Chris Hahn's article, "To Charge, or Not to Charge" (MWAN, No. 81), provided an informed discussion of the phenomenon of the "charge" on the battlefields of what the author labeled the "horse and musket era," roughly 1756-1865--as I understand his definition. Since Mr. Hahn invited comment and discussion of his argument and conclusions, I'd like to take the opportunity to add my thoughts on various aspects of the problem.

First, from a personal standpoint, it is always refreshing to encounter articles in wargame journals that attempt to analyze common aspects of rules' mechanics for their correspondence (or lack thereof) to battlefield reality, as we understand it. Such articles usually provoke response or argument, and in the end, we all benefit.

It's always useful to define what we're talking about, and Mr. Hahn is evidently not pleased with Mr. Web ster's definition of "charge." well why not stop tilting at Mr. Web ster's windmill and adopt a satisfactory definition? Not surprisingly, I'll provide my own: "An accelerated, concentrated attack, such as a cavalry charge" (noun) and "To dash rapidly against an opponent or a target" (verb)- (Excerpted from Dupuy, T.N., Haynes, G.P., and Curt Johnson, Dictionary of Military Terms (New York: Wilson, 1986, 46).

I think that is fair to say that no one is denying that real battlefield charges were sometimes rapid movements and sometimes ponderous maneuvers (or both) which were relatively accelerated, concentrated attempts to close with the enemy or objective. Further, it should be recognized that because of the element of lethality, friction was present, and the tempo of operations was much reduced from what the uninformed might expect.

On Friction

Friction affects any number of variables, but primarily it results in delay, confusion, misunderstanding, and gross performance degradation. To a degree, training, experience, planning, and superior command and control offset or counter the effects of friction, but nonetheless, it will always be present. The real problem for wargamers is not so much how to represent the degradation of movement and other obvious measurable performance categories on the battlefield but how to represent other effects of friction.

Generally, I think that designers attempt to capture these effects by assignment of "morale" or "morale and training" factors and requiring "morale checks" in certain situations. In reality, the designers are being asked to assess combat effectiveness. Since all or most rulesmiths, despite intelligence and ingenuity, are incapable of accurately assessing combat effectiveness, we have expedient rules and player dissatisfaction in varying degrees.

Now, we can recognize that and play on, despite our misgivings, or work toward more realistic rules. In effect, "house rules" (which are more or less universal) recognize the dissatisfaction that even the least informed among us have with aspects of commercially-available rules. The prevalence of rules-lawyers is another manifestation of the inadequacy of commercially-available rules. However, neither (commonplace) phenomenon is necessarily negative, nor should it be unwelcome or discouraged unless it positively inhibits play.

That said, there is really no room in historical wargaming for palpably absurd rules. You are either wargaming a historical engagement or you are not. That is not to say you can't game hypothetical engagements, but please stick broadly to the facts. Otherwise, you don't have a "historical' engagement, and you might as well make up any rules that suit your fancy.

What do I mean by the above? well, for example, too often I've seen Renaissance battles fought by linear formations, since otherwise carefully crafted, competent rules permitted the players to adopt formations that historically were virtually unknown--and rewarded them for doing so. Other examples might be adduced ad nauseam.

This caveat, I believe ought to be applied to the "charge." We need to examine what the charge entailed in the period of interest. Mr. Hahn has arbitrarily defined a period that is not a phenomenological whole. The US Civil War is much removed from the Seven Years War in terms of military phenomena and analytical constructs.

There is no point in getting into an argument over just which conflicts belong in the "Horse and Musket Era" as opposed to a more modem era, characterized by the ascendancy of the rifle-musket and other 19th century technological innovations. Suffice it to say, the charge on the Frederician battlefield was a very different thing from the charge at, say, Gettysburg.

Shifting Correctness

Sometimes we look at an event in one conflict and remark that it is the analog of an event in a preceding or succeeding conflict. In a broad context, we may be correct, but in close analysis, we will more often be incorrect. What we will find is that the human context will quite often be closely correspondent-because human nature is immutable--but that the combat environment will be quite different. The analogous nature of the human context is what will move soldiers to attempt to replicate the feats of ancestors (thus, the remarkable charges of the Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War, and World War I ) in impossible circumstances. until the hard school of experience forces a change in how things are done-largely.

Doctrine--fundamental operational concepts--is slow to change, since it is essentially magisterial. Strangely, doctrine is one of the least-studied and least-understood aspects of military experience. But doctrine is what wargamers really need to examine when they're putting together their rules for different conflicts. To my mind, the differences in doctrine between national forces in a given period will essentially define (broadly) how they'll act and react in combat.

So, if we want realistic rules, we need to analyze"doctrine and incorporate our observations into our rules. The closest thing I've seen to this is George Gush's concept of "standing orders," incorporated into the WRG Renaissance rules. But, I've never seen a game played under these rules that actually used standing orders. Players, in my experience, regarded these as a useless encumbrance. They wanted to be able to act and react (ahistorically). Thereby, they inadvertently illustrated the evolution of doctrine (and, of course, the fundamental pragmatism of Americans and all modems).

On Limitations

Another thing we need to do is recognize physical limitations and incorporate those limitations in our rules. For example, we can recognize that even though the term "charge" connotes violence and rapidity of movement, such concepts are relative and dependent on the limited physical capabilities of the individuals involved. Again, friction will intervene. So, we shouldn't be surprised that the marvelous "charges" bequeathed to us by Lady Butler and other romanticizers of combat "Just ain't so." If we permit unrealistic accretions of movement based on "charges," we just don't have realistic rules.

Now, Mr. Hahn has quoted my description of Brandy Station (1863) and commented that my statement that casualties of the opposing forces were "quite high" is "a subjective assessment." As a military historian who has studied strength and casualty data for the better part of a lifetime, I think I should be permitted the opportunity to defend myself. First, in fact, casualties at Brandy Station were remarkably high in the context of cavalry combat, both contemporaneous and before and since. Let's have a look at some intense cavalry combats of the mid-19th century and see how Brandy Station measures up.

Koniggratz vs. Gettysburg

At Stfesetitz (Koniggratz) on July 3, 1866, 5,700 Austrian horsemen contended against 4,500 Prussians.

The Prussians (victors) lost 440 men (9.8%), while the Austrians lost 1,170 (20.5%) ("The Greatest Cavalry Combats of Modern War History," in Berndt, Otto, Die Zahl im Kriege, Vienna: G. Freytag & Berndt, 1897, 72). Now in this combat, both sides were under severe infantry and artillery fire, especially the Austrians, who, because of this, were forced to withdraw, despite having won the (purely cavalry combat. Ibid. I have paraphrased Berndt's observation). As one would expect, the loser suffered more than the victor (I hope I don't have to explain this.).

At Gettysburg (July 3, 1863), Federal cavalry commander Gen. D. McM. Gregg (2d Division) reported "severe" losses for both sides in the cavalry combat on the right flank. Gregg's 5,000 horsemen (3,000 engaged) lost 254 (5.1%). Stuart's 6,000 men lost 180 (3.0%), not including heavy losses incurred by Jenkins' Brigade of mounted infantry, which numbered 1,600 and is included in 6,000 total given for Stuart's strength. Including Jenkins' unknown casualties in the Confederate total would likely increase the number to 250 or more, making Stuart's percent per day loss approximately 4.2%+. It is interesting to note that Custer's Brigade incurred 219 of the 254 Federal casualties.

The results of a true Civil War battle of annihilation (my emphasis) are instructive. At Brice's Cross Roads (July 10, 1864) the defeated Federals lost 2,612 of 8,500 men, of whom 4,800 were infantry. The was a loss of 30.7%. Forrest's 4,900 Confederate cavalry lost 493 (10.1%). In the actual combat, of course, Forrest and Sturgis' Federals likely had a near tradeoff . The bulk of the Union loss was in Forrest's's pursuit.

At Trevilian Station (June 11-12, 1864) Hampton's Confederates lost 1,071 of 4,900 (10.5%/day), while Sheridan's Federals lost 1,007 of 9,000 (5.6%/day). Confederate horse artilleryman R.P. Chew describes this combat "as severe and destructive a fight as I ever saw."

So, we can see that by comparison with the more destructive cavalry combats of the mid- 19th century, Brandy Station saw grievous losses on both sides, which were relatively high, especially considering the size of the forces involved (percent per day losses drop in proportion to the size of the forces).

Some years back I was privileged to attend a talk given by the distinguished German soldier von Mellenthin. Many of those in attendance were serving officers of the US Army in its worst bureaucratie period. Mellenthin described how his command had annihilated Soviet formations on the Eastern Front in desperate counterattacks.

Much of his talk might have been familiar territory to anyone acquainted with combat realities and, indeed, Mellenthin's's own writings on his combat experience. Still when question time came, there were those souls entirely unencumbered by knowledge of history who earnestly enquired of this warrior whether he had killed all the Russians in annihilating them and--how about this--how he felt about it!

To his credit, Mellenthin described very patiently that in fact very few Soviets had been killed in these operations--despite the use of the term annihilation. It was enough to envelop the enemy--"pocket then find and reap the harvest of prisoners and materiel. Mellenthin, of course, felt quite satisfied at what he'd accomplished, as just about any soldier would. Moreover, he was pleased that casualties had been kept to a minimum by clever tactics, despite the annihilation of the Soviets, which his dopey questioners somehow believed meant the complete destruciion of the Reds!

I introduce this anecdote for two reasons: First, to illustrate that the military application of a term in this case, anihilation, may not be what you think or expect; second, that, while casualties are a product of combat--let's say a combat outcome--their absolute number may be irrelevant and misleading as a measure of combat effectiveness.

If I had to comment on my remarks above, I would characterize them as not so much a criticism of Chris Hahn's analysis but as an elaboration. I believe that Chris is moving in the right direction, but I sense that he's overemphasizing at least one aspect of combat--casualties--and has somehow managed to ignore a multitude of other factors that might subtly and not so subtly affect the forms of combat in the "horse and musket period" he's discussing. I would hope that my statements engender some debate.

I invite correspondence and may be reached at: Scenarios for Wargamers, P.O. Box 15172, Chevy Chase, NM 20825-5172.

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