When people write battle reports, they usually focus on what happened over the course of the game. This style does not always make the tactics employed by the commanders obvious. There is little about the battle plan selected by the opposing armies. Often it is not clear whether there was a specific plan or the commanders were inclined to play a game of action-reaction. It is possible to play a more elaborate game much like those of Chess masters. To do so requires an understanding of what tactics are available and when to use them. Napoleon urged all those aspiring to be successful generals to read and re-read, and model themselves on the great commanders including Alexander, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick the Great. To this list can be added many more including Napoleon and his adversary the Duke of Wellington, Belisarios, Nikephoros Phokas, Genghis Khan, Saladin, Rommel, Guderian, Patton, Montgomery, “Stonewall” Jackson, US Grant, WT Sherman, and Mao Zedong. Modern militaries include the study of military history to help prepare commanders for fighting wars. In the Saga Publishing rulebooks, there is a section at the back on tactics. All of the examples are based on military tactical doctrine and are common throughout military history. One can find many good examples in the thousands of books on military theory and accounts of conflicts. What follows are some examples of the application of these tactics. In conjunction with this article, I suggest that readers also read my article on the principles of war. Many of these will be recognised in the examples. Here are the tactics as discussed in the rules: Frontal attack Envelopment Echelon attack or refused flank All of these favour the principle of the offensive. Other principles can be applied more specifically to aspects of each tactic. Some of the best examples of frontal attack can be found in the battles between Greek hoplite armies, and barbarian hordes. Both types of armies tended to have one dominant troop type with few supporting types. The opposing commanders lined up their forces and then moved into contact. There was a period of pushing and shoving, and then one side would give way. The losers then tried to run faster than the winners to escape death, wounding or capture. The best fighters were usually placed in the front ranks and did most of the actual fighting. Some of the best warriors would be placed on a flank, often the right, which was considered a place of honor. This variation would pit the good fighters of the right flank against the lesser fighters of the opposing left flank. One common trend was for the right flank to beat its opponent and then be in a position to either pursue the losers and/or turn upon the rest of the enemy army. Sometimes this led to the opposing armies wheeling up to 90 degrees or more as the right wings moved to engage new opponents. Other times one or both right wings would pursue and not take any further action in determining the outcome of the battle. If one right wing decided to wheel to engage elements of the enemy army, then it could usually ensure victory. The allied army of the Diadochi (Lysimachos, Seleucus and Kassandros) did this against the army of Antigonos One-Eye during the Battle of Ipsus in 301 BC. His son Demetrius the Besieger defeated the opposing allied cavalry wing and then went on to pillage the allied baggage camp; meanwhile the allies were able to flank the Antigonid army. By the time, Demetrius had rallied his troops and returned to the battlefield, he was unable to prevent the allies from defeating his father’s forces. Several innovations can be tried to prevent such results. For example, placing good troops on the left flank so that they were opposite enemy troops of the same calibre. The well-known Sacred Band of Thebes tried another variation, which involved adding ranks up to 50 so that it could have greater weight in the pushing and shoving phase. This was successful because most hoplite formations were only about eight ranks deep. The principle of mass was applied in this innovation as the Sacred Band had local superiority. The Spartan army achieved a similar superiority by exploiting the tendency of hoplite formations to drift to the right as the soldiers tried to keep positioned close to the shield of the soldier on the right. This often led to the right wing overlapping the opposing left wing. The Spartans of the overlapping files then wheeled towards the enemy’s exposed flank. The result was a single flank envelopment. Before further discussing this tactic, let us consider other variations on frontal attacks. One of the most popular Greek innovations was to add more troop types to the basic hoplite formation. Usually the additions were either cavalry or light infantry. The former could be armoured (heavy) or unarmoured (light) mounted troops. The latter could be psiloi or peltasts. Cavalry were usually placed on the flanks during battle, but could be used before battle as a screen behind which the bulk of the army deployed. This denied the enemy a view of its opponent moving from march formation to battle formation. A screen could also be augmented with or replaced by light infantry. Cavalry were good at intimidating the enemy because even a small force could cause havoc if able to penetrate a hoplite formation. Cavalry were also able to ride down fleeing troops and inflict a disproportionate number of casualties. Since cavalry could move faster than infantry, horsemen could more easily attempt to envelop the opposing army. Fear of flank attacks could cause the enemy to halt and adopt a defensive formation. With the enemy wary of flank attacks, the opposing army could take its time in closing and even pick a point of attack to achieve local superiority. A stationary enemy would be more vulnerable to an echelon attack. But more on that later. Back to the options for light infantry. In this article, psiloi are defined as open order or skirmishing troop types. They can be armed with slings, javelins, bows and other missile weapons. Peltasts are defined as loose order troop types, equipped with missile weapons and possibly combat weapons. Like cavalry, light troops can be deployed on the flanks or in front of the hoplite formation. When placed on the flanks, they can emulate the tactics of the cavalry. When in front of the hoplites, they can attempt to soften the enemy by inflicting casualties to both weaken and disorder the enemy. One example of the benefits of light troops is the confrontation of Spartan hoplites and Athenian psiloi at Sphacteria during the Peloponnesian War. The Spartans were unable to pin the psiloi and force them to engage in melee. Every time the Spartans advanced, the psiloi retreated. When the Spartans halted, the psiloi closed to missile range and were able to inflict casualties while receiving none. As long as the psiloi could stand off and fire their missiles, the Spartans could not fight back. In the end, the Spartans surrendered. Interestingly enough, the Persian military never developed a similar capability to oppose Greek hoplites. There certainly were plenty of light troop types available to the Persian army, but Persian generals preferred to recruit Greek hoplites and gimmicks like scythed chariots. The frontal attack is one of the simplest of offensive actions. If an army is dominated by one troop type, then it is a good option. This is true even if the troop type lacks a combat weapon or is of light troops. The English army at Agincourt during the Hundred Years War advanced to within missile range of the French army and then goaded the French into attacking across unfavourable terrain. Asiatic horse-archers would ride towards the enemy to fire and then pull back to prevent the enemy from closing. This tactic was typical of Skythian and Mongol armies. The Parthian army did this successfully against the Roman army at Carrhae in 53 BC. The frontal attack is vulnerable to envelopment and echelon attack. Examples of the former are given above. The latter allows for the opposing army to attempt to achieve local superiority while denying the frontal attackers contact along a wide front. Envelopment was a favoured tactic of Hannibal Barca, the most famous Carthaginian general and victor in many battles over the Romans during the Second Punic War. The Battle of Cannae is considered by many historians to be one of the best examples of the double envelopment. Hannibal had the advantage in terms of cavalry when compared to the Romans. He was able to exploit this at Cannae to achieve a major victory. With the increased presence of mounted troops, the traditional Greek hoplite battle became much more elaborate. For most ancient armies, the typical deployment had the infantry in the centre and cavalry on the wings. This model was quite common until more modern times. Hannibal enticed the more numerical Roman infantry to attack his centre by refusing this part of his army. Meanwhile his left wing defeated the Roman cavalry and then rode around to take the Italian allied cavalry of the Roman left wing in the rear. The two wings of Carthaginian cavalry then attacked the rear of the Roman infantry. In conjunction with the cavalry, the left and right flanks of the Carthaginian infantry enveloped the flanks of the Roman infantry. (Ironically, Scipio Africanus employed the same tactics to defeat Hannibal at Zama in 202 BC!) The Romans suffered a similar defeat in the Battle of Adrianople in 378 AD. The Gothic and allied cavalry drove off the Roman wings and then struck the Roman centre. The Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus considered this a second Cannae. The German plan for the Battle of Tannenburg in 1914 was similar to Hannibal’s but on a much larger scale. It was successful and was often imitated on the Eastern Front during WW 2. The Germans successfully encircled the Russian armies and “bagged them” in isolated pockets during Operation Barbarosa in 1941. The Russians learned well and returned the favour in the later war. The German 6th Army was trapped in Stalingrad in 1943, and in 1944 the German Army Group Centre was “bagged” in a strategic envelopment. The defence of Bastogne by the 101st Airborne Division during the Battle of the Bulge was a good example of an encircled force fending off its attackers. The allied forces were able to mass at various points along the German perimeter and breakthrough to Bastogne. The Mongol army often employed envelopment to defeat its foes. This tactic was ideal for such Asiatic mounted forces, which relied predominantly on archery to cause casualties. The swift light or skirmish cavalry would attempt to draw the opposing army into a pursuit that could cover miles in which the pursuers were likely to become strung out. Meanwhile the wings of the horse-archer army would encircle its opponents and strike on the flanks and rear. The Byzantine military developed a good counter to this tactic. The Byzantines formed at least two or more supporting lines against the more manoeuvrable Turks (as they called most Asian nomads). The supporting lines were to discourage any attempt to envelop the Byzantine flanks. The one major failure of the Byzantine tactic occurred during the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 AD. This was more the result of treachery than Turkish prowess as the Byzantine second line was withdrawn prematurely by its commander. This allowed the Turks to encircle and destroy the Byzantine first line. Envelopment relies heavily on the opposing army to put itself into a noose similar to that on a hangman’s rope. Not every enemy will be so obliging. It helps to have surprise to ensure a successful envelopment. The Macedonian army of Philip II and Alexander III favoured the oblique echelon attack. This was evident in the first battle that Philip fought as a newly recognised Macedonian king. His victory in the battle with the Illyrian (Dardanian) King Bardylis near Monastir (located close to Lake Okhrida) in 358 BC was a variation on the successful tactics of the famous Theban general, Epaminondas, whom Philip studied while a hostage in Thebes. The echelon attack was used by Alexander in all of his major battles: Granikos, Issos, Gaugamela and Hydaspes. The Macedonian army was deployed by Alexander to execute an oblique advance. On the right, Alexander commanded the Companion cavalry, Agrianian psiloi and Macedonian (or Greek) archers, Paeonian and Macedonian light cavalry, and Hypaspists. The Macedonian phalanx was deployed in the centre. The left wing under the Macedonian 2 i/c, Parmenio, included the Thessalian cavalry (very similar to the Companions in quality and role), Thracian cavalry, and Greek cavalry (both allied and mercenary). A second line or reserve consisted of the Greek allied and mercenary infantry, Thracian and Illyrian infantry and assorted other troops. Parmenio was expected to hold against the enemy’s right wing while Alexander punched through between the enemy’s right and centre. Frederick the Great of Prussia also favoured the oblique echelon attack. His army was not always able to achieve victory, which illustrates the need to varying one’s tactics. Coming on in the “same old way” allows the canny opposing commander to plan a suitable response. Fortunately for Alexander, the Persian commanders were unable to contain his assault in any of the three battles in which they opposed Alexander. An echelon attack emphasises the principles of mass and manoeuvre. Alexander’s use of a second or supporting line represents his awareness of security. These are but a few of the thousands of examples of good and bad uses of tactics. There is one last piece of advice worth mentioning and that is a quote from Sun T’zu: Know your enemy and know yourself and you will be the victor in 100 battles In essence before picking your tactics, it is good to know the capabilities of your enemy and your own army. One of the major advantages we have as tabletop commanders is good intelligence of our enemies through knowledge of the typical army lists, and study of history. It is highly recommended that one have an objective before deploying the troops. This will influence both the deployment and choice of tactics. Just remember to keep it simple and adhere to it as much as possible. Back to MWAN # 133 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2005 Legio X This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com