by Ken Jacobsen
Have you ever wondered why a select few Civil War generals consistently beat the pants off their opponents? Certainly, Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant are at the top of this list. What was the magic ingredient that made these two so successful? Initial examination reveals nothing similar. Lee was the embodiment of the aristocratic Old South; proud, aggressive, and well cultured. At the war's outbreak he was reaching the apex of an already distinguished military career. Grant was none of these things. Quiet and stoopshouldered, his often unkempt image made him appear a dullard. His civilian pursuits before the outbreak of hostilities were an abject failure. How could these two men, so dissimilar in background and appearance, become regarded as the premier commanders of our nation's bloodiest conflict? The common thread was their ability to seize and maintain the initiative. How could something so theoretical, so nebulous, as seizing the initiative translate into success on the battlefield? There are a number of reasons. To begin with, it is almost impossible to decisively defeat an opponent by letting him call the shots. Even the debacle at Fredericksburg did little to assuage the punch of the Army of the Potomac. Likewise, the Union victory at Gettysburg did not permanently disrupt the manpower pool of the Army of Northern Virginia, nor did it adversely affect the morale of Lee's army. Only by seizing the initiative, by dictating the course and tempo of the battle, can a leader win a decisive victory. In simple terms, possessing the initiative allows a commander to choose where and when the critical showdown on a battlefield will occur. This allows that commander to deploy his forces advantageously to maximize his chances of success. The commander without the initiative spends an increasing amount of energy and resources reacting to his opponent. Eventually, he will have lost his power of maneuver because events overcome his ability to command; a command paralysis sets in. At this point, he is much like the dazed fighter waiting for the knockout punch. I will examine the notable highlights of Lee's and Grant's careers, ones in which they delivered the knockout punch. <>Robert E. Leee Lee had an inauspicious start as a general. His campaign in West Virginia was a disappointment, at best. During the tense summer of 1862, with McClellan knocking at the gates of Richmond, he began his rise to fame. After the wounding of Joe Johnston at the Battle of Fair Oaks, Lee received command of the Confederate forces defending the capitol. Naming his forces the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee began to search for a way to throw back the invader. He soon noticed the Chickahominy River split the Union forces; he had found his opportunity. He devised a bold plan to attackthe isolated Union forces north of the river with the bulk of his army, leaving only two divisions south of the river to stave off the huge Yankee horde. Clearly, Lee was relying on the inability of the methodical and plodding McClellan to effectively deal with a rapidly changing tactical situation. Little did he know that he had already seized the initiative. Over the course of the next seven days, Lee launched a series of disjointed attacks. Despite the lack of coordination in execution, the plan was solid. What is more important, it worked. Although he suffered comparatively higher casualties than the Federals, Lee never abandoned his commitment to the offensive. Lee's aggression so unnerved McClellan that he retreated meekly following each battle. All the while, the belligerent posturing of the 27,000 Confederates south of the river convinced McClellan that his 69,000 were heavily outnumbered. The Peninsula campaign ended with McClellan declaring victory, then promptly withdrawing his forces from whence they came. Though costly, seizing the initiative allowed Lee to defeat a much larger force and save Richmond from grave danger. The following summer, Lee reached the pinnacle of his success, thought by many to be his greatest triumph: Chancellorsville. Ironically, events leading up to the battle could not have gone worse for Lee. First, the Army of the Potomac had a new commander, Major General Joe Hooker: "Fighting Joe" to his men. Hooker infused the army with a spirit and determination previously unknown to the Yankees. Then in late April, he began his well-planned offensive. He left Sedgwick's Corps at Fredericksburg to make a diversionary assault upon the rebel fortifications. He sent the remainder of his huge army northwest to impose itself between Lee and Richmond. The Confederates would then be crushed in the jaws of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker was so confident of success that he declared to some newspaper reporters, "The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of the Potomac." Robert E. Lee had other ideas. It is true that Hooker had stolen a march on Lee and had placed the Confederate commander in a tough situation. Nonetheless, Lee resolved to turn back this invasion as he had all others. He judged the activity at Fredericksburg to be a feint. His top generals disagreed with him. However, Lee was willing to gamble his army and the Confederacy, and trust his judgment. He decided to leave a division of infantry (Early's) at Fredericksburg and march with the remainder of his army northwest to meet Hooker. The bold move worked. At the first sound of Confederate guns, the dauntless Federal commander became myopic and confused; he inexplicably withdrew his forces into the tangled forest around the Chancellor House. After a day of inconclusive fighting, Lee, Jackson and Stuart conferred. The Union right flank was in the air, not resting on any natural barriers. Jackson proposed a flanking march with his entire corps to attack the vulnerable position. Lee agreed. What followed the next day is well known: the crushing attack, the wounding (and subsequent death) of Jackson, and the rout of the Federal army. The defeat was so total it caused the President to moan, "My God, it is horrible; and think of it, one hundred and thirty thousand magnificent soldiers cut to pieces by less than sixty thousand half-starved ragamuffins." In the face of overwhelming numbers, Lee had seized the initiative and handed the Union its worst defeat of the war. Grant's battlefield initiation was similar to Lee's. The little known Battle of Belmont was a tactical defeat for the future commander of all Union armies. However, after this less than propitious start, Grant achieved a crucial victory for the Union. Following his capture of Ft. Henry on the Tennessee River, Grant quickly marched his forces 15 miles east and besieged Ft. Donelson on the Cumberland River. Sensing the futility of attempting to withstand the siege, the 15,000 Confederates attempted a breakout. The Confederates launched their attack in the pre-dawn hours and took the Union right flank completely by surprise. Receiving reports that his right flank was crumbling under the weight of a determined Confederate assault, Grant surmised that the Confederates must have stripped their own right to support this attack. Grant calmly organized an assault on the Confederate right amidst the turmoil and confusion spreading through his army. This assault had the desired affect; on the verge of victory, the Confederates pulled back into the fort, sealing their fate. The Confederate garrison surrendered the following day. Grant's bold seizure of the initiative at the height of tumult resulted in a significant victory for the North. The Union Navy could now roam the Cumberland River and force the abandonment of Nashville. The half victory at Shiloh and the masterful Vicksburg Campaign followed. Elsewhere, however, the Union effort was stalling. The victory at Gettysburg had not aroused any killer instinct in Meade; Lee and his army were safely ensconced behind his Mine Run fortifications. The Federal offensive through mid Tennessee and into Georgia met with disaster. The defeat at Chickamauga caused the Federals to retreat to Chattanooga. Bragg and his army followed, besieging the city. The Federal army was starving to death. Mules and horses were dying by the thousands. Morale was at its nadir. To rectify the situation, Secretary of War Stanton gave Grant command of all Union troops between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi, and sent him to Chattanooga. Grant arrived soiled, cold, and looking exceedingly insignificant, and immediately took charge. Patiently listening to the reports of his subordinates he wrote out orders that would swing the pendulum in his favor. He restored a steady flow of supplies to his troops and formulated an attack on the Confederates. All the while, the Confederates submissively watched the developments from atop Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Bragg, through his inactivity, virtually handed the initiative to Grant on a silver platter. After weeks of unmolested preparation, Grant launched his attack. His planned double envelopment did not work, but an impetuous charge by the troops of his center up the slopes of Missionary Ridge routed the Confederates. Grant rode to the front where one of the soldiers yelled "All we wanted was a leader." In a very short span, he had taken an army from the brink of disaster to the heights of victory. Perhaps fate had destined that these two great generals play out the last act of the war together. For eleven brutal months, from May 1864 to April 1865, they performed a bloody pirouette across the Virginia countryside. First, in the Wilderness, they fought one another to a standstill. Then, there was the slaughterhouse of Spotsylvania, followed by the North Anna River. An ill fated assault at Cold Harbor interrupted the procession before the siege of Petersburg. Although tactically inconclusive, each of these battles had a common characteristic: Grant was the attacker. Undaunted by rising casualties, he maintained the initiative throughout. He forced Lee to counter his moves, not vice- versa as it had been in the past. Grant was able to dictate the tempo of the campaign by applying constant pressure on the battlefield. He hemmed Lee in around Petersburg within forty days of crossing the Rapidan, robbing the master tactician of his ability to maneuver. It was all possible because of his ability to seize and maintain the initiative. Historical narrative aside, how can the player apply this to a gaming situation? After all, that is the objective here. You must find the weak spots in your steely-eyed opponent and take advantage of them. These weaknesses come in two primary forms: bad tactics and poor knowledge of the rules. Let's examine each of these in detail. Bad TacticsThe Beer & Pretzels Approach: Unfortunately, some players feel that wargaming is simply moving a piece or stack to the nearest enemy piece or stack and rolling the dice. You can easily lure these types into traps by hanging inexpensive bait out. In no time at all you will have swept their units from the field. The McClellan Syndrome: As the name implies, these types are excessively cautious. This predisposition to caution can be encouraged by giving them a bloody nose at the earliest opportunity. Also, they will be aware of unit types rather than capabilities. Example: A single strength point of artillery will dissuade them from assaulting a position. The Hood Syndrome: These players have but one option in their tactical repertoire-ATTACK. Against these players you must be the matador. The red cape will be that division (or corps) that you maneuver to a threatening position. Set up a strong defensive line and let him bang his head against the wall. Predictability: These players exhibit a distinct lack of flexibility. These are the folks that will always attempt a flanking maneuver, or will always try to capture a dominant terrain feature. They may also be excessively concerned with unit symmetry (i.e., having all infantry units in a straight line, or all units having extended line markers to the right). Usually, if you upset their combat architecture you can run rings around them. Poor Knowledge of the RulesMovement: Where to begin? We have all come across the novice who will leave his infantry in column formation well within range of our artillery. But what about the player who, as the Federal in Thunder, enters his reinforcements in line and leaves them that way? There are a number of other examples, but the point to remember is that these players will be hindered in their ability to effectively maneuver their forces. Combat: This is the Opponent who will use extended line markers for his already under-strength brigade in full view (and range) of your massed artillery batteries. Or, he will march out a single wrecked brigade to combat an entire division. Whatever the manifestation, not fully understanding the combat rules will prevent a player from effectively employing his forces. Morale: The morale rules for CWB are not overly complex. However, I am constantly amazed at players who fail to understand how morale affects combat efficiency. Does your opponent place his wrecked and routed brigade in a stack with fresh "A" level troops? Along the same vein, does he fail to recognize the need to recover stragglers? If either of these cases apply, it should be fairly easy for you to match your best against his worst. Supply: Again, supply rules are fairly straightforward. We all know that it is a matter of time before some units become Low Ammo. However, resupply would be difficult if our supply wagons were on the other side of the map. At the other end of the spectrum, the player who places his supply wagons in the front line is just asking you to teach him a lesson. Are these examples the magical keys to victory? Absolutely not! I intended them as a point of reference. Your situation, as you are locked in a life and death struggle in your opponent's cozy den, may not lend itself to application of these examples. Furthermore, blind adherence to any pre-conceived plan is not only foolish but invites disaster. However, even though the tactics may change, the plan does not. So, the next time you have your back against the wall and are wondering what to do, seize the initiative and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Good luck & happy gaming! Back to Table of Contents -- Operations #12 Back to Operations List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master List of Magazines © Copyright 1994 by The Gamers. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |