John Company

Rules for Conquest of India, 1750-1860

by Chris Ferree and Patrick R. Wilson

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MINIATURES RULES

When near the end of his life, the Duke of Wellington was asked which was the hardest battle of his career , the one he wanted to be remembered for, he didn't say "Waterloo," he said, "Assaye!"

The great European conflicts of the late 18th and early 19th Centuries have been well provided to the war gaming fraternity, and the later Colonial Wars of the British Empire have particularly received their due. And yet, a century of warfare on the Indian Sub-Continent has heretofore been overlooked by the war gaming fraternity. Why this has been so is beyond the scope of this piece, but the reasons may include a general lack of knowledge of the period, a certain degree of EuroCentrism, and possibly a perception that conquering India wasn't a "fair fight," and never in serious doubt.

Well, what can I say? For those of us whose interests eventually led to India's exotic landscapes, remarkable peoples and personalities, we beg to differ. To those who know their meanings, who can read such phrases and words as "Black Hole of Calcutta", Ghurka, "Last Stand of The 44th", "Peccavi", "Remember Cawnpore!", "Nunc Fortunatus Sum", Khalsa, and more, without conjuring images of victory and defeat, genius and stupidity, heroism and poltroonery found nowhere else?

The British East India Company's armies campaigned through the jungles of Bengal, the deserts of Baluchistan, the crags and passes of the Northwest Frontier, the rain forests of the Northeast Frontier, the coastal plains of the Carnatic, and even to the Rooftop of the World, the Himalayas.

Canny business sense and shrewd diplomacy drove the machine, but it was the Company's own Sepoys who had to take and defend the prize by force of arms. The battles that built the British Raj varied as widely in opponents as in terrain. The Indian Armies faced by the Company ranged from European trained infantry, to tribal hill men, Pindari bandits, religious fanatics, and irregular feudal cavalry. Native artillery could be state-of-the-art field pieces, or hopelessly antiquated-some guns older than the Company itself. However, if the Native armies were commonly outclassed, they were never outnumbered!

If the Iron Duke knew how much harder combat was in India than in Spain or Belgium, perhaps the subject should be re-considered by mainstream historical wargamers of the "Horse And Musket" era.

John Company was designed to provide the opportunity to experience some of the adventure and challenge of warfare in India. A. variety of worthy foes await on the table top, and not only the climate and topography, but a host of enemies with different styles of warfare. Can you do as well as Clive when outnumbered by over ten to one? Can you lead the charge, have your horse "piked", and still press on as Wellesley did at Assaye? Can you face the Khalsa's artillery, the biggest and best in Asia, and order your men to take it with cold steel, like Gough?

Native Chieftains have their own problems. Hordes of fierce warriors do not an army make. You may have great numbers, and hundreds of guns, in positions of your choosing, but can you control and animate your forces to act when and how you want them to? Can you build a battle plan based on the advantages you do have, seize the initiative and prevent the Feringhees from controlling the battlefield?

John Company presents such problems, not as mere tactical exercises, but as questions of Leadership. Real human reactions to the stresses of combat are at the heart of these rules and the man who best understands the human, as well as the material, limitations of his troops is the General who will most consistently bring back victory.

Before outlining some of the assumptions and systems of the rules, some basics about them are in order.

John Company comes as an 8.5" x 11", plastic spiral bound, 155 page book with full cover colors and 20 full color and 4 B&W card stock sheets of game decks, cheat sheets, orders and other game record counters (which must be cut out), complete and ready to play.

The figure to man ratio is a 1:60, each turn representing 15 minutes. The game is "Brigade Level" with anything up to around 40-50 figure Bases to a (large) one of British/Company type. Native Brigades can easily be twice as large. Generally, one player per Brigade is the rule of thumb. The smallest tactical unit is the Battalion/Regiment/Battery, a variable number of which comprise a Brigade. Complete organizational information for all periods between 1750 and 1860 as experienced in India is provided.

Though written with 25/28mm miniatures in mind at a ground scale of 1":100', virtually any miniatures scale may be used. While ranges and distances are described in inches throughout the text, a selection of printed Fire and Movement Gauges are provided that allow players to continue to use "inches" but as they appear on the appropriate Gauge. Thus, the game can also be played with 5/6mm, 10mm, 15mm, or 20mm miniatures without troublesome conversions. A four page listing of figure lines and providers in a variety of scales is included.

The recommended Base sizes are 3/4" square for Infantry and 1" x 2" or 2.5" for Cavalry. Artillery is mounted on triangular bases (printed templates are provided in two scales which demonstrate the observed firing angles). The number of miniatures mounted on a base is entirely up to the players. For example, it is perfectly permissible to mount one 28mm Infantry figure on a Base, or as many as eighteen 5/6mm figures, and still use the basic game scale of 1 "-100'. It's all the same in play as fire effects and loses are calculated by the number of Bases rather than figures.

However, if preferred, players may mount 15mm or smaller scale Infantry and Cavalry on 1/2" squares and 3/4" x 1.5" rectangles and then use the appropriate Fire and Movement Gauge. Indeed, as it is entirely a matter taste and/or budget, players are free to devise virtually any Base size so long as opposing forces are mounted identically.

Regarding dice, only the traditional six-sided variety (D6) are required, and three per player is ideal. These should be of different colors (Black, White, and Red make a functional blend) as many tables require comparisons between dice, though not "opposed" rolls.

Unless using the Optional Ammunition Supply rules, NO written records or rosters of any kind are required. This function of play is provided entirely by use of full color, printed game counters which include a range of permitted Orders, as well as Resolve Level, Target, Prone, and "Sapped" markers.

The book itself can be divided into the rules proper (97 pages, 19 of which are Optional rules), much of which covers introductory and organizational information, and the Resource Material (some 60 pages) including Designers Notes (largely reprised here), Maratha, Afghan, Sikh, British and Company Army Profiles, and four ready-to-play scenarios. These include the historical action at Assaye, 1803, and three fictionalized battles representing the First Afghan War, First Sikh War, and the Indian Mutiny. All come with OB's, map, and special rules for each. Also provided are a list of Campaigns and Battles fought by "John Company" between 1750 and dissolution in 1860, Figure Sources, an extensive Bibliography, and six pages of uniform guides for basic troop types called for in the Scenarios.

John Company started as a project in 1991 when my co-author, Chris Ferree, proposed sculpting a line of true 25mm figures for the Sikh Wars later produced by one of the certifiable grognards of the War Games Hobby, Mr. Richard Houston. (These are now available through The London War Room.)

I can't remember when I first met Chris, but I do remember commenting that dirt wasn't white anymore. We had both been gamers long enough to know better, and we both had wide creative streaks. Fortunately, these tended to be complementary skills (he can paint and sculpt; I can watch) and we had have both been writing rules forever. My first published set was Cordite And Steel in the mid 70's, but I didn't become committed to Colonial Era Wargaming until my "Damascus Road Moment" in 1981 when I first played the classic The Sword And The Flame (TSATF). This eventually led to my association with author Larry Brom, one of a handful of true founding fathers of the modern hobby. My contributions to the 20th Anniversary Edition of TSATF led to further projects since published by "And That's The Way It Was.," the company founded by him and daughter, Lori. But all that was still in the future when this project was conceived. Naturally enough, Chris and I first considered designing a variant to TSATF, but quickly began thinking of a dedicated set of rules instead, fully realizing that virtually nothing specific about India had been addressed by any game systems.

Indeed, we firmly believe that simply adapting a rules model on one subject to another solely on the basis of more or less identical technology, or because they are more or less contemporary, is unnecessary. Wars are not defined simply by weapons used or the date on the calendar. Whatever it is that truly provides the character of a conflict, that makes it unique and fascinating in its own right, is a blend of its fundamental elements. We wanted to create a new gaming model that grew out of the subject matter, rather than take a preconceived system and hammer it over the subject. Our object has been to write rules from the "inside out," rather than from the "outside in."

We were also influenced by a number of other factor we felt were missing. For decades, we had read accounts of battle in all periods and places where units were described as coming under "withering", "blistering", "concentrated", "accurate", or simply "heavy" fire, and being "pinned down" or "held up" for hours, then having the account finish with a remark like, "...and Private Smith was wounded." From skirmishes to full scale battles, descriptions with plenty of shooting, but few or even no casualties incurred. In traditional war games, such outcomes are virtually impossible because sc many systems depended on casualties inflicted to determine when one side or the other simply runs away.

The other basic consideration we felt largely unaddressed was the human psychological element. The works of Holmes and Keegan, among others, had already begun to make w question the value of emphasizing hardware over humanity. Eventually, these and other authors (notably Fox in his Archaeology, History, And Custer's Last Battle, and du Picq's seminal Battle Studies) pointed us towards devising a new model attempting just that Despite the warnings of some who claimed "human behavior cannot be quantified, bur weaponry can be," and that we shouldn't even try, we persisted.

Years of at least five re-writes, and playtesting produced the rule's first incarnation, The Raj And The Lion, specific to the Sikh Wars. Sent round the world for comment and crit. icism (indeed, was published in MWAN some 8 years ago when it was still a 1:30 scale game and far more complex than the "final" version), we received ideas and instructior from the likes of Howard Whitehouse, Andrew Preziosi (now of Khyber Pass Games), anc particularly Messrs. Matt Kelland, of Somerset, England, and the remarkable Bryar Ansell, then in Guernsey. It was the latter who encouraged us to broaden our scope anc provide for all of the Honorable East India Company's campaigns in the century it took to complete the conquest of India. For seven years, the project, now renamed with its current title, was revised with frequent adjustments and at least four more re-writes followec before the decision was finally made to bring the project to print.

The goal of John Company may simply be stated as a game in which the players have distinctly limited control of their Units, but still have enough to favor the side which con. trives the most effective battle plan and use of reserves. Players will quickly discover tha their battles begin to develop in ways they cannot foresee, taking on a life of their own Like the Generals, they are the not always voluntary participants in what is, after all, bloody accident which, once initiated, is beyond the control of any man. Watch for you units to "think" and act for themselves, reacting to the battle as they perceive it, some times as the players do, sometimes not. This is not a game for control freaks!

Our application of Chaos Theory applies to all levels of command, but never to all at the same time. Chaos manifests itself in the actions of individual units, not in the entire army at the same moment. For example, instead of an entire army doing nothing at all for one or more turns, individual units might change formation or facing, retire or advance or their own. Rather than a one-size-fits-all means of losing control of one's forces, it will be the actions of elements that will lead to the gray hairs and bald heads of Generals!

Further, we wanted to avoid the trap of writing rules catering, intentionally or otherwise to "rules lawyers." That is, most complex war games wind up being decided by someone', superior knowledge of the rules, rather than the historical subject or tactical circum stances. Whatever the reasons Napoleon lost at Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington citing an obscure phrase on page 37 of a non-existent rule book was not among them. In prat tice, the game requires so much tactical improvisation and reaction to events on the table in that no single rules interpretation can suddenly decide the outcome.

John Company is further predicated on two basic ideas: First, a General's capacity to corn municate Orders, and second, the troops' reaction to those Orders in relation to thei immediate circumstances.

Generalship

The ability to issue Orders is embodied in the Generalship Rating which represents the General's innate talent for making decisions and his capacity, through his Staff, for communicating them to the intended Units. The higher this number, the greater the General's potential to react to events and transmit his Orders to those who "need to know."

The Orders Deck determines the number of Orders a given level of Generalship can successfully deliver in that turn. There is a range within each Generalship Rating to allow for variable performance from turn to turn, but the higher rating will tend to be more effective overall. A total of 32 Cards constitute this deck (eight blanks are provided as well).

The use of a "dedicated" Action Deck allows for a modified form of random order of movement and, thus, when to reveal a Unit's Orders (if any) and determine its Resolve. Each card bears the name/number of one Brigade or independent command in both armies. When that card is drawn, that command must begin its turn, or stipulate that it is not doing anything.

The Events Deck represents the otherwise uncontrollable and inexplicable behavior of Units that inevitably occur in battle. Events can also occur to General Officers and their Staffs, further varying their performance at any one time. Event Cards are drawn when randomly indicated while determining the number of orders a General can give in the coming turn, or as a result of suffering Fire, or engaging in Confrontation.

There are 50 different cards in the Event Deck, each containing a range of results that vary by the type of unit which is affected by it, and/or by random factors provided.

While these Events certainly add color, uncertainty (and just plain fun!), they are more than mere "chrome." They are integral to affecting the players' control of battle and to make them not merely initiators, but reactors to developments. Not only must the players respond to the actions of the enemy, but frequently they must respond to those of their own troops!

Like Napoleon himself, we believe that battle is little more than a protracted accident, the Generals having little say in the outcome once control has been lost, an event that occurs almost immediately. Accordingly, the Event Cards are not merely devices to keep the game fresh and interesting, though they certainly do. Their frequency and specifics (all are based on actual historical examples) guarantee the development of unexpected and unpredictable developments that cannot occur in traditional games. With each successive game turn, events will tend to get further away from the Players' grasp and battles will be decided "at the front" by the Units committed to the fight. The Action Deck furthers this purpose by preventing the traditional absolute control of Players over their troops, and eliminating the game design myth of "simultaneous movement."

Close study of original, after action reports and the experiences of eyewitnesses have been given more weight than later analysis. What actually happened-or didn't-was of more importance to capture the feel and flow of combat in this era and the unique environment of India. It is our hope to convey a sense that as "Generals in battle" you are dealing with human beings, not just 'toy soldiers. By studying the Resolve Table and its list of Modifiers, you will quickly discover that the General who concerns himself with the well being of his troops from turn to turn will get the most out of them.

The effect of this approach is to underscore the true value of fresh reserves and encourage efforts to minimize the decline in Resolve of troops already engaged. The longer they are under fire, the farther and faster they march over variable terrain, and the less certain they are as to where friends and safety are, the more certain is the process of disintegration. They will begin to move more slowly, fire less effectively, and generally become used up in ways that have only an incidental relationship to physical casualties.

A Tactician's Game

This is a Tactician's game. More, while designed to be accessible to historical war gamers still at an introductory level, it is aimed at those who take their interest seriously enough to study the historical actions and the actual formations and tactics used. The system has been designed so that the tactics and formations which are most effective will almost naturally suggest themselves to match the technology. The intimate knowledge so many gamers have of battles in this era can be practically applied to good effect.

Taken together, battles in John Company tend not to depend on a mastery of semantics and using the rules to bludgeon opponents, but on the players' reactions to events on the table as they occur. Filtered through the limitations of Generalship and Leadership, as well as the innate qualities of the troops being led and events beyond prediction, the Players can apply their own judgment.

By studying the relationship between the provided Game Orders, (particularly the "Support" order), Players can actually formulate battle plans with an emphasis on positioning of units in this last era of set piece battles. However, do not think that tightly plotted plans are a magic key to victory. Truly, no plan will survive contact with the enemy, and the capacity to react and improvise is ultimately more valuable.

In the rules for Fire, there are no "positive modifiers" to the effects of Fire (except possibly from a random factor and to make distinctions in the weight of Artillery). This is no accident. We do not believe that any man or machine can "improve" while in combat. Battle is strictly destructive of materiel and ever so much more so of human potential.

The tendency of effectiveness in battle is forever downward in reliability and predictability. The best that can happen is for the rate of decline to slow or fluctuate at a given moment. Therefore, even the best firing circumstances bring no guaranteed "bonus", only minimal degradation.

While minor differences can be said to exist between musket types, smoothbore and rifled, the effective differences can be virtually negated by the most critical determinant of weapons effectiveness: The ability and willingness of the man behind to use it. All the weapons test firing data in the world from this period (and later, if the truth be told) is completely removed from actual combat performance, and this is no less true of people.

For an obvious example, in most game models, the man with a Brown Bess facing a man with an AK-47 is going to lose every time. This is because most other rules have been written with the emphasis on "hardware", which is ever so much more quantifiable. The range and rate of fire alone would make this no contest. But if you stipulate in the example that the man with the AK-47 has lost the willingness or ability to use it effectively, he will lose to the man with the Brown Bess who has not.

Most games of John Company will produce seemingly small numbers of casualties, compared to other games. Most others provide artificially inflated losses, encouraged by "The Rule Of 10%." That is, in many traditional game models, "Morale Checks" occur with each 10% of casualties in a unit. In point of fact, whole armies often do not suffer as much in battle (though it frequently occurs that one or more units in the same action can take far greater losses). Such game systems are driven by blood. We believe that battles are driven by fear, and the difference is more subtle than first it may seem.

Obviously, fear can be generated and amplified by casualties, but there is so much more that is working on the soldiers' emotions that is not dreamed of in that philosophy. Varying from moment to moment, combat can be exhilarating, terrifying, heartbreaking, funny, or even merely tedious. It is a terrible roller coaster ride whose only certain effect is emotional and physical exhaustion if the soldier is exposed to it long enough, and exhausted soldiers of flesh and blood are brittle as soldiers of tin.

As a practical matter, it is easier to estimate the casualties that can be inflicted on a unit than it is to consider all the other factors that affect a unit's performance. There is only so much a General can do to minimize the losses to a unit, but there is much that he can do to maximize the endurance of the men in it.

Regarding visibility, on a black powder battlefield it ranges from poor to nil, depending on wind and weather. But more than smoke and/or dust, battle produces a form of tunnel vision in the combatants. Realistically, the only world a soldier worries himself with is perhaps the 10 degree arc to his immediate front. Overwhelmed with sound and distraction from all sides, he concentrates on the dangers that threaten him directly. He may have been taught to fire on the oblique, but he will hardly ever see a target there more important to him (or to the officers sharing his perspective who would give the command) than the one straight ahead, pointing right at him.

Pioneering work by Ardant du Picq in the 1860's and S.L.A. Marshall in the 1940's, as well as many others since, have all stressed the importance of sociological and psychological factors that determine a man's "willingness to fight." These are the most important predictors in battle. Superior weapons are of no consequence if soldiers are not willing or able to use them effectively. Likewise, the best tactical doctrine in the world, if abandoned by the troops taught to use it, will lose to an inferior one aggressively used.

There is a point in battle where each man suddenly realizes he is in mortal danger. This is a visceral, glandular experience and is totally removed from rationality. He is terribly aware that his anonymity is being lost. He is afraid of being alone, isolated from his fellows because they might run, so perhaps now he should, too. Exactly when or under what circumstances he experiences this moment varies with individuals. It can come while under long range fire or when enemy bayonets are pointed at him. For some men in a battle, the moment never really comes. For others, it happens so soon that observers cannot imagine why they run away. The determining factors seem to be questions of faith in their weapons, their leaders, their fellows, and themselves. The lower the degree of each of these, the sooner he will decide he must flee or die. As soldiers are physically or emotionally fatigued or malnourished, the quicker they reach their breaking point.

This variable Stability/Disintegration factor is what we ended up calling "Resolve." This is a numerical representation of a Unit's capacity to engage in combat by measuring the combination of its "wil~to fight," leadership, training, and degree of organization. A given Battalion/Regiment/Battery will be assigned an Initial Resolve appropriate to its type (as explained in the rules and specific Army Profile), and this number can be further adjusted by circumstances acknowledged to apply from before the battle's beginning (e.g. Forced Marches, disease, short sleep/water/rations, etc).

During play, each time the unit acts on new orders, or is attacked, its Resolve is determined. Depending partly on luck (meaning "for unknown reasons"), but mostly on circumstances, Resolve Levels can go up, remain unchanged, or go down. Then, the next such test starts from the new Resolve Level. Thus, units tend to fluctuate between steps on a sliding scale that recognizes six levels: Heroic, Resolute, Steady, Shaken, Wavering, and Panicked.

Morale

Commonly, in previous designs something like this has been done: A unit having a "Morale Point" of, say, 18, simply runs away when a modified D20 roll of 19 or higher occurs. If the roll was less, the unit would continue to do everything when and how the player wants it to. But in JC, a unit's Fire effectiveness and Movement Rate are affected, both for better or worse. There's even the chance it will disobey its current orders and do something else (and not just "run away!").

A Resolve Test represents the situation of a Unit at the moment it is called upon to do anything on the battlefield. Its Resolve Level is adjusted by its immediate circumstances, giving the Unit's Resolve status for that turn, and influencing its Resolve in the next. This determines how well a Unit responds to its Orders or even if it will obey those Orders. It is for this reason that Resolve Tests are made before Movement, Fire, or Confrontation in each turn.

The Resolve Test Table is predicated on the fact that the most difficult things to ask of soldiers are those they perceive as carrying the most risk. Advancing or Retiring before an enemy is generally a more dangerous psychological moment than simply Defending, and Charging or being Charged is clearly the most dangerous of all. When troops are "Without Orders" (as can happen in play for a variety of reasons) they are in effect left to their own devices, which are heavily influenced by what's happening to them now, not what some absentee leader may want them to do.

Regarding what the rules call "Confrontation," the authors believe that the rarest event in battle is actual hand-to-hand fighting by two forces on open ground. Again, as du Picq, Marshall, and Keegan all make clear, when one force is closing on another, the same fear process is going on in both. Neither really wants to be bayoneted, but it is momentarily becoming more possible. That moment when the first men are reaching their "breaking point" is looming and it is a mixture of luck and each unit's "relative stability" as to which force will blink first.

For another example, in a traditional Napoleonic war game, if a Guard battalion charges with the bayonet an equal number of Militia, the probable outcome is considered obvious. The Guard has done this many times before. They have likely experienced long service together. They have never really been defeated in a direct confrontation. They are accustomed to seeing their enemies turn and flee long before anyone lunges with a bayonet. They are identically uniformed, march in step, and each man can believe that if anyone is hit, it won't be him. And, it doesn't hurt that they tend to be thrown in when the enemy is already wavering. Collectively, they expect to win.

The Militia may never have been in combat as a unit. They have trained-if at all-very briefly and possibly not even together. They may be strangers to one another and have little or no uniformity in dress or movements to assure personal anonymity. Each man suspects that at the last moment the men on either side may run away and leave him alone to face death. Oh, he's brave enough. He joined the Militia and wants to fight, but he's not going to let anyone make him do it alone. If a man runs in front of strangers, he knows he'll never have to look them in the eye again. He is free of all real associations with them and is already looking over his shoulder for the short road home. In such cases, it should surprise no one when the Militia bolt while the Guards are still a long way off.

But, is this inevitable? Most games say the Guards will win because their "Morale" is superior to the Militia's. This is fine, but assumes that "Morale" is an absolute, that it is the same value from battle to battle, even moment to moment. As we have tried to show, there are so many variables at work, that as unit stability trends down, so does predictability. The Guards of this example are not guaranteed victory, and not only because of the wide range of random factors determining their actual performance. After all, the Militia can have their limited Resolve enhanced by the General who thinks to maximize their potential.

What if the Militia are from the same community? Each man knowing the other, the moment when an individual may run is likely to be delayed. The General may not be able control this, but he can influence the outcome in other ways.

For example, soldiers are more secure in close order formations (though, of course, much better targets, also). If the Militia have been placed with, say, a river on their right flank and a village on their left, they have secure flanks. If they have uncommitted friends close enough to come to their assistance, even artillery support, they are less likely to feel isolated. Oddly, it's even better if they know there's a clear way to escape if they have to. And all troops are heartened by the physical presence of a respected leader willing to share the danger with them. Obviously, if they can also be put in defensive works, so much the better (though this probably denies them that clear escape route).

Of increasing importance as the battle goes on is their Fatigue state. If they have been able to remain stationary, not engage in the battle before now, or at least have not been called upon to Quick March, or march over broken ground, their performance will not be degraded by exhaustion.

Taken altogether, these, and other factors, can be addressed to give these troops their best chance to outlast their attackers.

By eliminating the need for written orders or records, John Company allows its Players to concentrate on the action. While there are many possible modifiers determining Resolve, Confrontation, and the effects of Fire, rarely do more than a few apply at any one time. We certainly encourage players to start with small battles, only a Brigade or two per side at first, then work up to larger actions closer to their historical counterparts in size and complexity.

Despite the authors' personal fondness for 25/28mm scale miniatures, we encourage the use of smaller scales, as provided for in the rules. Frankly, 15mm and smaller scales are not only more affordable, but much more manageable, particularly again for those attempting historical re-fights.

When first play tested, the game was on the cutting edge of heresy in traditional game design, but as the years passed in development, we found we were only part of a growing tendency towards many of our basic tenets. Frankly, we always intended John Company to be a "Simulation." Though the word has become synonymous with tedium, and the distillation of all that is uncertain and exciting out of gaming, we've worked hard to avoid this. Truly, complexity does not equate to authenticity, and simpler, innovative game models are the solution to greater historical accuracy, not more detail.

In a period in the hobby's history when smaller, faster, simpler games have largely replaced the dinosaur designs of the 1970's, we hope to have provided a "serious" game that is worthy of time and effort, but which rewards its players with a sense of excitement and a feeling for a distant time and place not otherwise available.

John Company is priced at $45.00, plus $5.00 postage, and is available exclusively from "And That's The Way It Was." Publishing at 213 3rd Street NE, Hickory, NC 28601-5124, USA. Orders may also be made online from www.amazon.com/shops/loribrom with payment via PayPal.


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