The idea of actually destroying an incoming torpedo used to be virtually unthinkable as unthinkable as the idea of shooting down an incoming missile was in the 1950s. The threat has changed, and so has the capability to deal with it. Until recently, the torpedo threat could be dealt with by a combination of aggressive ASW and towed acoustic decoys. It is still always better to kill the shooter than the weapon he's fired. The problem is, shooters are getting harder to- find and 01. Small, very quiet diesel subs are proliferating, and they are being found in shallow coastal waters, which provide excellent acoustic cover. Also, the torpedoes are a lot harder to fool. Advanced digital seekers ignore all but the most sophisticated decoys, and are also easily reprogrammed as new countermeasures appear. They are also quieter than earlier models, which means they may not be detected at long range as before. Even more troubling are the wake-homing torpedoes, which the Russian are fielding (and selling) in both 650 and 533mm sizes. There is no way to decoy a wake homer. They react to a disturbance in the water which can only be created by the passage of a ship. Nothing else, short of another hull, can generate that wake. Crisscrossing wakes to try and confuse the torpedo's seeker only gives it that many more choices of targets, not to mention wasting the ships' time making circles in the ocean. A smarter weapon fired by a stealthier platform means that more torpedoes will reach their intended targets, and navies these days have fewer ships to lose. While all the major navies continue to develop and field advanced "soft kill" systems, all now have classified programs aimed at developing something that will actually detect, localize, and kill an incoming torpedo about one nm out. It's difficult to imagine how that might be done, and some of the methods cross the line from naval technology to science fiction. The Russian RPK-5 Liven system (see sidebar) shows one practical approach. Its effectiveness is so far unknown. Also unknown is the effectiveness of the Mk46 Mod 7 torpedoes fired from the stern of some American aircraft carriers. Described as a "countermeasure," the Mod 7 version of the Mk46 torpedo is designed to somehow counter Russian-built (if not Russian fired) wake-homing torpedoes. An installation has been seen on CVN-70 Carl Vinson; and if it works, will probably appear on other carriers as quickly as they can be installed. just as effective missile defenses changed the tactics of missile shooters, torpedo defenses could have the same effect on submarine attacks. Players used to gun battles are usually daunted by their first missile attack on a welldefended formation. It's not rare for a wellarmed group of ships to shoot down the bulk of an incoming strike, so that instead of the wave of destruction the shooter planned to inflict, all he gets is a ripple. Submariners may now face the reality of having successfully tracked the target, maneuvered into position, and fired two good weapons, and watching one or both be destroyed. Saturation tactics may become as important as stealth. They're changing the rules again. BT Back to The Naval Sitrep #5 Table of Contents Back to Naval Sitrep List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Larry Bond and Clash of Arms. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history and related articles are available at http://www.magweb.com