I must apologize to readers for my long absence from these pages. For whatever reason I have been extraordinarily busy--I have not painted a figure or made any terrain in years, played a game in months or even had much time to think about gaming. In spite of the way it may appear, considerable thought goes into my articles for MWAN (assuming that I can find the time to write something out). The last gaming I did was on a computer when visiting my old college roommate-a brilliant game called Man of War. What the game (using a computer the way it should be used) is give the player the view from the quarter-deck of the flagship (after an inter-phase turn of planning the next move using ships on a chart). I have some criticisms, of course--ships sink far too easily and the choice of scenarios seems curious, but I am happy to report victories for the Royal Navy at Dogger Bank, Cape St. Vincent, Camperdown, Cabrita Point, Trafalgar, San Domingo (finally!), and Lissa (the less said about the Chesapeake, the better). In response to Charles Elsden, let me say that I did not mean to imply that both sides in the English Civil War were identical, but (compared to the block and linear systems which the Imperial and Swedish Initially pitted against each other) they were essentially so. Here I ought to note that, as is customary in wars of any duration, the successful practices of the opposing side were increasingly adopted by its enemies as the war progressed and by the conclusion, there seems to have been little to no difference remaining between the tactical systems used by the opposing forces (H.M. War Office may have achieved some record in this--apparently assuming during the war that the success of the French cavalry was a matter of the style of their shakoes and later introducing heavy cavalry breastplates and light cavalry lances from an enemy that they had defeated). As to the English Civil War, my reading, while sporadic, has been rather extensive. I confess to being an unabashed Royalist (I am C of E, after all) and have visited the sites of Marston Moor (after a visit to the ruins of Rievaulx Abbey--home of my patron who wrote an account of the Battle of the Standard and a stay of several days with the monks of Ampleforth Abbey) and First & Second Newbury (while staying with the monks at our "mother-house" at Elmore (which was garrisoned by the King's forces during the Second Battle of Newbury). It is true that some distinction can be made between the Swedish and Dutch methods of deploying infantry--it was, after all, the cause of a violent argument between the Royalist leaders Prince Rupert and the Earl of Lindsey. Nevertheless, both were linear deployments with infantry units having the pikes in the center and muskets at the flanks. The theory was that after a few musket volleys the opposing infantry would advance to the "push of pike," (and some units such as Hopton's Cornish infantry accomplished this) but it seems that the pikes were more commonly used as a defense against cavalry attacks, with the musketeers sheltering behind or between the pikemen (how this was accomplished when the musketeers were deployed to the sides of the pikes requires some imagination). In a "typical battle," infantry was in the center with cavalry placed on either flank. Artillery was unlimbered where it could do damage to the enemy without harming oneself overmuch (across the front of one's infantry was good). Dragoons (when available for battle--they were perhaps more valuable in irregular operations) were dismounted in a skirmish line that might do some damage to the enemy (they were placed outside the cavalry by both sides at Edgehill en crochet behind a hedge to the left side of a battlefield by the Parliamentarians at Naseby). There were always exceptions depending on the terrain (First Newbury seems to have been very obstructed by bad teffain--hills and hedges) or the forces available (at Roundway Down the Royalist army was entirely cavalry, outnumbered by the cavalry alone of the well balanced Parliamentarian forces-which they completely overthrew). To be fair, it seems that the tactics used in the English Civil War have never been properly assessed. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that although most the men in the ranks were complete amateurs almost a] I of the leaders on both sides had extensive experience in the wars on the continent (Cromwell being a notable exception, but he was not a significant leader until laterin the war). As to the use of the caracole by the Parliamentarians, it seems to have tried by Waller's forces against the enemy cavalry at Edgehill, but after that first battle, Waller insisted that cavalry should never receive a charge at the halt. What eventually became decisive was that the only Royalist cavalry leader who seems to have been able to rally his men after a victory was Sir Charles Lucas (who never rose above the command of a regiment), while Cromwell seems to have been able to impress the cavalry commanders of the opposing side of the need to rally and help the infantry. This is when the caracole would have been advisable, but the reports of piked horses and hard fighting make one suspect that when cavalry could be induced to return and help out in the infantry battle, the excitement led to charges with sword in hand. It seems to me that country of origin does not make for objectivity in historical analysis-- judging from the romance and mythology produced by Southern writers as the centennial of the start of the Civil War drew near, rather the reverse. False ideas of how both the British and Continental armies fought in the War for American Independence are common on both sides of the Atlantic (after Bunker Hill the British fought in two ranks with files at four feet per man, as did the Continentals after Valley Forge--whether the Americans should have stuck to Lexington and Concord harassing tactics with militia and never even bothered to field a European type army, as suggested by General Lee, is an interesting point). Some very curious notions about the American Civil War are certainly common in this country, whereas Jackson's Valley campaign was standard at Sandhurst at a time when the subject was forbidden at West Point and some of the most insightful studies of the "late unpleasantness" have come from Britain, as in the outstanding work of Paddy Griffith (one thing that is outside the scope of Paddy's work is the fact that the North would probably never had been able to conquer the South without the steam engine). Griffith's suggestions seem to have resulted in much initial denial that his facts can possibly be correct, but I note that Herman Hattaway (perhaps the outstanding American historian of the Civil War) has considerably revised his comments on tactics in his most recent work. But as to my thoughts (and rules) for the Thirty Years' War, at least initially, the Imperial and Swedish forces made us of different tactical systems. According to Delbruck, the Swiss pike blocks derived from the deep formations of the Teutonic tribesmen (thus rules systems that treat Swiss pikes as essentially the same as Macedonians eff in that the Swiss formation was deep and the Macedonian linear--Swiss pike blocks didn't worry about aligning on each other). The Spanish increased the number of missile troops in support of the pike block. What eventually happened in the Imperial forces was that a deep infantry formation designed to deliver close combat shock became primarily a missile formation which had tremendous staying power since it was very hard for people in the center of the formation to run away, no matter how much they wanted to (one is reminded of the formation proposed by Richard Armour which was one hundred men deep by one hundred men across--it was never able to deploy because everyone was trying to get into the middle). The theoretical original size of the Spanish tercio (3000 men) was found to be excessively massive and by the time of the opening of the Thirty Years'War the typical formation was a block of 1500 men (50 across by 30 deep because moving men need more depth than width). The cavalry also deployed in deep formation, in continuation of the tactics successful in the French Wars of Religion. Again according to Delbruck, the difficulty of training enough men to make effective use of the lance, led to its supersession by pistols (one might observe that pikes are longer than lances and the fact that men can crowd together to present a row of closely aligned sharpened implements much more effectively on foot than they can if mounted would suffice without raising the question of adequate training with the lance). The theory of the caracole was that the cavalry would be deployed in successive lines and ride toward enemy infantry until within effective pistol range. Thereupon the first line would fire and filed off to the flanks to reform in the rear of the formation and reload, allowing the second rank to close and so on. Again, it requires some imagination to figure out how this actually worked. Presumably this was the preferred tactic when facing pikes--surely against musketeers (whose weapons, no matter how inefficient, presumably out-ranged the pistols) it would have been far better to charge in, swords flashing in the sun. Nevertheless, the German reiters did get a reputation for battlefield effectiveness in the French Wars of Religion, so it must have worked somehow! In any case, we again find that an arm (rather than a formation) generally regarded a~ being intended primarily for shock relying on missiles (and not terribly effective missiles, either). Artillery was heavy and generally left in place (and so considered so peripheral to decision on the battlefield that if was sometimes left behind if it became too great an impediment). In the Dutch Wars there came an attempt to counter these massive tactics by some method other than imitation. The rebels under the leadership of Maurice of Nassau being influenced by one of the periodic revivals of the classics (as well as an inability to match the Spanish numbers) substituted the battalion (500-600 men--comparable to the cohort of the Roman army) for the tercio. By deploying infantry in ten (later five) ranks, Maurice made a far higher proportion of his men combat effective, but also created vulnerable flanks. The new cohorts were seldom tested in battle--the war was largely one of sieges and the numerically weaker Dutch not only were reluctant to take the risk of large casualties in open battle. but only needed to hold out until the enemy got tired and went away (which they eventually did). The Swedes under Gustavus Adolphus adapted the Dutch system with some modifications, the most significant being an offensive intent (which led to an increase in the proportion of pikes-- 216 to 192 muskets in a squadron--quite different from the 2 to I advantage in muskets normative in the English Civil War and annoying to theoreticians who assume the progress in the military art always means increased reliance on firepower). The Swedish cavalry had used the typical reliance on fire until severely embarrassed by encounters with Polish lancers. Thereafter they were trained to charge with sword in hand. Gustavus Adolphus also tried to develop an effective but mobile artillery, tight enough to maneuver on the battlefield and fire more quickly than the heavy pieces in typical use * Let me be the first to admit that there is a great deal of speculation in all of this--the Imperial cavalry surely charged sometimes and many modem commentators think that Gustavus's artillery experiments were a failure, but the differences make for an interesting game situation. My pike and shot army was a gift and the Revell figures are already mounted 1 deep and 3 abreast on their stands for both infantry and cavalry. Artillery has four crew on a stands with the gun detachable (allowing both to indicate a timbered piece and to leave it in place for scenic effect should the crew be eliminated). I don't care for rosters (the system used by this plastic army in its earlier battles) nor casualty caps or different status markers. The number of stands remaining indicates the status of a unit. A unit is either combat effective at full strength, still fully combat effective but having suffered some loss (tercios can also be combat effective in place but too shaken to advance), or is removed from play. More specifically: Artillery units remain in play until a result of elimination. Swedish Infantry and all Cavalry Regiments remain in play as long as they have two stands remaining, Imperial Infantry Tercios remain active as long as they have at least six stands remaining, and remain on the table as long as they have five stands, but if reduced to five stands can no longer advance and are eliminated if taking another hit. Stand arrangement (approximately 1" frontage per figure): Artillery: one gun with four crew (all crew fixed on a stand with the gun separate--indicate that a gun is limbered by placing the crew stand first with the gun behind, trail forward) Swedish Infantry Battalion: 3 stands of 3 figures each deployed 3 across by 1 deep Imperial Infantry Tercio: 8 stands of 3 figures each deployed 2 across by 4 deep Swedish Cavalry Regiment: 3 stands of 3 figures each deployed 2 across by 1 deep Imperial Cavalry Regiment: 3 stands of 3 figures each deployed 1 across by 2 deep Reasonable scales considering unit size and weapon range would be that I figure represents about 60 men and 1" is about = 10'. As is my usual goal, the actual rules fit on one side of a sheet of paper. A New Tactical Synthesis (Aelred Glidden's Rules for the Thirty Years' War) TURN SEQUENCE: Swedes activate/ resolve combats, Imperials activate/ resolve combats. Casualties are inflicted only during the phasing player's turn. MOVEMENT: Units may wheel up to 180' and not move further, or may wheel up to 45' before movement or may move first and then wheel at the end of the move up to 45' (if not in contact with the enemy--see ACTIONS below for moving into contact). Swedish Artillery may limber or unlimber rather than moving (may only fire if unlimbered). Imperial Artillery may begin timbered, but once unlimbered may not limber: Artillery (unlimbered= 0"; timbered = 8") Swedish Infantry = 4" Imperial Infantry = 6" All Cavalry = 8" Any unit traversing designated difficult terrain (which may vary with unit type) tosses I die, failing to move on I or 2 and moving without penalty on 3-6. FIRE: Tercios may fire in any direction, but only at one target. All other units may fire only to their fronts (notethatunits maywheel as above before firing). Artillery range = up to 8" is close, up to 16" is medium, up to 24" is long Muskets (Infantry) range = 8" Pistols (Cavalry) range = 4" Toss 1 die per unit firing: Long range Artillery & Swedish Cavalry Pistols score a hit on 6 Medium range Artillery & Swedish Infantry Muskets score a hit on 5 or 6 Close range Artillery & Imperial Infantry Muskets & Cavalry Pistols score a hit on 4-6 EFFECTS OF HITS FROM FIRE: (+ I to die score per extra hit) Toss 1 die per unit receiving hits: (if from Artillery at close + 1, at long - 1) 1 or 2 = no effect 3 or 4 = Lose one stand (no effect against Artillery--all Swedish units and Imperial Cavalry may instead fall back 6", backs to enemy) 5 or 6 = Lose two stands (eliminates Artillery--all Swedish units and Imperial Cavalry may instead lose one stand and fall back 6", backs to enemy) ACTIONS: A unit must pass a toss to charge into melee (new or existing; note that Artillery may not move into contact). Toss for each unit trying to ciose--score must be equal or higher than stands remaining. Each Swedish unit tosses I die, each Imperial unit tosses 2 dice to attack an enemy front, 1 die to attack enemy flank or rear. MELEE: A unit may inflict melee hits only to its front (note Tercios have all around facing). Toss 1 die per unit attacking (+2 if attacking enemy flank or rear): All Artillery and all Imperial units score a hit on 5 or 6 Swedish units score a hit on 4-6 EFFECTS OF HITS FROM MELEE: (+1 to die score per extra hit) Toss 1 die per unit receiving hits: 1 or 2 = no effect 3 or 4 = Lose one stand (artillery is eliminated--all Swedish units and Imperial Cavalry may instead fall back 6", backs to enemy) 5 or 6 = Lose two stands (eliminates artillery--all Swedish units and Imperial Cavalry may instead lose one stand and fall back 6", backs to enemy) Note: Artillery units remain in play until a result of elimination. Swedish Infantry and all Cavalry Regiments remain in play as long as they have two stands remaining. Imperial Infantry Tercios remain active as long as they have at least six stands remaining, and remain on the table as long as they have five stands, but if reduced to five stands can no longer advance and are eliminated if taking another hit. Back to MWAN #96 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1997 Hal Thinglum This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com