The Chinese are making changes. They've long based their military doctrine on numbers: hundreds of divisions of foot soldiers, squadrons of small missile boars, clouds of cheap aircraft. They didn't have the technology to match the West or the Russians, so they bet on their ability to mob the enemy, to willingly take large casualties in return for inflicting smaller, bur still significant casualties on the enemy Desert Storm shocked them but good. A technologically superior force (the Coalition) hammered the Iraqis, the fifth largest armed force in the world, with less than a tenth of the casualties predicted. With the Americans potentially able to dismantle their forces at will, and the Russians and Japanese almost as great a threat, the Chinese suddenly had to accept the fact that their army was virtually ineffective. Now, the Chinese have an odd attitude toward their armed forces. On the one hand, like any state, they recognize the need for an armed force capable of protecting their borders and safeguarding their national interest. Their military traditions go back to a time when Europeans were still figuring out which tree bark was good to eat. On the other hand, the armed forces have been consistently last on the list of "Five Modernizations," their five-year plan. The Chinese government has encouraged the PLA (People's Liberation Army) to grow its own food and run its own businesses on the side. Not only does this take time away from training and readiness tasks, but the opportunities for graft are awesome. China's armed forces must be thought of as a political tool. Their only recent operation was Tianmen Square, where they performed as ordered. Political reliability is more important to the leadership than military prowess. Thus the discussion of hardware improvements below must be considered in the light of the Chinese military's overall condition. That condition may be challenged in the near future. The Spratlys and Paracel Islands may represent the first military challenge to China in twenty years. The last fight was a border dispute with Vietnam, which resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Chinese. The Spratlys and Paracels represent critically needed resources and a source of foreign exchange. If they were closer to Chinese territory, or could be reached by a land route, they probably would have taken action already. Instead, they must depend on the Navy, which has been structured for coastal defense, not as a power projection force. So the Chinese are trying to change. They are buying some excellent gear from the Russians: Kilo-class subs and Su-27 Flankers are now in service. The Chinese are also trying to build up their technological base, but are on the wrong part of a learning curve that seems to be steeper each year. Though they are masters of reverse engineering and making do, what can they field on their own? The air force and naval aviation's front-line aircraft is the F-8 Finback, a twin-engine adaptation of the MiG-21 that looks a lot like the defunct 1950's Mikoyan Flipper. The newer version, the F-8 II Finback B, has an improved radar (type unknown, but probably equivalent to a Jay Bird) and better engines. With all these upgrades it's about as effective as an early F-4E. See page 13 for a Harpoon Form 20 with its characteristics. The FH-7 entered service this year or last. A dedicated strike aircraft, it has a terrain-following radar and afterburning engines, sort of a SEPECAT Jaguar on steroids. There are still gaps in the information on this plane, but like its F-8 Il comrade, it's light on ECM and other countermeasures, carries only the C801 as a guided weapon, and needs frequent engine changes. Advanced radars, composites, and stealth features are things the Chinese air force reads about in Aviation Week. Engine changes are especially important. Chinese jet engines are only good for about 150 hours before they have to be replaced. That makes flying and training expensive. The Chinese would love to have access to Western jet engine technology, but they just can't seem to understand the linkage between human rights and good relations with the West. If they had minded their manners, Western defense companies would be tripping over each other to upgrade Chinese equipment and build factories. The Chinese are doing everything they can to expand their technological base. In an efFort to bypass some of the Westerimposed trade sanctions, they have partnered with the Pakistanis to develop a new fighter for die Pakistani Air Force. A revamped Super-7, which is actually a revamped MiG-21, the FC-1 is supposed to have performance "in the F-16 class." Little is known except that it will have a Russian RD-39 engine and is supposed to be a multirole aircraft. On the naval side, the Chinese are fielding the Zhanjiiang (Luhu) class destroyers (see page 12 for a Form 10), a followon to the Luda class that has incremental improvements but still has limited ASW capability and no AAW capability better than the mediocre Crotale point-defense missile. Chinese indigenous SAM development programs have been failures, and only the twof Jiandongs (now decommed) carried an area SAM system, of limited range and effectiveness. They are also developing a new sub, the Song class. It has an Albacore hull, but probably has the same sensors and technology as the Ming class. It may be roughly equivalent to a French Agosta or Daphne class. What's the point, then, if the gear's no good? First, it's new gear, and when you're dealing with the Philippines and Vietnam, it may be good enough. Second, it's a sign of their intentions. They may be giving more resources to their military, although the rebuilding process would not be complete until well after the turn of the century. The question is, will they wait that long? Harpoon Format Stats FH-7 Attack Cannon ATA: 3 Def ATA: 3.0 (2.0) Size: Med IOC: 1995 Sensors: Terrain-following and attack radar, RWR. Speed in Knots (nm/Phase) Throttle Setting Altitude Cruise Full Mil Reheat V/Low: 540 (2.2) 540(2.2) 650(2.7) Med: 540(2.2) 630(2.6) 685(2.9) High: 720(3.0) 1033(4.3) - Ceiling: 20000 m Engine Type: TF Inflight Refuel? N Cruise Range: 1500 nm Internal Fuel: 8255 kg Drop Tank Desc. Fuel Wt Range Add 400 L drop tank 320 kg 44 nm 790 L drop tank 631 kg 86 nm Ordnance Loadouts: Payload: ? Cannon: Type 23-3 twin-barrel cannon 2 C801 & 2 400 L drop tanks & 2 PL-513 or PL-8 Remarks: 'Hongzhaji-7' or H-7 or B-7 (Westernized). Also called JH-7. All-weather. Operational in limited numbers. Attack radar type unknown, assume ranges of 100/62/40/18/10 nm against Large/Med/Small/VSmall/Stealthy Targets. BT Back to The Naval Sitrep #5 Table of Contents Back to Naval Sitrep List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by Larry Bond and Clash of Arms. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history and related articles are available at http://www.magweb.com