Introduction/Operational Situation
As the political situation in Europe deteriorated in the summer of 1939, the German "pocket battleship" (Panzerschiffe-Armored Ship) Admiral Graf Spee set sail from the port of Wilhelmshaven on August 21, 1939 and proceeded to open sea to await further instructions. Those instructions came on September 26, 1939 when Captain Langsdorff was ordered to commence operations against British merchant shipping. In the South Atlantic From September 30, 1939 to December 7, 1939, Graf Spee sank nine ships totaling 50,089 tons. Amazingly, no one was killed in any of these operations.
So successful was the raiding of Graf Spee that special "Hunting Forces" of British and French warships were created to find and destroy the elusive Graf Spee (see Figure 1).
- Force F: Berwick and York;
- Force G: Cumberland, Achilles, Ajax and Exeter,
- Force H: Sussex and Shropesbire,
- Force L Cornwall, Gloucester and Eagle,
- Force J: Malaya and Glorious;
- Force K Ark Royal, Renown,
- Force L: Dunkerque, Bearn, Gloire, Montcalm and Georges Leygues
- Force M: Dupleix and Foch;
- Force N: Strasbourg and Hermes, later reorganized to include:
- Force L: Repulse and Furious;
- Force X: Hermes, Dupleix and Foch,
- Force Y: Strasbourg and Neptune.
On December 2, 1939, the freighter Doric Star was captured off the coast of Africa. However, she was able to transmit the "RRR" raider report, indicating she was being attacked by Graf Spee before the signal was jammed. When Commodore Harwood of Hunting Force G received the news of Doric Star, he concluded that Graf Spee would next cross the South Atlantic to evade the pursuit that was sure to follow. Harwood had always believed that sooner or later, Captain Langsdorff would head for the River Plate area to take advantage of the shipping that proceeded to sea from the major ports of Buenos Aries, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay. So he ordered Force G to rendezvous off the coast of South America, in the vicinity of the mouth of the River Plate.
At this point, Hunting Force G was composed of the light cruisers HMS Ajax, HMNZS Achilles and the heavy cruiser HMS Exeter. The fourth ship of the force, the heavy cruiser HMS Cumberland, was in the Falkland Islands undergoing a self-refit and unable to join her sister ships. Force G arrived on station December 12, 1939.
While waiting for the anticipated arrival of Graf Spee, Harwood explained his battle plan; when Graf Spee showed herself, the force would divide and approach from two converging directions and then maneuver so as to "maintain decisive gun range." Force G practiced the plan while they waited and watched for Graf Spee.
Meanwhile on December 6, 1939, Graf Spee met with her supply ship, Altmark, to offload prisoners and replenish stores and fuel. Captain Langsdorff then gave orders to head for the freighter-rich area off Buenos Aries for one last foray before heading home to Germany.
Location
Off the River Plate Estuary, approximately 240 miles east of Cape Santa Maria. Wednesday, December 13, 1939 at 6:16 a.m. local time.
Tactical Situation
Early on the morning of December 13, 1939, smoke from a ship over the horizon was sighted by lookouts on Achilles and Exeter ordered to investigate. At the same time German lookouts on Graf Spee sighted the mast tops of one, two, then three warships. As Graf Spee cleared for action, Exeter confirmed the identity of the approaching vessel as Graf Spee. Both forces continued to close and by 6:18 a.m. the battle of the River Plate had begun.
Graf Spee is anticipating enemy shipping coming out of the River Plate estuary, heading east to sea. Langsdorff's normal tactics of launching an aircraft at dawn to search for ships is not possible due to the Ar 196 being out-of-commission with cracked engine cylinders.
The two Fairey Seafox aircraft from Ajax and two Vickers Supermarine Walrus from Exeter were not launched to aid in the search for Graf Spee because of Commodore Harwood's desire to keep the engine hours low and not risk engine failure. Achilles was not carrying her single Vickers Supermarine Walrus.
Environment
Visibility: Very Clear (100%). Wind: Strong Breeze (13 knots) from southeast (135 degrees T). There is a low swell from South East, with slight sea (sea state 3). Sunrise is at 5:56 a.m.
German Forces
Pocket Battleship Admiral Graf Spee, (Deutschland class) Captain Hans Langsdorff, on course 135 degrees, speed 11 knots.
German Orders
Seek and destroy enemy merchant shipping. Avoid engaging enemy forces unless unavoidable, in which case, take any and all action to render pursuit and continued detection impossible.
German Victory Conditions
Decisive. Sink HMS Ajax, HMNZS Achilles, and HMS Exeter or inflict at least 50% damage to each ship before disengaging or forcing Hunting Force G to disengage.
Tactical. Damage each cruiser sufficiently enough to maintain a 5 knot speed advantage and disengage from Hunting Force G pursuit.
British Forces
Hunting Force G, Commodore Henry Harwood, aboard HMS Ajax
HMS Ajax (Leander class), Captain C.H.L. Woodhouse
HMNZS Achilles (Leander class), Captain Edward Perry
HMS Exeter (York class), Captain Frederick Bell
British Orders
Engage Graf Spee sufficiently to sink, or cripple and prevent escape. Pursue and report if Graf Spee attempts to disengage.
British Victory Conditions
Decisive: Sink Graf Spee
Tactical: Damage Graf Spee at least
25% and avoid damage sufficiently to
maintain a 5 knot speed advantage with
at least one cruiser and maintain
contact with Graf Spee.
Setup
Distance between Graf Spee and Ajax is 20,000 yards. Graf Spee bears 320 degrees from Ajax.
Graf Spee's Ar 196 Arado aircraft is outof-commission due to an engine failure.
Hunting Force G is in column formation (Ajax, Achilles, Exeter) ; 1000 yards separation between ships, on course 070, speed 14 knots.
Special Rules
Disengaging Disengaging from the enemy occurs when the enemy has lost contact with ship(s) being pursued. This occurs when visual, sonar or radar contact has been lost for two consecutive Intermediate Turns. This includes stack smoke.
Variations
Allow for Graf Spee's Ar 196 Arado aircraft to be operational and available for dawn launch.
Allow for HMS Cumberland (Kent class) to have joined Hunting Force G in time to participate in the battle.
Historical Outcome
Graf Spee increased speed and continued to close on Hunting Force G, opening fire at 20,000 yards at 6:18 a.m. with her 11-inch guns.
Harwood's plan was executed immediately upon identification of Graf Spee by Exeter. Ajax and Achilles changed course and increased speed to dose on Graf Spee as quickly as possible from the north. Exeter also increased speed and altered course to approach Graf Spee from the south.
By 6:22 a.m., Exeter was close enough to return fire with her 8-inch guns. Soon Ajax and Achills were close enough to also engage with their 6-inch guns. While closing to engage, Ajax had launched a Seafox aircraft to spot the fall of shot. Graf Spee then began to split her 11-inch gunfire between targets, but soon switched back to concentrating on Exeter.
The pounding Exeter took was devastating and by 7:30 the cruiser was crippled and in danger of sinking. But by then Ajax and Achilles had become a concern to Graf Spee and her guns shifted targets once more. Torpedo attacks by the two light cruisers were easily avoided by Graf Spee. But the aggressiveness of the British cruisers had caused concern aboard Graf Spee which turned to avoid the pair and headed north in an attempt to disengage.
Harwood pursued with Ajax and Achilles, despite the fact that the former had sustained severe damage and lost two turrets. Harwood intended to shadow Graf Spee and maintain contact until night when he would attempt to close and fire torpedoes under the cover of darkness. For hours Graf Spee ran north, dogged by the cruisers. Several times Langsdorff came about and fired on his shadowers in attempt to drive them off, but to no avail.
Finally in the estuary of the River Plate it became evident that Graf Spee was headed into Uruguayan waters where Langsdorff could seek sanctuary and make repairs. Ajax dashed forward but was unsuccessful in getting close enough for a successful torpedo attack. By midnight Graf Spee was safely anchored in Montevideo harbor. Graf Spee had sustained only minimal damage, but it was sufficient enough to cause Captain Langsdorff to worry about safely crossing the Atlantic, providing he could escape from Montevideo.
However, the battle had been hard on the ships of Hunting Force G. Exeter was limping towards the Falkland Islands, staying close to the coast line of South America in case she needed to run aground to avoid sinking. Achills had suffered only moderate damage, but had exhausted most of her 6-inch ammunition. Ajax had her two aft turrets out of action and was also low on ammunition.
Meanwhile in Montevideo, Graf Spee became the focal point of a diplomatic contest as fierce as the battle at sea. Britain wanted Graf Spee interned or rejected out of port immediately, whereas Germany demanded sufficient time to make repairs. Ultimately the Uruguayan government authorized Graf Spee only seventy-two hours in port before being subjected to internment, a compromise between the British and German demands.
To Captain Langsdorff, the situation was impossible. He was under orders not become interned in Uruguay, and he felt the River Plate too shallow to allow Graf Spee to safely reach Buenos Aries, where internment was authorized. Rampant rumors and false sightings of British warships incorrectly interpreted on board Graf Spee had convinced Langsdorff that a greatly superior force awaited Graf Spee once she entered the estuary, where lack of room to maneuver and superior guns would sink the pocket battleship.
Instead, Langsdorff decided to sneak most of his crew off during the night and scuttle Graf Spee the next day just outside the harbor. The explosions stunned everyone who was watching that afternoon of December 17, and the fires from the burning warship illuminated the evening sky for hours. Two days later, Captain Langsdorff wrapped an ensign of the Imperial German Navy around his shoulders, left good-bye letters for his wife, parents and German Ambassador and then committed suicide with his pistol.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Siegfried Breyer, Pocket Battleship "Admiral Graf Spee (West Chester, PA_ Schiffer Publishing), 1989.
Walter Boyne, Clash of Titans (New York. Simon and Schuster), 1995. Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), 1948.
Great Britain Admiralty, The Battle of the River Plate (London: HMSO), 1954.
Richard Hough, The Longest Battle, The War at Sea 1939-1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company), 1986.
Terry Hughes and John Costello, The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade), 1977.
Sir Eugen Millington-Drake, The Drama of Graf Spee and the Battle of the River Plate (London: Peter-Pauls Ltd.), 1964.
Helmut Pemsel, Atlas of Naval Warfare (London: Arms and Armor Press), 1977.
Dudley Pope, The Battle of the River Plate (London: William Kimber), 1956.
S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea 19391945 (London: HMSO), 1954.
Martin Stephen, Sea Battles in Closeup: World War 2 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press), 1988.
Jack Sweetman, "River Plate." Naval History Magazine, Vol. 9, Nr.2, June 1995
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