In his article on the Swiss army, Tom McMillen states "Macedonian armies can run around with individual syntagma of pike interspersed with hypaspists, Thracians, Companions, etc., making them considerably more flexible than their legionary opponents, which is crazy". On the surface, a reasonable statement. When was the last time you saw a Camillan Roman Army beat the Seleucids? Not recently if both players were of fairly equal ability.
Further, one of NASAMW's proposed (but voted down) changes was to limit pike-armed troops to 180 degree turns (not 90 degree as they presently do). I've always commented on the maniple-like movement pikemen exhibit on the table and felt it was pretty bogus. Or is it?
I started thinking about the phalanx's size, depth, and organization, both during the pike era and on the table top and how die two relate. First. however, let's take a short history lesson on the development of the Phalanx.
HISTORY
Historians generally credit Philip II of Macedon with the development of the pike armed phalanx. Some credit Thebes with the original development of an *extra deep" hoplite force that, in part, defeated the Spartans at Laucrts in 371 BC. Philip was a political hostage at Thebes between 369-367 BC J.R. Eft states "we can scarcely credit the stories circulated by some ancient and modern authors that Phillip learnt and developed, at this time, many of the ideas with which he was to inculcate the Macedonian army a decade or more later."
Phillip was in his mid-teens during that sojourn in Thebes. For whatever reason, whether totally indigenous or a practical application of ideas seen in his youth, there is no doubt Philip formed the raw Macedonian peasantry from the sometimes factional Upper and Lower Macedonian provinces into a national army, the Foot Companions (or Pezctairoi).
The "Pure Macedonian" portion of Philip's army (non-Macedonian troops included Greek mercenaries, Thessalian cavalry, the Agranians, etc.) consisted of the mentioned National army plus the Royal Army, consisting of the Companion Cavalry and the Hypaspists. The National army owed allegiance to the never stated, nebulous, yet always them ideal of a Macedonian kingdom (state is too strong a term in this case) and many sources allude to its power to either choose or affirm the office of king (the king being the state).
Considerable debate continues over this power to actually choose or merely rubber stamp the choice of king. I feel the army's function was more than mere affirmation, just look at the trouble many of the Successors had in keeping their thrones in Macedon. Demetrius Poliocretes and Cassander both were kicked out by the National Army. Obviously the army had real power in this area.
The Royal army, on the other hand. was loyal to the king and probably represented the landed nobility of Macedon plus upwardly mobile people of talent let into the body. We know that both Philip and Alexander let many of their "conquered" peoples into the Companions. A forward thinking way of assimilation of one's enemy's into a new state instead of impoverishing local talent. Tam probably makes too much of this, his ideals of Alexander and the brotherhood of man is a bit naive for my tastes, but, nevertheless, "foreigners" were an important ingredient in the Royal Army.
PHALANX ORGANIZATION
Originally, the phalanx was probably only 10 men deep as evidenced by the file leader's title, decadarches. By Alexander's time, the file had grown to 16 men deep by 16 men wide. This was the basic unit of Alexander's phalanx called the syntagma (256 men).
We do not know if this move from 10 to 16 men deep was of Philip or Alexander's doing. The basic unit of the phalanx the syntagma, would not change during the time frame when phalanx usage was in vogue. Its name did change later (Polybius called it a speira as does material found in the Amphipolis military code dating from the time of Philip V, 221-178 BC).
Aside from the name, another aspect of the phalanx that changed over time was the size of the formation above the syntagma/speira level (things get confusing here).
In his article, Tom refers to the taxis. Taxis means a `formation'. During Alexander's reign six syntagma formed a taxis (1536 men). So far so good. Think of the syntagma as a company and the taxis as a battalion (putting it in modem terms.
Each taxis (battalion) was commanded by someone. The fact that the taxis' commander's names in the "Big 4" battles of Alexander survive strongly suggest each battalion was an independent entity. In other words, Alexander paid the 10 command points for each of 6 phalanx units. I sure hope he had his copy of WRG 7th with him (probably put it under his pillow at night along with his dagger and copy of the Iliad) and had the umpire okay his list or he would have been in loads of trouble.
Further evidence complements the taxis' size during Alexander's campaigns. We have high confidence in his Order of Battle at the Big 4: Granicus. Issus, Arbela (also called Guagemala), and Hydaspes.
At the Granicus, Alexander had 6 taxis of the phalanx, each commanded by Perdiccas, Coanus, Amyntas, Philip, Meleager, and Craterus. While they were drawn up next to each other in the battle line, three of them were in Alexander's command, the other three in Parmenio's. Again, this implies they were not one massive block of men.
Also, the numbers of pikemen at the battle match up well when looking at the phalanx composition. We know Alexander had 9000 pikemen at Granicus. Well what do you know, six taxis total 9216 men. A coincidence? I think not. Further, the number 6 comes up often in the Foot Companion organization, both tactically and strategically.
When embarking on his Persian campaign, Alexander left 9000 pike-armed foot behind with the regent Antipater in Macedonia. We also know that Philip II had 12-14 taxis of the phalanx when he was assassinated. I prefer 12. Look at the progression. 6 syntagma to the taxis, 6 taxis in each operating theater, Europe and Asia. It's obvious Alexander split his total Foot Companion force in half when setting out for Asia. We in the military intelligence business (I know, I know, an oxymoron-stop snickering and keep reading) look for patterns such as this to predict trends. The "6" trend then becomes clear and consistently applied. No one could deny Alexander's genius as an innovative tactician and strategic commander but he still needed some basic tactical organization. And using multiples of 6 for his company, battalion, and army level organization makes sense and is strongly inferred by the known number of pikemen and their commanders in each battle.
At Issus, his phalanxes were still in six taxis. The only difference was Ptolemy replaced Philip as commander of one. While modem authors disagree as to whether or not Alexander's army was larger or smaller than at Granicus, the size of the phalanx probably remained constant. We know he stationed troops along many of the Asia Minor coastal cities that the took while he advanced. But as he subsequently proved in his settlement of Iran and Afghanistan, he used predominately Greek mercenaries and superannuated Macedonians for colonizing and garrisons.
Also, these were his least effective troops on the battlefield. Since we credit the man with so much military ability, it's ludicrous to assume he would leave his best troops behind in garrison duty. Even if he left small numbers behind, Antipater and Alexander's logistic systems were very good at providing supplies and reinforcements. The staff work of his HQ and commissary people was outstanding.
Again at Arbela (Guagemala), six taxis of the phalanx occupied the center, four under Alexander, two under Parmenio. A problem exists here since we know of a "rear phalanx", either situated as a central reserve or it refers to a double depth (32 men) syntagma.
As the battle developed, a gap opened between the phalanxes in Alexander's and Parmenio's commands (further evidence 4 separate units) which the Persian Horse Guards and Indian cavalry exploited. Arrian claims this cavalry broke through the main phalanx (which implies it was separate from the six taxis, thus refuting the 32 man-deep theory) and began looting the front line baggage (not Alexander's true baggage camp which was located 10-14 miles back, a round trip on horse back would take two hours).
The composition of this rear phalanx poses a quandary since the Persian cavalry had little trouble breaking through. They eventually died, however, since this same rear group reformed, turned, and killed them as they looted. Despite this anomaly in "phalanx" reference, it's still clear Alexander used his basic 9216 pikemen in six battalions as front line infantry.
At the Hydaspes, we know that Alexander lead group on the river crossing had two taxis of the phalanx (commanded by Antigenes and Cleitus) with the others of the force. Additionally, three more taxis followed but Arrian makes no mention of them in the battle (yet I agree with Tam's and Fuller's assessments that they in fact fought). Also, numbers listed for the battle indicate two taxis in the advanced force with three following .Again, all consistent with the unit size and composition of the taxis.
TABLETOP TRANSLATIONS
Hopefully, I've established that each taxis was an independent unit and we are certain of its size. How does this translate into what we see on the table top in 7th? As Tom stated for the Swiss, their battlefield mobility certainly shows they were close and loose order foot. I feel this is also true for the Macedonian phalanx. Their speed in moving, plus Alexander's use of them in a variety of assault roles certainly indicated a change in order. While I don't think that switch occurred on the battlefield (in Alexander's context), it's plausible on a situational basis. It also implies a certain tactical flexibility and movement capability on the battlefield as best shown by the phalanx opening gaps for the scythed chariots to pan through at Arbela.
People constantly wonder how the "big block" of pikemen had the ability to do this. The :big block" perception skews opinions on the Alexandrian phalanx. If their size was small, such a move is quite possible. As this leads up to giving the pike units in 7th their due: sure they move like maniples, yet much of what we see is that Alexander could employ them with tactical flexibility that approached the Roman maniple, more than what we, traditionally as ancient garners, perceive.
Still, how does the 1536-man taxis took in 7th? Just divide by 64 (the ratio given in the back of the rules) and you get 24 figures. Unless you use the not so game effective 1/2 elements, no one buys 24 figure pike units-you either see 16 or 32 figure units. Yet the 24 figure unit is accurate and its varying formations on the table top explain references by Polybius and Arrian to 8, 16, and 32 man depths to the phalanx.
With 8 deep, you would have two ranks of 12; 16 deep means 4 ranks of 6; 32 deep equals 6 ranks of 4. In the last case, the two ranks are "wasted" in 7th. In fact, in hindsight, ancient and modem historians agree that the 32 deep pike film were ineffective. While this 24 figure formation can move well, the artificial mechanics of the rules limits its maximum tactical effectiveness (and yet folks, 7th is not the ultimate simulation of ancient combat). Yet 16 and 32 figure units are clearly not what Alexander used. Generally, I don't mind people using 16 figure pike units when using either the Alexander Macedonian or Imperial lists. The game itself dictates that size to an extent. Players are at least keeping in the spirit of Alexander by using the most innovative method with what's at hand.
So all of you Alex Mace and Imp players using manipular phalanxes of 16 figures, don't feel too bad. Still, if you desire total historical accuracy, better play with the 24 figure blocks.
NOT DONE YET
Now wait a minute, I'm not done yet. Just because it's okay to run smaller pike blocks in the Alexandrian lists does not mean the same with the other pike armies that followed. It's from this period (300 BC) that the common wargaming perception of massive slow-moving non-maneuverable phalanxes arise. I also think it colored some of Mr. Barker's judgments when giving some of the troop examples in the back of 7th.
With the overall "army system" that Alexander's Successors used remained generally intact for most of the period, their operations did not approach his genius or tactical flair. This is best shown in the evolution (or devolution) of the phalanx.
In the 250 years after his death, the phalanx changed from many small, maneuverable battalions to one or two massive divisions consisting of many thousands of men. You wonder why Alexander fought and won many times in rough terrain with rivers blocking his path yet bit successors and their successors fared so poorly in similar terrain. For starters, the men that followed did not have his flair and by that time, the phalanx was no longer a flexible body.
One reason for the Roman victories at Cynoscephala, Magnesia, and Pydna was due to the smaller Roman maniple's ability to dodge and move around intervening rough terrain that the large phalanx plodded through and subsequently disrupted its formation. Alexander would not have been caught like that!
By Polybius' time, 200 BC, the phalanx had grown enormously. While the basic unit remained the syntagma (now called the spiera) four spiera formed a chiliarchy (instead of six to the taxis as had been in Alexander's time). That in itself is not so bad, probably would now been even more flexible. However, Successor generals went on to form 4 chiliarcies into a strategia. Simply put, the operating element of the phalanx (not the basic element) had grown from 1536 men to 4961 ! A chiliarchy, at the 1 to 64 ratio, conveniently comes out to 16 figures on the table. This is the number Mr. Barker shows as an example unit in 7th.
And yet, we see the strategia broken down on the battlefield only twice: by Pyrrhus in Italy at Asculum in 279 and by Antigonus Doson at Sellasia in 222. Mr. Barker is clearly wrong when he implies that the phalanx chiliarchy fought as an independent unit most of the rime. It then becomes clear that the Successor kingdom's generals made their phalanxes in divisions of 4000 men (that's the size of an entire Roman legion for crying out loud) with little or no thought to breaking them down into their more flexible chiliarchy. Alexander was rolling in his grave by now.
As the 4096 man strategis roughly coincides with numbers from the major battles of the period. For example, at Cynoscephsla, Philip had 16,000 pike - 4 strategia. There he operated them in two-strategin groups. At Pydna, the Macedonians had 5 strategia and operated them as one block (or at least they lined up abreast).
The bulldozer tactical approach also explain Polybius' account of the fearsome, awe-inspiring sight the phalanx made when deployed. Further he stated nothing could withstand the charge of the phalanx on level ground. No wonder when you consider the pike strategia of 4096 men usually outnumbered its tactical opponent 5-10 to 1 !
Also, consider why the Romans had such success against this behemoth when it moved over something with a pebble in the way. It also explains why, in many cases, the Romans suffered push backs in the early stages of battle against the phalanx - a couple of measly maniples were being overwhelmed frontally by the equivalent to an entire legion.
Yet those 8 figure maniples could move and slide out of the pikes way, kill its flank supports, and then beat it up on three sides. Much has been written about the pila's usefulness versus the pike, yet it was really the Roman tactical system that was so superior. While it stretches the imagination to assume the Romans borrowed ideas from Alexander, their conditions were different, they still employed the basic concepts that are universal to righting good battles. Their Macedonian, Seleucid, and Ptolemaic contemporaries apparently did not.
Again, superior tactical mobility and flexibility, just as in Alexander's time, beat the opponent, not the steamroller. I see this time and time again on the table top. Just ignore those 48 figure blocks, move around them, and kill them on the flanks.
So, the phalanx was no longer the small, flexible body but instead a slow-moving tank. The two advantages of the phalanx in Alexander's time, weapon and flexibility, now only one remained but the added unit size was too big a disadvantage to make up for weapon superiority. Anyone who could move would kill you. Further, that disadvantage translates well to the table top. Ever try to move a 48 figure block in a tactical move. You don't get very far do you? I know you will say "yeah, but no one dares to attack me frontally."
As I mentioned, you and Polybius are right. Instead, I'll scoot around, get rid of your flank supports, and kill you at my leisure. It's no coincidence that some of the best 7th players are those with lots of mobility.
If you divide the strategia size by 64 you get 64 figures. Oops, that ultimate simulation called 7th Edition only allows for 48 figures per unit. Another artificial mechanism getting in the way of history. Still later pike armies should not have pike blocks in less than 48 figure units. Now is when the 16 figure pike block in a mid to late Selcucid army becomes historically absurd. Alexander did it (well sort of), Antiochus III did not, Philip V did not, Perseus did not. The list goes on.
I hesitate to dictate to gainers how they should organize their army. Obviously, if your playing a historical campaign, or recreating the battles on the table top, you should use 24 and 64 figure units (screw the rules on this one). Still, in the tournament setting, all of us want to try and emulate Alexander in our play, deployment flair, and tactical innovation. No one says we have to play the game like Phillip V ran his army. I mean that's the main reason why we play this silly game: what if....
This article is reprinted with the kind permission of the Saga Newsletter.
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