If we do not act so that future historians cannot raise even one point of criticism. -- (General Tamemoto Kuroki, Commander of the Japanese First Army 1905) The art of war, like other arts, has its fundamental principles. If that were not the case, war would not be an art. War is learnable and is something that must be learned; it is an understanding of the true nature of war gained through extensive and intensive study of military history that is the basis for study of the art of war. -- (Marshal Ferdinand Foch) It has been many issues since my last article on theory. After reading some of the most recent posts on the Saga Warfare discussion group (http://games.groups.yahoo.com/group/SAGAWarfare/), I decided to update my comments (up to January, 2005). For centuries, organised military forces have subscribed to the idea that there is a set of guiding principles or ideas that guide the conduct and study of war. Collectively, they are known as the principles of war. While there has never been universal agreement on one common list of principles, most militaries have developed their own list based on their military culture, experience and heritage. Throughout history, it was too common that proud and aggressive military leaders were too focused with their grand battle plans and with the mission and fighting, that they neglected the plain basic needs of their combat forces, and their unheroic but essential auxiliary units. Military doctrine establishes "the framework of understanding of the approach to war" and this is fundamental throughout history. Regardless of era and ethnics, the building blocks of doctrine have been relatively consistent throughout time. A simple Internet search using “principles of war” provided thousands of hits with regard to military employment of these guiding principles and many examples of their applications. Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, Napoleon (78 military maxims), Clausewitz, Marshal Foch (four principles of war), and Major-General J.F.C. Fuller (eight principles of war) wrote their own versions of these guiding principles. All of their ideas continue to be among the most widely used concepts upon which modern military doctrine is based. They have even been applied to business! Fuller’s principles were incorporated into British Military doctrine in 1932 and continue to be cornerstones in both American (first discussed in a 1921 Army training regulation) and British doctrine (and by extension most English speaking military forces). They are as follows: The principle of the objective The principle of the offensive The principle of security The principle of concentration The principle of economy of force The principle of movement The principle of surprise The principle of co-operation For example, my own military education included learning the ten principles espoused by the Canadian Army: Selection and maintenance of the aim Offensive action Security Concentration of force Economy of effort Surprise Maintenance of morale Flexibility Co-operation Administration In the United States, there are nine widely accepted principles. These will be presented in detail so that the reader understands how to apply them and when. Bear in mind that they may sometimes appear to be contradicting, but this is why it is important to know when to apply them. The Objective "Direct all efforts toward a decisive, obtainable goal." The ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and will to fight. The ultimate objectives of operations other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, they too must be clear from the beginning. The linkage, therefore, between objectives at all levels of war is crucial; each operation must contribute to the ultimate strategic aim. The attainment of intermediate objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the operation. Using the analytical framework of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T), commanders designate physical objectives such as an enemy force, decisive or dominating terrain, a juncture of lines of communication (LOCs), or other vital areas essential to accomplishing the mission. These become the basis for all subordinate plans. Actions that do not contribute to achieving the objective must be avoided. Stick to the mission, and persist. Military action should have a clearly defined and achievable objective, and all efforts should always be directed to achieving that objective, even despite difficulties and diversions caused by the enemy or other reasons. There is often a temptation to improvise or alter the basic plan. The danger is illustrated by the maxim order, counter-order, disorder. Think before you act and then try not to second guess. This requires having confidence in your ability to develop and carry out a plan. Remember to be active, and always. In battle, sitting still, or even just being predictable, often leaves control of events to the enemy, which simply means that your side is much more likely to lose the battle. This is true not just for the attacking side. In the battle of Kursk, the defending Russians were almost hyperactive in constantly intensifying and enhancing their defensive fortifications and readiness for the expected German attack. That's why they won the battle as the Germans crumbled when finally attacked. A classic example of the devastating results of ignoring this principle is the Battle of Britain. The German Luftwaffe was getting close to achieving its objective of eliminating the British fighter force. An achievement that was essential for making an invasion of England possible. But then, in an emotional response to a bombardment of Berlin, Adolf Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to shift its effort to bombing London. The result was that the British fighter command was able to recover its strength, win the Battle of Britain, expel the Luftwaffe, and secure Britain as the remaining base of the western front. To do this, however, subordinate commanders must be given "terrain objectives" toward which they move. Thus, Richmond was not a proper (terrain) objective for McClellan's army in 1862 because capturing it would not necessarily destroy the Confederate army and the loss of Richmond in 1862 would not have meant defeat of the Confederacy. It was a proper (terrain) objective for Grant in 1864-65 because it had become so important by that time that Lee was forced to defend it even if it meant destruction of his army. Although Grant's objective was Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. (not Richmond, per se), by directing his efforts toward Richmond he forced Lee to stand and fight him for its defense. When planning, pick an objective that can be achieved by your forces and your commanders. Make sure that you are comfortable with what you want to achieve and confident that you can achieve it. Simplicity "Prepare uncomplicated plans and concise orders to insure thorough understanding and execution." Everything in war is very simple, but the simple thing is difficult. To the uninitiated, military operations are not difficult. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity is especially valuable when soldiers and leaders are tired. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and troop leading at all echelons and permits branches and sequels to be more easily understood and executed. "Keep it simple, stupid" (KISS) or as I sometimes say keep it stupid, simpleton. Since battle is so complex and unpredictable, complex plans almost always fail. To succeed, a battle plan must be simple. Simple to understand, simple to execute, and simple to adapt to changes. Remember you may have to command players who are not familiar with you, the rules and how to play the game. Make sure that they know what is expected of them. The most famous example of a battle plan, which failed to achieve its objective because it required too much in order to succeed, even became a language term. "A bridge too far" is now a common language term for "too much", named after the book (and movie) about Operation Market Garden in September 1944. This was a daring attempt to advance a long way, across several successive guarded river bridges in one strike, right into Germany. One bridge was not captured and so the heroic attempt failed to achieve its objective. Too much depended on moving along a single corridor and adhering to a timetable with few options. The principle of simplicity is also true for the design of weapon systems. While German tanks were sensitive to technical failures, needed a lot of maintenance, and were complex to produce, Russian and American tanks were mass-produced and were able to fight a long time with minimal field maintenance. Union General Irwin McDowell at the Battle of 1st Bull Run violated the principle of simplicity, since his troops were too green to execute properly the maneuver he prescribed. To make things simple and keep them simple, it is important to develop cooperation and coordination. The basis of drill is to get a group of people to do a certain action in response to a command. From there, it is possible to create what may seem like a complex series of actions as demonstrated in military parades and the actions of military flying units. This same process is applied in many fields and is often called rote learning. A football team (NFL or CFL) has a playbook and the contents are practised repeatedly until the coaches are satisfied that the players know what to do and when. Such a playbook can also be developed for use with tabletop armies. Remember, we have greater control over our troops than many historical commanders ever had. Even irregular armies can implement their playbook on the gaming surface Unity of Command. "For every task there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander." At all levels of war, employment of military forces in a manner that masses combat power toward a common objective requires unity of command and unity of effort. It requires a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose. Unity of effort, on the other hand, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces--even though they may not necessarily be part of the same command structure--toward a commonly recognized objective. Collateral and main force operations might go on simultaneously, united by intent and purpose, if not command. The means to achieve unity of purpose is a nested concept whereby each succeeding echelon's concept is nested in the other. In combined and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort coordination through cooperation and common interests is an essential complement to unity of command. The Union flagrantly violated this principle before the Battle of Kernstown. Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign taught President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton their lesson, and Unity of Command was obtained by creating Pope's Army of Virginia. (The Federals were nevertheless defeated in the Second Bull Run campaign.) There are many common expressions that illustrate this principle such as too many cooks in the kitchen or too many chiefs, and not enough Indians. Different forces, especially from the different military branches, should cooperate and coordinate their efforts. The idea is that to ensure optimal cooperation between the many commanders of all the various units and branches, which naturally have different views of the situation, different tactics and doctrines, and sometimes unrelated or even contradicting orders, is to bring all the units in the area of operations into one chain of command, so that all commanders receive their orders from one source, a supreme commander. This obviously results in better cooperation between the units under his command. Other examples of good cooperation are when the artillery and air support attack where the ground forces need them to attack, the tanks and infantry protect each other, different ground forces coordinate their attacks, the intelligence provides the needed information when it's needed, fighter escorts and navy warships are there where and when they're needed, and all forces are properly supplied. Examples of bad cooperation are when forces are hit by their own air support, artillery fires at empty fields, the infantry is overrun by tanks, the tanks are ambushed by infantry in the woods or in urban areas, encirclement attempts fail, there's plenty of intelligence that doesn't help at all, fighter escorts and warship escorts are so far away when they're urgently needed, the tanks run out of fuel, and supplies are air-dropped right to the hands of the enemy. The German Blitzkrieg tactics were so successful because for the first time closely coordinated operations of the ground forces were combined with the crushing potential of close support aircraft that were assigned to help them. The tactics were simple. The tanks should continue to advance rapidly, in order to keep their momentum and strength in the enemy territory in order to inflict maximum damage. To achieve that they bypassed strong enemy positions wherever they could. Where they could not bypass the enemy, instead of stopping their advance to engage the enemy, they called for massive air support, which rapidly removed the obstacle from the tanks' way. This allowed the panzers to use their own firepower mainly for destroying light enemy units and Inflict maximum damage, instead of engaging strong enemy points. The result of this cooperation was shocking to the enemy. Another good example of unity of command is when Admiral Max Horton, a former submarine captain and commander of the British submarine force, took command of the battle against the German submarines in the North Atlantic in WW2. Horton demanded and received command authority over all the naval and air units, which were involved in anti-submarine warfare, and this allowed him to significantly improve their combined effort, achieve much better results than before, and defeat the U-boats. A negative example of the lack of unity of command can be found in the Japanese high command, where the Japanese army and navy almost fought two different wars. The army remained focused in its war in China while the navy was focused in Pacific operations. The result was of course damaging, and so when US Marines occupied islands closer and closer to Japan, millions of Japanese army soldiers were practically stuck in China, unable to save their own country from invasion. Make sure that you coordinate well and that there is cooperation amongst your commanders. The Offensive "Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative." Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined common objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. This is fundamentally true across all levels of war. Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations. The side that retains the initiative through offensive action forces the enemy to react rather than act. You simply can't win a war without eventually attacking. That's why armies mark it as a principle. It's simply a derivative of the initiative principle. The German 6th Army that attacked Stalingrad was weakened by the horrible bloodshed in the street fighting, but a large scale flanking attack was required to exploit that. The Russian attack completely encircled the Germans and their allies, resulted in the greatest single defeat in the history of the German military. Ironically, the Russian plan was similar to that used by the Germans during the Battle of Tannenburg during WW1 when fighting against the Russians. Lee's generalship embodies this principle, whereas it was the fatal deficiency in McClellan's. It is the quality most conspicuous in the make-up of most successful commanders, particularly Stonewall Jackson, Grant, Sheridan and Forrest. As General GS Patton stated, the best defence is a good offense. Be proactive rather than reactive. You should consider what the enemy is likely to do in response to your actions, and of course, how you plan to counter the enemy’s actions. Maneuver "Position your military resources to favor the accomplishment of your mission. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to gain positional advantage. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and protects the force. It is used to exploit successes, to preserve freedom of action, and to reduce vulnerability. It continually poses new problems for the enemy by rendering his actions ineffective, eventually leading to defeat. At all levels of war, successful application of maneuver requires agility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then shifting points of main effort and the considered application of the principles of mass and economy of force. At the operational level, maneuver is the means by which the commander determines where and when to fight by setting the terms of battle, declining battle, or acting to take advantage of tactical actions. Maneuver is dynamic warfare that rejects predictable patterns of operations. Maneuver in itself can produce no decisive results (as Hooker at Chancellorsville failed to realize) but if properly employed it makes decisive results possible through the application of the principles of the offensive, mass, economy of force, and surprise. It is by maneuver that a superior general defeats a stronger adversary (e.g., Jackson's Valley campaign). Use your brain, and adapt your basic plan. War and battle are complex, varying, and uncertain environments. That's why battles are so rarely fought as planned. That's why commanders of all ranks should constantly judge the situation and be flexible enough to find the best way to achieve the objective in the changing circumstances. Rigidly following orders, plans, or a doctrine in battle is often fatal. Remember no plan survives contact with the enemy. The winner is usually the commander whose plan is sustained despite the changes in the conflict. The fact that until the end of the war the Japanese navy refused to adopt the convoy tactic to adapt to the threat of American submarines cost them their entire merchant fleet, a loss which resulted in severe shortage in most war materials. The British navy and air force adapted to the German submarine threat with increasing efficiency, survived and even defeated it. Mass "Achieve military superiority at the decisive place and time." Synchronizing all the elements of combat power where they will have decisive effect on an enemy force in a short period of time is to achieve mass. To mass is to hit the enemy with a closed fist, not poke at him with fingers of an open hand. Mass must also be sustained so the effects have staying power. Thus, mass seeks to smash the enemy, not sting him. This results from the proper combination of combat power with the proper application of other principles of war. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results, while limiting exposure to enemy fire. Mass in this sense does not mean "more men." "Military superiority" can be attained against a more numerical enemy if you have superiority in such things as weapons, leadership, morale, and training, and local superiority. Mass is generally gained by maneuver. The proper objective ("purpose") in battle is the destruction of the enemy's combat forces. It is probably the most important principle. What decides the outcome of wars and battles is usually not the amount of forces you have, but the amount of forces you have where it counts, where the battle is decided. The commander should concentrate his forces, and their fire, and by doing so achieve a decisive local superiority, that will overwhelm the enemy there, break the balance, and allow a breakthrough to victory. The whole idea of the German Blitzkrieg tactics was to concentrate massive armored forces, and massive close air support, to create an unstoppable rapidly moving "armor fist" that could smash through anything and cause havoc and chaos in the enemy's side, regardless of the enemy's total force. The naval equivalent of this principle is simply don't divide the fleet, which is true both in attack, as was so destructively demonstrated by the German "wolf pack" submarine warfare tactics in WW2, and by the convoys tactic which negated it. Modern air war is where this principle is most evident. When they penetrate enemy airspace to attack, scattered aircraft are easy prey to defenders. But when an entire air force takes off and charges as one coordinated force, it's usually an unstoppable overwhelming force. Hence the terms air superiority and air monopoly. The former is illustrated by the lack of German aircraft during the 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy. The latter by the absence of Iraqi aircraft during the 1991 Gulf War (many Iraqi Air Force planes sought refuge in Iran for the duration of the conflict). Economy of Force "Allocate to secondary efforts minimum essential combat power." Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. No part of the force should ever be left without purpose. When the time comes for action, all parts must act. The allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde (withdrawal) operations is measured in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time on the battlefield. This is a misleading term because it does not mean what it sounds like. It does not mean, "do the job with minimum combat power." Note that the principle pertains to "secondary efforts," and it is the means by which a superior general achieves "mass" as defined above. Mass and Economy of Force can be considered the opposite sides of the same coin. Don't be wasteful, and use your forces efficiently. Make the best effort, not the maximum effort. There's a big difference. On the Russian front during WW2, the Russians, and later the Germans, suffered huge unnecessary losses simply by throwing every available unit directly at the enemy or by not allowing it to retreat, with total disregard to whether this is the right way to use these forces. The lack of economy of force is almost a trademark of totalitarian regimes. Surprise "Accomplish your purpose before the enemy can effectively react." Surprise can decisively shift the balance of combat power. By seeking surprise, forces can achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Rapid advances in surveillance technology and mass communication make it increasingly difficult to mask or cloak large-scale marshalling or movement of personnel and equipment. The enemy need not be taken completely by surprise but only become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed, effective intelligence, deception, application of unexpected combat power, operations security (OPSEC), and variations in tactics and methods of operation. Surprise can be in tempo, size of force, direction or location of main effort, and timing. Deception can aid the probability of achieving surprise. Tactical or strategic surprise does not mean open-mouthed amazement. Thus, a corps may be "surprised" by an attack it has seen coming for several hours if this attack is too powerful for it to resist by itself and if no other unit is within SUPPORTING DISTANCE. The fate of the Union XI Corps at Chancellorsville is an example. The principle of war known as "Security" may be defined as all measures taken to avoid "Surprise." The idea is to use secrecy, speed, and deception, to achieve the objective in a way that the enemy will be unable to efficiently resist. A dramatic example is the allied invasion of France in 1944. It was obvious to allied commanders that despite all their efforts and air power, a swift and massive German armored counter attack could smash their beachhead and throw them back to the sea. To prevent that, a tremendous dual effort of secrecy on one hand and active deception on the other hand, succeeded in misleading the Germans about where and when they where going to attack. The deception effort was so convincing that even after the invasion began, when the Germans obviously knew both the Where and When, they kept their main armor reserves away from the beachhead because they were still convinced that the invasion in Normandy is just a diversion attack to the main invasion which they expected in Calais. When they realized they were wrong it was much too late. The German attacks through the Ardennes in 1940 and 1944 are also good examples. In the first, the allies did not think that modern mechanised forces could move through the rough terrain of this region. In the second, the allies did not expect the Germans to be capable of launching an offensive after suffering heavy losses and at that time of year (winter). Security "Never permit the enemy to acquire an unpredicted advantage," Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by a commander to protect his forces. Knowledge and understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, doctrine, and staff planning improve the detailed planning of adequate security measures. Risk is inherent in war; however, commanders must not be overly cautious. To be successful, commanders must take necessary, calculated risks to preserve the force and defeat the enemy. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power. Another definition would be "measures taken to prevent surprise." A unit in bivouac, for example, uses outposts and patrols for security. Lack of security at Shiloh resulted in surprise of the Federals. Don't leave unprotected sectors, and also keep a reserve force to block a breach by the enemy, or to add it to the main attack at the right time and place to achieve a breakthrough. Don't really concentrate everything in one point, because if the enemy will act elsewhere, you're in trouble. In the battle of Kursk, although the Russians built several lines of defense, one behind the other, the spearhead of the German panzer attack was still able to break through all of them, but then, after they passed all those lines, the remaining German tanks were engaged by the Russian reserve, a large force of T-34 tanks which engaged them near the small village Prokhorovka and broke the German attack before it could do further damage behind the Russian lines. In 1944, the Germans had a powerful armored strategic reserve in France. It was obvious that its job is to engage the allies wherever they will invade and that it was capable of crushing the invasion force before it could be reinforced. A huge allied campaign of deception was performed mainly in order to mislead the Germans about where the invasion will take place. Its main purpose was to ensure that this strategic reserve will not be in Normandy and will not be sent to Normandy to stop the invasion. The deception succeeded, and so was the invasion of Normandy. The French military in 1940 totally neglected to secure the west flank of France's northern border. In contradiction to their border with Germany, which was very heavily fortified, but in the Ardennes, the main defensive lines were very poorly defended by light infantry forces. It was so because the French generals believed it was impassable. Despite what happened during WW1 when the German armies invaded France. They never tested that belief, but others did, including Sir Basil Liddell-Hart who personally tested the Ardennes with his bicycles years before the war. The inevitable result was that in May 1940 the German armor forces rushed deep into France through this unsecured section of the border and nothing was there to stop them. German victory in France was very quick and very decisive. The Principles Of War: Summary and Psychological Factors Back to MWAN # 133 Table of Contents Back to MWAN List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2005 Legio X This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com