With the publication of Guderian's Blitzkrieg and the launching of the Operational Combat Series, Dean has tried to bring a closer focus to the way modern warfare operates. The fundamental focus of the OCS is an effort to model the dynamics of WW2 operational combat, including logistics and the use of reserves. Board wargaming sadly neglects these two concepts. Yet, they are important because they are the methods by which modern commanders influence the course of battle. The availability of supplies is always limited, forcing commanders to choose between competing sectors in allocating precious resources for offense or defense. Moving those supplies forward is the flip side of that problem. Virtually all WW2 offensives ran out of steam because they outran their logistical tails and forced a slowdown in operations.

Reserves are the other dimension of a commander's influence. The proper commitment of reserve forces marks the difference between success and failure, both offensively and defensively. The player specifically designates OCS reserves, either following combat to exploit opportunities, or to react during the enemy turn and limit his opportunities. Not all mechanized forces can participate simply by dint of being "mobile." Instead, the player must weigh the consequences of withholding them from the initial attacks in anticipation of translating local successes into something larger. While some forces can become active in both phases, by way of positive combat results that create "exploitation" forces from the initial attackers, these troops are intentionally less effective than units set aside specifically in reserve. Moreover, major results can only come from the deep penetration attainable with those reserves.

Finally, it is exactly this use of supply points and HQ's that creates an infrastructure and gives the opposing player a reason to go deep: a chance to really disrupt this rear echelon. The essence of the Blitzkrieg is rapid, deep penetration to the enemy communications zone. The resultant confusion, supply disruption, and overwhelming of enemy reserves can often leave frontline enemy forces, nominally quite fearsome, irrelevant to the outcome of the struggle.

Perceiving Reality

Of course, any game rests on the foundation of sensible abstraction. The OCS is no exception. An attempt to preserve and differentiate all the factors of warfare would drive any player to distraction with tedious overwork. However, given the goals of the system, choosing where to make those abstractions is critical.

For example, most WW2 operational level games tend to make German units the strongest on the map, with larger combat strengths and better movement rates. Soviets-especially 1941 Barbarossa Soviets-by contrast, tend to be much weaker. For instance, in SPI's War in Europe, German infantry divisions have a combat strength of "6", while their Soviet opponents are rated at "1". Europa combines similar (though not nearly as pronounced, 2 or 3 to 1 rather than the 6-1 ratio) numerical German superiority with a number of other Soviet restrictions that leave the USSR forces in the first turns virtually incapable of effective response. The result is historical, but the process simply assumes German advantages are unbeatable. The German can wade across the board with impunity, killing vast hordes of Russians. This leaves the Soviets only one successful response. Outrun the Germans and wait, secure in the knowledge that later turns bring not only more troops, but individually stronger units as well, allowing a more even contest with the enemy.

I do not mean to imply that this is a flawed concept. The result of this kind of abstraction is an historically valid path in 194 1, but is doomed to eroding defeat later in the war. It is a technique that allows for a manageable recreation of the entire campaign from 1941 to 1944-45. However, it presents the German with mastery of mobile warfare as a Fait accompli. The system automatically hands him this advantage.

The OCS intentionally seeks a different level of resolution. Technical mastery of mobile war remains with the player, not the system. This is not to say the German player does not have advantages over his Soviet opponent in GB: he does. Individual units-the building blocks of operational warfare-are the resolution threshold. While the Germans are not automatically stronger than their foes (and a simple comparison of raw GB combat strengths reveals a fairly hefty Soviet force, superficially anyway), German tactical superiority portrays itself through the use of action ratings in which the German force has a distinct advantage.

Yet, action ratings alone do not guarantee German success. If the German pursues an attritional strategy, for instance, he will find GB a virtually impossible game to win against competent Soviet play. The action ratings alone simply will not provide enough of a boost in straight combat to guarantee successful attacks and preclude effective Soviet counterattacks. The tremendous tactical advantages of the Wehrmacht are not there at first glance. Even the vaunted Panzer Divisions are vulnerable: the 10th Panzer, for instance, attacks with a strength of 34 and defends with 23. A Soviet Tank Division is somewhat stronger on the attack, with a combat strength of 40, and defends on par with the Panzers, at 20. It is not that difficult for the Soviet to amass enough strength to build decent odds on a Panzer column, and do it serious damage, if his opponent lets him. One player even complained that it was possible to surround a Panzer Division with USSR Militia Divisions. The precious Panzers would be impotent due to lack of supply. They would be unable even to attack out and liberate themselves. Our reply? Yes, of course this can happen, but only if the German player lets it!

None of the above prevents the Germans from running wild over the map, shattering the Soviets and taking Moscow. In fact, I have seen Moscow fall in more than one game. Action ratings, air power reserves and rear-area infrastructure all set the stage for this kind of explosive success, but execution is solely in the hands of the player. In effect, the OCS asks players to recreate operational doctrines via interaction of the above building blocks, not merely benefit from them after the fact.

A Question of Doctrine

Where, then, are the detailed rules and restrictions that highlight the doctrinal differences between opposing forces? While the OCS standard rules seem rich in detail, GB itself makes little overt effort to punish the Soviets with "doctrine" rules, (which are usually just a long list of can't do this and can't do that's anyway). There is a distinct lack of Soviet restrictions in GB-beyond a couple of critical items. One gamer commented that the two armies were interchangeable. Soviet units could start in the German set-up areas and vice versa, and GB would play the same. I suggest that conducting that experiment would produce some startling results, and reveal the subtle differences inherent in the system that quickly derail any would-be Soviet blitzkrieger.

The Historical Context

It was not Soviet doctrine that was flawed at the opening of Barbarossa: it was execution that suffered. The theoretical basis for Soviet warfighting was sound-perhaps even the most advanced of the period, and copied by the Germans themselves. The field regulations of 1936, developed under the aegis of Marshal Tukhachevskii and a number of other innovative officers, called for a style of warfare based on deep penetration and the use of large-scale mobile formations in he form of Tank and Mechanized Corps. The dire effects of Stalin ism, however, were about to intervene. The great purges, which had became a way of life in Soviet Russia under Stalin, at last came to the army in 1937. The result was the elimination of virtually the entire leadership of the Red Army, and certainly the extinguishing of all original thought or initiation. By 1939, Marshal Voroshilov, long an opponent of the mobile arm, realized his ambitions and disbanded the mobile corps as field formations. A year later, the lessons of the Winter War in Finland and the success of German large-scale mobile units in France initiated the reversal of this disastrous course and encouraged a return to the 1936 precepts, but little time remained.

Even by the spring of 1941, only a few of the higher formations were re-established. The dearth of qualified officers was crippling. A survey of 225 regimental commanders uncovered that the sole military education for 200 of them was completion of a junior lieutenant's course, qualifying them for platoon leadership! To compound matters, the Soviets lacked the support forces to back up these larger mobile units, and none of the various tank and mechanized units were fully formed by June of 1941. They lacked trucks, prime movers, communications gear, and engineering troops, all just as critical to the success of mobile warfare as tanks. In short, the Red Army was not capable of conducting the style of warfare it planned.

The Cardboard Experience

The two largest limiting factors facing the Soviets in GB are inadequate action ratings and the Red Airforce's inability to conduct hipshoots. Few of the Soviet Units-especially the critical mobile units needed to conduct a Blitzkrieg have action ratings of even "4", let alone "5". Their opponents, the Wehrmacht, have an average action rating above "4". This action rating discrepancy and the lack of co-ordination from the air means that the most important tool of mobile warfare in game terms--the overrun attack--is doomed to failure for the Soviets. The Germans can overrun disorganized opponents--pounded by the Luftwaffe in hip shoots--with surprise roll modifiers of anywhere from +2 to +4. The Reds, even if they use one of their valuable "4" rated tank brigades, must face undisorganized opponents with a differential of 0 or - 1.

What is worse, the OCS is a mutually bloody game. Even at high odds, the attacker may well suffer a casualty, forcing the loss of the unit contributing the action rating to the engagement. The German army, with a great depth of "5" rated units, can suffer severely. The Soviets, to whom every "4" is sacred, can bleed white rapidly, even if locally successful. The only way to avoid these critical losses is to withhold the good troops from surprise and combat modifiers. This hamstrings any regular attack and turns an overrun into a bloody fiasco.

These two simple elements-requiring only one special rule, prohibiting the Red Airforce from conducting Hip shoots-completely alter the way the two armies fight. The German style is one of sweeping maneuver. Overruns are common, and usually exploit results occur, allowing the Germans to extract double duty from much of their army. The Soviets are virtually denied overruns, except in rare and critical cases. During combat they need to drag up lots of strength, hoping to offset German surprise and combat modifiers with high odds. Finally, if they wish to conduct significant activity in the Exploitation Phase, they must plan for it. They must withhold reserves accordingly, because the vast bulk of their army will not become Exploit - marked due to those same dreadful action ratings.

OCS: The Evolving Context

Yet, the OCS was not designed simply as a vehicle to recreate the conditions in front of Moscow in 194 1. Instead, its stated goal is the simulation of WW2 era operational combat across the spectrum. Hence, it needs to be a canvas across which multiple doctrinal brushes can paint, even simultaneously. This simultaneity, based on a set of common building blocks, allows for contrast and comparison of competing doctrines.

The OCS also allows players to take part in the evolution of a given army's tactical doctrine. The second game in the series, Enemy at the Gates, (the Soviet Stalingrad offensive) ushers in a Red Army whose basic units have improved substantially. Now the USSR player has a number of Tank and Mechanized Corps, usually four-brigade forces with decent "3" and "4" action ratings. There are even a few "5" units, including the elite 26th Tank Corps, easily destined to win the Order of Lenin, since they will repeatedly fall into the most critical tactical situations.

The Axis force has declined. Not only are there hordes of weak reeds in the form of Rumanian, Hungarian and Italian troops, but the German units are slipping. The Panzers are back, bigger and better than ever~ but there are too few of them to be everywhere, and the German infantry is in decline. Some of the divisions now carry "3" ratings, and the Luftwaffe Field Divisions might as well be Rumanians.

Even so, not all is a cake walk for Stalin's boys. The Red Airforce still cannot conduct hip shoots. The average Russian Tank Corps has only four steps to lose. This contrasts poorly with the German Panzer Division's six or seven. While possible now, one must still execute overruns with great care and planning, as the average Soviet mobile formation lacks the depth of its Fascist counterpart. One misfired overrun can gut a Tank Corps, costing the action ratings necessary to repeat the assault.

However, the Soviets are unquestionably on the rise. They can execute a form of deep- penetration warfare, albeit not with the same off-the-cuff style that the Germans bring to it, The pairing of Multiple Tank Corps gives the Reds a substantial exploitation capability through reserves and some combat-induced exploit markers. The key is not to expect single corps to persevere in the face of adversity, but to continually turn to fresh reserves to redress the situation.

For their part, the Germans are evolving from the Blitzkrieg offense to the mobile defense. The Panzers can no longer launch fullthrottle offensives. They lack the support of quality infantry (or any infantry, in some cases) to screen the rear and flanks. Instead, their best tactic is the riposte delivered as the Soviets ]cap out-perhaps encouraged by a feigned German panic-to the end of the Russian logistical tether. In move mode, without the depth of infantry steps to absorb losses, and always short of trucks to bring up combat supply, a German prepared to hit hard and fast can devastate the Red forces.

These developments are especially exciting to us in-house because they are evolving within a proper historical framework. The initial Soviet Uranus Offensive (19 November 1942, which surrounded the German 6th Army) is a powerful blow, that shatters the German and Axis-Allied defenses, leaving the defender dazed and demoralized. It is also a distinctly Soviet Offensive, different from the German blow that opens Guderian's Blitzkrieg with a similar effect. Soviet success demands tight control and well-defined objectives. Yet it must contain enough force to overcome the local set-backs engendered by a still inferior troop quality. Lack of focus and overreach will prevent the kind of shattering success on turn one that the Soviet needs, allowing German mobile units to slip out of the trap. Later play indicates that the Soviets are especially vulnerable in the midst of rapid, deep exploitation. All of this closely parallels both historical Soviet doctrine and the unfolding of actual events. Manstein's famous "Backhand Blow", the counter stroke that retook Kharkov in March of 1943 from an overextended Soviet command, is not only possible but eminently likely.

Manstein's concept of "slack", having German forces pull back to coil like a spring and then hit the Soviets, works very well indeed. No force is so vulnerable as one that is in pursuit. Rapidly advancing forces outrun the reach of reserves (Dean has cut reserve movement to 1/4 in the regular Movement Phase, a critical change to the series rules) and the reach of air cover. A defender who can run fast enough can take up this slack, convert to combat mode, and devastate unwary attackers so recently victorious.

Best of all, the above trends unfold naturally, as inherent benefits of the basic system. None of these occurrences required special rules to duplicate, but revealed themselves as players made full use of the existing structure. The OCS simply proved that it could survive beyond the existence of GB's unique circumstances to bear up robustly in the quite different environment of EatG. GB saw two divergent forces-Superior German and vastly inferior Sovietclash in a way that reproduced the historical context quite nicely. EatG sees two similar forces-each a mix of individual strength and weakness, but overall both uniquely vulnerable-collide and again produce historical reactions.

Doctrine versus Doctrine

Still, the doctrinal question awaits an answer. The OCS will recreate historically valid doctrines if the players so decide, but it does not force the issue. A player can adopt radically a historical tactics as he chooses, without a single overt rule to hinder him.

However, the simplest of all measures intervenes-his opponent can hinder him. Against a competent player who applies the correct doctrinal solutions, our 'rebel without a historical clue' will most likely lose badly. I suspect that this defeat-and messy defeat at that-is the greatest of all incentives to apply the correct lessons of history.

We are most happy with the OCS precisely because it allows this kind of comparative study, and produces the right answers. Gamers are free to apply any sort of doctrine, but will find the best results with the correct historical application. Ideally, the system hands each player the basic building blocks of his army-the mobility class and action ratings of his units, the capabilities of his airforce- and asks the player to evolve a doctrine for its successful use. The German player in GB wins through the ruthless application of the Blitzkrieg because his force is well suited to it. The Soviet player must search out a different doctrine, and needs to choose his attacks with care and much greater preparation. This process allows players to examine more closely the process by which one army proved superior to another, and discover not just that mobile warfare worked, but why it worked.

The ultimate goal of the OCS is to ask players to evolve the most naturally successful doctrine base on the capabilities of their forces at hand, and to show that the most successful doctrine is also the one that produces historical success. The game asks the players to invent their own doctrine, and if the game works, history validates the player's choice. So far, we think the OCS works very well indeed.