The Red Army begins Guderian's Blitzkrieg in great jeopardy. Like the army of Archduke Charles before Eckmuhl, Bryansk Front faces an enemy strongly poised to smash its left flank and drive deep behind it. Guderian's path into the Russian hinterland runs through the area held initially by the Thirteenth Army and Front Reserve. The operational problem that confronts this force in its starting positions furnishes a perspective of Russian approaches to doctrine during the fluid early period of Scenario 8.

Orel dominates the center of the maps. Second Panzer Army must control the routes to Tula and Kaluga and from Bryansk, if it is to contribute to the defeat of the sizable Russian forces to the North. Thirteenth Army must delay the German advances to and past Orel (and Kursk) to enable friendly forces to respond to the thrust. However, temper the desire to impose maximum delay with an understanding of friendly capability, and the need to preserve troops to fight again.

German mobile troops derive a serious tactical advantage from the hip--shoot, overrun, and surprise rules. A German player prepared to lose steps in selected overruns can blast through nearly any line without relying on the combat phase. As a result, GB Russians can seldom manage a they shall not pass defense in most terrain that permits overrun. Instead, their defenses must protect their units locally, contest roads and other means of rapid passage, and use reserves to threaten or execute counterattacks against over-extended enemy units. Passive blockage has its place, but a player must realize that it is usually temporary and plan accordingly. Often, the most a blocking force can do is require the attacker to address his option results.

In the Thirteenth Army sector, the Soviet player would like to hold the Germans away from Orel throughout the first movement phase. That would allow him to secure the city with reaction, and subsequently reinforce it by rail. Even if the Russians could not bring up sufficient troops to establish Comrade Yeremenko as the inventor of the principle of slack, they would at least slow and weaken the German advance onto Map A. Unfortunately, that is not quite possible. Thirteenth Army has not the strength to fully block every likely path through the open terrain against Germans starting in B11.16. (The only way is to play the shell game and hope the opponent guesses wrong.)

The following setup plan represents a small solution that concedes the advance to Orel. However, it protects most of the Soviet force, and limits the extent of German advance beyond its positions. It depends on a combination of simple distance, terrain cost, outright blockage, and persuasion. In the process, the Russians will knock some bark off Schnellheinz' "klotz", and might even persuade him not to detach anyone to reinforce Hoepner and Kluger Hans.* The plan incorporates the OCS changes discussed in Operations #9 and #11.

I. 13th Army and Front Reserve

14.24-BK; 15.17-Hog, 101, 81, RR; 15.24-81(-); 16.22- TD; 16.23-C; 17.22-BK; 17.25-R, TB(M), HQ(M); 17.27-R, TD(M); 18.21-Hog, 121; 18.22-R, Arty, Hog; 18.23R, Katy, Hog; 18.24-R, TB; 18.26-R, TB(M); 19.19-Hog, 12 1, Pen; 19.22-C; 19.23-TB; 19.24-MtC; 19.25-Hog, 10 1 (-); 20.19, 81.

II. Abbreviations:

I: infantry; C: cavalry; R: reserve marker; BK: breakdown; Hog: initial hedgehog; (-) unit has one step loss; (M): unit in move mode; (Smot): semi-motorized, usually with supply trucks

III. Notes

a) Units are listed in order, from top to bottom.

b) The TBs in 18.24 and 17.25 should be 12's if available.

c) If the player is willing to commit himself to reorganizing a particular tank division, the units in 16.22 and 16.23 should be switched.

d) Players using the old reserve rules may wish to reorganize the reserves and security line to reduce exposure to recon units.

IV. Supplies

Use your own judgment. The roadblock detachments must use the free Ts to cover all likely overrun attempts. The 18.23 dump should set up with the 13 HQ or within 2 hexes of it. The Orel dump can set up in 29.30 for use by 50 Army. Remember that the new stacking rule does not permit a stack to hide under its supplies. (Oh well ... )

V. Overphase fortification

The roadblock hexes should build the highest possible Level, and the non-reserve hexes from roughly Row 16 east should build at least Level 1. Cost: 4-6 1/2 SP. 50 HQ should be able to assist with funding.

VI. The Neighbors

Fortieth Army is hiding in the woods near Surny, with perhaps one reserve marker. Reserves in 5 Cav and 49, 50, and 3 Armies: (all are M)-2xC and I xKaty, near Plavsk; QxR); Art, 12 Smot, TB at A37.18; (I xR), 3x 141 (Smot), 50 HQ and Art, possibly 3RR and Art along road between Navila and 20.35, (4 or 5xR).

VII. The Germans

You can count on the enemy using every available ground and air unit, except roughly 2-4 fighters. The German players can be heard in the next room humming Horst Wessel, and it smells like gasoline in there...

The positions consist of a pair of detached roadblocks, and a security line that shelters a substantial force of reserves. The Germans must expend much of their movement and hipshoot capacity before they can drive towards Orel or interfere with the Soviet reserves. If the reserves are not immobilized, they should encourage the Germans to avoid over extension. Soviet reaction (including that of neighboring forces) can then withdraw, counterattack, or support the extraction of survivors. In the Russian turn the survivors will mostly withdraw, probably toward or past Bryansk.

These positions do not prevent the Germans from breaking through. Instead, they limit enemy choices after breakthrough. The depth imparted by the roadblocks requires the Germans to address the various layers of the position more or less sequentially. As the attack proceeds, its remaining uncommitted strength will dwindle until it reaches a point at which it is too weak to proceed further. While they can probably capture Orel, the Germans will not likely do so with a very large force.

The first roadblock, at 15.17, is too large and well protected to be overrun or hipshot efficiently. A German who is unafraid of a bloody battle can overrun anyway, but that occupies roughly 3 divisions (if old Schnellheinz wants to use StuGs or combat mode, let him) and costs 3 or 4 steps. It also ties up airunits, especially should the German wish to ease the way by trying to kill steps with the barrage table. This hex can be bypassed easily enough, but that is also costly. The stack prevents use of the road, and hinders pre-release movement of German reserves. Each bypassing unit loses one round of overrun capacity. Moreover, the stack would continue to tic up at least some units watching it starve or attacking it. The chief German benefit is the freeing of air units.

The second roadblock requires the Germans to spend some additional hipshoot and overrun capability before they head into the Soviet rear. The stack in 19.19 will usually have a choice whether to stand or retreat after the first round of overrun, depending on the remaining strength with which the Germans could then attack 20.19. This should force the enemy to use at least three rounds of overrun on the two hexes.

Once the German has driven past the roadblocks, he can either turn north against the balance of the Soviet force, or bypass it and push on to the East. By now, his remaining forces will be weaker due to prior commitment, distance, and the MP cost of bypassing roadblocks (if any). If the German thrusts eastward, he must bomb the Russian reserves to reduce reaction; bombers in turn will be more numerous if he has not used them on the roadblocks. The threat of reaction is crucial because the enemy cannot afford to strip his own reserves to strengthen the drive unless he can negate the threat.

If the German turns to engage the main Soviet positions instead, his manner of dealing with the roadblocks will similarly restrict him. Also, he must overrun or circle the Russian security line to reach the reserves. Hogs and artillery protect the security line relatively well, and its most exposed part also possesses decent action ratings. If the German has overrun all the roadblocks, the forces he will have left to enter the reserve zone will be small (roughly 17th Pz and a few StuGs) and will face undisrupted artillery because of expenditure of hipshoots. If he squeezes out more air units by bypassing 15.17, or omitting to bomb 20.19, he either limits most units to a single overrun attempt, or spends additional troops to hit 20.19. Circling the security line is a good way for the enemy to lose recon units, especially under the new reserve rule.

The German might also pre-empt the Katyusha by setting up his cavalry to overrun Row 16. The threat should encourage fortification. However, German chances of carrying 16.22 or 16.23 without AOB are not much above half with surprise factored in. Such use of the cavalry would divert it from the encirclement of Bryansk.

The depth of the positions gives the Russians an additional benefit. The German (or his dice) will have at least a few opportunities to stumble before he passes the second roadblock. Thus, he may be unable to use each unit with its greatest efficiency. For that reason, I do not think that strategic movement poses a major threat. While the enemy can overrun all the roadblocks with some troops to spare, every unit he takes out of move mode puts him closer to the envelope. Also, the Russian player can shuffle the infantry setup slightly to promote uncertainty: all but one of 13 Army's infantry divisions sets up concealed by a Hog. (I encourage players to do this.) Moreover, the German risks counterattack if he ignores the Soviet reserves. Still, the position is not without risk for the Russian, especially if the enemy cracks the reserves.

There is an additional reason for the German to avoid clearing the road by overrun: his casualty and supply cost. Overrunning all three roadblock hexes can cost 4-8 steps, and the new supply rule (OP #11) requires roughly 13 SPs. That is one third of his weekly supplies. The new surprise rule may mitigate his losses a bit, but some of them will be 5s if he pursues that. The plan does not depend heavily on such persuasion, since it deals with the zone of a key offensive. A truly flaming German can accelerate his advance, but he will pay in future capability if he does so.

So far, I have focused on activity during the German movement phase. After all, the Russians must live through the overrun orgy before they can make any counterplay. The OCS modifications greatly assist the Soviets in maintaining their reserve status for use in the reaction phase. Their reserve force is too small to make extensive attacks, and friendly air support is unlikely unless the enemy is spread thin. If the Germanswho will all be in move mode- leave weak forces exposed, the Russians can make them pay with selected local attacks.

A German blunder might even leave Orel exposed. The threat of reaction can be more important than the actual event. As long as the Russians maintain their reserve force in being, the Germans must cover its reactive options by blocking them all or by keeping reserves of their own. If the enemy strips his own reserves, Russian counterattacks can take free rein. Units not needed to counterattack or support retreats will withdraw. The 13 HQ can even move up to A 19.02 in time to act as a rail depot for Bryansk (if you use the rail option).

When the Soviet turn finally arrives, the survivors will withdraw. Bryansk is the most likely direction, although the German move may leave other routes open. Escape can be an exercise in futility for the infantry; some of these units could block roads and bridges to require the enemy to attack them before moving on. The mobile troops would like to try for the relative safety of Kaluga. Since that requires more than one turn, these units risk being trapped around Bryansk. The player can use reaction to set up an escape corridor. That jungle around Bryansk is not altogether a bad place for thwarted escapees. Even if the railroad is unusable, truck supply may well enable the pocket to hold out (despite bombardment) until bad weather. Air supply becomes possible on overcast turns. Also, an enlarged pocket force needs more German attention to contain or reduce than does one including only the local infantry.

The Thirteenth Army is positionally challenged because of its relative weakness and the limits of the setup area. Therefore, it must make some unique applications of doctrine that are strictly emergency measures. This plan's key feature is its establishment and protection of reserves. It exerts a certain dissuasive effect on German maneuvering. However, the protection is far from perfect and, the Germans can defeat it if they overcome the artillery, or have good luck with hipshoots or surprise. There is another potential drawback in the consumption of reserve markers and initial Hogs needed by other areas. At least the plan gives this force an opportunity to do more than die gloriously for Uncle Joe.

Play under the OCS can be enormously varied and subtle. Much of the above analysis is as subtle as the proverbial brick in the face. I cannotclairn a definitive understanding of the system, and the foregoing defense represents only a window slightly open to it. The Russians in this sector may be capable of more, or perhaps less. GB definitely delivers on Avalon Hill's old line that wargames are "more challenging than chess."

*From the usage among Kluge's colleagues, if not his troops. See Telford Taylor, The March of Conquest (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), p. 20. (Recounts the 1940 campaigns in the West.) Could this little bit of snideness have played a part in Hoepner's and Guderian's dismissals?