Jake said, "Simulation and realism are the two most important aspects of gaming." Dan nodded his head in agreement as he arranged his hooks, charts, and other paraphernalia on the edge of the table. "And in order to have the most accurate simulation one must have the most accurate set of rules. Fortunately, today we will use Zed Paducah's Vive La Napoleonic Trivia, which will provide us with that accuracy," Dan said as he tapped the cover of one of the four massive three-ring hinders arrayed in front of him.
- --Stephen J. Walker, "The Wargame," a satire, The Courier, #91, August 2004
Way back in the 1970's the premier wargame company, Simulations Publications, Inc. was a think tank for wargame and simulation design. The fellows that worked there made some decisions about game and simulation design that we are still struggling with today. These design assumptions and subsequent beliefs have been deadly-fallacies that still control our thinking in the hobby and put a break on productive discussions of wargames and simulations.
Stephen's satire quoted above pokes fun at one of these fallacies. The one illustrated is the notion that simulation accuracy is closely related to the quantity of factoids included in a design-only a huge pile of facts can produce an accurate simulation. It is absolutely not true and never has been seriously entertained by simulation designers outside the hobby. So why does the hobby hold on to such notions? But wait, I'm getting ahead of myself.
This is the first of a three part article describing simulation design and how it applies to historical wargames. However, before I can even attempt to describe what a simulation is, I first have to explain what a simulation is not. In our hobby, there is so much baggage attached to the concept, so much history clogging the works, that it is impossible to discuss simulation design without clearing the decks, so to speak. Like most scrambled notions, these simulation myths developed over time in a logical progression, becoming completely snarled together, with few of the component beliefs being seriously challenged. It all started with:
Myth #1: Quantity over Quality.
One of the first issues SPI faced once it started designing simulations was "what constitutes a quality simulation?" Because reality is so complex, SPI designers concluded that the more complex a simulation became, the closer it was to reality, and thus the better the quality. The corollary was: the greater the detail, the more `realism'. This idea naturally led to SPI designers cramming historical details into their games by the truck load. The outcome were extremely complex mega-games, both board games like the nine map monster War in the Pacific and miniatures rules like Empire. Other designers followed a different tack. More detail simply meant more charts, more die rolls, and more die roll modifiers. The idea was that twelve die modifiers had to be more `accurate' history than three modifiers. WRG rules are famous for this line of reasoning and their acres of modifiers. This notion was sort of accepted without question because there didn't seem to be any alternative.
Of course, the simulation community outside the hobby was never really consulted during this time, except by a few wargamers. If they had been, the notion that quantity equaled quality would have died a quick death. Unchecked, the idea that the amount of details crammed into a design measured simulation quality led to the second myth.
Myth #2: Quantity equals Accuracy.
It is easy to see that it is a small step from seeing the quantity of facts as the indicator for quality, to seeing amount of data as the indicator for accuracy too. The thinking went, "If reality contains millions of details, then more details you put into a game, the closer you are to accurately portraying reality." This is very bad simulation design, but it was believed. And it justified the design of the overly complex games that inspired jokes like the one above about the four volumes of rules for Vive La Napoleonic Trivia.
Unfortunately, there was a very serious problem with this definition of accuracy: the greater the detail, the more unwieldy the simulation became. It got to the point that whatever the players were doing to administer the dozens of turn phases, it had little relation to simulating command during a battle or anything else for that matter. Many game designs were so weighted down with details and rules that players never played them passed the third turn -- if they played them at all, but hey, they were `good' simulations. Useless as games, These unplayable designs, loaded with information, were justified by SPI and others by comparing them to history books. They were `teaching machines' or excellent sources of `dynamic information.'
So, gamers found they had a problem. Simulations Publications Inc. found they had a problem. And in dealing with it, they created Myth #3.
Myth # 3: Realism vs. Playability.
It was a logical conclusion in some ways. Because `realism' and `accuracy' is created by loads of details, then anything that is actually capable of being played will force a reduction of that data, and thereby reduce the historical accuracy and the `realism.' In other words, an accurate simulation will probably be difficult to play and a playable game will be less "historically accurate."
In some ways it was true: as the amount of detail in a simulation increased to improve simulation quality, the games became less playable and certainly less fun. Presto!: Being able to easily play a simulation game became seen as diametrically opposed to simulation realism. Then the fourth myth was created in an attempt to deal with the problems created by the third. See a pattern unfolding?
Myth #4 Simulations vs. Games.
Simulations Publications, Inc. actually organized their game production around this fantastical dichotomy: As head of Research and Development for SPI, Terry Hardy explained in 1977 that "The designer worries about the game as `history', the developer worries about the game as a `game."'
This schizoid view of Simulation and wargame design is still with us, as if simulations and games had nothing in common structurally, or that in designing a simulation, the design would automatically fail as a playable game, unless it was developed as a game-often meaning that the historical detail was cut away after it had been designed in. Nothing could be further from the truth concerning simulation design, but hey, SPI was the biggest thing in the wargame hobby at the time, with the loudest voice. They existed for more than a decade, and influenced a whole generation of wargamers.
Once the illusion of simulations vs. games was accepted at reality, the best one could hope for was a compromise, because quality in accuracy had to be sacrificed for the quality in the playability of any game design and vice versa. There was no other viewpoint seriously entertained by SPI and other game companies. The hobby became philosophically isolated from the larger simulation design community. The fact that professional simulation designers at the time never held to such ideas was ignored, even though those professionals represented many different fields, and many created simulation games for sale.
Myth #5: Realism vs Fun.
Well, SPI folded in the Mid-Eighties after a great run, but the myths they had fostered persisted and continued to evolve. After struggling with the first four myths for more than a decade, many wargamers decided that you either play simulations for the 'realism'-that is the history-- or games for the 'fun'-but you can't expect to do much of both. This conceptual schism continues unabated today. This fallacy has so controlled our thinking in the hobby that there really hasn't been a set of wargame rules designed in the last twenty-five years that didn't begin with assumptions/Myths #1-5.
For example, in the Introduction for Napoleon's Battles, S. Craig Taylor Jr. says that his game "represents an attempt to strike a compromise between a game (playability), a simulation (realism and/or detail), and a visual panorama (the `look') to experience a Revolutionary or Napoleonic battlefield on the grand-tactical scale." [The parenthesis are his.]
Even when acknowledging this supposed conflict, many game designers refused to accept that compromises were absolutely necessary. They wanted both for their designs, because gamers still wanted both the fun and history, which made compromises unattractive, though intellectually suspect just the same. So, we have designers like Rich Hasenauer claiming in his game introduction: "The ebb and flow of Civil War combat has been recreated in Fire & Fury, innovative game system using miniature armies to recreate battles of the American Civil War. The system, the result of five years development, emphasizes playability without sacrificing historical accuracy."
I have heard wargamers scoff at this claim even while being diehard advocates of Fire and Fury, listing what they feel are points where historical accuracy was sacrificed. As Richard never explains how he achieved both playability and accuracy, we don't know if he was successful. Game designers struggled with this compromise and some came to a decision: By the Eighties, simpler games like DBA, The Sword and the Flame, Shako, Armati, and Volley & Bayonet were published, to name a few, and as they became popular, the more complex designs waned.
Reluctantly, the hobby discovered the whole `Realism vs Fun" dichotomy was no fun at all-there was no resolution, no practical compromise. The myths were so ingrained that wargamers found that they were forced to make choices between realism and fun, and the ensuing arguments about the issue were unproductive and less than enjoyable. The inherent conflicts created by the first five myths became so untenable as the years went by that another myth was created in the latter half of the Nineties to simply avoid the conflicts altogether.
Myth #6: Simulations as an impossibility.
This myth follows the logic in the first five myths to conclude that `reality' is too complex to be `accurately simulated' at all. None of the previous myths are challenged, just taken to extremes: A reasonable simulation of history isn't possible-it would be horribly complex and impossible to actually play.
As early as the Mid-Eighties, designers like John Hill are struggling with this new mythconception. In his introduction to Johnny Reb, John first says that his "game is by nature complex, since we are simulating the complex interaction of many factors to produce a realistic effect." [Introduction page viii] Then at the end of the rules he concludes by saying: "So, in many respects, this game, despite its great amount of detail, cannot even begin to simulate the true maelstrom that seemed to engulf the Civil War battlefield. Even at best, it is but a representation." [Page 71]
So what is the difference between an actual simulation and a mere `representation?"
This `is, but it isn't' argument couldn't be maintained for very long, so the conclusion was that games `cannot even begin to simulate' history-A true simulation was an impossibility.
This was then picked up by gamers and often communicated in strident tones, polarizing the `realism vs. fun' myth. `Fun' was touted as the only reasonable purpose for a wargame design, and any attempt at `realism' was both absolutely impossible and absolutely no fun. As Sam Mustafa concluded in MWAN #124 nothing we do on a tabletop actually `simulates' anything other than moving little metal men on a tabletop. So it doesn't really matter what processes we use, we're never really simulating war."
Of course, as the issues were taken to extremes, the arguments for and against were recast as 'either/or' debates expressed in superlatives: True simulations are impossible, we're never really simulating war, and only games are playable; there is no real historical accuracy in games, only fun; games are not science, only art, etc. etc. For wargamers, when forced to decide between the two alternatives by this rhetoric, their choice was obvious: the fun.
The second outcome of this radicalization of design philosophy became the realization that something about the hobby's notions of games and simulations was very much fantasy because the middle ground in game design had disappeared. But in the maze of interlocking myths, exactly what was missing was hard to say.
The desire for history in our games wasn't exactly marginalized. Many wargamers never stopped talking about capturing `the way it was', they just pretended it didn't matter. Others still believed that history could be simulated, so they took on the role of heretic in their group or list, or formed small groups of like-minded gamers here and there looking for a historical simulation to play.
The issues were endlessly hashed and rehashed to the point that wargamers naturally began assuming that when someone uttered the word `simulation', they were advocating mountains of detail, a very tedious experience, with a lot of attendant `should' messages about how to have fun-in other words, they began expecting the same myths recycled in any discussion of game design.
Understandably, they wanted to avoid the unpleasant experience-especially when every discussion was recast as an argument about fun and someone's attempt to define what people should enjoy, regardless of the actual topic. Game design discussions had become a round robin of self-fulfilling expectations. Simulations were an impossibility, even though hundreds of people, many professionals were creating the every day in dozens of different fields. It didn't matter, an historical simulation was an impossibility.
Myth #7: "Realistic Simulations"
The overarching myth which tended to torture Wargamers by raising their expectations to extremely unrealistic heights was created along with Myth #1 Starting with SPI, and continuing on to present game designs like John Hill's. `Realism' had become a bvword.
James Dunnigan, in his 1980 Handbook of Wargames gives the word `realism' significant weight in describing wargames:
"To be a wargame, in our sense of the word, the game must be realistic. And in some cases, they are extremely realistic, realistic to the point where some of the wargames are actually used for professional purposes (primarily the military, but also business and teaching)."
Yet Mr. Dunnigan never once in his entire book defines how a game is `realistic,' or what it means for a board or miniatures game to be `extremely realistic.' This leaves the reader to substitute whatever meaning he wishes. And we are still doing it. For instance, Bob Jones used `realism to describe his goals for Piquet:
"My first goal with Piquet was to allow a more fluid and realistic treatment of time in the battlefield environment.... Another goal with Piquet was to reduce the unrealistic "sure things" that Wargames have previously provided. "
Of course, these aren't bad goals. It's just that `realistic' and `unrealistic' are left completely undefined in game terms. Garners get to fill in the blank, which means that wild and unreasonable expectations were and are attached to the word `realism' and thus to Bob's and others' simulation designs. They can only far short. Of course, promotional promises help inflate expectations, all claiming some kind of realism: "Just like generals of old", "Relive the battle," "face the real challenges of command" etc. etc.
And the myth continues, and gamers still look for `realism' in simulations, their wargames, but few find any of the grandiose promised for `realism' fulfilled. Even as the term `realism' continues to be bandied about, many in the hobby know that `realism' is an illusion, and have known it for a long time. Way back in 1979, Jim Getz not only provided a solid description of a simulation compared to a game, but addressed the lack of meaning in the term `realism.' In the introduction to his Civil War rules, Stars and Bars, he explained,
"A game merely requires some random events, some interactions, and a winner and loser. A simulation demands more. A simulation mush have both internal and external consistency. The internal consistency implies that the parts of the rule set must work smoothly and logically with each other to produce the desired result. [just like a game must.] This desired result must then be externally consistent with the historical realities of the period. Notice I said nothing about `realism.' THERE IS NO SUCH THING!! A rule set can only create a set of decisions that are analogous to certain decisions faced by real world commanders. If the results of the analogy are consistent with historical realities, you produced a simulation-not reality." [Page iii, [my insertion]]
So why do wargamers still look for `realism', expect `realism', and decry the lack of it in their simulations? Because it sounds good and thus still shows up in the descriptions of our game designs-and because we still want `real' history in our games. In the end, without any design definition of `realism', most gamers stopped expecting the word to mean anything and substituted `I like' for the `realistic' and `I don't like' for `unrealistic.' Like many game terms today, `realism' has been reduced to an expression of personal preferences, having no other meaning than `it feels right to me.'
This is part of the continuing problem with all the myths. They are so ill-defined and unworkable in the first place, most have been become redefined over time to mean other things too, but they remain just as useless in understanding simulation and wargame design as ever.
CLEANING UP THE MYTHS
How do we get back on track, so we can understand functional simulation terms, proven methodology, and far more `realistic' expectations for historical simulations. We go back to the beginning and chose some new definitions for accuracy, quality, and simulationsones that have been honed over time, working terms that help create simulations wargames, not myths.
Basic Myth Corrections: The amount of detail in a simulation has little to do with its quality. The excellence of the data in a simulation, not the amount helps determine a simulation's quality. Erroneous facts, no matter how numerous, still creates a bad simulation. But there is more to it. Complexity is not a simulation requirement, and never has been.
Simulations are bound by the same design restrictions found in games. Too much detail destroys them. That is why Jerry Banks [An engineer and computer simulator] says this in his Handbook of Simulation: "Immediately, there is a concern about the limits or boundaries of the model that supposedly represents the system. The model should be complex enough to answer the questions raised [the goals of the simulation], but not too complex." There are entire chapters on the issue in the handbook-and the solutions are just as applicable to `playable' games. In functional terms, the things that limit a good game also limit a good simulation. Professional simulators do not see these "Realism vs Playability", `simulation vs games' dichotomies as meaningful at all, even when they are creating simulation games for research and for sale. Why do wargamers?
A game with only one historical fact in it could be an accurate simulation IF 1. That single fact was well-documented-i.e. quality data, and 2. The game actually mimicked that particular fact during play,-i.e. it was an accurate simulation. All historical simulations are limited in the amount of history that can reasonably be recreated. Simulation designers outside of the hobby often use game mechanics to mimic the dynamics of reality. There is no Simulation vs Game dichotomy here, only game mechanics that do or don't mimic portions of reality.
THE REALITY IN SIMULATIONS
Reality is an infinite ocean of cause-and-effect. Any single event has an uncountable number of intellectual, emotional, and physical experiences, and no construct of man's is going to come close to capturing it all-ever. It isn't going to happen, so get over it.
The whole purpose of a simulation is to mimic a small part of that greater reality-a very small part. That is all simulations can ever do: recreate a select portion of real life, a very small portion in comparison to the whole. Simulation designers all recognize this limitation, regardless of how complex the simulation is. It's a given for professional simulation designers. However, they see that as a starting point in design, not final proof that `true' simulations aren't possible.
To use a simile, if reality is an ocean, then a simulation is a glass holding a small portion of that sea. The value of the glass is in it's design: does it hold the amount intended? Does it work as a glass? Is the water actually from the ocean? To decide that the only good glass is one big enough to contain the entire ocean is just silly. First of all, it is impossible to build such a glass, and who would want to?
Second, if it was built, it would be useless as a glass--no one could lift it. There is a complexity point of no return for simulations, where too much data renders the simulation useless-like that ocean-sized glass-like any wargame.
What the hobby needs is a functional, rather than an impossible, concept of what a simulation is and can do. The beginning is to change the definition of quality for both simulations and wargames. The switch from quantity of detail in a game/simulation to the quality of ONLY the historical information included is the foundation. In Part II we'll build from there.
A LACK OF METHODOLOGY
A simulation can be very accurate, very specific to what is `real' and also be a great game. Part of the historical wargame designers' inability to design functional simulations is that most wargame designers are ignorant of even the most basic simulation design methodology. The problems that designers run into because of this failing are often thrown up as proof that an accurate historical simulation is impossible, let alone fun to play.
The recent story, "Wargame Design is an Art, not a Science," in MWAN #130, demonstrates this skewed thinking and the attendant design complications very well. The lead character, poor Winston Wargamer, falls victim to sheer ignorance. He spends four years collecting data for his simulation, The Glory of Glory, and never determines the specific objectives for his design or what data will actually help him achieve them. Establishing design goals is Simulation Design 101, but the hapless Winston is completely unaware of this. Equally uneducated in simulation methodology, Winston just collects a huge pile of facts and wedges them into a bunch of game mechanics. And of course, his whole effort predictably falls apart in play testing his design because he:
- 1. Never had any design goals to focus and limit the amount of `reality' he would need to mimic, and
2. Because of this oversight , he has no idea what data or mechanics are necessary to keep in the design on track and what can be jettisoned.
So when criticisms about the game mechanics come up in his first test game, he:
- 1. Doesn't even know if they target something important or superficial. He remains completely unfocused midst the huge number of rules and his self-inflicted data complexity, and
2. Doesn't know how separate mechanics work together to achieve any design goalsbecause he doesn't have any, so any problems in game play are dealt with separately, which only complicate the conceptually isolated and unfocused game systems, and
3. Believing the simulation vs game dichotomy, struggles to resolve each criticism as first a simulation question, and then an issue of internal consistency for his game. This schizoid view of each problem leaves him with few options, because without any workable methodology,
4. His only response is to compare any problems raised and their possible solutions to specific historical factoids. Any other approach screws up either existing his simulation mechanics OR the game system. Without any overall set of goals for the simulation, he has no way to integrate the game systems. Without a methodology, there are no methods for resolving the problems. He's trapped by the either/or of the simulation vs. game.
His efforts all puddle into a mess that is neither a game nor a simulation, and of course, poor Winston is very discouraged. Why? Because Winston was trying to design a simulation when he had no idea what a simulation was, let alone how to create one: He had no specific goals, no working methodology, no conceptual framework within which to work, all the while believing the Seven Wargaming Myths of Simulation Design.
Of course, he failed. He was trying to assemble a V-8 engine without the instructions or tools, while believing he was building a garden mower. All he had to show for the effort was lots of game design pieces scattered about which didn't seem to fit. It doesn't have to be that way.
So what is a simulation exactly, and what is this `working' methodology for designing one? And how can this improve our games and our fun? Those questions will be addressed in part II. In the meantime, there is a new, free on-line book by James Dunnigan called the Complete Wargames Handbook. You can find it at:
- http://www.hyw.com/Books/WargamesHandbook/Contents.htm
It is fascinating because, not only does Mr. Dunnigan relate his experiences as a wargame designer over the last thirty years, including his tenure as the founder of SPI and a game consultant with the Military, he also details what he feels is the basic methodology for wargame design-aka simulations. They are very much like the accepted design methodologies for simulations established outside wargaming community, with a few significant differences. One missing component is `establishing validity,' which is surprising, because Mr. Dunnigan faults the Military for often not validating their wargame designs. [There are actually eight different ways to validate a historical simulation, but we'll get to that.] Of particular interest are his chapters on "What is a wargame?," "Designing Manual Games", "Wargames at War," and "The History of Wargames." Enjoy. We will be referring to his book and several of Mr. Dunnigan's cogent insights in part II of "What is a Simulation."
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