When I first began to read Civil War history, I became fascinated by the range and scope of leadership and personality inherent in the conflict. Even casual readers will notice how differently writers treat leaders in later struggles such as WWII. Personality in modern warfare seems submerged within the greater scope of a global war machine. For every Patton hoisted to fame in the Second World War, Lees, Grants and Jacksons abound in our nation's bloodiest affair. In short, corporate warfare has become largely depersonalized.

Lack of modern tactical communication and only rudimentary staff development amplified both the abilities and failures of individual leaders. The Civil War general, brigade or corps commander had to operate with a comparative lack of information. Intelligence provides a good example. Modern armies derive intelligence about their foes from diverse sources. At the operational level they can develop close estimates of enermy positions and strength. The Civil War commander did not have such opportunity. His intelligence network most often consisted of his own cavalry and a few enemy newspapers. Civilian spy networks provided occasional flashes of brilliance, but the Pinkerton detective agency assembled the only real effort in this area and was a failure. Lee got better service from the able cavalry commander, JEB Stuart (though Stuart had notable lapses, such as Gettysburg). Ultimately, the Civil War General often had to act on guesswork. This confusion was also true on the tactical level, where subordinate officers faced rapidly changing events amid the confusion of battle.

Given the conditions and the scale of the conflict, it is hardly surprising that so many men of such varied ability led troops in battle. While West Point training was one good way to a General's straps, many officers came from political backgrounds as wen. As a result, ability ranged from outstanding to truly abysmal with commanders learning on the job. The game designer must find a way to reduce the glorious riot of personality to a representative system that will provide a method of simulation that is at the same time colorful, simple and accurate. It is not an easy task.

Our answer was the command system in the CWB. Dean devised a basic system that captures the feel of Civil War orders (including a degree of uncertainty) without an excessively complex process. One simple value quantifies each leader's tactical skills. That value does duty on several levels portraying command effects. What does that single number represent? To say that Lee is a four, indicates that he is better than McClellan, laboring along with a zero, but fails to define the qualities that comprise that difference.

The CWB rates two types of leaders: army commanders and all others. Army commanders' ratings derive from two criteria; their ability to handle large formations on the battlefield and the impact they have on troop morale. Other officers' ratings stem from the above factors and include the assessment of a particular leader's combat initiative.

The primary consideration in rating an army commander must be how effective he is in coordinating the efforts of the nurnerous forces at his disposal. The morale effect is secondary. An example is John Pope, the Union army commander at 2nd Bull Run. Pope repeatedly failed to organize a single concerted attack on Jackson on August 29, while that Rebel general remained isolated from the rest of Lee's army. On August 30, Rebel counter strokes disrupted Pope's entire plan, and he was mostly ineffective. He failed to rally his troops and prevent an ignominious retreat from the field. With morale he was no better and many Federal soldiers disliked him intensely for his perceived insults offered them in comparison to western Yankees.

Pope's rating of 1 in August Fury is perhaps even a trifle generous Another example worth examining, if only for the unusual nature of the circumstances, is Gettysburg. In Thunder at the Crossroads I Lee carries a dual rating, reflecting the difficulties the Army of Northern Virginia faced at Gettysburg. Lee is a 4, but a game special rule limits the Rebel commander to issuing orders as if he were a 2. (A variant allows Lee to use his full faculties.) Poor command coordination marred the ANV's performance there. I felt that Lee, by failing to find the measure of his two new corps commanders (Ewell and Hill) was a major factor in that defeat. Nonetheless, the morale effect he could have on his men was nothing short of amazing, and merited a 4 at the least.

Of special note is In Their Quiet Fields, since it represents an extreme example of problems in rating leaders. In the end, McClellan's performance was so bad, and the Rebels so good that the situation pushed the envelope of the system. Finally, Dean settled for a series of special rules that captured the unique quality of the battle without disrupting the full command rules. Any attempt to force the command structure to conform to these extremes and still produce a workable game would have irrevocably damaged the system by overburdening it with complexities included to hinder McClellan. The system needs to cover the generalities of Civil War command, while leaving true aberrations to be handled on a case by case basis.

Initiative, which army commanders do not use (in game terms), provides the base value of other leader ratings. An officer's ability, not just to make a decision, but to make the right decision with limited external information, is crucial. Initiative is not just the measure of how quickly a general could reach a decision. Union Major General Sickles, again at Gettysburg, decided that his assigned position was untenable. Quickly, he seized the initiative and advanced his 3rd Corps forward to the Peach Orchard salient. Sickles saw a problem and acted promptly to solve it. Unfortunately, Longstreet's attack on July 2 virtually eliminated the 3rd Corps, exposed and unsupported as it was due to Sickles unilateral action. Clearly, despite almost 50 years of post-war partisan politicking, Sickles' decision was a grave mistake.

Worse than rashness, however, is indecision. Failure to act cost both lives and battles. Some men, like Sigel at 2nd Manassas, who passively watched as the Union Iron Brigade engaged two Rebel divisions, fully earned their low ratings. In August Fury, for this and other failures, Sigel merits his 0. Similarly, on July 1, 1863, Ewell hesitated after the capture of Gettysburg, held back by heavy losses, Lee's urging for caution on the previous day, and simple newness to Corps command. He failed to press on to Cemetery Hill where the Union army was rallying. It is not certain that such an attack would have brought victory, as many critics claim, but at least he could have tried.

While Ewell justified his 1 rating in Thunder I, the above circumstance is also a good example of another device useful to the designer in the CWB: anti-intitiative ratings. Some degree of Ewen's caution was due to Lee's urging "not to bring on a general engagement until the rest of the army was up". Poor communication on July 1 meant that neither A. P. Hill, who initiated the fight, nor Ewell, whose timely arrival won the day, were clear about what was happening until late afternoon. By that time, the Federals had recovered their equilibrium and brought up fresh troops. Lee's general anti-initiative rating reflects this problem.

Not that inactivity is wrong. Longstreet seemed to wait forever at 2nd Manassas to launch his counterattack. Critics have questioned this delay. Was it a mistake? When Longstreet struck, all Union reserves had finally become engaged. Only one small division was in place to hold back the Confederates. I believe that the Southern victory was greater due to this timing. Despite taking little action from his noon arrival on the 29th until 3:00 p.m. on the 30th, his strike was successful because of the wait. This is why he is a 4 in August Fury.

It is the quality of doing the right thing that merits high numbers. However, not all good decisions were informed decisions. Some were mere gut feelings. Rating leaders is a subjective business. Biased accounts can prejudice one's opinion. I try to read many opinions on a topic to locate a middle ground from which to work. The Civil War is rife with post-war examples of reputation bashing from old soldiers scrambling to justily themselves and squelch their rivals. One might wonder how such a collection ever managed to function as an army, let alone a good one.

One decision that has raised some hackles was that of rating each officer's worth on an individual battle basis. Instead of always rating Jackson or Longstreet a 4, the values are not constant. Even the best commanders had off days. Longstreet, a 4 in all games so far, put in a poor performance at Seven Pines. His delay and confusion were prime causes for the South's failure to organize an effective general attack. His force was the main effort of Johnston's plan. Some blame belongs to Johnston for failing to issue clear and concise orders. However, Longstreet did not do well here or in the aftermath of the battle. He even had some hand in an effort to conceal the truth and direct blame away from Johnston. In a game on Seven Pines, Longstreet would not be a 4 but rather a 1 or even a 0.

The same is true for Jackson during the Seven Days' campaign in front of Richmond. Jackson arrived from the Valley campaign with a brilliant reputation. However, for the next few days he did not live up to that fame. He consistently failed to meet promised schedules and dealt with unexpected problems as if in a daze. At White Oak Swamp, his failure to become involved with the battle allowed McClellan's troops to escape. It was a time when intervention on the Union flank could have spelled disaster for the Army of the Potomac. In games dealing with the week from June 26 to July 1, 1862, Jackson will have to carry a lesser number.

All Civil War commanders were expected to provide leadership by example. Therefore, the leader counters must be capable of influencing morale. The morale effect is secondary 'in the rating process, since it is a less important effect in game terms. Fortunately, there are few examples where a leader's inspirational abilities differ radically from his command skills. The most extreme example is that of McClellan. In 1862 he won the undying admiration of the troops, but his crippling caution was at odds with the 4 deserved by his morale effect. Interestingly, McClellan was either a detached and distant observer (Antietam) or not present at all (most of the Seven Days) in all the major actions fought by the Army of The Potomac. At Mechanicsburg, Game's Mill and Malvern Hill, McClellan was not even onthe field but let subordinates run the show. His actual combat morale benefits never get used. It was this lack of activity at Antietam that precluded any need for a special rule akin to Lee in Thunder. The Seven Days' games will penalize him accordingly.

Subjectivity is a major factor in all aspects of the leadership question. Debates have raged among historians and participants concerning the relative merits of individual men. I doubt that gamers will agree with all of my choices in assigning values. If I have slighted your favorite general, forgive my transgression. Change the numbers to suit yourself. Experimenting with a game is another way to provide further in sight into the historical event. I welcome thoughts on various aspects of leadership and game design as well thoughts on the men themselves. Who knows? Maybe you can salvage the tarnished reputation of a personal favorite and convince me of my error. At any rate, I would enjoy listening to you try.