During the winter of 1997 while traveling in France, I had occasion to visit the town of Bazeilles near Sedan. In 1870, it was the scene of a fierce combat between French Colonial Infantry and the Bavarian of Von der Tann's I Corps. A celebrated part of this fight was the "Maison de la derniere cartouche" which was immortalized in the painting of Alphonse de Neuville. The "house of the last cartridge" still exists and is in fact, preserved as it was after the battle of Sedan, and now houses a fine museum dedicated to the French Colonial Infantry (or as it is also known -- Marine Infantry).
While there, I purchased a small pamphlet dedicated to the actions of the French Colonial Infantry in the Battle of the Frontiers during August, 1914. The opening of the "Guerre de quatorze" and its potential as a wargaming subject has always fascinated me. I won't go any further into my fascinations now, but I will offer this: a translation of the pamphlet I purchased describing the grand tactical actions of Neufchateau and Rossignol. My hope is that this description, however incomplete or biased, will add to a more accurate understanding of those momentous opening battles. Perhaps this will in turn, fire some imaginations concerning this interesting and grand period.
It must be remembered that this is a translation. If there is a bias, it is not mine. I admit to being a novice at translation, but have given it my best shot. I plan to do this in two installments. The first being the background information and the Battle of Neufchateau; the second, the Battle of Rossignol and perhaps some ruminations on the wargaming possibilities of the 1914 encounter battles.
So, let us begin.
From the Pamphlet "Tintigny, Rossignol, NeufchatealL4 22 Aout 1914"
Part One: THE DEROULEMENT OF THE BATTLE
The situation and forces present
Beginning on the 19th of August, the French Army from the Sambre to the Vosges prepared itself for battle. Significant German forces had revealed themselves in Luxembourg and in Belgium. Their movement had been tracked from the southeast towards the northwest. Brussels had recently been occupied by the enemy.
Observing that the German forces in Alsace and in Lorraine had stayed in place, the French high command believed that a fatal gap must open between the German Armies moving towards the Meuse and those holding in Alsace.
It was in this region, presumed devoid of German troops, that the French high command hoped to penetrate, cutting the German forces in two.
The Calvary Corps of the IVth Army (4th and 9th Divisions) operating beyond Tintigny had repulsed German calvary who had been in the region for several days. In the wake of the cavalry skirmishes, the first evidence of atrocities vis-a-vis the civilian population were discovered.
French Intelligence reported on the evening of the 19th that the outskirts of Neufchateau were held by only light enemy forces. French orders for the 20th instructed the Calvary Corps to advance from the region of Neufchateau-Bertix and to push reconnaissance to Bastogne and St. Hubert.
Reconnaissance by the French Aviation arm confirmed what had been reported by the cavalry.
It was with this misunderstanding of what the Germans were doing in the north that Joffre, on the 20th of August formulated his plan of attack: to attack through the center with the IIIrd and IVth armies, then to launch the IVth Army of General Langle de Cary on the left flank of the German forces to the north in Belgium who were marching towards the Meuse.
The IVth Army, of which the Colonial Corps was a part, was positioned on a front of about 70 kin between Mezieres and Montmedy.
To hide the disposition of his army, General de Langle de Cary, ordered the five corps under his command, the 2nd, 12th, l7th, 11th and Colonial, to begin their advance after nightfall on the 20th and to be established on the 21st on the line Grand-Verneuil-Torgny (2nd Corps), Sommethonne Margny (Colonial Corps), Villers devant Orval, Mogues, Matton (12th Corps)...
Late on the 20th, it was learned that the Cavalry Corps had encountered violent opposition and it could neither advance from Neufchateau nor continue to hold it.
From Joffre's point of view, this small news was overridden by two larger observations: the evacuation of Briey by the Germans, who seemed to be moving north towards the Meuse, and the attack launched by the Germans in Lorraine against IInd Army. These factors convinced the Commandant en Chef that the moment had come for the Illrd and IVth Armies to pass over to the offensive and to penetrate in force into the central dispositions of the enemy.
At seven o'clock on the morning of the 21st Joffre gave to Langle de Cary the order to begin his attack:
"Combining his right with the left of Illrd Army on Arlon, IVth Army will march in the direction of Neufchateau, both Armies taking for their objective the German forces in Belgian Luxembourg.
"On the night of the 21st-22nd, the advance will be preceded by strong Avantgardes of all arms on the general line, Paliseul, Bertix, Straimont, Tintigny to assure the exits of the army beyond the Semois.
"On the 22nd, the axis of advance will be North-south.
"The enemy will be attacked wherever he is found."
At six in the evening on the 21st, Langle de Cary gave orders defining the mission for the Wth Army for the 22nd of August.
"The Colonial Corps will have for its objective, Neufchateau; at the same time its 2nd Division will stay in the second line at the disposition of the army commander, not going any farther than Jamoigne.
"To the right of the Colonial Corps, the 2nd Corps will advance in one column by Tintigny et Mellier having for its objective, Leglise.
"To the left of the Colonial Corps, the 12th Corps will exit by Saint-Medard and Straimont and will take for its objectives Recogne and Libramont."
Concerning the Germans, the French command knew very little.
On the 20th of August, Captain Reboul of the Etat-Major of the Colonial Corps on duty in Arlon had spoken with the Count de Brevis, Governor-General of Luxembourg. The Count was worried.
"The Germans are in the forest of Rulles and in the Etolles woods," he told Captain Reboul, "they are there in force."
At IVth Army command in Stenay, Captain Reboul's report of this conversation was judged pessimistic.
However on the 21st, in the company of Lt-Colonel Aubert, Captain Reboul was sent by automobile to scout the region of Sommethonne, Meix and Gerouville. On several occasions they were fired at, and the local inhabitants indicated that there were numerous Germans in the region, particularly in the forests.
Captain Reboul reported what had happened and what he had been told when he returned to Stenay, but his his report was not regarded seriously.
The French command knew that the 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions had been involved in a serious combat at Neufchateau on the 20th and that considerable enemy forces had penetrated into Luxembourg, but thought that "this shows that the enemy is on the move and that his forces in the region cannot be considerable." The atmosphere at French Command was permeated with a desire to go on the offensive, and it was believed that speed was of the essence, that it was important to show oneself to be audacious. And then there were the orders from above. They were clear and simple: 'The enemy will be attacked wherever he is found.'
THE COLONIAL CORPS IN THE BATTLE
At mobilisation the Colonial Corps included three divisions:
- the 1st Division was without its 2nd Brigade which had been left on the Italian border at the beginning of hostilities. Later it was sent to Lorraine. In consequence the 1st Division included only the 5th Brigade composed of the 21st and 23rd Remnants, both from Paris.
- the 2nd Division from Toulon (General Leblois) including its entire complement:
- the 4th Brigade (Colonel Bourdonnet) composed of the 4th and 8th Regiments
- 6th Brigade (General Caudrelier) composed of the 22nd and 24th Regiments.
- the 1st Regiment of Colonial Artillery constituted the divisional artillery.
- the 3rd Division (General Raffenel) from Brest;
- the 1st Brigade (General Montignault) composed of the 1st and 2nd Regiments;
- the 3rd Brigade (General Rondony) composed of the 3rd and 7th Regiments.
- the 2nd Regiment of Colonial Artillery constituted the divisional artillery
- cavalry--the 3rd Regiment of Chausseurs dAfrique from Constantine
- artillery--3rd Regiment of Colonial Artillery from Toulon
- engineers--4 companies
The Colonial Corps was considered a Corps d'elite comparable to any. It was constituted for the most part of volunteers who had already experienced combat. It was full of enthusiasm, eager for adventure, devoted to its leaders and ready for any sacrifice.
At 2100 hours on the 21st of August orders for the IV Army reached the headquarters of the Colonial Corps at Baalon.
Immediately the 3rd Division and the 5th Brigade were notified that the next day they would advance on Neufchateau, the 3rd Division via Rossignol and the 5th Brigade via Suxy.
Detachments sent ahead on Saint-Vincent and on Jamoigne would make up the advanced guard. Units from the 5th Brigade were given Jamoigne as an objective, those of the 3rd Division were expected to reach Breuvannes. These positions were to be in hand by 630 hours on the 22nd.
The 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique were to follow the advanced guard of the 3rd Division until its exit from the wooded region above Fosses. At that point the Chasseurs would screen the Colonial Corps in its advance on Neufchateau. The corps artillery would march with the 3rd Division.
The 2nd Corps would march on the right of the Colonial Corps, starting from Bellefontaine and Klaving for its objectives, Mellier and Eglise. On the left of the Colonial Corps would be the 12th Corps marching from Izel by Chiny, Striamont et Petitvoir (13 km west of Neufchateau).
UNFOLDING OF THE BATTLE
For each of the two columns engaged in the direction of Neufchateau, the coming combat would present a identical analysis; surprise, impetuous and uncoordinated attack, resistance, counter-attack and disengagement.
For the first column as well as for the second, the surprise was total. The French high command had misread their intelligence; they ignored the existence of the German reserve corps and were convinced that they would find no German troops in front of them. The Germans, for their part, had done everything they could to remain unseen. Traditional billets had been abandoned in order to fade into the forests. The German formations had dug in on the heights and in the woods, bivouaced there and waiting for any French offensive movement.
For most of the 3rd Colonial infantry division, the battle was a desperate fight for survival. This due to the flank attack realized by the Germans on the French right by the absence of the 2nd French Army Corps which was late in arriving. The 5th Brigade won a clean tactical success. Along with the 12th Corps, which was attacking on the right of 5th Brigade, it checked an entire army corps and caused enormous losses and strongly tested German moral.
For the sake of clarity, we will recount respectively the stories of the battles fought by the two columns, who in any case were operating without direct liaison. In the offensive spirit of 1914, each formation was expected to rush at the enemy, the success of one bringing about the conditions of success for the other. Besides this factor, contact between columns was made even more difficult by the nature of the terrain, as it was deeply cut by valleys and covered by large forests. The Germans, as previously mentioned, were on the defensive on this area of the front and had taken advantage of the terrain, the forests allowing them to concentrate in secret and to keep their positions hidden.
In route from Montmedy towards Neufchateau, one encounters, in effect, a first band of wooded terrain: the forest of Orval that separated the valley of the Chiers (from where the Colonial Army Corps started) from the valley of the Semois. The Semois flows from the east to the west, its numerous meanders stretching the width of its floodplain to include meadows where is found the village of Florenville, and also marked the way through the villages of Jamoigne, Saint-Vincent, Tintigny and Rossignol. To the north another forested zone: the forests of Chiny, Neufchateau and Rulles, accessible by only three roads which started at Florenville, Jamoigne and Rossignol respectively and converged on Neufchateau.
It was in this setting that the 5th Brigade on one hand, and the 3rd Colonial Infantry Division on the other would separately enter into battle.
BATTLE OF NEUFCHATEAU
As was noted earlier, the 5th Brigade, or the mixed Brigade Goulet, was made up of the 21st and 23rd Colonial Infantry Regiments, each of 3 battalions, one group of 75 mm field artillery (group Texier), two section of the 4th engineers, and one squadron of the 6th Dragoon Regiment.
During the night of the st and 22nd of August, General Goulet received orders from the Colonial Corps Command prescribing his advance on Neufchateau via Suxy. Along with the orders he was given information regarding the enemy forces he would encounter during his advance. According to Corps intelligence, the Colonial Corps had before it nothing more than scattered German cavalry patrols and, more specifically, the regions Paliseul, Betrix, and Herbeaumont were empty of German troops.
Yet, at Jamoigne, where the avant-garde of the 1st Colonial Division under Col. Neple had just arrived, the local citizens were very worried. According to them, the Germans were present in force, and they were dug in.
In fact an engagement had already taken place. A German patrol installed in the farm Hailleuse had been driven back. Two German officers were wounded and captured; French moral soared. News of French success at Mulhouse and the capture of 24 guns further flamed the impatience of the Colonial Corps. The hour was fast approaching when the Colonial corps would cross swords with the enemy.
"The area is empty of Germans" was what the order of operations had said. In truth, the XVIII German Reserve Corps was in position on the line NeufchateauBastonge and had disposed various cavalry elements in advance of Neufchateau.
The XVIII Corps included the XXI and XXV Infantry Divisions. Both these formations were composed of young reservists who had recently completed their active service. In total the Brigade Goulet including 6000 men and 12 guns were facing 28,000 Germans and 72 guns.
The avant-garde of the Brigade Goulet left Bulles at 7 am. The men had not had their morning coffee, but they joked that it didn't matter; they would have sharper appetites when they broke for lunch in Neufchateau.
The avant-garde was composed of the squadron of the Dragoons as well as three sections of the 1st Company of the 23rd Regiment.
Following 200 meters behind came another company of the 23rd.
At 600 meters came the rest of the avant-garde followed by General Goulet.
At 1500 meters followed the rest of the brigade with Col. Aube, the commander of the 21st Regiment in head.
The column stretched out for nearly six kilometers.
Immediately upon leaving Bulles, the alerts began. German cavalry appeared and disappeared, small arms fire was exchanged. The French did not arrive at Suxy until 10 am.
The column crossed the Basse Hevreau forest without notable interference and the head of the column moved out onto the plateau.
The French, estimating that they were within several kilometers of Neufchateau, sent forward foragers to prepare billets.
The point of the avant-garde was in the act of crossing a small stream near Neufchateau when they came under German small arms fire. Several dragoons were wounded. The dime sections of the 1st company deployed and advanced. It was 11:30 am. Behind, the infantrymen in the main column tried to see or get word of what was happening ahead. The residents of Montplainchamp assured them that ahead in Neufchateau there were many Germans.
At noon, the battle proper began. The Germans occupied the Bois d'Ospot in force and had set up machine guns there. Their front extended at least several kilometers. As the French moved up to cross the bridge over the Neufchateau stream, the German gunners started to lay howitzer fim at the foot of the bridge.
Meanwhile, Col. Neple avoided the bridge and waded the stream, and set up his command post nearby. The commander of the second battalion of the 23rd reported to him there and was given the following orders: to attack -- two companies having for their objective, the crest north of the stream; the other two companies, the Bois d'Ospot.
The marsouins (nickname given to the Colonial infantrymen meaning roughly, porpoise..?) crossed the stream. Col. Neple with a gesture showed them their objectives. Full of spirit they launched themselves into the attack under heavy fire. Commandant Amiel suffered a fractured femur from a shell fragment.
Immediately the combat became fierce. The German forces in the Bois d' Ospot were numerous and their fire murderous. The avant-garde, engaged to their front, began to take fire from the rear.
General Goulet, assured of the cover of his left flank by the 12th Corps -- he could hear the report of their 75's -- decided to commit the bulk of his forces in the direction of the Bois d'Ospot.
He was thinking as well of protecting his right flank against any enemy attack from Neufchateau and at the same time giving aid to the 3rd Colonial Infantry Division which he had learned was heavily engaged near Rossignol.
He assigned this task to the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 21st Regiment, Battalions Moreau and Reymond. If the 23rd Regiment could not advance, they Would stand their ground.
The situation then was as follows:
At 12:45 the French artillery deployed and opened fire on the 88th Infantry Regiment in the Bois d'Ospot. German reports given several weeks later, stated of this initial and sudden bombardment, that, "the frightening and effective fire of the 75s mowed down one half of our effectives, and reduced to silence the neighboring group of artillery, killing the gunners and destroying their equipment."
On the right of the 21st Regiment, the attack of the battalion Moreau on the Bois d'Ospot began at 1 pm. The skirmishers deployed without incident, followed by Col. Aube, who remained mounted. At less than a kilometer from the wood, rifle fire began to crackle from a small spruce grove. The skirmishers halted and drifted back to the main body. Nonetheless, Col Aube, by this time on foot, ordered the advance to continue.
The 21st attacked and overran southern sections of Bois d'Ospot at a run, but after moving through the woods and crossing the small crest at the north edge, they encountered a murderous fire. The Germans were waiting for them with the support of their artillery. Luckily for the marsouins the fuses on the German shells were set poorly and they detonated too high without causing serious losses.
It had been an irresistible assault. The 21st had pushed back by several hundred meters a surprised and numerically superior adversary who was in the act of flanking them.
On the left of the 21st Regiment, the Battalion Reymond found itself at 2 pm still on the road to Neufchateau before Montplainchamp. Battalion Reymond moved towards the border of the Bois d'Ospot, in front of which it was necessary to align itself on the left of Battalion Moreau. The fire from the woods was deadly and the advance was difficult. Losses were heavy. Capt. Imbert was killed and in less than twenty minutes a quarter of the effectives became causalities, this despite the very effective artillery support already mentioned.
It marked the end of the advance. The men found what shelter they could and responded to the enemy fire.
In view of the attack bogging down, General Goulet decided to call forward the battalion of Col. Ibos. The time was 2:30 pm. All of 5th Brigade was committed except for three companies.
For the 23rd Regiment north of the Neufchateau stream, the fight had become fierce. The two battalions of the 23rd had before them at a distance of only several hundred meters, from the Bois des Blanes Cailloux to the outskirts of Neufchateau, the entire XXI Reserve Division. Added to this, they were being fired on from behind by elements of the XXV Division who were positioned on the northern border of the Bois d'Ospot.
Col. Neple maintained his calm. He at no time considered moving his command post towards the rear. He declared, full of confidence, that "the advance of the 23rd will disengage us."
Two feats of arms, taken from the many that were preformed in that storm of fire, give an idea of what happened in the course of this epic fight.
To the left of the French line of fire, Company Lasseau succeeded in stopping two battalions of the 80th and 87th German Regiments who were looking to outflank the French positions by the streambed of the Gros Cailloux. At the same time, to the French front, five German battalions from the same regiments attacked in close formation from the north. Theses troops had infiltrated forward and assembled in the dead ground just to the front of the French positions. Coming over the crest to attack, the Germans were shoulder to shoulder.
The alarm was given, "Debout, voila Penemi". The adjusted French fire caused the German lines to hesitate. Then spontaneously, a section of Company Lasseau threw themselves forward, bayonets fixed. The German reservists broke. With a numerical advantage of nearly twenty to one, the Germans turned and retreated to the dead ground behind the crest, some three hundred meters to the rear.
To the right of the 23rd Regiment's position, one section, by following the road, had reached two hundred meters or so to the west of Neufchateau. The section had already lost its commander and had suffered heavy causalities. Lt. Legentilhomine (a member of 5th Brigade staff) present with these troops, having been sent forward to observe the battle, assumed command. He was joined by the machine gun section of Lt. Bergey. Having already suffered heavy causalities, all that remained of Lt. Bergey's section were one officer, one non-com, three machinegunners and one machine gun. All the rest had fallen during the advance up the road.
There were in total perhaps a dozen men in position to challenge an entire battalion of the 87th Regiment as it deployed an the outskirts of Neufchateau.
Under a hail of bullets, the chef of the machin an section put his piece into action. He was not in a good position to offer effective . The machine gun was set up on the road, in the open. The French machine gun opened fire. Almost immediately the German troops went to ground. One of the French gunners was hit. After just a minute of two of fire, enough to stop the German advance, the French gunners were short of ammunition. There were not enough men left to bring the heavy ammo boxes forward. The two French officers decided it would be best to retreat with the four or five men remaining toward the command post and consolidate with other units and find more ammunition. Lt. Bergey was killed, and within seconds all the machinegunners were hit. In the end, Lt. Legentilhomme carried the machine gun on his shoulder back to Col. Neple's command post accompanied by one wounded gunner.
Towards 4 pm, the French realized that their position was hopeless, that they must retreat. The retreat was accomplished by echelons under the converging fire of the Germans, firing at ranges of about 200 meters. In the course of this difficult movement, Col. Neple was severely wounded. (He was evacuated, but died several weeks later at a military hospital in Chalons.)
The greatest threat remained the enemy position in the Bois d'Ospot which threatened to outflank the French right via Le Sart and Molifaing.
The 1st and 2nd battalions of the 21st Regiment had fought furiously all day long against the entire XXV German Division. Attack and counter-attack followed each other with an undescribable ferocity. The colonel in command of the 21st Regiment was wounded and made prisoner.
The Germans, too, in the course of this long day, suffered considerable losses. Night brought a relinquishing in the pressure of their attacks.
General Goulet received no news of the 3rd Colonial Division for whom he had been waiting in vain. At Montplainchamp, he regrouped his exhausted and decimated battalions. He decided that to continue any advance was impossible and that he must fall back on Suxy and Bulles. This movement was carried out without interference from the Germans; they had been equally bloodied and were in no state to pursue.
So ended this bloody day for the 5th Brigade, during which the two regiments of marsouins, supported admirably by one group of artillery exhibiting magnificent courage, audacity and disdain for death, took by the head an entire army corps and retreated only under orders.
It was a rough baptism of fire. The 5th Brigade lost one half of its effectives. It was equally as rough for the XXI and XXV German Reserve Divisions. The Germans thought they had encountered an entire corps. The night following the battle, they dug in expecting renewed attacks the next day. They did not leave their positions until the following afternoon. The tension and the resentment of the German troops manifested itself in their treatment of the French wounded (most were shot) and the atrocities committed on the local civilian population.
End of Part I (Next time ... the 3rd Colonial Infantry Division and the battles of Rossignol and De Breuvannes)
At this point, for the sake of balance, I would like to add a small excerpt of John Keegan's broad description of this action:
- "...the Colonial Corps, flower of de Langle's and arguably of the whole French army,
was in no way deterred from pressing forward. It would have surprised all if it had been, for its three divisions were composed of regulars who had served their time in North Africa, Madagascar and Indo-China, men equal in experience to the contemptibles of the BEF and as bold and skillful in battle (though unfortunately trained in the heretical school of the bayonet instead of the bullet).
Directed to seize the town of Neufchateau and its environs, the colonials advanced with a will, brushing aside the skirmishers who attempted to block their passage along the narrow, thicket-lined roads and ignoring the Uhlans, who sniped at them with their carbines from the undergrowth.
"The vanguard of the corps was deployed in two columns, to the left the 5th Colonial Brigade, to the right and separated from it by a tract of peculiarly dense Ardennes woodland, the leading brigade of the 3rd Colonial Division. Both expected to join hands at Neufchateau, on which their separate routes converged. Both were halted by resolute German opposition well short of their objective. The 5th Brigade, though furiously assailed, stood its ground and inflicted terrible casualties on the doughty but inexperienced German reservists who barred its way..."
Next time: the episode that perhaps contributed most to the legend of the martyrdom of the French infantry in the Marne campaign... Rossignol.
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© Copyright 1999 Hal Thinglum
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