During the last week of November 1941, the German offensive toward Moscow sputtered to a halt. Nazi spearheads at Kashira were only miles from the southern outskirts of Moscow. From the Soviet point of view, the Fascist invaders were at the gates.

Army Group Center (Bock) from north to south consisted of the following units; the 4th Army (Kluge), covering from the north edge of the Guderian's Blitzkrieg map south to the Aleksin area: the 2nd Panzer Army (Guderian), from the Aleksin area south to about 35 miles north-west of Yelets (Bxx.25 row): and the 2nd Army (Schmidt), from there to the south edge of the map. North of the map, 9th Army, and 3rd & 4th Panzer groups fought.

To face the Nazis in front of Moscow, the Soviets placed the burden on one commander Georgii Zhukov. The Soviet forces from the Western Front under his command had at least 10 armies in this portion of the line. Zhukov also soon had available several additional armies then forming to the east of the front.

The German view was less than rosy. By 29 November (end of game turn 10), it became clear that further offensive operations by the overextended German forces were impossible. However, this clarity of vision did not extend past Army Group Center headquarters. As late as I December, Field Marshal Von Bock needed to remind OKH that the Soviet defenses had not collapsed and that the Army Group was incapable of further meaningful offensive action.

On the morning of 30 November 1941 (Game Turn 11), Marshal Zhukov submitted a plan for a counteroffensive both north and south of Moscow. The initial objective of this counterattack was to halt the Nazi advance on Moscow and prevent the Germans from digging in for the winter near the capital. Through the first few days of December, it appeared that Soviet plans for attack were premature. German breakthroughs occurred along the main Smolensk- Moscow highway. Guderian's armor seemed as though it might finally cut Tula off from Moscow. However, by 5 December the minor gains in front of Moscow halted and Guderian had given up hopes of encircling Tula, proposing a modest withdrawal to the west.

Day broke on 6 December with the temperature a cheerful -38 F (deep freeze)! Zhukov had ordered that the attack begin on the morning of the 6th. South of Moscow, things started modestly as the offensive was restricted to a division (+) attack on the eastern edge of the Tula bulge. In fact, the German Second Army even managed to capture Yelets on 6 December, although this would be a short-lived conquest. The northern shoulder (off-map to the north) of Army Group Center was not as fortunate. The 1st Shock and 30th armies had begun a ferocious assault. The 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups had to retreat northwest of Moscow.

On 8 December (game turn 12), the Soviets broke through the Nazi lines south of Yelets with a cavalry division (brigade in Guderian's Blitzkrieg. In this article I will refer to Soviet cavalry units as divisions even though in terms of strength, etc.. the game properly portrays them as brigades.) By the 9th, two additional cavalry divisions plus infantry and artillery had succeeded in widening a ten mile breach.

Field Marshal Von Bock instructed the army staffs of Army Group Center to prepare a withdrawal to the Gzaatsk-Orel-Kursk line on the 9th. Bock seemed to have good reason for such preparations. Soviet attacks were beginning to tear apart the 2nd Panzer Army line west of Tula. They surrounded Yelets by the 11th.

If the shock of resurgent Soviet forces was not startling enough, by early December the German Army Group Center rear area experienced something completely new in the conquests to date: partisans. Soviet partisan units began to blow up railroad bridges and disrupt supply movement. Although these attacks were best characterized as a nuisance for the time being, they only got worse as the winter progressed. Much worse, Field Marshal Brauchitsch visited the front during this period. After conferring with Bock and Army commanders, Brauchitsch requested that Hitler authorize a withdrawal to the Gzatsk-Orel-Kursk line. Hitler denied the request, although in such a vague manner that Bock and Brauchitsch took his answer as a qualified yes and preparations for withdrawal continued. They soon needed these preparations.

By the 15th (game turn 13), the Russians held open a 10-mile hole in the 2nd Panzer Army front west of Tula. Soviet units began to pour through to the west. As if that was not enough, the thinly stretched 2nd Army (east and southeast of Orel) could only be described as undergoing disintegration. Breakthroughs were too numerous to count. Countless units were cutoff from communications and began to fight their way to the west.

December 16 was a day of decision for STAVKA and the Soviet high command. The threat to Moscow was gone. Forces had achieved advances of 30 and 50 miles (6- 10 hexes) along almost the entire front. Clearly, they had met virtually all the initial Soviet objectives.

Zhukov Optimistic

Zhukov optimistically believed that the objective for the rest of the winter should be a concentrated offensive to return approximately to the line from which the German Typhoon offensive started in late September. However, STAVKA and Stalin had bigger fish to fry. They envisioned nothing less than a complete encirclement of Army Group Center! Zhukov privately believed that the effort necessary for such a large encirclement maneuver could be beyond Soviet means after the disasters of the past summer.

For the Nazis' part, the situation was not particularly pleasant. Bock told Hitler, on the evening of the ]6th, he felt the situation was serious enough that it was now possible Army Group Center would be destroyed if not allowed to retreat. A crisis within the German command was fast approaching.

By the 18th, the 4th Army was no longer able to halt Soviet attacks aimed at Kaluga, General Popov, commanding a tank brigade along with cavalry and rifle divisions, launched a surprise assault directly at Kaluga. Popov's attack was combined with a general Soviet assault against the 4th Army along the Nara river line. Predictably, Popov breached what remained of the Nazi front, heading for Kaluga. By the evening of the 20th, his tanks were just south of the city, and later that night, they entered Kaluga.

Army Group Center's difficulties were not confined to the 4th Army sector alone. Daily supply movement per Army averaged between 350 and 1000 tons per day (2-5 supply Pts per turn). With only 70 tanks in running order on the 18th, the 2nd Panzer army had begun to move regiments back to the Oka river line.

Hitler ordered all Armies to stand fast on the morning of the 18th. In particular, he ordered Guderian to hold the Aleksin-Plavsk-Livny line. One problem with this was that by the time 2nd Panzer Army received the order, the actual front line was already 5 miles (1 hex) west of Aleksin! To add insult to injury for the Nazis, there was also an 18-mile hole in the German lines south of Livny and that city was surrounded by advancing Soviet forces!

December 19, 1941, was a momentous day for the German Army. Hitler's patience with quibbling subordinates ran out. He replaced Field Marshal Von Bock with Kluge, who also retained command of the 4th Army, for the time being. Brauchitsch was incensed and offered his resignation. This was the opportunity Hitler had been looking for to solidify his control over the Army. He accepted Brauchitsch's resignation and assumed the position of Commander in Chief of the Army (OKH) himself.

While the German high command preoccupied itself with matters of control, the Soviets at the front closed to within 40 miles (8 hexes) of the Kursk-Orel railroad. By late on the 19th, two German infantry divisions were destroyed-trapped between Yelets and Livny. Only a few (less than 4 dozen) starving survivors ever returned to Nazi lines. To the North, several Soviet divisions broke off of Popov's assault and by the 21st, were driving hell-bent-for-leather in the direction of Belev.

On 22 December (turn 14) the Soviets completed their breakthrough in the 4th Army sector. The 4th Army was already in a poor state due to Red possession of Kaluga and began to withdraw by the morning of the 23rd. It was fortuitous that the Nazi withdrawal began when it did as Soviet units were approaching Chekalin (approximately hex A37. 10).

The 4th Army was not the only German formation conducting retrograde movements during this period. The 2nd Panzer Army and the 2nd Army were also heading to the rear. The 2nd Panzer was retreating to the Oka River line (without authorization) while the 2nd issued orders giving up Novosil and Livny. Kluge reported to Halder that the Russians had crossed the Oka, and that the defenses behind Kaluga were crumbling. The 2nd Panzer Army attempted a counterattack to close the gap on their northern flank. They got as far north as Belev but were unable to proceed further.

Command Changes

The elevation of Kluge to Army Group command had predictably serious effects for Guderian. Kluge and Guderian had been professional rivals for years. Both men harbored intense dislike and lack of respect for each other. Incensed that Guderian would begin a withdrawal without his authorization, Kluge fired Guderian on the 26th, replacing him with General Schmidt. General Kuebler took command of the 4th Army.

Command changes also occurred on the Soviet side as STAVKA reactivated the Bryansk Front, which took over command of all Soviet forces south of the Orel-Yefremov line. Ostensibly, this move was made to enable closer supervision of the attacking armies in this area. However, it seems that the real motive was to reduce Zhukov's control (hence credit for any victory achieved) over events. The Soviets were not immune to a meddling dictator's dabbling in matters of military high command.

By 26-27 December (end of turn 14) the German situation was truly alarming. Clearly, a large Soviet attack was underway between Kaluga and Belev. With equal clarity, the 2nd Panzer Army could not close the gap north of Belev. Meanwhile, elements of two Soviet Armies pushed on towards Yukhnov and Sukhmichi. Orders for the 4th Army required preparation to defend those two locations deep in its own rear. Unfortunately for the Nazis, Kuebler had no force with which to defend Yukhnov or Sukhinichi as incessant Russian assaults pushed the 4th Army back and ground it down.

On 28 December (turn 15) Soviet cavalry crossed the Sukhinichi-Kaluga railroad driving toward Yukhnov. The Nazis were able to offer little opposition against this thrust. The Russians had almost reached Yukhnov and were roughly 75 miles (15 hexes) west of Belev.

By 1 January 1942 the general line ran north from Tim to just west of Novosil. At this point, the line followed the Zusha River through Mtsensk, north along the Oka River to Belev-just captured by the Soviets. Here the German line ceased to exist. There were no German forces on the front again until just northwest of Kaluga (A38.17 area). Northeast from the Kaluga area, the line ran past the Protava River to the edge of the Nara River and then (although only lightly held) to just east of Mozhaysk.

The Soviet 10th Army streamed through this gap, forming a large bulge. The only breakwater to the Red tide was a few scratch reserve forces at Sukhmichi. All the German armies in the Army Group Center region were beginning to organize rough fire-brigade like units. These emergency units formed from all manner of rearechelon types (remnants, replacements, supply & transport personnel, administrative personnel, etc.) and served as last-ditch defenders of key locations, such as Sukhmichi. These ad-hoc units would save Army Group Center.

In the south, the Bryansk front continued to attack. However, that portion of the Nazi line between the Oka and Novosil held firm (for a change). The 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Army line in this region held more front the poor performance of the Soviet Bryansk Front than any other reason. The Bryansk Front seemed unable to effectively coordinate attacks in this area. This factor combined with the limited tactical competence of the units involved almost assured failure. From the Nazi perspective, it was just as well that the Bryansk Front operations were poorly conducted. The 2nd Panzer Army's main concern was its ever-widening north flank, now extending far to the west from Belev toward Bryansk.

On 2 January, the Soviets managed to open a 10-mile hole between Borovsk and Maloyaroslavets (approx. A41.25-42.23). All 4th Army troops north of this break were re-assigned to the 4th Panzer Army. This change left the 4th Army in a bulge centered on Kondrovo extending as far east as the Protava River. Kuebler was in a precarious position indeed. The 4th Panzer Army received orders to attempt to close the gap recently created and link up with the 4th Army.

On 3 January, the advancing Soviets surrounded approximately 4000 ad-hoc Nazi troops in Sukhmichi. Hitler immediately (4 January, turn 16) ordered a counterattack to retake Sukhmichi. However, there were no troops available. Breakout from Sukhmichi became impossible by the 9th when Soviet troops, aided by partisans, captured Kirov. The Red Army had advanced over halfway to Bryansk from Sukhmichi along the Bryansk-Sukhinichi road. Hitler ordered the defenders of Sukhmichi to hold in place. The Luftwaffe was conducting a modest aerial re-supply operation to the besieged, staving off disaster.

While the Nazi defenders of Sukhmichi perfected the culinary art of horsemeat preparation, the 4th Army received continued abuse. Into the huge hole in the German lines, STAVKA began to funnel troops from the stalled Bryansk Front. By 5 January, the 4th Army had managed to assemble enough troops to defend Yukhnov and the road northeast of that town. The Soviets, merely deflected by the Nazi resistance, proceeded to cut the road southwest of Yukhnov on the 7th. Even Hitler could see the 4th Army situation as precarious and authorized a 10-mile withdrawal west from the Protava River.

Momentous decisions were brewing in the Kremlin. On the 5th, Stalin and STAVKA resolved to go over to a general offensive on the entire Eastern Front. Zhukov argued for a continued concentration on the center but to no avail. Nine out of ten Fronts were assigned significant general offensive objectives. There can be no question that Soviet leadership underestimated remaining Nazi strength and overestimated Soviet capabilities. This vast dispersion of effort squandered considerable Russian forces.

In the Center, Soviet goals changed. Achievable, limited objectives (turning the Nazi invaders back from Moscow) turned into an enormous war-winning attempt to envelope and destroy most of Army Group Center, The plan was expanded dramatically.

The West Front would continue to explode through the Belev-Kaluga gap, fanning out west, heading toward Vyazma via Yukhnov. Meanwhile, the Kalinin Front (off map north) undertook to converge on Vyazma from the northeast and the northwest. The newly formed 4th Airborne Corps would drop southwest of Vyazma to assist. The rail line heading north out of Vyazma was the sole line of supply for the Nazi 9th Army (off map north). If both Fronts could converge on Vyazma, the German 9th and 4th Armies would be surrounded.

New Soviet Goal

This was the new Soviet goal. Patterns began to emerge in the month-old Soviet offensive that made achieving objectives such as these questionable. In spite of the weather and poor supply situation, the Nazis were successfully defending and holding key crossroads. The Red Army began to have supply problems of their own. Units that found it comparatively easy to break through the German lines (there was no real front along huge stretches of line) discovered that remaining in supply was an insurmountable challenge with many vital road junctions still held by the Nazis.

The Bryansk Front is an example of the dispersion of effort in the Soviet offensive. Marshal Timoshenko's command had the mission of attacking towards Kursk and seizing Orel and Bryansk. Even if sufficient forces had been assigned to the Bryansk Front to accomplish this challenging mission (they weren't), Timoshenko had yet another focus for his forces far to the south-the Izyum bulge. It is hardly surprising that the Soviets failed in their efforts in both regions.

During the week of 11-17 January (turn 17), the situation took a turn for the worse for the German 4th Army. On the 13th, elements of the Soviet 1st Guards Cavalry Corps crossed the Roslavl-Yukhnov road (Rollbahn) heading north toward Vyazma. At about the same time the Soviets reactivated a previously destroyed army HQ (33rd) in the area east of the gap between the 4th Army and the 4th Panzer Army (approximately hex A26.25). The 4th Army had to abandon the Medyn (A38.23) position, preventing any hope of the 4th Panzer Army closing the gap north of that location. By the 15th, the 4th Army was confined to a bulge approximately 20 by 25 miles east of Yukhnov (4th Army HQ was now in Spas-Demansk).

Keubler and Kluge presented a plan to OKH (Hitler) to save the 4th Army. The plan involved an army-wide withdrawal west, keeping the Rollbahn open, and shifting the remainder of the 4th Army northwest 15 miles to close the gap to the north with the 4th Panzer Army. Given the Army's precarious position, the plan seemed the only alternative--even to Hitler.

During this period, several substantial events occurred along the southern portion of Army Group Center. First, the 2nd Army transferred to Army Group South. Reality dictated this measure as the focus of Army Group Center had gravitated north. Reflecting the northern focus, the 2nd Panzer Army began preparing an attack to relieve the besieged defenders of Sukhinichi. The depleted state of the surrounding Red Army forces helped the defenders of Sukhinichi as much as sporadic Luftwaffe resupply efforts.

On the 18th (game turn 18), 2nd Panzer Army began its attack northeast along the Bryansk-Sukhinichi road to relieve the pocket at the latter location. The attack consisted of the only units that the 2nd Panzer Army could spare: the l8th Panzer division and the 208th Infantry Division. Resistance was unexpectedly light (the Soviets were having their own supply problems) and on the 24th, the 18th Pz Div made contact with the garrison of Sukhmichi.

Also by the 18th, the threat from the rear was significant for the 4th Army. Soviet cavalry, with partisan assistance, and reinforced by the recently landed 4th Airborne Corps (actually little more than a few reinforced battalions survived the landings as units), began serious operations within the Vyazma/Spas-Demansk/Yukhnov triangle. Meager supplies came in at night to the polyglot Soviet force. Nevertheless, the Russians received substantial enough support for those Soviet forces to attack south toward the Rollbahn, cutting the road in at least two places. In both instances, cavalry simultaneously attacking north briefly linked up with elements of the 1st Guard Cavalry Corps and the 4th Airborne Corps. Fortunately for the Nazis, the 4th Army reopened the Rollbahn on the 22nd, restoring the important German lifeline.

German Low Point

The 24th heralded the low point in German fortunes along this part of the front. Vyazma appeared threatened from all directions. The Soviet 39th Army and the 9th Cavalry Corps were bearing down from the north (off map). From the southeast, the newly formed 33rd Army threatened. Directly south, the parachutists of the 4th Airborne Corps and their partisan allies snapped at the Nazis. Finally, the capable Ist Guards Cavalry Corps threatened from the southwest.

Unknown to the Germans, on the 19th and the 21st, STAVKA pulled two armies out of the line and into STAVKA reserve. They pulled out the 1st Shock Army (off map, north) and the 16th Army (Sukhmichi area) because, for all practical purposes, they had been destroyed. STAVKA's failure to concentrate the Soviet assault had critical repercussions as no immediate reserves were available to replace the two withdrawn armies.

On the 26th (turn 19), General Belov's 1st Guard Cavalry Corps finally got across the Rollbahn in strength with five cavalry divisions and two rifle divisions plus supporting artillery. Their mission was to link up with airborne, partisan and cavalry forces already north of the road and threaten and/or capture Vyazma. The Rollbahn was only open in a figurative sense. At any one time, the Soviets were capable of placing artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire on the road at random (this did not change until late spring). The situation was difficult enough that officers from 4th Army HQ had to fly, rather than drive from Spas-Demansk to Yukhnov to visit the troops.

General Belov's 1st Guard Cavalry Corps was successful in pressing north. By 27 January, a Cavalry division (18th) actually sat astride the main Smolensk-Moscow highway west of Vyazma! Also. the Rollbahn was closed (yet again) behind the 4th Army. This proved to be the high tide of the Soviet offensive.

Well to the north (off map), the Rzhev gap had closed on the 24th and the Soviet 39th Army was pocketed. Thus, the threat to Vyazma from the north was not as serious as earlier feared. Also, only one brigade out of three of the 4th Airborne Corps made it to the battle area; the remainder sat for lack of transport planes. All available planes were flying supplies to the 39th Army. The threat from the south was, at most, a modest one.

By the end of the month, the situation for the southern portion of Army Group South had stabilized somewhat. The Smolensk-Moscow highway as well as the Rollbahn was open again. In addition, the gap between the 4th Panzer Army and the 4th Army closed-this time permanently.

For all the losses that the Nazis had suffered, the Soviets were no better off. The Russians began a full-scale offensive in the middle of a bitter winter and had conducted non-stop operations for almost two months. Many Soviet units were depleted, exhausted, and without sufficient logistical support, This was on top of a campaign season of historically horrendous losses.

By the first week of February the front line ran north from Tim to Novsil along the Zusha river to Mtsensk then north along the Oka River to just south of Belev. From there it went northwest to A32.07, southwest along the Zhirda River to A29.04, northwest to A25.08 and northeast to Sukhinichi. From Sukhinichi, it ran southwest across the Bolva River to the A 19.08-09 area, north to just northwest of Kirov (A 19.15), then northeast following south along the Rollbahn to around A27.19. Next, it ran directly east to the A36.20 area, north to A36.24 and west (again!) to A30.24. A large gap existed from A30.24 to A29.27. The front resumed and ran from A29.27 east to A33.26 and almost directly north to the map edge.

Behind the Nazi line (if you call the above a line), in the forests south and southwest of Vyazma were partisans, the Ist Guards Cavalry Corps and elements of the 4th Airborne Corps. Behind the German front, the 33rd Army was trapped in the forests northwest of Yukhnov. Although sporadically supplied, these Soviet forces were close to starvation at times. Even with these hardships, much of this ground remained firmly in Soviet control until May 1942. Soviet survivors from these units formed the core of powerful partisan units that continued to harass the Nazis until the spring of 1944.

The Soviets retook much of the territory captured from the Germans since late September. Although vicious fighting continued, Soviet priorities moved to other sectors. The Nazis had survived a rigorous assault, and remained within striking distance of Moscow, continuing to hold Vyazma, Bryansk, and Rzhev. The German high command fell confident in handling the worst the Russians would be able to hand out.

In fact, each Nazi army on the southern wing of Army Group Center had experienced a near brush with extinction. Soviet attacks came perilously close to meeting Stalin's grandiose expectations. Fortunately for the Germans, Soviet resources had not been sufficiently concentrated to achieve decisive results. This was a mistake that the Soviets would not repeat again when they met the Nazi invaders along the Volga less than a year later.