Does Life imitate Art, or is it the other way round? This may seem like too philosophical a question with respect to an article for a wargaming newsletter, but it goes directly to that age-old quandary we face in playing wargames, writing rules, and painting miniatures: the question of realism versus playability.
Consider the film GLORY, where the 54th Massachusetts Regiment assaults Fort Wagner. The regiment begins the attack, or charge if you will, in parade order. However, as Confederate artillery plays among the ranks, the parade order transforms into a an order of preservation. But then the command "CHARGE! " is shouted, and all hell breaks loose. All order is lost as well, as the soldiers of the 54th scramble and dash for any available cover. The morale of the unit holds, but the assault ultimately fails in the face of superior numbers.
Consider as well, the film GETTYSBURG. Here, we are treated to a visual spectacle of the engagement that some would argue, lost the war for the South. In Pickett's Charge, some 15,000 Confederates advance across cannon-swept fields to assault the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Unlike the "mad dash" of the 54th Regiment, this attack was made in a more orderly fashion. Indeed, I may go so far as to question the correctness of the label, "Pickett's Charge". (Recollection of Armistead walking forward, urging his men forward, waving his hat on a raised sword.) As I understand the word "charge", at least in the military sense, it represents a violent assault, with the intent of throwing back an opposing force. This admittedly subjective definition implies a certain movement, an impetus, as it were, by the attacking force(s).[1] The only running I observed in this treatment of Pickett's Charge was after the attack had been repulsed, and the survivors were retreating to friendly lines.
Let us now consider the film WATERLOO. Here too, one is treated to a visual spectacle of one of the pivotal battles in Western Military History. In this historical film however we are able to observe the interplay of cavalry and cavalry, as well as cavalry and infantry with respect to the charge. (As opposed to the infantry "only" engagements cited above.) The British and Allied infantry are formed in squares on the reverse slopes prepared to receive the masses of horsemen Ney is leading across the narrow valley. For the better part of an afternoon, the French cavalry ride up to and around the infantry squares, suffering from almost continuous musket fire (and the occasional artillery salvo). The squares remain unbroken, and the French cavalry is forced to withdraw, exhausted, with their number much reduced.
It is not my intention, in this article, to examine the accuracy of such cinematic treatments. It is my intention to consider to what extent our wargames (Art) allow us to imitate Life (military history). In particular, I want to examine the charge, or the charge move, as used in horse & musket wargames. [2]
The inspiration for this examination comes from a current wargaming project - one near to the
heart of most wargamers - that of writing a set of rules. In fact, I am in the process of rewriting a set of home-grown rules for the horse & musket period. [3] While looking over the game move sequence, I
was struck by the length and seeming complexity of the charge move phase. As they now stand, the
rules governing the charge declaration and movement are:
Going to Extremes?
It would appear that I have gone to an extreme - at least with respect to length of the process - with this particular phase. [4] Does that matter if the process provides for realism? Does this sequence provide for realism?[5] Does this sequence
provide for playability?
For sake of discussion, let us consider a point on the wargame battlefield where a line cavalry regiment has declared a charge on an infantry battalion. Both units are of good morale, in good order, and formed in line. If the charge declaration/move sequence is carried through to its conclusion (Step I), then one is looking at an estimated 22 die rolls five references to various charts, and the placement of "WORN" and "SPENT" formation markers on the involved units.
Under this rule system too, there would be the required tracking of casualties and status on the unit rosters. A conservative guess of the time required to complete this process, would be 15 minutes. Returning the major questions of realism and playability then, one may find this system to provide a great degree of realism by the fact that almost every event within the charge is covered. This claim is a little less subjective than the ones made for Playability. Some wargamers may enjoy the rolling of dice and chart consultation, while others will want to resolve the situation and move on with the game. To be sure, the frequency of an actual charge being declared, carried out and received, is not that great on the table top.[6]
With respect to these rules, the process is just so involved that the probability of something "going wrong" at one sub-step or another is fairly significant. Still, the question of revision begs an answer: Is there a way to simplify the process of charge declaration/charges?
Looking at the problem from another extreme, what if the charge declaration phase/the
charge move phase were eliminated altogether?
Most wargamers would agree that the foundation of any set of rules consists of the four
M's: Movement, Missile (Fire), Melee, and Morale. To be sure, wargames with
miniatures would be only dioramas if the model troops were not moved, "engaged in
combat", and suffered the losses associated with such activity. Charges seem to merit a
special place in this foundation, however. One might even argue that the basis of any
decent set of rules consists of four M's and one C. But in what order should the letters
be placed? What comprises a turn within the game? How is the turn constructed? How
does a player carry out a charge move? How can we hope to replicate the events we see
in the historical films - not to mention those battles we read about - and have the game
remain appealing, remain playable?
The charge move phase, like other phases within the game move sequence, is an artificial
and administrative construct. [7] These phases are an intrinsic part of the rules we wargamers use to "fight" miniature battles. Indeed, it is a compromise that we must make in order to play in and/or host effective, fun, and realistic games.
In my admittedly limited wargaming experience, the charge move phase has been
combined with the movement phase, or interspersed between a couple of the main
phases of the game move sequence.[8] Movement charts of various rule systems would have a special column for charge movement. For example, line infantry may move normally at a rate of 12 inches per turn. If they were to charge, they would, perhaps,
receive a "bonus" increment of six inches. Simple and straightforward enough. And yet
in this single line of a movement chart, so much is revealed about the philosophy of the
rules (and of the author) with respect to scale as well as command and control.[9] Before
getting into that topic however, this seems as good a place as any to stop for a moment
and consider the definition of the word charge.
Webster's defines the word "charge" as verb and/or noun.[10] If used as a verb, charge may take on the following meanings (though these are listed well into the body of the definition):
As a noun the meaning, at least in the wargame sense, is placed last in the definition: 7: a violent rush forward (as to attack). Both definitions make use of the word "attack", which may
be, ultimately, a more correct term. Both definitions also explain that a charge involves
a "rush (sometimes violent) against or forward" - in the direction of an opponent. There
is no mention made of the disorder resulting from this movement, whether to "attacker" or the
"attackee".
Indeed, there is no mention made of this word "charge", used either as verb or noun, in
relation to matters military. Therefore, I believe that most wargamers would probably voice some
dissatisfaction with Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary on this specific point.
Returning to the issue of movement, briefly.
Let us continue with the example presented on the previous page. A line infantry battalion can move 12 inches in a turn. If the scale of the rules set is one inch represents 20 yards, then that battalion can move 240 yards per turn. What time frame are we looking at here? If the set describes the time scale as one game move sequence represents 20 minutes of real time, how realistic and how playable is it to have an infantry battalion march 240 yards in that time?[11] The same line of questioning could be
applied to the rate allowed for charge movement. I would imagine that charge movement is carried
out at a quicker pace than the normal route march or advance. (Otherwise, there would be no
reason to categorize it as a charge.) How realistic is it then, to allow an infantry battalion to "charge" 120 yards?12 Further, what does this say about the command and control rules
of the hypothetical set?
Playability vs. Realism
Perhaps one of the most egocentric, or ego-building experiences, is to leave the offiee behind for a few hours and take command of a corps of Napoleon's Grand Army against a combined
Anglo-Allied force. Better still, why not take on the role of Napoleon? The ability to take
command of, and control miniature forces, tends to reinforce the romantic inclinations of most
wargamers. And yet, where does one draw the line? For while we plan to utilize the strategy of
Napoleon, we also want to be up in the front line, adjusting the alignment of the 140th Line
Battalion. In other words, if one is taking on the role of a corps commander or even Napoleon,
will one be concerned with or have the ability to conduct a charge with an individual, dependent
infantry battalion or cavalry regiment? It seems to this author that the level of the game is the central conern. If one is participating in a small scale game, then such involvement would be realistic. If one is commanding a corps, then there are larger concerns than what this or that individual battalion/regiment is doing. 13 And yet, it is often the case where a wargamer controlling a corps will exercise "complete control" over the elements of that corps, as if he were eommanding each separate element. Is there a way around this confliet of interest, as it were?
Let me suggest a compromise between an admittedly over-detailed charge move sequence, and no charge move sequence at all. First, by utilizing random movement, one can achieve a close approximation of the general lack of control by a division or corps commander. If the player, as
division or corps commander draws up a plan of attack or defense for his units, and then is forced to roll for the movement allowance of those same units . . . well, all sorts of interesting things can happen. [14]
One of the more interesting and exciting - is when the rolled movement allowance takes a
unit into an enemy unit. What then? I leave this to the wargamer and or umpire of that particular contest.
Given the abundance of historical evidence to the contrary, perhaps a simple die roll (or two or three - but certainly less than 20!) that would provide for the reaction(s) of the units involved. In such cases, I do not believe I would allow for morale or experience modifiers. [15] Of course, if the higher echelon command (wargamer represented by mounted officer and staff were to be attached to a unit, then it makes perfect sense to be able to commit that unit to a charge. In these cases, detailed rules
governing the charge move sequence would be best. It would also be prudent (realistic) to penalize the remainder of the division or corps because the commander was focusing attention on a narrow front.
I have hinted and suggested at the abundance of historical evidence in support of a general point reflected in the complexity of my rules. My initial questions on the detail of the sequence revolved around playability. I would now like to treat the subject of realism, if I may ask the indulgence of the reader at this point.
Is the charge move sequence, as it now stands, successful in recreating the contests between the three arms on the battlefield during the Horse & Musket Era? What, exactly, were the contests between the three arms like during this period of military history?
For the purposes of this article, the Horse & Musket Era will comprise the following three conflicts: The Seven Years War, The Napoleonic Wars, and the Civil War. A review of the historical evidence will show that the battlefield charge was more often a clash of wills, as opposed to an actual clash of arms (hand-to-hand fighting). This general "rule" applies to the possible combination of combats between all arms: cavalry v. cavalry, cavalry v. infantry, and infantry v. infantry. [16] A brief review of
selected engagements during these horse & musket periods, supports this contention.
In "The Age of Frederick the Great", T. A. Heathcote traces the evolution and battlefield experience of the Prussian cavalry arm during The Seven Years War. [17] In simplest terms, the role of cavalry - by the Prussian ideal - was to protect the infantry, ride over the opposition, and pursue the defeated foe. [18] As Heathcote cites:
Dragoons and Hussars (or other light types of horse) comprised the rest of the wing, their job on the field of battle dictated by their type. The Hussars, for example, were tasked with pursuit and/or harassment, so that they might "win time for the heavies to regroup and reform after the melee." (110) Sometimes, however, there was no need for the Hussars to win time.
For example, at the Battle of Rossbach (1757), von Seydlitz - single-handed - led the Prussian horsemen to victory against a numerically superior Allied force. This, he accomplished in the space of an hour, with charge after charge, delivered by squadrons, according to T.A. Heathcote, "carefully controlled and brilliantly led." [19] Personally, I would not contest the brilliance of von Seydlitz. I may contest the description that the squadrons were carefully controlled, however. Battle, it seems to me, is a very confusing event. It would seem doubly so for horsemen, as they are dealing with their own fear as well as with that of their mount. [20] The victory at Rossbach was one were the Allies were forced to withdraw under, eventually, the pressure of combined arms. The argument that charges were more contests of wills (morale) is reinforced by a review of the casualty lists for the battle.
Heathcote reports that of 70,000 engaged, approximately 1100 were killed (from both sides), with 6,000 Allied Infantry and 72 cannon captured. [21] A similar conclusion may be made about cavalry v. cavalry combats in the 19th century.
In his unsurpassed study of the Battle of Waterloo,[22] John Keegan notes: "Cavalry could, it must be emphasized, suffer very grievously at the hands of other cavalry when nerves failed, horses were blown or weapons were markedly unequal." (149) He also suggests that, "unless cavalry action resolved itself into a complex of single combats, it was pretty harmless to the participants." (148) This is quite a contrast to the image painted by Heathcote. But again, one finds that cavalry combat in the 19th century was a contest of will and not one of arms. One also finds that charges were more controlled affairs. Keegan explains:
To the US Civil War Charges
In this manner then, cavalry charges on the Napoleonic battlefield were not the "glorious scenes" that we, as wargamers, might be inclined to believe. [24] Turning to a consideration of cavalry engagements in the American Civil War, one may state that charges were less frequent, and even less glorious than those on the European battlefield. [25] The exception to this, was the massive cavalry combat at Brandy Station.
Curt Johnson describes the contest of wills between Union and Confederate cavalry at Brandy Station in "US Cavalry and The Civil War." [26] Apparently, the pistol and carbine was used much more readily than the sword or lance, as Johnson relates:
Horse artillery and infantry were also present at this day-long battle, and were used to some effect. (161) Excepting the charge of the 6th Pennsylvania Regiment and the 6th Regulars, one again finds that this engagement to be a contest of wills. [27] The critical evidence for such a conclusion comes, again, from an analysis of the casualties inflicted during the course of the engagement. Johnson states:
Contests involving cavalry and infantry were usually not so inconclusive. Here too, one finds the common "clash of wills". The exception is that one side was able to deliver physical punishment from a distance, as opposed to the "threat" of physical punishment.
Returning to Rossbach for a moment, we can see this battle was an exception to the general rule. The Allied infantry, as has already been related, were not prepared to receive the onslaught of Prussian horsemen. Indeed, the manuals of the period suggested that cavalry was meant to fight cavalry. [29] If the infantry had been prepared to receive the charge of cavalry, then there would have
been no contest.
As Charles Grant explains in his excellent work, Wargame Tactics:
On the field of Waterloo, the Allied infantry were indeed prepared for the massive attacks by French cavalry. Keegan provides the historical narrative that Grant is lacking:
Some 50 years later, cavalry no longer need fear the steady ranks of infantry armed with musket and bayonet.
In the Civil War, cavalry was truly a secondary arm on the battlefield. [32] Due to the increased effectiveness of infantry weapons, as well as other factors, the mounted arm of both sides became essentially, mounted infantry. For example, the Battle at Gettysburg opens with a Confederate assault on elements of Buford's cavalry division. The combat swayed back and forth north and west of the town. The Union troopers did not execute any charges, but instead, bled the advancing grey coats with their carbines. [33] Similar actions took place throughout the remainder of the war. [34]
Having looked at the historical evidence - with respect to the charge - of actions involving cavalry on cavalry and cavalry on infantry, it only remains to review the historical evidence dealing with actions where infantry faced infantry.
Infantry versus infantry combat in the 18th century was decided with the musket. Richard K. Reihn documents this fact in his excellent article, "Linear Tactics and the Wargame: Part II". [35] In a very straightforward manner, Reihn traces the evolution of the Prussian tactic of firing while on the move, and its subsequent historical impact. In addition to bringing a galling fire on an opponent, the Prussians under Frederick the Great sought to bring/deliver that fire at ever shorter distances. [36] One might imagine the carnage resulting from such a contest. Reihn helps our imagination when he describes the action of infantry involved in assaulting a strong point in the linear era:
A similar result was produced by avoiding the built-up area or works, and attacking the main line. In both situations, Reihn stresses the importance of command and control by the leaders of the battalions, divisions, and wings. (5) Unfortunately for those leaders, life expectancy in the 150 yard zone of engagement was not very long. [37]
Conflict in the 19th century brings no significant change to these circumstances. To be sure, the names have changed, there have been slight modifications in battlefield tactics, and there have been some developments in weapons technology. Accepting all this, infantry versus infantry combat in the 1800s was decided with the musket and not with the bayonet.
This general point is reinforced by again, turning to the Keegan study. While infantry combat was pervasive on the field that day, I would like to narrow the focus here to a consideration of the advance by d'Erlon's corps and the final attack by the Imperial Guard. To be sure, each was magnificent in its scope, but not so grand in its effect. Each attack was destroyed by concentrated musket fire, though artillery and cavalry played important secondary roles.
Neither attack/advance was a "charge", by any definition of the term. Keegan provides this overview of the two actions: "In both, very large and dense masses of French infantry advanced across the whole width of the valley separating the two armies to within a few yards of the British line, exchanged fire with it for a very brief period, then turned summarily about and fled." (167) Though Keegan admits that the mathematics of these contests are easy enough to understand, and help to explain the eventual defeat of the French; he also states that it is more involved. (170) The contest of infantry against infantry was both a clash of wills as well as a clash of arms in that the length of the close-combat depended on the ability of each side to absorb and endure musket fire. Surprisingly, this ability to absorb and endure applied
more to flanks and rear of a formation, than to the front. As Keegan explains:
A very brief consideration of Civil War engagements points to an opposite conclusion.
In the Civil War, infantry close-combat was decided at the front; was decided by each lines ability to absorb and endure the fire of the other. Perhaps the most famous closecombat of this conflict was Pickett's Charge. [39] Of the 12,000 men beginning the advance, about 150 were able to breach the Union position and engage in hand-to-hand combat. [40] The was an exception to the rule, as
the rifled-musket reigned supreme in close combat. [41] A possible list of other such engagements demonstrating the devastating effect of the rifled-musket would include: Shiloh: The Hornet's Nest; The Seven Pines: Casey's Redoubt; Fredericksburg: Marye's Heights; and, The Wilderness Campaign: The 'Burning Breastworks'. [42]
Success or failue?
It would appear that I have gone to another extreme - at least in respect to length of presentation of the historical evidence. I have perhaps asked more questions and made more references to previous articles or texts, than I have made statements. My original intent was simply to re-examine the question of the charge move as currently (to my knowledge) used in wargames. In looking at the efficacy and/or actual necessity of that particular phase
of the wargame, other topics came under scrutiny: movement, command and control, and to a lesser
extent, the time and ground scale used in a set of rules. My intent was not to advance a position, but it seems that through such analysis and the presentation of historical evidence, I have done so.
Wargamers play at war. We make a game of it, suspending our collective belief as we maneuver masses of painted miniatures around a terrained table or place cardboard counters on a hexagonal map. We derive pleasure from the friendly competition, and perhaps from the shared appreciation of military history. We strive to recreate history, employing the strategy and tactics of a particular period.
How successful is the attempt? How real are wargames? How real can table top engagements be and remain, or should I say, "retain", a degree of simplicity and playability?
In brief summary, let me suggest that rules governing the charge/charge move sequence should
provide for the following:
The rules should also reflect that: infantry advances were more easily controlled than cavalry charges - even accepting the horrendous volume of fire, noise and smoke because the infantryman had become an automaton through the discipline of the drill of musketry, and the cohesion of his unit. [43] Furthermore, the infantryman was a single figure; the cavalryman was trooper and mount. Even the most brave cuirassier could not bring a horse that had decided not to charge, to charge.
Related Articles
[1]Interestingly enough, the lexical definition of "charge" contains only a passing reference to the military meaning of word. I would imagine that most wargamers hold a more romantic interpretation of the word than Webster's. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, page 227. Back to MWAN #81 Table of Contents
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
A. Player with seetor initiative is considered the "attacker".
B. "Attacking" player declares: charge, charging unit(s), and target unit(s)
C. Charging unit(s) must pass initial morale test in order to carry-out charge
1. If morale check is failed, check for reaction on "Attacker" Fails Table.
(Consult Table in Section 9)
D. "Attacking" unit(s) may issue preparatory fire on target unit(s), at -1
penalty.
2. If morale check is successful, the target(s) of the charge must undergo a
morale check.
a. If this morale test is passed, the target unit has several options in response to the charge. Consult "Defender" Reaction Table II in Section 9.
b. If the target(s) of the charge fail the morale check, then check for reaction on "Defender" Reaction Table I in Section 9.
1. If casualties are produced by this fire, the defender must check morale.
E. If consultation of "defender" reaction Table II shows that the "defender" may issue
"hasty" fire against "attacker", and casualties result, then the "attacking" unit must
test morale.
1. Reaction to morale test may prevent charge from "going home".
F. If "attacking" unit may continue charge, roll for movement allowance.
1.Even at this stage, a successful completion of the charge is in doubt.
G. Fight 1st round of melee.
2. If "defender" is counter-charging, then roll for movement must also be made If contact is made, the 1st round of melee is "fought."
a. If these is no contact, the units will remain out of contact for the rest of the turn.
1. Determine unit combat value(s), and winner of melee round.
H. If there is no conclusive result in 1st round of melee, 2nd round may take place.
2. Determine unit easualties, command casualties, and unit reactions to the 1st
round of combat.
1. If cavalry v. cavalry, or v. Infantry, then cavalry will be marked with "WORN"
formation counter.
* At this stage of the sequence, Segments 6 and 7 of the Game Move Sequence are
played.
I. For the 2nd round of melee, repeat cycle as note in Step G.
1. If no definitive result is reached after 2nd round of melee:
a. All cavalry units involved will receive a "SPENT" marker.
b. All infantry units involved will receive a "WORN" marker.
c. If melee continues into the next game move sequence, then all cavalry units engaged will disengage and withdraw, with "SPENT" marker. Infantry units will also receive a "SPENT" marker, and disengage.
4 a: To bring (a weapon) into position for attack: LEVEL < ~ a lance> b: to rush against or bear down upon: ATTACK: also: to rush into (an opponent).
Each flank of the main infantry was guarded by a wing of cavalry. In front of each wing was a
solid line of cuirassiers riding knee to knee, in two or three ranks. An iron-clad wall of
armoured men on heavy horses, its role was to ride down any horse, over any foot or through
any guns that got in its way. (109)
In theory the squadron could be manoeuvred at a gallop, say at over twenty miles an hour, but it would very shortly lose cohesion if it was, as stronger horses outstripped weaker; and in any case distances and gradients of the Waterloo field make it seem unlikely that high speeds were achieved with any frequency. (147) [23]
At the Church, Major C.E. Flournoy, commanding the 6th, barred the way with 150 hastily
assembled troopers. These men charged the head of Dans's column and flung it back in a wild
melee. Dans, a veteran of dozens of scraps in the course of the war, was shot in the head during
this melee, and killed. (161)
"Brandy Station was almost entirely a cavalry combat. Nearly 18,000 horsemen clashed at St. James's Church and on the slopes of Fleetwood. Casualties were quite high, totaling 623 Confederate and 936 Union officers and men." (162) "But for all this," he continues, "the battle was strangely inconclusive." (162) [28]
". . . their role (cavalry) was really a secondary one as, with the volume of fire of which infantry was capable, cavalry could not hope to get to close quarters with them, especially when they were armed with the socket bayonet. Unbroken and steady infantry is immune to any cavalry charge except possibly a surprise attack from the flank or rear. Horses cannot be persuaded to hurl themselves against an unbroken line of men, several ranks deep, particularly when the latter are shooting at them and are furnished with some weapon . . ." (116-117) [30]
. . . the French troopers were engaged in a dual battle of wills-not only with the British
musketeers but also with their own mounts. Gronow, an intensely acute observe in one of the
Foot Guards' squares, describes how 'the horses of the first rank of cuirassiers, in spite of all the efforts of their riders, came to a standstill, shaking and covered with foam, at about twenty yards distance . . . and generally resisted all attempts to force them to charge the line of serried steel' . . ." (158) [31]
". . . we see time and again how line battalions are flogged into the small arms fire zone until they can no longer take it, whereupon they are simply replaced by new battalions. And this would go on until, hopefully, the losses of the defenders rose to a critical point or, more commonly, the number of attackers exceeded the number of cartridges left in the pouches of the defenders. (5)
Dirom is absolutely specific: after the British Guards had delivered their volley, 'part [of the
French column] seemed inclined to advance, part halted and fired, and others, more
particularly towards the centre and rear of the Columns, (boldface is by Keegan)
seemed to be turning round.' (. . .) Those least immediately threatened were the soonest off. It
was behaviour such as this, rather than direct British action, that rendered useless the most
critical French attacks of the day, and led to Napoleon's defeat. (172) [38]
Footnotes
[2]To be sure, this is not an original idea. I would refer the reader interested in the subject to Philip J. Haythornthwaite's article, "Charge! A New Thought on an Old Theme", in The COURIER, Vol. VI, No. 6, pages 58. On the issue of realism in wargames, see "In Search of the Realistic Wargame", by Jason Monaghan. Part I of th ie article is found in MINIATURE WARGAMES, No. 82, (March 1990) pages 10-12. Part 11 in MINIATURE WARGAMES, No. 84, (May 1990) pages 26-27.
[3]The reader may recall my previous articles about this rules system. See MWAN, Issue 65 for its development. See MWAN, Issue 76 for a wargame report utilizing the finished rules.
[4]For those readers still with me, I have no exact documentation on the evolution of this sequence. Based on similar form, I can
attribute partial credit to Jason Monaghan, specifically, No. 84 (May 1990), pages 26-27. Further review points to ONE VALIANT CHARGE, a set of ACW Rules by Jerry Lannigan. These rules were published in MWAN No. 66 (pages 57-72). Any other additions to the
phase may be attributed to ideas gathered while reading a variety of sources, and the occasional attendance at gaming conventions.
[5]Initially, the rules seem to do well, if one accepts that the sequence distinguishes between contests pitting cavalry against cavalry,
cavalry against infantry, and infantry against infantry.
[6]A statement supported by historical evidence. And one, I'm sure, that is not news to most wargamers. This contention is more fully examined in the later half of the article.
[7] Pat Condray discusses this point in his article, "Warfare in the Age of Napoleon III (The Little): Grand Tactical Wargame for 1850-1871", in The COURIER, Vol. VII, No. 5, page 29.
[8] A general assertion on my part. I have not been able to game on a regular basis, though I have held an interest in military history and wargaming since Junior High School. I am not a regular subscriber to the numerous periodicals covering the hobby (except for MWAN). And so, I cannot state for certain that this "marriage" of charge
move to Movement Phase remains intact.
[9]Indeed, even their philosophy toward miniature wargaming.
[10] Webster's, page 227.
[11]Please see Napoleon At War, edited by Albert A. Nofi. In the introduction to the text (actually, selected writings of F. Loraine
Petre), Mr. Nofi discusses the general tactics used during this period with respect to the employment of artillery. Considering the volume of fire a battery could produce, he states that cavalry and infantry targets could cover the intervening ground, some 1200 meters, in three to
five minutes, and seven to ten minutes, respectively. Of course, the rate of the advance would be modified, "depending on the nature of the ground and the condition of the troops." (61)
[12]I think it was H. Delbruck who first conducted these type of living history experiments. He was examining the Battle of Marathon, and concluded by trial, that the center body of Greeks could not have charged down upon the Persian host without becoming completely disorganized and rather tired as well. (Personal experience in Junior High football would reinforce such findings. End-of-practice 100 yard sprints (charges) were exhausting, chaotic experiences.)
[13]My thoughts on the topic are not original, to be sure. Again, I draw my reference/information from a variety of sources. I would recommend the reader to Paddy Griffith's article, "Role Playing a Napoleonic General" in The COURIER, Vol. VII, No. 3, pages 16-18.
[14]See Monaghan, Part 11, Experiment 12.
[15]Ibid., Experiment 9, and perhaps Experiment 11.
[16] This is not to deny the significance of combat between artillery and the other arms. This combat deserves separate attention, however. For here too, one is dealing with the concerns of realism and playability, not to mention scale and the
effect of fire. Please see previous citation, Footnote 11, for Napoleon At War, (selected writings of F. Loraine Petre), edited by Albert A. Nofi. After such bombardment, one would have to wonder if there would be any troops left to complete the advance/attack or charge.
[17] "The Age of Frederick the Great" in The Cavalry, edited by James Lawford, pages 107-115.
[18] This role shared by the cavalry arms of other nations fighting in this conflict.
[19] Heathcote, "The Age of Frederick the Great", page 112.
battlefield.
[20] This assertion made recognizing that cavalry mounts were trained for the noise and color of the battlefield.
[21] Heathcote, page 113.
[22] "Waterloo, June 18th, 1815", in The Face of Battle.
[23] See especially, the descriptions of the 2nd Life Guards meeting Cuirassiers on the bottom of 147 and top of 148; and a regiment of the German Legion against a French regiment, on page 149 (inset).
[24] I am sure some readers will fault my exclusive use of the Waterloo engagement in respect to describing cavalry v. cavalry combats in the Napoleonic Wars. I would suggest that these readers review the observation made by Keegan on page 147, "Common sense tells us . . ." This is not to deny that such actions did take place. I have little information on the contest at Eylau, however. I would refer the reader again, to The COURIER, Vol. VI, No. 6, for the following articles: "Cavalry Tactics and Quality during the Revolution and Napoleonic Wars", by G.F. Nafziger, pages 16-17 especially; "The Largest Cavalry Combat since Eylau", by James R. Arnold (excerpted from Crisis on the Danube, also by J. Arnold); and finally - though it is dedicated more to gaming considerations - "Some
Quick Thoughts on Cavalry Melees", by Paddy Griffith.
[25] I think to a large degree, this "demotion" of cavalry may be attributed to its secondary role in battle. Rifled muskets, rifled artillery, and the broken terrain of most Civil War battlefields prevented cavalry from conducting sword-drawn charges. This is not to say that it did not adapt to its new role and perform very well.
[26] In The Cavalry, pages 155-163.
[27] Johnson cites the narrative of one Major J.F. Hart, whose battery fired upon the charging Union horsemen: "Never rode troopers more gallantly than did those steady Regulars, as under a fire of shell and shrapnel, and finally of canister, they
dashed up to the very muzzles, then through and beyond our guns, passing between Hampton's left and Jones's right. Here they were simultaneously attacked on both flanks, and the survivors were driven back." (161 - 162)
[28] This casualty figure represents just 8% of the combined forces. A subjective assessment by Johnson, I would comment.
[29] Heathcote, pages 109-110. Given the dispositions of the types of horse, and reasoning that other combatants would follow similar deployments, cavalry would be engaged against cavalry. Charles Grant notation Explain this reasoning
[30] From Chapter 14, "The Eighteenth Century". I accept the fact that Mr. Grant may not be as recognized for his scholarship of military history, but his name is very well known in wargaming circles, and his argument about cavalry facing
infantry is borne out by historical evidence.
[31] The entire section, "CAVALRY VERSUS INFANTRY", is excellent and informative. The reader might find the description of the game of "chicken" on the bottom of page 156 especially interesting.
[32] The exception to this rule has already been noted in the discussion of Brandy Station.
[33]"The Gettysburg Campaign", in Echoes of Glory: Illustrated Atlas of The Civil War, Editors of Time Life Books, pages 110-133.
[34]Brandy Station has been mentioned. The reader may also look to The Battle of Reams' Station, 25 August 1864. See Paul Stevenson's two-part article, "Hancock's Humiliation", in MINIATURE WARGAMES, No. 95 (April 1991), and No. 96
(May 1991).
[35] The COURIER, Volume 11, No. 5, pages 3-9. This was a three part series in The COURIER.
[36] The one notable exception, as described by Reihn, was Prague. Here, Frederick sent in the infantry at the quick-march, without preparatory cannonade, and with shouldered arms, against an undisturbed Austrian line of defense.
[37]A partial assertion on my part. It would only make sense though, that the cost of fire-fights to battalion cadre would be significant.
[38] As with the previous discussion, it is recommended that this section of Keegan's study, INFANTRY VERSUS INFANTRY, be read in its entirety.
[39]See Echoes of Glory, pages 130-131. See also, Great Battles of The Civil War, by John MacDonald, pages 107-108. My subjective objection to the use of the term has already been mentioned.
[40]Great Battles, pages 106-107.
[40] One other exception, taking place the day before Pickett's Assault, was Chamberlain's bayonet charge against the 15th Alabama. Here, as noted in Echoes of Glory (123), the act was one of desperation, as the 20th Maine had run out of ammunition.
[42]Great Battles, pages 26-27, 34-35, 74-75, and 138-139, respectively.
[43] This is a subject treated by various historicans. Interested readers are invited to check The Pursuit of Power (especially chapter 4, "Advances in Europe's Art of War) by William H. McNeill. I believe Keegan also discusses the point in The Face of Battle.
© Copyright 1996 Hal Thinglum
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