From MagWeb.com member Jon Perlman:
Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect, 1995
1. We misjudged then - as we have since - the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries.. .. and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.
2. We viewed the people and leaders of South Vietnam in terms of our own experience. . . . We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.
3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people. . . to fight and die for their beliefs and values.
4. Our misjudgments of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area.
5. We failed then - as we have since - to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces, and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements.
6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale U.s. military involvement in Southeast Asia before we initiated the action.
7. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why we were doing what we did.
8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient.
9. We did not hold to the principle that u.s. military action - other than in response to direct threats to our own security - should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully . . . by the international community.
10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs. . . there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions.
11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues, involving the great risks and costs - including, above all else, loss of life - associated with the application of military force under substantial constraints over a long period of time.
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