Published by G.P. Putnam, 1997
hardbound, ISBN: 0-399-14236-3
551 pages, 20 B&W photos, numerous maps, references

The "science" of military command speaks in terms of troops, firepower, march rates, logistics, and other quantitative measures. Yet the "art" of war deals into inspiring and leading soldiers, judging the timing of implementing plans, anticipating enemy responses, and other qualitative measures of human psychology. The two meet on the battlefield with varying degrees of friction, with the best commanders overcoming such obstacles, and the worst commanders succumbing to them.

Into the Storm delves into the very nature of command, using the Gulf War as a backdrop, the US VII Corp (nicknamed the "Jayhawk") as the model, and Gen. Fred Franks, jr. (left in photo, Clancy on right) as the immediate subject commanding the 146,000-strong VII Corps. It brings you deep inside the councils and sessions to provide an in-depth examination of operational planning and decision making at the corp level.

Yet before we read about the sands of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, we first meet Franks in the jungles of Vietnam as a S-3 (plans and operations) for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. He had been transferred from Germany and spent about nine months serving in Vietnam and Cambodia before being wounded in an attack which eventually cost him his foot.

Lessons Leanred

Clancy relates the numerous lessons learned by then Major Franks and their application in the Gulf War, including the benefits of forward command:

"When I was there [at the front] with them [subordinate commanders], I could look them in the eye and see if they understood what I wanted. That way, there could be no ambiguity in orders.

Second, at the division tactical command post, you get the best, the freshest information...

Third, senior commanders really get to make only a few key decisions during the fight. What you want to do, then, is to inform yourself so that you can determine the best time to make those decisions.

Commanders shouldn't be staying in the command post. They should be out and around the soldiers, where they can be feeling the pain and the pride, and where they can understand the whole human dimension of the battle. That way of operating has practical, tactical consequences. It will better inform commanders' intuition about what to do; it will suggest alternative courses of action that will accomplish the mission at least cost to the troops." (p. 103)

Along the way from Vietnam to the Gulf War comes the realization that the Army was broke and needed fixing. Clancy explains the transformation, both as an army suffering from the loss of a campaign and as Franks suffering a loss of a foot. Yet the personal struggle and the way he dealt with the loss and eventual return to active service -- the first amputee as active duty general since the Civil War -- is an inspiring story at a time when he could have been easily discarded. Just as the army developed new maneuver warfare doctrine, so Franks refined his command and control techniques.

"Commanders of large campaigns and large land forces don't think in chronological terms. They think in terms of the mission against a particular enemy, the organizational forces on the ground, the time it takes to get their forces in a posture to accomplish their mission on that terrain and at the least cost to their own side." p. 289)

Complexity of Orders

Meanwhile, the US redeploys the VII Corps from Germany to Saudi Arabia and this leads up to the VII Corp left hook into Iraq and the mission to attack and defeat the Iraqi Republican Guard units. And if you though the only thing a corp commander did was point on a map and tell an aide to order a unit from one place to another, guess again. The sheer complexity of items a corp commander must consider boggles the imagination to those outside the military. Sure, the chain of command exists to carry out an order, but each link must be fitted into a whole, and the corp commander carries the burden of construction. A few key decisions during the battle? Sure. But the preparation that goes into those few key decisions is immense.

"There is an old saying: If an order can be misunderstood, it will be." (p.103)

"The organization of an order in the US Army follows a five-paragraph organization originated at the turn of the 20th century:

1. enemy situation, friendly situation, attachments and detachments in terms of organization of the major unit;
2. mission;
3. operations--including a concept for the major unit, a concept for the maneuver, a concept for fires to include a whole fires annex, a detailed list of tasks to subordinate units, and a list of major coordinating instructions;
4. logistics;
5. command and signal, including key radio frequencies for command radio nets and succession of command in case of death or evacuation of the commander." (p. 145)

"A complete corps order might total 200 or more pages, complete with graphic drawings and overlays to depict unit boundaries, phase lines, and objective areas used as control measures to ensure coherence of the operation." (p. 146)

Clancy weaves the events of the VII Corps advance and battle with the command realities of a corp commander. Franks' moves and decisions -- more than the "few" he modestly noted -- are tracked and analyzed against this maneuvering column of vehicles. Of interest are his moves between the main command post and tactical command posts, where he gathers information in order to make those decisions.

"I planned to use the main TAC and the two smaller jump TACs as my operating bases and command the corps from the front. To ensure a positive link to my nerve center at the main CP, we had arranged for my executive officer to make two courier runs to the main TAC daily, at 0900 and at 1700...In this way, I could be forward to command face-to-face, get my "fingerspitzengefuhl" of the battles, and obtain the latest information from the corps main, which had much better long-haul comms." (p. 257-258)

A plethora of maps highlight the maneuvers of various units, from the strategic army level sweep down to more tactical level battles. Clancy keeps you interested with sharp prose and a strong sense of Franks' comments coming through that prose. You receive an eyewitness view of the war, just as if you were sitting next to Franks, and this brings you face-to-face with the challenges of command.

Friction

Friction, or the capability for orders and actions to go wrong, are covered throughout. Fro example, the corps received an order to attack early -- of course, after the timetable had been worked out for weeks based on a later attack start. The shift in atack time, plus all the attendant difficulties, is well covered and insightful. Bad weather, friendly fire, and hissy fits between Franks and Schwartzkopf over the speed of the advance are all part of this friction. It looked so easy on the TV screen, but the reality that Clancy relates was quite different.

"While you are arranging and maneuvering, you can never lose sight of physical friction. Armored formations have to refuel and rearm, which takes time...different vehicles move at different speeds...movement at night is much slower than in the day...soldier fatigue also affects speed...sometimes our assessment of how long it would take to conduct a particular maneuver would be off as much as 300 percent." (p.324-325)

"We had interdicted the road junction but not seized it...I had gotten those verbal orders [seize the crossroads where peace talks would be held] at about 0330 on 28 February. The written orders came later that morning. My interpretation...was to stop Iraqi movements through that road junction. My selection of tactics was interdiction with air...I and everyone else missed the "seize" in the written order. That was my fault. (p. 455-456)

Any failure of the corps to seize the road junction was my responsibility, but it was not failure based on disobeying an order. I never heard any more about it, not then and not since...I could never understand why the CINC's first reaction would be to accuse John Yeosock [immediate superior] and me of disobeying an order." (p. 456)

Friction happens, and Into the Storm shows the inner workings of command at the corps level, and how corps command interacts with division and army commands during the "89-hour war" (p.475). That the war ended in an overwhelming victory is testament to the superiority of weapons, training, and command and control of the army.

Into the Storm does a marvelous job of riveting your attention to the command structure. Clancy, with a good editor and several fiction bestsellers to his credit, brings superb prose to a book that could have easily turned out monotonous. It captures and holds your attention, highlights decisions and actions, and provides a tremendous appreciation of the complexity of command.