forces are German:
30 Corps HQ 8-0 (5- 10) Truck mobility
42 Corps HQ 8-0 (5- 10) Truck mobility
54 Corps HQ 8-0 (5- 10) Truck mobility
22 Inf Div 20-5-3 (10-5-5) sent to Crete
24 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to Leningrad
28 Jaeger Div 15-4-3 (7-4-4) sent to Leningrad
46 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to Caucasus
50 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to Caucasus
72 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to AG Center
73 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to Caucasus
125 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) Caucasus, Kuban garrison
132 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to Leningrad
170 Inf Div 20-4-3 (10-4-5) sent to Leningrad
318 Inf Rgt 6-3-3 (3-3-5)
360 Inf Rgt 6-3-3 (3-3-5)
617 Cmbt Eng Rgt 8-5-3 (4-5-18) Truck mobility
197 AG Bn 5-4-6 (2-4-14) Track mob. Yellow armor symbol
249 AG Bn 5-4-6 (2-4-14) Track mob. Yellow armor symbol
1/787 Arty Bn 9-2/3-2 (4-2/3-18) Truck mobility
2/787 Arty Bn 9-2/3-2 (4-2/3-18) Truck mobility
3/787 Arty Bit 9-2/3-2 (4-2/3-18) Truck mobility

You can make counters by hand, or in some cases rob them from Guderian's Blitzkrieg for employment in Enemy at the Gates. Simply borrow any units whose values match. (To my knowledge none of these troops were involved in GB, so I do not think you will come up with exact unit ID matches.) Deploy them according to the rules below.

Use this variant in either scenarios 1 or 6, the Full or Little Saturn Campaign starts. Use of this variant costs the German player 10 VP, incurred at the end of the scenario. (Note: if you apply the VP award at the start, the Soviet player wins a sudden death victory on turn one.)

Deployment

All units of the 11th Army, above, may set up within 5 hexes of Stalino.

Release:

In Scenario 1, no unit of 11th Army may move until it successfully released. Release occurs with a roll of 9+ on two dice, starting with the reinforcement phase of Turn 2. Release occurs automatically by Turn 7. If any Soviet ground unit crosses the Donets or the Manych Rivers at any time, release occurs automatically.

In Scenario 6, consider all forces released. They may move freely, without restriction.