During the Battle of Jutland, Royal Navy (RN) warships seemed to be more vulnerable to magazine and ammunition explosions than their German counterparts. The common wisdom of the inadequacy of flash protection as the primary cause of a nearly catastrophic fire on Seydlitz at Dogger Bank, the loss of three British battlecruisers, and nearly a fourth, at Jutland has echoed throughout the history books. Modeling this type of casualty in a wargame has always been hard, because there was no consensus on how much of the problem was material (faulty turret design, volatile cordite powder) or procedural (incorrect procedures, poor training). There have been a number of articles on this subject, particularly from such noteworthy historians as John Campbell and Nicholas Lambert, and it comes down to this - there was no definite answer as to why RN ships had more magazine explosions than German ships. The usual reasons why RN ships tended to blow up when turrets were hit have been attributed to volatile RN cordite, poor flash protection and/or poor turret design. Historically, there is little evidence to support the claim that any of these were the driving issue. The chemical composition of German (RPC/12) and British (MD) cordite were virtually identical, although the Germans did have a better production process that removed more of the impurities that caused decomposition. Furthermore, many of the ships that exploded in port, such as HMS Natal and HMS Bulwark are reported to have had the much older, less stable Cordite MkI. The over-aged cordite, using essentially first generation production practices, was found to be more liable to spontaneously ignite and then explode. Turret flash protection schemes were also very similar between RN and German ships. After examining the interned German capital ships, it was found that their flash protection was no better than the RN’s in 1916. Finally, both German and RN battlecruisers had insufficient turret armor, particularly on the roof. Even the poorly designed RN capped armor piercing shell managed to penetrate the turret armor on some of the German battlecruisers at Dogger Bank and at Jutland. At the time of our publishing FG&DN, the biggest issue appeared to be the fact that the RN, emphasizing high rates of fire, stored shells and powder bags in the backs of the turrets and had additional rounds in the transfer hoists. This required that the flash protection doors be left open. Thus, there was a complete powder train from the turret to the magazine. The Germans also used this type of firing philosophy, however, they may have stopped the practice after the near loss of Seydlitz at Dogger Bank. Even with this excellent piece of historical research, it still did not explain why the Germans had fewer magazine explosions as the RN. Given that the most recent analysis was pointing to a procedural problem, but not a consistent one or one that was particular to the RN, I was having a difficult time integrating this concept into a “nationality” based rule. By the end of 2000, we were sorely pressed to get FG&DN out the door and I didn’t have a reasonable discriminator in which to write a fair rule, so I chose, rightly or wrongly, to not address the issue in the rules book. I knew there would be some complaints about this decision. But the cordite theory in particular would affect not just the RN, but a number of other countries as well, and even then not consistently as we would have to find out which ships were fitted with the older cordite -- virtually an impossible task. So we sent FG&DN to the publisher in January 2001, and in the finest traditions of Murphy’s Law, an article came out shortly thereafter that I believe provides a reasonable explanation for the RN magazine explosion problems. In the summer of 2001, David K. Brown and Iain McCallum published an article in Warship International, No. 1 of 2001 entitled Ammunition Explosions in World War I: A Re-examination of the Evidence. In the article, the authors made a strong case that the nose-fuzed, Lyddite filled HE shells in RN service, coupled with the poor safety procedures, was the most logical explanation for the magazine explosion problems. They further suggested that the TNT filler in German shells was more stable and less likely to detonate in a fire that resulted from a penetrating turret hit. Since Lyddite is a picric acid-based explosive, this problem would also affect a number of Allied navies (France, Japan and Italy) that used similar shell fillers. The authors point out that the nose-fuzed Lyddite filled HE shells were withdrawn from service soon after the Battle of Jutland and a new, less sensitive explosive, Shelite was adopted. Given this article, and the one written by Nicholas Lambert in 1998, I became convinced that it was now possible to realistically track when procedural and technological changes were made to the firing doctrine and shell designs used by the RN and by those navies that used picric acid -based shell fillers. This new research would now support a fair and reasonable rule to be crafted that would provide a historically accurate depiction of magazine explosions. The modifications to the FG&DN Critical Hit rules are presented below: Critical Hit Modifications 8.2.6 Casemate. On a roll of 9 or 0 the ready ammunition detonates inflicting two times the Short range HE damage to the ship. (Optional) For the navies of France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, add one (+1) to the die roll because they used a picric acid based explosives in some or all of their shells. 8.2.15 Main Battery. (Optional) Because some navies exercised poor flash protection procedures and/or used a picric acid based explosive in some or all of their shells, the following modifiers is applied to the main magazine detonation die roll. This modifier is only applicable to A, B and C size class ships. Nation and Time Period Die Roll Modifier Austria-Hungry 1914 to Mid-1915 +1 Late-1915 to 1918 +0 France: 1914 to 1918 +1 Germany 1914 to Early 1915 +1 Mid-1915 to 1918 +0 Great Britain 1914 to Mid-1916 +2 Late 1916 to Mid-1917 +1 Late 1917 to 1918 +0 Italy: 1914 to 1917 +1 Italy: 1918 +0 Japan: 1914 to 1918 +1 Russia: 1914 to 1918 +0 United States: 1914 to 1918 +0 8.2.17 Rudder. Once the jammed rudder is freed, course changes after moving the required advance are reduced from 45° to 15°. The reduction to 1/3 of the ship’s undamaged speed remains in effect Sources G.F. Dale, Stability of Nitrocellulose-based Powder, Warship International, No. 4 1980 S. Ball, H.M.S. Bulwark, Warship International, No. 4 1984 J. Campbell, Cordite, WARSHIP Volume II, Conway Maritime Press, London, 1984 N.A. Lambert, “Our Bloody Ships” or “Our Bloody System”? Jutland and the Loss of the Battle Cruisers, 1916, The Journal of Military History, January 1998 D. K. Brown and I. McCallum, Ammunition Explosions in World War I: A re-examination of the evidence, Warship International, No. 1 2001 BT Back to The Naval Sitrep #23 Table of Contents Back to Naval Sitrep List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Larry Bond and Clash of Arms. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history and related articles are available at http://www.magweb.com