Iranian Airpower

History and Assessment 2001

by Larry Bond

Iranian Air Force F-14A

This article fills a large hole in Harpoon’s Annex B. For some unknown reason, we omitted Iran from Annex B, although we included it in Annex A. There are no operational aircraft of local Iranian manufacture (for right now). For the most part, the aircraft listings in Annex B for the country of manufacture can be used for aircraft in Iranian service.

This article provides the best order of battle I can collect, and information on some of the imaginative things that the Iranians have done to field an operational force.

History

Iran’s armed forces have operated in three distinct periods since WW II. First, from 1945 until 1979, Iran was an ally of the United States and operated Western equipment, with all the logistic and technical support that she could absorb.

The Shah’s goal was to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, and the USA was more than happy to help him. According to most accounts the Iranian armed forces of this time were competent and effective.

The second period began abruptly with the fall of the Shah in 1979. The Iranian Revolution shut off the supply of Western arms and support. In addition to the obvious materiel problems, the government’s revolutionary ideology looked on a Western-trained professional military as anathema. Many officers were jailed or even shot. Others fled to the West. The purge of the officer corps, including of course many of their most competent pilots, reduced the armed forces to near-impotence.

Taking advantage of the chaos, Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, triggering a seven-year war that mixed high technology with human-wave attacks. During this second period, Iran’s airpower was subjected to the ultimate test of battle. Suddenly cut off from logistic support and with many of their best men gone, a force less ready for combat can hardly be imagined.

Only the ineptness of Iraqi airpower prevented Iraq from gaining complete control of the air. Iran’s air force flew strikes, made intercepts, and functioned better than most thought possible. They did, however, lose a lot of aircraft and expend a lot of ordnance, much of it irreplaceable. The motto of the Iranians during the war was “keep it flying,” and they went to amazing lengths to do it. They bought parts for US aircraft from third parties, usually under the table, stole or smuggled parts from US suppliers, sold US technology to the Soviets in return for trade credits, and in general elevated scrounging to a high art.

When the war ended, the third period began, which continues to this day. Iran is working hard to expand its industrial base, with the immediate goal of supporting its existing fleet of aircraft and achieving self-sufficiency in as many categories of arms as possible.

Missions of the Armed Forces

Iran’s military is a defensive force. Although it has flown attack missions outside its borders, into Iraq or the Persian Gulf, her first concern is basic military security. That security involves gaining and maintaining control over her own territory and the Persian Gulf airspace.

Iranian fighters would be expected to aggressively intercept any aircraft entering her security zone, while attack aircraft would go after naval vessels in the Gulf.

Iranian ground attack doctrine is probably oriented toward direct support of ground forces and maritime strike. There is little evidence of, or the desire or ability, to fly interdiction missions, or to attack strategic targets.

Iran’s Problems

In addition to her political isolation and weak industrial base, Iran fields a bewildering mix of aircraft types. Supporting some of those planes, like the F-14, is difficult (read as expensive).

Iran lacks sophisticated radars and other command and control equipment. She has little or no EW capability. She has few patrol or reconnaissance platforms.

Iranian Air Force F-4E Phantom II Fighter

None of her borders is absolutely secure. Iran is surrounded by hotspots and potential enemies. To the north is Russia, the east Afghanistan, the west Turkey and Iraq, and the south the Persian Gulf.

The Gulf is especially troublesome, since it isn’t narrow enough to be an effective barrier, and in fact acts as a highway for naval forces. Iraq, although weakened by the Gulf War, is still viewed (justifiably) as a hostile aggressor. Iran’s internal political situation also has to be listed as a liability. Military professionalism is not a virtue to some parts of the government.

The Revolutionary Guard

Worse, the presence of an “ideologically pure” but separate military force is at best a distraction and a waste of resources.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard may be a check on the regular military, a showpiece for revolutionary ideologues, or an “attack dog” that can be used without involving the regular armed forces. Whatever its justification, it siphons off money and people that could be better used.

Unlike another “ideological force,” the WW II Waffen SS, these are not elite troops, and they don’t have front-line equipment. The officers are picked for their ideological purity, not their combat record. The troops’ training is problematical.

Separate chains of command exist for the regular military and the Guard, and their aircraft cannot operate with the other air arms in a coordinated way.

Iran’s Strengths

Iran has a large force of fairly modern combat aircraft. She has a large transport aircraft fleet, so she can shift forces quickly from one border to another. Although Iran doesn’t have an infinite amount of cash, her oil income does allow her to make purchases abroad, if she can find someone willing to make a deal. Iran also enjoys rough military parity or superiority with her most likely opponents. There are no dangerous holes to fill immediately.

Increasing Ties to the East

Iran’s self-sufficiency drive can only take her so far. The need for sophisticated, high-technology weapons was frighteningly demonstrated in the Gulf War. While she may be able to manufacture parts and even some aviation ordnance, first-line aircraft have to purchased abroad. While Iran has bought some combat aircraft from China, these were only a stopgap, since China’s best aircraft are two generations behind the West.

Iran began to turn to Russia after the Gulf war. Placing orders in the late 1980s, she had begun to receive MiG-29s and Su-24s when her inventory of Russian aircraft was suddenly increased. The donation of a significant fraction of Iraq’s Russian-built air force added incentive to Iran’s desire for closer ties with Russia.

Force Modernization

Some of the pre-1979 aircraft may finally be replaced. The long-serving F-14s may be replaced by MiG-31 Foxhounds. The P-3Fs will be replaced by the Iran 140, a locally-built version of the Antonov An-140 transport. There is no information on what its sensors or armament will be. The Iran 140 will also replace the aging C-130s.

Her new relationship with Russia allows Iran to order a wide range of aircraft. Types that have been mentioned include the Tu-22M Backfire, the Ka-50, the A-50 Mainstay, the Su-25 Frogfoot, the Il-78 Midas, the MiG-27, and the MiG-31.

Some purchases, like the MiG-31, Su-25 or the Il-78, would modernize the existing force. Others, like the Mainstay and Backfire, would add new capabilities. I believe the Tu-22Ms would be used for antishipping and all-weather heavy strike against local targets. I do not believe that at this time Iran wants to acquire an out-of-area power projection capability. As important as aircraft is logistical support. Iran would like Russia to establish a depot-level maintenance center for MiG-29s and Su-24s in Iran. This would raise availability rates of the Fulcrum significantly, moving them from second-level to first-level maintenance on the table described earlier.

A new “fourth period” in the history of Iran’s armed forces may have begun in December 2000, when Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev visited Teheran. During the meeting the two countries announced a “program of expanded cooperation,” meaning more arms sales, and support for the existing aircraft. It’s a match made in heaven. The Iranians need arms, and the Russians need a customer.

The Famous F-14s

Almost a generation after the Islamic Revolution, the F-14 force is rapidly coming to the end of its useful life. With only 70 airframes ever delivered and given normal attrition and combat losses, probably not more than a dozen are flyable on any given day. The Iranians made a point of showing 25 Tomcats in a military flyby in 1985, something they probably could not duplicate today. The rest of the force probably represents a spare parts farm, and are acting as decoys for Tomahawk missile strikes at coastal bases. Right now, the only unit that is flying the F-14 is flying out of the dual-use field at Bandar-al-Abbas.

As for Iranian F-14 systems capability, the 70 F-14A GRs sold to Iran in the 1970s were “monkey models,” with many classified features Iranian F-4E Boeing removed from the RWR/ECM gear, the AWG-9 radars, and the communica-tions packages.

The unique and powerful Phoenix missile is the F-14’s trump card. There have been many accounts of US technicians sabotaging the missiles before they fled the country during the revolution. They may be true, since Iran never used the Phoenix during its war with Iraq.

Home-Grown Missiles

Instead, other missiles have been seen mounted on Iranian F-14s. Both IHawk land-based SAMs and Standard ARM naval SAMs have been seen on F-14s, and are probably used as ARMs. They could be easily optimized to home in on the SAM missile illuminators used on most US warships. If you wish to use these weapons in a scenario, treat them as a Standard ARM.

New Planes or Just Dreams?

In the past few years, articles have appeared naming the Azarakhsh (Lightning) fighter-bomber, another fighter called the Owj (Zenith), a prop-driven trainer named Parastu (Swallow) and a jet trainer named Doma (Lark). There has also been talk of an Iranian-designed helicopter.

An Iranian General, a member of the General Staff, claimed that the Azarakhsh entered production late in 1997. No pictures of any of these aircraft have appeared in the open press, and no details of their character-istics have been revealed.

Supporting the Forces

More to the point, the Iranians also claim to be 90% self-sufficient in aircraft parts. While the 90% figure depends on which beans you’re counting, they have increased their ability to logistically support foreign-built aircraft, within limits.

For Harpoon players, aircraft availability is a critical issue. In Harpoon, a front-line, well-supported force has an 85% chance of repairing an aircraft that has been damaged. A second-rate country has an repair rate of 70%. This second figure is about the best that Iran can hope for. Her technicians are not as well-trained as those where the plane was manufactured, parts have to be ordered from another country, and depot-level maintenance must be performed out of the country. Planes like the MiG-29 and Su-24 fall in this category.

Below them are American-built planes like the C-130 and F-4. Although support from US sources is blocked, parts are available (at a higher price) from third-party sources or from one of the many other countries where the planes are operated. These aircraft have a repair rate of 55%. Below these planes are unique aircraft like the F-14. Aside from Iran, only the US operates it, and almost the only source for spares is cannibalization or “growing their own.” These planes have an repair rate of 40% of total.

Thanks to John Gresham for his review and assist on this article.

Bibliography

Books

Encyclopedia of World Airpower, by Bill Gunston
Naval Institute Guide to Military Aviation 1998-98, by René Francillon

Periodicals

Aviation Week & Space Technology Jane’s Defense Weekly
Naval Forces
Warplane
World Airpower Journal

Internet

fas.org
geocities.com/capitolhill/9363/
sec3a.html
cyberiran.com/history/air-force.shtml
mylima.com/airforce/i.htm
itsa.ucsf.edu/~ico/history/5natinoalsecurity.html

Iranian Aircraft Order of Battle

BT


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