A wargamer specializing in the ancient and medieval periods might be attracted by the prospect of reconstructing a battle such as Cannae (fought on the equivalent of 3 August 216 B.C.), which was Hannibal's greatest victory over the Romans and a model of tactical perfection. Unfortunately, because of the large numbers involved, it is almost impossible to put this into practice, for the Roman force consisted of 8 Roman and 8 allied legions, totalling 80,000 infantry with 8,000 cavalry, while Hannibal's Carthaginian army had 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Even scaling down so that 100 men on the battlefield equal only I man on the wargames table still calls for 1,200 infantry and 180 cavalry, and a very large wargames table will be required if these numbers are not to be so packed together as to make manoeuvre impossible. Much the same problems exist with such other battles as Zama, 202 B.C.; Hydaspes, 326 B.C.; Chalons, A.D. 451; and Hastings in 1066. However, numerous smaller battles and skirmishes are suitable for reproduction on the wargames table, the forces taking part and the topographical features being easy to simulate.
Many possess tactical and human aspects worthy of simulation, including significant and outstanding examples of the art of warfare and the development of tactics. Fought in 1288 B.C., the Battle of Kadesh was not only one of the earliest recorded battles but is almost certainly the first-known instance of a tactical outflanking movement; the Battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C., demonstrates the earliest example of attack in the "oblique order" later used by eminent commanders such as Frederick the Great in the mid-eighteenth century; Alexander's use of "artillery" at the River Jaxartes in 330 B.C. was not paralleled for centuries; Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. was the start of the triumphal march of the Roman legions, heralding the decline of the historic phalanx, although this formation was successfully resuscitated by the Swiss mercenaries some 1600 years later; and the defeat of Harald Hardrada and his Norsemen at Stamford Bridge in 1066 put an end to centuries of Scandinavian invasions of the British coast.
Some of the best-known battles of the Medieval period do not lend themselves to reproduction because of their lack of outstanding tactical features. Most engagements of this period were nothing more than scuffles of scrambling men and horses over a patch of bare land or a hillside, as armies formed themselves into great masses (battles) to be independently launched at the nearest enemy; lack of discipline and control ruled out any combined tactical movements.
Numbers, terrain and dearth of information eliminate many interesting battles. Not included because of lack of detailed battle reports and maps, or forces too large for realistic scaling down, are wars involving Assyrians or Persians, and other ancient empires, the Romans in Britain, the Crusades, the Moors in Europe and the Mongol or Hun cavalry armies.
Select battles where the numbers involved are not too great for table-top scaling down to a ratio of 1:20. Thus at Leuctra the Thebans' 6,000 men will be represented by 300, the Spartans' 10,000 by 500 figures. In those battles where only part of an army was engaged, or its separate parts came into action at varying times, the same group of figures can be used more than once, drastically reducing the number of model soldiers to be bought and painted.
The opposing table-top Generals must not be permitted to take advantage of hindsight, so that they can perform tactical manoeuvres far in advance of those known to their counterparts on the historical field. In a battle between Ancient Britons and Romans, for example, the commander of the former would have been most unlikely to throw his entire force forward in the characteristic headlong charge favoured by the Britons because he would know that it would be repulsed by the disciplined formation and tactics of the Romans; how would he have conceived a tactical plan that included feint attacks, outflanking movements, feigned withdrawal to destroy Roman cohesion or holding back a reserve; his woad-covered Britons would never have obeyed orders with the discipline and steadiness of the Grenadier Guards. The wargamer should remember the tactical limitations of his troops, therefore, or we shall find, if the commander of the Ancient Britons is more conversant with table-top tactics than his Roman counterpart, that the semi-savage Britons are being handled in a tactical fashion superior to the well trained and highly disciplined Romans.
It is essential, therefore, that the tactics and formations of the original battle are reproduced and that all troops are obliged to conform to their known standard methods of fighting. For example, at Pharsalus the Roman legion formed up its 10 cohorts three-deep on a frontage of 2,000 feet, so allowing each legionary 6 feet of space in which to fight. On the flanks and in front the auxiliary slingers and archers skirmished and flung their missiles. Following the cardinal rule of dealing with an enemy on the defensive, Caesar's legions began their attack when 120 yards away, with the front line of cohorts moving forward at the march and then at the double until the first two ranks of each cohort were about 60 yards from the enemy. Then they launched themselves forward and hurled their pila at a range of about 20 paces; their comrades followed up and repeated the performance until the back lines of the cohorts had thrown their pila over the heads of their front ranks, who were now among the enemy, thrusting murderously with their short swords. They fought for exactly 15 minutes before being withdrawn and a fresh century or cohort thrown in. At the same time, the second line of cohorts moved forward, their front men preparing for their 60 yard run. The third line of cohorts was held in reserve to mop up the last of the enemy resistance or to cover retreat if necessary.
It must be accepted that the tactics and the manner of fighting of all armies conform to their known and recorded style at the battle under review. This is difficult to achieve because it is not easy for a wargamer to eradicate all knowledge of modern military tactics, and the wargamer handling the losing side may be disinclined slavishly to follow a course of action so obviously doomed to failure.
Typed by Dave Latz
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© Copyright 1989 Hal Thinglum
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