Recreating battles of the 100 Years War allows the wargamer to enjoy the colorful heraldic panoply of knights, with men-at-arms, archers, and crossbowmen fighting in clearly defined tactical styles and English supremacy being overtaken by emerging French military professionalism backed by the intelligent use of artillery. Small medieval populations meant small armies, so avoiding the need to buy and paint large numbers of model soldiers. Wargame campaigns in this period can be unusual because opposing armies often completely lost each other through not keeping in touch by vedettes or patrols; scanty and inaccurate geographical knowledge and lack of maps caused armies to stray apart and lose sight of each other so that battles, often between relatively small numbers, were fought simply because they bumped into each other rather than for an objective such as a road, bridge, or ford.
Never-the-less, if the re-enactment is to bear any true resemblance other than its name, to realistically re-fight such battles requires thought and imagination to ensure basic similarities with the actual conflict, so that it follows its historical course yet, within creditable bounds, allows a reversed result. The most basic reconstruction consists of an accurate scaled-down terrain (principle factor in pin pointing the battle) on which numbers of soldiers, proportionate to their historical counterparts, act out past maneuvers, take the same proportion of casualties, leading to the same end result. This is an historical exercise and while serving as a vivid demonstration of real-life events, is not a wargame. On the other hand, to allow armies, scaled-down in types and numbers, to be maneuvered over a realistic terrain by `commanders' using latter day tactics is solely naming the battle and ignoring history. The result may vaguely resemble the known outcome of the battle, but the method by which it is achieved bears little resemblance to its actual course.
Before attempting reconstruction, various accounts of the action and the events leading up to it should be read because they detail factors influencing its pattern and trend, such as did bad weather or muddy roads cause a significant proportion of an army to be late on the field or fail to arrive at all? Consideration of the campaign reveals the objective of the battle; before Poitiers the Black Prince was attempting to join an ally or to return home with his booty. Knowledge of a commander's intentions allows strategic and tactical plans to be better understood, enabling the wargamer to dissect the battle into its more obvious phases and to recognize those points when a decisive move led to victory or defeat. Each phase should be considered on its merits and in the light of possible alternatives in the historical trend of events.
Transcending normal provisions of conventional wargames rules, emphasis should be given to those factors that lead to a more enjoyable wargame. Foremost among them are military possibilities - a pregnant title that may cause the battle, after a significant part has followed its historical course, to diverge from history and open up interesting patterns and possibilities. Controlled and logical alternative courses of action and fluctuations in recorded patters, military possibilities, if invoked at appropriate moments, can materially affect the course and result of a battle. These are not excuses for indulging whims and fancies nor for diverting history on the basis of curiosity. They are mutually agreed courses of action by opposing wargamers that can produce results more reasonable and credible than occurred on the actual field of battle. Military possibilities must not exceed the capabilities and potentialities of the day and age; for example it is extremely unlikely that any medieval or feudal army would be capable of making a night march that would bring them on an enemy's flank or rear at the desired time and place. It has to be decided whether military possibilities are to radically alter the historical course of the battle or to be restricted to relatively minor aspects that permit tactical changes.
Numerous military possibilities are possible. An obvious one for the 100 Years War would be the better French employment of their professional mercenary Genoese crossbowmen, especially at Crecy and Agincourt. Also, at the latter battle, there were artillery pieces with the French army that could have stood off and battered the tightly-packed English into submission; but, for a wargamer to suggest that course of action on his tabletop battlefield must indicate either a great desire to change history, or else he badly want to Win!
Military possibilities abound in all battles. The interest and color they bring to the wargames table are proportionate to the historical knowledge and ingenuity of the wargamer.
THE CLASSIFICATION OF COMMANDERS
With hindsight wargamers can perform tactical maneuvers far in advance of those known by their counterparts on the historical field. For example, when fighting a wargame of the 100 Years War period, the commander of the French will be most reluctant and unlikely to throw his entire force forward in a characteristic headlong charge because he knows that it will be repulsed by the disciplined formations and tactics of the English, acting within the framework of the rules. He is more likely to conceive a tactical plan far beyond the conception of any French commander of the day - making feint attacks, attempting outflanking movements, feigning withdrawal to destroy English cohesion, holding back a reserve - and on all occasions his headstrong knights will obey orders with the discipline and steadiness of the Grenadier Guards! More than that, should the wargamer who is handling the French be more conversant with tabletop tactics than his English counterpart, then we have the anomalous situation of disjointed and ill-disciplined French being handled in a superior tactical fashion to the well-led and highly disciplined English.
It is essential that the tactics and formations of the actual battle are reproduced and all troops obliged to conform to their known standard methods of fighting. However, no wargamer willingly follows a course of action that history tells him brings defeat, particularly when he has a marked numerical superiority. Those handling the historical losers may feel disinclined to slavishly follow a course of action so obviously doomed to failure, although military history indicates this to be the stereotyped course taken by commanders throughout the ages. The military mind seemingly does not learn quickly - it took the French most of the Hundred Years War to revise the tactics that caused them to be repeatedly destroyed by the English archer and his longbow.
When two forces are exactly equal in strength, morale, equipment, position, maneuverability, etc., then victory will almost certainly go to the best commander, but, on the wargaming table, the ability of a commander is that of the wargamer representing him. In most of the battles described, a numerically weaker army defeated a strong enemy force solely because its commander possessed outstanding tactical ability and the capability of inspiring his men to exceptional heights. Thus, just as history dictates that one commander was "Above Average," so this fact has to be reflected on the wargames table. Using Poitiers as an example, the Black Prince must be classified as an above average commander, as might be Warwick, Salisbury, and even Captal de Buch. The French King, the Dauphin, and the Duke of Orleans must be classified as below average commanders, while one of the two Marshals Clermont or Audrehem can be an average commander.
The effect of a commander's rating must be reflected by troops of an above average commander possessing a higher standard of morale and better fighting qualities, represented by adding say 1 (or a pre-decided score) to any dice affecting morale or fighting qualities. A below average commander would be required to deduct I from dice scores; the troops of an average commander are unaffected.
An above average commander could be given greater flexibility of movement and, within definite limits, the ability to undertake tactical movements outside his period (in other words, the wargamer is allowed to be himself). The average commander must control and maneuver his force so that they conform to their known style of fighting. The below average commander is given no such opportunity and must control and maneuver his force strictly according to their known style of fighting, subject to interference of loss of control through chance cards, for example.
The outstanding lesson emerging from the 100 Years War was that battles were won by the commander who employed to the maximum the capabilities of combined arms. English leaders accomplished this by combining, in a system that gave defense marked tactical superiority over offense, the maneuverability and high fire-power of the English archer with the defensive capabilities of heavily armored men-at-arms, capable of reverting to their usual role as armored cavalry when required to attack or counterattack.
If a wargaming system is used where at the start of battle orders are written for each army or group, then the grading of commanders can be reflected by ruling that below average commanders must conform rigidly to their initial orders until disorganized by a forced reaction, such as a low morale rating. Average commanders can write orders to carry through three moves of the game - at the conclusion of the third move, fresh orders may be written if circumstances have not already altered the original instructions. Above average commanders may write orders at the beginning of each game move.
An alternative is to allow commanders, according to their rating, to write orders at the beginning of the game but the lower the commander's grade the greater the number of moves he takes to alter his orders, while the above average commander can change his instructions more rapidly.
CHANCE CARDS
Chance cards introduce factors, pleasant and unpleasant, into a wargame that materially affect minor or major aspects of the battle, and even its eventual result. They pose eventualities - tactical, physiological, or psychological - and a commander must take practical steps to carry out the instructions. Closely allied to "military possibilities," chance cards form the human element that may affect the purely tactical aspects of a military possibility.
Each battle can have its own specific set of cards designed to cover eventualities peculiar to that battle, such as de Buch's flank attack on the French at Poitiers, by ruling that a sunken road or a small ravine barred his route or that thick hedgerows hinder his progress or that a stretch of lush green grassland is a marsh - Machiavellian topographical features that present unknown delaying obstacles!
Every battle of military history abounds with situations which, in a wargaming context, can give rise to the use of chance cards, and many will undoubtedly spring to the mind of the imaginative wargamer.
SIMULATION OF SURPRISE
Three battles - Poitiers, Patay, and Formigny - were affected by the element of surprise; seemingly indicating that while victory frequently goes to the big battalions, it can also be vastly influenced by shrewd tactical moves, or the mere fluctuations of Fortune. Surprise movements of bodies of troops so that they suddenly arrive upon the rear or flank of the unsuspecting enemy (as at Poitiers and Formigny) are difficult to simulate on the wargames table, but such movements charted on a map held by a neutral umpire enable forces to be maneuvered so that the enemy are unaware of their intention and even their existence until a clear cut contact is made.
Assuming that a conventional wargames table is 8 feet by 5 feet, then scale it down to 1 inch equals 1 foot, or 8 inches by 5 inches. Draw a map 24 inches by 15 inches covering an area of nine wargames tables with the actual battle ground taking up the middle oblong. In the surrounding oblongs continue topographical features such as hills, rivers, roads, etc. Cover the snap with a pattern of inch squares by drawing fine lines with a mapping pen on the actual surface of the map or by laying on it a transparent plastic sheet on which such squares have been drawn. Movement on this map is to the same scale as movement on the table, thus infantry moving 12 inches on the wargames table will move I inch on the map. This is most important because it is the means by which off-table movements are made.
When drawing the large map, the countryside surrounding the area of the battle (in the center oblong) may be drawn inaccurately on the map of the commander who is due to be surprised so he is unable to estimate the possibilities of an outflanking movement or the time it will take to reach him. Conversely the commander of the side doing the surprising can similarly be given an inaccurate map representing a military possibility affecting his surprise move, and allowing the real-life loser a slight chance of reversing the situation. In such circumstances it is advisable to have an umpire with an absolutely accurate map. It saves a lot of arguments!
A reasonably successful method of surprise and concealment, again using maps that can be accurate or inaccurate as desired, requires the commander making the surprise move to asses, on a scaled map, the number of actual game moves that it will take. Then he writes down:
- a) The unit or units involved (or total strength of force).
b) Route from A to B (starting point of move to point of contact).
c) Number of moves required.
If the force making the surprise move could be seen in the actual battle, it will remain on the wargames table and will not move until the game move when it strikes home or is otherwise revealed. If, in real life, the surprise force was not in view then it will not be placed on the table, but will move exclusively on the map, being revealed and placed on the table at the moment when it is considered that its presence is discovered. Using written movement orders with a scaled map of the terrain the commander perpetrating the attack plots his surprise move for the required number of game moves, writing instructions in progressive columns.
On completion of the requisite number of moves their presence is disclosed by the wargamer controlling them; declaring if he wishes to terminate his concealed move before its completion, when he must move his troops up to the point they have reached. Surprise is considered to have been lost, even if his troops are now technically concealed. A suspicious enemy commander may challenge, but his suspicions will need to be reasonably precise as to direction and intention.
The advisability of using an umpire is stressed. In the event of something happening on the wargames table that interferes with the surprise move, such as an enemy force crossing or positioning itself on the line of march, then the move will have to be revealed at that point and a decision taken as to whom is most surprised. This eventually could take the form of a military possibility.
Another method of simulating a concealed force requires each commander to have a set of eight or ten progressively numbered terrain maps drawn on tracing paper. At the commencement of the battle on his number 1 map, each commander draws blocks representing his troops at their agreed starting points. From each block he draws an arrow in scaled move distance indicating his first move. The umpire compares both sides' maps to see whether or not any troops are within visual distance or have actually come into contact. Each commander then places his number 2 map over his number 1 map drawing blocks over the ends of the arrows that indicate the first move before drawing in the arrow representing his second move. The umpire checks both maps, marking on each the position of any enemy forces that can be seen. The procedure continues with progressively numbered maps until a contact is made, then the actual troops are placed on the wargames table.
In the case of a known historical battle surprise is difficult to simulate but if the conflict is to be accurately reproduced, then the surprise element must take place. However it can be tempered by military possibilities arising from "local" rules, morale factors, or other means suggested in this section. Although all the troops are in full view on the tabletop a certain degree of tactical surprise and apparent concealment is made possible by each commander initially drawing up a plan of the tactics he intends to use, giving a broad outline of the role to be played by each unit of his army. Both commanders have eight playing cards, two being aces. Before each move a card is drawn. The commander may alter a unit's allotted role if he draws an ace. Otherwise he is committed to his original plan. This method can be tied in with the ratings of commanders simulating the decisiveness of the French and the "wooliness" of the English leaders at Patay by giving the English one ace and the French three aces per eight cards.
The flank attack at Poitiers by the Gascon, Captal de Buch presents certain practical problems on the wargames table as in 1356 the French had no idea that this attack was coming on their left flank, whereas in our reconstruction they are fully aware of this daunting fact. The English commander may be given the choice of sending de Buch out to his right or to his left so that the French, while being aware of the flank attack, will not know from which side. But they must take steps to counter it by allocating men to watch the flanks of their column and these men will not count in the main melee. Chance cards and military possibilities may well cause the flanking force to be so delayed that they will never arrive at all, or be too late to affect the result of the melee.
Perhaps the simplest way of achieving the essential surprise elements of these battles is for the host not to tell the visiting player the name of the battle he is fighting, presenting him on arrival with a narrative that does not include details of essential surprise factors. For example, without mentioning the name of the battle he could be given the story of the events leading up to Kyriell forming up facing Clermont at Formigny, a course that he follows on the wargames table only to find, as did the unfortunate English commander, that the Constable of France has suddenly arrived on his left flank. An obvious snag to this procedure is that the host will not be able to take a leading part in the battle but may have to umpire or hold a subordinate role under one or another of the commanders.
TIME CHARTS
Those battles that include a surprise factor involve a certain amount of recording in order to check on the anticipated time of arrival of a flanking force, for example. A time chart, programming such vital factors beyond dispute, must include those maneuvers whose timing is an important feature of the battle marked up in specified periods of time, each represented by a game move.
A time chart is vital in keeping check on off table map moves where different forces are moving along various routes or attempting out flanking movements that will bring troops onto the tabletop battlefield at some intermediate stage in the conflict. It is almost impossible to retain control of these factors without such a chart.
Maintaining touch with detached portions of a force might require a commander-in-chief, perhaps unaware of their exact location, to send out messengers. Their progress must be recorded on the time chart so that their exact time of arrival is known, and the unit to whom they are bringing orders cannot react until those orders are actually received. The non-arrival or delay of orders provides military possibilities that can realistically alter the course of an historical conflict.
A classical example of a battle in this book requiring a time chart is Captal de Buch's outflanking ride at Poitiers.
MORALE
Believed by Napoleon to be three times as important as physical factors, morale concerns the collective and individual discipline and confidence of troops. In most battle, certainly in all described here, morale of the respective armies played a major role in deciding the outcome of the battle. Thus, there must be adequate simulation of this intangible factor that causes men suddenly to break or to rally and beat a force larger than themselves. The action of the English archers of the baggage guard at Vemeuil is an excellent example of high-moraled men vanquishing stronger troops against whom they would normally stood no chance.
It is customary in wargaming to allow a smaller force some chance of success by using morale rules that cause their numerically superior, but otherwise inferior, opponents to break and run, often before or at contact. This factor is suggested as the best method of simulating Henry V's success at Agincourt.
LOCAL RULES
When attempting to simulate these historical conflicts on the wargames table, remember that most of them include numerical disparities, surprise factors, varing qualities of troops, inequalities of weapons, and morale effects that are extremely difficult to handle under normal wargames rules. For example, Agincourt is a particularly tricky example of a situation where a force stronger in every aspect except discipline and leadership was completely routed by a much smaller army. There are occasions in battle when a commander takes a deliberate calculated risk when no normal set of wargame rules would allow any chance of success. Yet, the history of warfare demonstrates many such incidents that succeeded and rules should include heavily weighed allowances for simulation on the wargames table.
This leads to the conviction that local rules for each battle are required - a suggestion that may well bring gray hairs to the heads of purist wargamers! Never-the-less it cannot be denied that no known set of rules, lacking local adaptations, would give victory to Henry at Agincourt, or to the French in almost any battle of the 100 Years War until its last quarter.
Local rules should make allowances for factors peculiar to a specific battle. None but the most wildly "cooked" sections on morale will allow the successful action of the English archers at Verneuil, or the bowmen at Agincourt taking on heavily armored men-at-arms. These "out-of-the-normal-run" incidents make hay of conventional wargames rules formulated on a norm of warfare where extraordinary feats of bravery or cowardice can occur but only when governed by incredible dice throwing! To cater for such exceptional incidents, local rules are the only suggested solution.
On the other hand, in the interests of an accurate simulation, unusual situations should be recognized and acknowledged by all participants, and resolved in a reasonable and equitable fashion whether or not the prevailing rules allow, because no set of rules can cover all battlefield eventualities.
All these factors and facets have to be practically considered if the reconstruction of an historical battle is to be more than a matter of giving a name to a wargame.
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© Copyright 2004 Hal Thinglum
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