Lieutenant General Isamu Cho, Chief of Staff for the Japanese 32nd Army, was not a happy man. While the Japanese 32nd Army grimly held onto the southern half of Okinawa, the principle commanders were holding yet another council of war near Shuri castle to determine what to do next. Cho knew that the younger men present silently seethed at how the defense of the island campaign was being conducted.
US troops inspect a destroyed Japanese Tankette
They, like Cho, wanted to take the fight to the enemy like they had been trained to and not just sit here and wait for the inevitable. Presiding over the crowd of bitter and angry young officers was Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, who had been placed in command of the 32nd Army when it was formed over a year ago in April 1944.
The root cause for all of the tension in the air was the painfully slow, but arguably successful attrition strategy favored at the start of the campaign by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, who was the chief planning officer for the 32nd Army. In fact and entirely according to Yahara's plan, the US military landed almost unopposed after a massive bombardment the Japanese had watched from miles away. Some Imperial observers thought it looked "...very impressive" but obviously of little value. Once the first battles had begun after the US pushed inland, the brilliance of Yahara's plan came to light. The seemingly continuously line of interlocking bunkers and constant fighting rapidly wore down US units. Combat exhaustion cases rose to alarming proportions as US soldiers strained to discover cleverly hidden foes and disappearing guns.
Again, Yahara had not been idle and had spent the previous year turning the entire island into a well-disguised fortress. The constant pressure had affected so many US servicemen that many were not withdrawn from the front lines, as they customarily would have been before Okinawa because there weren't enough men to replace them. They had to somehow find a way on their own. Yet the very success of Yahara's plan grated on the normally more aggressive Japanese Army Officers. They could not see the effect of their fighting. All they knew was that they were locked in a war of attrition many felt they had no chance in winning and that tugged at their sense of honor.
In direct conflict with Yahara and the major proponent of offensive action was the unhappy General Cho. Like Yahara, Cho was a compelling figure and the two top decision makers under Ushijima's command clashed frequently. As the meeting progressed, Cho once more pressed for a change in strategy. In an attempt to undermine Yahara, Cho did not try to argue with the equally vocal planner, but instead directed his comments for action openly to the 32nd Army's younger commanders. Situations like this were not uncommon in the Imperial Japanese Army (DA) where young, impetuous leaders would take matters into their own hands if they felt it was necessary. That situation sometimes made for a chaotic command and control environment and had led to open mutiny in some cases. Oddly enough considering the Japanese penchant for order and respect, many of the small rebellions went unpunished, and if they were, the reprimand was so mild as to be ineffective.
Now Cho was using the very same tact to get his way. The General stood up after his speech and demanded an attack. General Fujioka, commander of the 62nd Division, also stood up and strongly sided with Cho. He argued that the timing was right because the US were not ready for an attack. That served to rip the meeting apart as both sides, those for Cho and those with Yahara, began shouting at each other.
In time, almost all of the voices came over to the idea of attacking. All except Yahara, who continued to plead his case in vain. Cho had won his way with this completely Japanese way of 'arm twisting' and got his attack. Once that had been decided, Ushijima ordered the offensive to begin on the night of May 3-4, 1945. Cho had won, but to give an idea of the duplicitous nature of the man, Cho's operations officers had been framing attack orders and telephoning the gist of them to unit commanders behind the backs of both Yahara and Ushijima well before the Japanese commanders conferred at Shuri castle.
Once the date of the attack had been fixed, Ushijima planners began to make decisions on which formations would take part or could be spared without weakening the entire defensive line, but even that brought controversy. When it was proposed that the 63rd Brigade of the 62nd Division come under command of the 24th Division for the attack, the 63rd Brigade commander, General Nakashima, began loudly berating the fighting abilities of the 24th Divisions. His brigade would not fight as a mere branch of a weak tree, he declared, rather it would die where it stood. While all present understood the real reason behind Nakashima's caustic remarks was that the 24th Division was built up to strength by levying Okinawa citizens into its ranks, Ushijima did not contradict the brigade commander. Nakashima had won his point, but also lost his place of honor. The Army planners did not add any role for the 63rd Brigade in the attack. The 24th Division would go forward almost alone. Again, Ushijima did nothing.'
As finally decided on, the main force for General Cho's effort was the 24th Division. It was in relatively good shape except for the battered 22nd Regiment who had seen serious combat since almost the first days of the US invasion. The division had over 15,000 men under the command of General Amamiya and just like Nakashima had so crassly pointed out, was made up of many local citizens instead of trained Japanese soldiers. Amamiya was given the job of driving two strong spearheads through the center and left (or eastern side) of the American lines. To aid the 24th Division, the 27th Tank Regiment and the remaining massed artillery pieces of the garrison would support the assault. In a bold move that showed their growing confidence with the attack, the Japanese intended to line up their guns in the open almost hub to hub. They didn't fear retaliation as Cho's plan called for the rapid breakthrough and crushing of the US artillery positions behind US lines and also because that formation would give the artillerymen maximum fields of fire.
To win the support war, the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment, armed with satchel charges and small arms would make an amphibious assault on the west coast behind American lines, while the 23rd Engineers did the same on the east coast. Both groups were ordered to land and seek out US tanks and artillery positions. To signify the importance of the mission to the men meant to carry it out, all of the raiders were formally detached from their units and ordered not to return for any reason.
Lastly, to deal with the overwhelming US carrier air support, the offensive was timed to coincide with kamikaze aircraft and boat attacks against American supply lines and naval vessels, especially the aircraft carriers. The sheer might of the US fleet, idly anchored off the coast was very demoralizing to the Japanese on the high hills to the south. They could see everything, but do nothing about it. At times, the US ships seemed so numerous that they "... looked like an island" to some of the garrison. It was an issue that had to be addressed before there was any chance of success in the campaign.
The attack plan itself was to be two-pronged and directly targeted the US Army's XXIV Corps front, held by the US 7th and 77th Divisions. The first attack prong, following a 30-minute artillery barrage at dawn, involved the 89th Regiment in the east (or on the US left flank). They were tasked to break through in the Onaga area. The 32nd Regiment, also supported by artillery, was to penetrate American lines in the Maeda area. Tanks from the 27th Tank Regiment were supposed to support both prongs but Cho considered the breakthrough at Maeda to be the critical blow, so the 32nd had more tanks, artillery, and antitank elements than the other zones. By the end of the first day, the Japanese were to have broken the front and penetrated two miles. After the 24th Division was established at the first objective northeast of Tanabaru, the troops were to dig in to protect against US counter-attacks, set up antitank traps, and prepare to continue the attack northward the next day. Once the US XXIV Corps front was shattered, Cho would commit his remaining forces that would destroy the US armies in a series of day and night attacks. On the 32nd Army maps lay that final objective: an east-west line at Futema and site of the US 96th Division command post, which the Japanese mistakenly thought to be General Simon Bolivar Buckner's Tenth US Army headquarters. It would not be the only mistake they would make.
The 22nd Regiment of the 24th Division, while not in great shape, but even it too had a part to play. They were paired with the Navy's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade and placed in the center of the 24th Division's line. Their new role was to screen the advance of the 89th and 32nd regiments with smoke and fire support. Once the attack began to move, the 22nd would join in the attack near the 32nd Regiments area of operations. At that point, once the breakthrough had occurred, the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, who had not seen any serious fighting, was given the task of wheeling North and cutting off the entire US 1st Marine Division.
Just like many other Imperial operations, the Japanese planned the ground attack with extreme care. Nothing was left to chance to derail the early morning start on May 4. Unlike other campaigns, there would be no massed banzai charge. Scouts and patrols were sent out to try and form an accurate picture of the American lines. The 32nd Army Headquarters made sure their orders were given in a clear and explicit manner. All participating regiments, battalions, and even companies were given definite objectives and precise, logical boundaries and timetables. Support units also were given designated routes and assembly areas.
Front line commanders were also ordered to dispatch even more infiltrating squads in their own sector to gain up-to-date information and also lull the US into thinking such nocturnal movement was normal. From First-aid sections, two of which were assigned to each of the main spearheads who would gather the wounded into caves and send the worst cases to the rear on trucks and carts to tanks and artillery, nothing was left to chance as were all integrated into the attack planning The remaining engineers not going on the raids were given responsibility for keeping the roads open and taking care of any leftover pockets of US resistance as the Japanese advanced. "Display a combined strength," Amamiya's final orders exhorted, "Each soldier will kill at least one American devil."
Meanwhile, the US commanders aided Cho by playing directly into the Japanese hands. All the careful Japanese preparations were almost completely overlooked by the US forces. Colonel Cecil W. Nist, XXIV Corps intelligence officer, did note a definite decrease in the intensity of enemy artillery fire, and sound-plots located several Japanese field pieces nine miles south of the front lines. Colonel Nist incorrectly assumed that the enemy was withdrawing his guns farther south to set up another defensive line. In other words, Nist felt the Japanese were getting ready to withdraw, not attack. Nist's voice echoed many of the sentiments at the US headquarters. Even General Buckner believed that the Japanese defensive strategy made it impossible for them to launch anything more than minor counterattacks. This is in spite of the fact that they had historical evidence that the Japanese routinely 'clammed up' right before any major attacks or operations. As the war in Europe was just days away from wrapping up, Buckner's staff may have been caught up with some victory disease of their own. 1,2
The Support Goes in First
The Kamikazes initiated the May offensive first by going after American shipping at dusk on May 3. Five suicide planes crashed into the Destroyer Aaron Ward inside of one hour, setting the ship on fire and killing or wounding ninety-eight men. Three others carrying bombs sank the USS Little. Four more vessels were damaged, but American planes and antiaircraft fire accounted for fourteen Kamikazes and twenty-two other enemy aircraft before dark. The Japanese also bombed shore installations and the US held Yontan airfield. While a stinging blow, the Japanese airmen failed to find or knock out the US carriers or hinder air support in the failing light.
Soon after the Kamikazes and Japanese bombers finished their attacks after sundown on 3 May, Japanese artillery opened up with heavy fire all along the American front lines. Over 13,000 shells rained down on the XXIV Corps positions. The 24"' Division troops moved up to their start lines and small teams of three or four men, variously designated as "reconnaissance raiding" or "rear harassing" teams, proceeded toward the American lines. Their targets were the US command posts, heavy weapons, communications, and supply depots behind the lines. They were also supposed to send back information by means of smoke signals - but how they were supposed to be useful at night on a battlefield full of smoke and fire could be anyone's guess. The 27th Tank Regiment also moved up from their reserve positions to Ishimmi according to plan, but not without cost as US Harassment and Interdiction fire destroyed several tanks en route. On the beaches south of Naha and Yonabaru, the suicide troopers of the shipping and engineer regiments piled into barges and assault boats and set themselves afloat. "The time of the attack has finally come," an unknown Japanese infantryman wrote in his diary during the evening. "I have my doubts as to whether this all-out offensive will succeed, but I will fight fiercely with the thought in mind that this war for the Empire will last 100 years."
First heavy contact went to the 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment executing its Forlorn Hope nowhere near the XXIV Corps lines. Armed with small arms, anti-tank weapons, heavy machine guns, and literally thousands of satchel charges, the three hundred plus men herded their convoy under cloudy skies for towards the Yontan and Kadena airfields but they got lost. It seemed that the 26th Shipping Regiment had more ardor than skill as boatmen as they landed in the wrong spot. Their new landing zone turned out to be one occupied by elements of the US 1st Marine Division. As the wooden boats struggled towards the defended shore around 0200 on the 4th, US sentries on the sea wall caught sight of the barges and opened up with concentrated fire. Flares soon lit up the area and exposed the small fleet. Instantly, Marines began pouring intense small arms fire on the distraught Japanese sailors. One Marine Company fired over 1,100 rounds from 60-mm. mortars while another platoon used fifty boxes of ammunition and burned out six machine-gun barrels. As the Japanese tried to cross the reef, the assault barges began bursting into flames and sinking. In short order, all of the landing boats were quickly destroyed.
In spite of the catastrophic start, many of the Japanese 26th Shipping Engineer Regiment managed to swim to shore. Some, in spite of their orders to the contrary, snuck back to Japanese lines, but the remainder were trapped on a small peninsula of land surrounded by Marines. The US troops quickly cornered the hapless raiders and mopped them up in short order. One small group of Japanese did escape and tried to carry out their orders. They advanced almost as far as Chatan, but they too, were contained and destroyed once they were discovered.
The 23'a Engineers had even less luck on the east coast of Okinawa. After a trip northward in various types of boats, including several commandeered native fishing boats, they tried to land behind the 7th Division lines. Before they could even land, the US Navy spotted them and opened fire. As the survivors tried to outrun the deluge of shells from the US escort ships, they struggled ashore - right in front of the waiting guns of the 7th Division's Reconnaissance Troop and the 776th Amphibious Tank Battalion. The amphibious attack was a complete disaster with the Japanese losing over 500 men and almost all their landing craft for no gain whatsoever. Round 1 of General Cho's attack was a convincing US win, but even more importantly than that, the failure of the suicide attacks left the US airpower and artillery batteries very much alive and well.
The 89th Regiment Attacks
Throughout the night, the US 7th Infantry Division was swept with over 5,000 of the 13,000 total shells used to soften up the US positions. Several veterans remarked that it was the most severe bombardment the division had ever experienced during the war. Even their foxholes gave little protection as the Japanese gunners used howitzer shells that burst in the air and showered the defenders with white-hot fragments. With their field pieces now in the open and well supplied with ammunition, the Japanese gunners were enjoying themselves with the best fields of fire they had for the first time since the campaign began.
Masked by the bombardment, the 89th Regiment crept up to its start lines. At 0500 on May 4, flares drifted high into the night sky and exploded into two brilliant, red balls of light. Instantly, the 89th regiment surged forward to the attack. As per the plan, the Japanese artillery fire became heavier. Troops from Company A, 17th Infantry, on a hill just north of Onaga, who was the US force in front of the 89th Regiment, dropped back below the crest for cover. No one ever dreamed that the Japanese would attack through their own artillery, but that was exactly what happened. Japanese shells fell on their own men as the remainder ran as fast as they could to the US lines. Very quickly, the 89th reached Company A's crest where they set up a light machine gun. PFC. Tillman H. Black, a BAR man who witnessed the move, brought his weapon up and cut down the gun team, but that did not stop the 89th regiment.
More Japanese rushed up to the gun and Black continued to defend his position by suppressing any Japanese who tried to man the machinegun nest. Four more would-be gunners fell to Black's fire, but more and more of the enemy began to arrive in front of Black. Unknown to the private, the Japanese were uncoordinated thanks to the effect of their own artillery fire. The bombardment had badly fragmented the 89th regiment, so they only approached Black in small groups, enabling him to hold his area alone in the dark. Just as the situation was becoming serious, the rest of Company A came back up and rallied around the BAR man and rapidly drove the 89th Regiment back off the hill. Behind them, the Japanese left three light machine guns including the one still in front of Black, four mortars, and a lot of ammunition.
Yet the 89th Regiment was not finished for the night. On high ground 1,000 yards east of Company A, another group of Japanese crept up the hill in front of Company I, 184th Regiment, commanded by Captain James Parker. In spite of the shelling, the attack caught Parker's men by surprise and two machinegun crews abandoned their positions. One of them unfortunately left the weapon intact and the Japanese were quick to take it over and turn it against Parker and his men. Parker, watching the attack from the ridge, had anticipated the move. The Japanese managed to fire one burst; then Parker destroyed the weapon and its new owners with his remaining heavy machine gun. For an hour or two longer the Japanese clung to the forward slopes, firing their rifles and screaming their frustration at Parker's men, but they could make no further progress against Company I.
By dawn, the seriousness of the Japanese attack near Onaga had become clear to the US Tenth Army. In the US 184th Regiment's sector the DA 89th Regiment, following instructions to "close in on the enemy by taking advantage of cover," had advanced around the east slopes of Conical Hill, crept across the flats, and assembled in force around the "Y ridges" east of Onaga. In that position, the 89th had outflanked three companies of the 184th on Chimney Crag and the Roulette Wheel north of Kuhazu, and had also managed to evade the forward battalions of the 17th around Kochi that had easily blunted the first assault. 1
As the new day dawned, Lt. Richard S. McCracken, commanding Company A of the 184th, observed the 2,000 Japanese soldiers that were part of that flanking force in the open area east and north of Kuhazu where their flank attack had taken them. They were, in McCracken's own words, perfect "artillery meat." Due to the small raiding parties sent out early in the battle, McCracken was unable to get through to his dedicated artillery support. Not to be content with that, McCracken used his radio and called his battalion commander, Colonel Maybury. After describing the target, Maybury was equally as pleased to pass on the Lieutenant's request for support. McCracken, however, warned Maybury that he "...might not be too happy as there are a group of Japanese within 100 yards of [your] post". "Oh no," Maybury replied, "that's a patrol from Company K down there." McCracken quickly shot back, "I don't know who the hell it is, but there's a lot of them and they've got two field pieces that are pointed right at your OP."
That settled the matter for Maybury, but before he could make a move, Company C, from the neighboring 17th Infantry regiment, also had spotted this activity, and within a few minutes maneuvered tanks into position and scattered the enemy group. A few well-placed shots destroyed both 75mm Howitzers as McCracken's artillery request came through in dramatic fashion to hammer the remaining Japanese 89th Regiment troops caught in the open. Once again, the 89th had been foiled, but the US 3rd Battalion, 184th had more fighting to do. After stopping yet another attack by 200 more Japanese of the 89th, the survivors withdrew to the ruins of Unaha and set up mortars. A mortar duel quickly ensued, sometimes at ranges as close as 250 yards, or minimum safe range for medium mortars. Looking to get involved, the US 3`d Battalion, of the 32°d Regiment, also got their guns into the act and poured more fire on the Japanese position.
Once the mortar fire lifted, a Japanese officer from the 89th started to rally his men by using the old ploy of standing out on open ground to show how safe it was for them to proceed. He waved his samurai sword in the air and the soldiers of the 89th assembled for another attack. The Americans, however, were not finished by a long shot. They were just patiently waiting for a worthwhile target to develop before they brought more mortar fire on it. Four times the unknown officer assembled his men, only to have them killed or scattered by another barrage. In the fourth and final attack, the mortars finally brought down the brave but reckless leader.
By 0800 the Japanese had been driven off across the entire US 7th Division front, but the 89th did not abandon or even postpone their follow on attacks. Here, error began to compound error as the timing of the Japanese plan unraveled right before the American positions. While the Japanese on scene commanders tried to sort things out, they made the mistake of milling about in the exposed flatland below the US dominated hills. Once more, the US artillery roared to life. In the confusion caused by the American gunners, the attackers were unsure of what to do. They couldn't attack through the curtain of steel rain nor could they retreat without losing face. Instead, they did neither and became perfect targets. "We laid them down like ducks," a platoon sergeant reported.
The 32"d Regiment attacks
While the 7th Division was repelling the Japanese attack in the eastern sector of the XXIV Corps line, the 77th Division was blunting the Japanese 32nd Regiment in the center. Like the 89th regiment, the 32nd was well supported by the Japanese artillerymen. This sector was the critical point of attack and had the bulk of the tanks that made it through the US artillery fire. Success here meant everything, as it would enable the supporting 44th Independent Mixed Brigade to cut west and isolate the 1st Marine Division.
In spite of the obvious need for success and support for that success, transportation difficulties plagued the 32nd Regiment almost from the start. During the night as previously stated, the US artillery so thoroughly controlled the road from Shuri up to the front that only the light tanks from the 27th Tank Regiment were able to reach the start lines on time. The US interdicting fire was so intense that the following medium tanks had to take a long detour along a different path that was in such poor condition that only two of the tanks could enter into the attack. Trucks and artillery also were slowed down. Even foot troops had trouble in moving. One Japanese infantryman recorded that his column was shelled on the way and that everyone except himself and one other was wounded. Another wrote of encountering "terrific bombardment" on the way to Kochi. These difficulties severely handicapped the 32nd Regiment in that now their attack would be going in after the 89th had attacked, so the element of surprise was long gone. Also and equally as foreboding, just as the 32nd went to step off, the 89th had finished their morning operations, thus freeing up the still untouched US artillery to shift all of their attention towards the 32nd. It was not the start that General Cho had envisioned.
Shortly before dawn, the 32nd Regiment finally reached its start lines. The 3`d Battalion from the regiment was to lead the assault and they were supported by nine of the light tanks that had made it through the artillery barrage. Their target was the US 306th Infantry Regiment, 77th Division. The 306th was deployed in a horseshoe pattern from southeast of Hill 187 to where Route 5 curled around the east end of Urasoe-Mura Escarpment. The Japanese planned to hit them at the far corner of Hill 187 in an attempt to roll up the US flank. Once the attack began, the Japanese ran into the US 1St Battalion, 306th, near Maeda. While the US 15t Battalion could not defend everything, the US soldiers used well-placed machineguns to cover the weak points of their line and the American automatic weapons fire tore into the Japanese ranks causing the first wave to fragment before they could even get close. As with their sister regiment in the southeast, the 32nd Regiment stalled in front of the US lines. One US platoon was driven away in confusion, but the remainder grimly held on and poured an increasing volume of fire into the attackers. Once the still omnipotent US artillery got involved, the Japanese gains were quickly erased. Several light tanks were destroyed, causing the remainder to withdraw leaving the DA 32nd infantry pinned in the killing ground.
Colonel Murakami, commanding the 27th Tank Regiment, saw that the initial assault had failed miserably. He became impatient and recklessly committed his own infantry company, (all DA tank regiments had their own infantry company) as he felt that they were the only troops he could trust to do the job properly. Once more, Murakami went over to the attack with his troops and the remainder of his tanks. It didn't work at all. Fully alert and ready for such a move, American artillery fire rained down on the infantry company completely destroying one platoon and thoroughly disrupting the attack before it could get anywhere.
As the sun finally came up at 0730, Murakami found his surviving troops trapped in the same killing ground with the 32nd Regiment. Murakami ordered his company to withdraw, but artillery fire prevented any retreat during the day. When the Japanese used smoke for concealment, the Americans simply blanketed the obscured area with shellfire back to their front lines after nightfall, but at a high cost. All the tanks that had supported both attacks were destroyed for no gain. Stung by the highhanded affair with the 27th Tank Regiment, the commander of the 3'd Battalion, 32nd Regiment bitterly recorded that while they were holding out in front of the US lines "...further advance is very difficult due to enemy fire. There is no tank cooperation." And now, thanks to Murakami's ill-advised attack and the still untouched US artillery, there were no more tanks to cooperate with.
The US Retaliates
Once the day began on May 4, US spotter aircraft quickly soared aloft looking for targets. The Japanese knew the little aircraft would come hunting and also knew that with so many of their batteries set up in the open, it didn't take a genius to find them. As with many Japanese plans, they had an elaborate back-up idea just in case the suicide sailors failed to take out their objectives of the airfields and artillery batteries. In this case, they set up numerous anti-aircraft batteries and smoke pots around their guns in the belief that one would keep the light aircraft at bay while the other would shield their guns from direct observation. As the US observation aircraft approached, the Japanese opened up with a fantastic anti-aircraft barrage and the smoke pots were fired, lifting a fog over the Japanese positions.
Reality was far crueler to the Japanese plans. Unfortunately, there was a nice breeze cooling the island that day and no sooner had the pots_ been lit than the protective screen quickly dissipated. The US aircraft then simply circled higher and once more called down the US artillery thunder on the exposed anti-aircraft crews. In short order, they were either driven to shelter or knocked out. The US aircraft them circled lower and began making pinpoint observations on the exposed Japanese artillery. In no time at all, 19 guns were knocked out and a further 40 more were destroyed during the battle. The Japanese thereupon moved their remaining weapons back into caves. With the lessening of Japanese artillery fire, the number of combat fatigue cases among American troops dropped rapidly.'
Daylight on May 4 also brought the return of the Kamikaze attacks. Unlike the pre-attack results, the Japanese committed a maximum effort on this day. From dawn to 1000, American naval forces were under continuous attack. Four planes crashed into the U. S. destroyer Morrison, and the ship sank in eight minutes, with 154 casualties.
An Ohka ('Cherry Blossom' as named by the Japanese), or 'Baka' ('crazy' or 'stupid' by it's US nickname) bomb hit the USS Shea, killing twenty-five and flooding the forward compartments, but the ship managed to stay afloat thanks to the excellent Damage Control parties on board. Another plane dove straight down into the Cruiser Birmingham just aft of Number 2 turret. The impact carried the motor of the plane through three of the ship's decks, and the attached 250-pound bomb exploded in the sick bay causing ninety casualties. More Japanese planes attacked at dusk. A suicide flyer hit the escort carrier Sangamon, destroying twenty-one planes on the flight deck and gutted the entire hangar deck by fire. All radar and bridge control was knocked out as well.
The Attack Continues, May 4-5
In spite of the severe setbacks, General Amamiya refused to abandon the offensive. The reason for Amamiya's continuance was due to one unit's 'accidental' success during the previous night. Unknown to XXIV Corps, elements of the 1St Battalion, 22nd Regiment, which had been in a support role, had found the gap between the US 7th and 77th Divisions and penetrated more than a quarter of a mile behind the American lines near Kochi without being detected. Whether or not it was the citizenry that were impressed with the 22nd that helped map the safe route is not known. After dusk on the 4th these elements were ordered to pull back to their regimental start lines.
Amamiya thought that he had found a weak point in the American defenses and planned his next attack along a similar route of approach used by the 22nd Regiment. Tagged for tonight's effort were the 1st Battalion, 32d Regiment, and the attached 26th Independent Infantry Battalion. Supporting them was more tanks from the battered 27th Tank Regiment that had finally made it up to the front. Both Infantry battalions had been in support during the debacle on the night of May 3-4 and were relatively fresh. Their job was to succeed where others had failed and to penetrate the XXIV Corps lines northwest of Kochi during the night.
Once more, the remaining Japanese artillery pieces fired on the 306th Infantry during the night of 4-5 May. At 0200, the 32nd Regiment stepped off towards the US 306th northwest of Kochi. Once again, American artillery, the omnipotent thorn in all Japanese plans, rained down high explosive on top of the surging Japanese and crushed the attack. Not to be deterred, the Japanese tried again at 0500. This time, instead of infiltrating, the entire battalion pushed forward supported by the tanks. Six tanks were knocked out, but the Japanese pressed on through the artillery and mortar fire and tried to get into the trenches with the 306th. Some hand to hand combat broke out along the US line and one US battalion observation post was overrun and all five of its men were killed or wounded.
At close range, both sides blazed away. One Japanese force, moving up a draw in close column marched squarely into a US company deployed in line and was utterly destroyed by automatic weapons fire.
Due to the withering fire generated by the US positions, most of the Japanese were unable to close those final yards to get into melee combat. Instead, the Japanese hid in ditches or shell holes just in front of the American positions. Grenade duels and exchanges of automatic fire continued throughout the remainder of the night. Due to the proximity of the Japanese forces, the US then shifted to their more accurate mortars, but they were not enough to keep the Japanese from setting up their own mortars and heavy machine guns. One bright spot occurred when the American fire suppressed and destroyed a Japanese regimental 75mm gun that had been brought up. By dawn, and in spite of the efforts of the IJA 32nd regiment, the US 306"' had the situation well in hand. In an attempt to erase the Japanese survivors, several Sherman tanks arrived after dawn and systematically moved along the ditches where they machine-gunned them where they lay. The remaining Japanese popped smoke and withdrew back to their lines, leaving behind 248 dead together with numerous machine guns, mortars, rifles, and several hundred rounds of 75-mm. ammunition for the gun they had failed to get into action.
Yet failure had bred success for the Japanese. While the US was bloodily repulsing part of the 1st Battalion and the 26th Infantry, the bulk of the 1St Battalion successfully slipped away to the west and got around the US positions. Amamiya had been right! About 90 more of the infiltrating Japanese made their way into the command post of the 306th Infantry Regiment, but while they did keep the HQ staff under fire, they failed to take the post during the night and were killed during the following day. Most of the Japanese, numbering approximately 450, crossed through the divisional boundaries and reoccupied the town of Tanabaru and Tanabaru Ridge. It was the deepest penetration of the attack and was more than a mile behind the US front lines. It also was the high water mark of the attack, but no one knew that yet.
The town and ridge the Japanese reoccupied had constituted a strong point on the first Shuri defense line. It dominated much of the adjacent area and had never actually been taken by American troops. In the first phase of the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese had been forced to abandon it on the night of 23 April when the rest of the line cracked around it. It was a formidable position to hold. To the north, an escarpment dropped abruptly in a steep coral cliff. The town stretched along the southeast slope of the ridge and was divided by a road running south to Onaga and Kochi where the defenders could see everything in front of them. More importantly, it was the supply line for all the battalions of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division. As long as the Japanese 1St Battalion held Tanabaru, the supply road was effectively cut.
Ironically, the 1st Battalion's march back to the Shuri line had been spotted by the very people their new position threatened. The soldiers of the US 7th Infantry Division could clearly see in the bright moonlight a column of troops moving northwest against the skyline on Tanabaru Escarpment. It did fire on them, but hesitantly just in case it was friendly forces from the nearby 77th Division. Once in place, the Japanese began cutting all the telephone wires they could find. They also raided several 17th regiment supply dumps at the base of the ridge, but thanks to the depot troops determined stand, were barely prevented from destroying them.
Retaking the Shuri Line - Again!
The job of cleaning out the infiltrating Japanese fell to Company E, which sent a patrol of platoon strength up the east slope of the escarpment. When the Japanese on the heights held up this patrol with fire, 1st Lt. Walter J. Sinkiewicz, commanding Company E, committed the rest of his unit. One platoon almost reached the top, but the enemy drove it back with mortar, machine-gun, and light-arms file, killing two and wounding seven. A sharp firefight developed, during which Sinkiewicz and all three of his platoon leaders were wounded. Easy Company withdrew to safer ground.
In the meantime, the Japanese were making the most of their position. They placed covering fire over the 1st Battalion's supply dump and motor pool on the north side of the ridge, rendering them inaccessible to the Americans. Small groups snuck down and mined the supply road through the town and set up machinegun nests to sweep the road with fire. Their first victim was not long in coming. A mine immobilized a half-track carrying medical supplies and the medical officer driving was killed as he tried to escape. The Japanese quickly occupied the vehicle and converted it into a makeshift pillbox. Later in the day, an American patrol killed eleven Japanese in and around the vehicle. Once it was secure, Staff Sgt. Carl W. Johnson volunteered to retrieve the weapons and supplies from the half-track but he made only three trips across the exposed ground before he was killed on the fourth.
By noon of 5 May there was apprehension at the US 17th Regimental command post, that perhaps the infiltration was stronger than they thought. From a hill near the command post Lt. Col. Albert V. Hard, executive officer of the 17th Infantry, could plainly see several Japanese soldiers 600 yards away on Tanabaru Escarpment. The Japanese were in turn watching the American activity. Colonel Hard got down into the prone position and fired at the milling Japanese with his M1 Garand. While he was so engaged, a soldier ran up with a radio report that the German armies had surrendered. "Well now," Hard replied, "if we just had the laps off the escarpment we'd be all right, wouldn't we?" 1
With Company E stalled on the east slope of the escarpment, Company F was sent in to perform a broad flanking attack. Two of its platoons on the line, supported by tanks, pushed through Tanabaru and knocked out hastily established defenses. Beyond the town the company drew heavy fire from numerous caves, and it spent the rest of the day destroying the Japanese in these positions. With that success, Company E thereupon took over the burden of the attack, and by 1730 it had reached the top of Tanabaru Escarpment behind a mortar preparation. This move enabled the 1st Battalion to transfer its vehicles and supplies to a safer location, but the supply route was still blocked.
May 6 and 7- The Final Days
Early in the morning of 6 May, the Japanese 1St Battalion, now sitting just below Company E perched above them, attacked the US troops with grenades and satchel charges. Sixteen Americans fell in less than a half hour, prompting the shocked Company E to retreat off the top of the hill onto a protected ledge just below. Here the survivors formed a line and bombarded the top of the hill with grenades to deny it to the enemy. While some members of the company hauled new boxes of grenades up the steep trail, the others lobbed several hundred grenades on the Japanese, who also withdrew from the exposed top at dawn.
Company F then returned to Tanabaru for a second sweep through the town and killed a further eight Japanese. Supported by mortar fire and aided by small-arms fire from the grenade pitching Company E, Company F initially made rapid progress on the slope but then ran into a series of coral outcroppings. The attack got going again with flamethrowers, mortar fire, and quantities of grenades. By evening, Company F had cleared all resistance on the slope. All that was left was the Crest.
On May 7th, Company F again attacked up the Tanabaru Escarpment from the west behind mortar fire and quickly gained the top. There they found the trenches littered with Japanese dead, most of them killed by 81-mm. mortar fire. Among the dead was a large amount of Japanese and American equipment. It included one 75-mm pack howitzer with ammunition, 2 heavy machine guns, 6 light machine guns, 2 knee mortars, 3 magnetic mines, and a large quantity of ammunition. Their American weapons consisted of 2 light machine gun, several BARs, 3 M1 carbines, and 3 Thompson sub machineguns. Japanese losses were complete with 462 ex-members of the 1St Battalion lying dead among the wreckage. The supply road was now open once again.
Endgame
By the end of May 6, it was clear to everyone from General Ushijima to General Cho that the offensive had failed. The Japanese had suffered tremendous casualties and had made no headway except for the infiltration in the Tanabaru area. Yet even there, the IJA forces were surrounded and slowly getting ground up. The realization was sobering and startling. General Ushijima now knew that Yahara was right and that he must revert back to defensive warfare. During the day Ushijima called Yahara to his office and declared with tears in his eyes that henceforth he would be guided by Yahara's opinions.
In an attempt to put a positive spin on the attack, Ushijima declared that the Army would "...temporarily halt its offensive because of the opportunity offered by the painful blows against the enemy". But just as quickly, Ushijima dropped the other shoe. Our new battle plan, he continued, will be one of "...an attrition of enemy strength until he has lost his endurance." The entire 32'd Army's morale sank when the statement was released. One Japanese lieutenant wrote in his diary, "We realized that we were doomed when we heard of the failure of the 24th Division." General Cho was his typically blunt self when he said that defeat was only a matter of time.
The Japanese lost well over 5,000 troops, including those killed in the counter landings. The 24th Division was greatly reduced in strength. On May 5, the combat strength of its 32"d Regiment had dropped down to 30 percent; the 89th Regiment was not any better with its battalions having suffered at least 15 percent each. The 27th Tank Regiment was destroyed and never fought as a mobile unit again; its six remaining medium tanks were converted to stationary artillery and pillboxes northwest of Shuri. Japanese artillery and shipping engineers also went into decline thanks to the severe losses to the rear area raids.
The only intact force from the entire venture was the Japanese Navy 44th Independent Mixed Brigade as it had not been committed after it became apparent that the 24th Division had failed. It became the sole reserve body for the entire army.
American casualties during the enemy offensive were heavy. On May 4 alone, the 1st Marine Division, which was performing its own independent operations and only mildly involved with the attack thanks to the suicide sailors, suffered 352 casualties. The bulk of the Marine losses had been suffered in making an attack west of Machinato airfield against strong enemy defenses. The two US Army divisions hit hardest by the counterattack and penetration, the 7th and 77th, suffered 379 casualties total over the three-day battle with the bulk, 335, coming on May 4. By just casualty figures alone, the Marines suffered more from taking on Yahara's well-conceived defenses than the two Army divisions who had repulsed a major attack. Ironically, the casualty amounts suffered from the US Army units were actually less than what they normally would have suffered from had they continued to take on Yahara's defensive scheme. Even the US Navy suffered more as the Kamikazes and air attacks accounted for 17 ships sinking or damaged and 682 casualties over the three days.
Like so many other Japanese plans during the war, Cho's effort was too clever for its own good. It also failed to take into account the possibility of failure of any part of the plan. By trusting the naval flanking efforts to deal with the US airpower and artillery, Cho essentially said that they were going to be a non-factor in the upcoming battle. That in itself was a grievous error as the US artillery and airpower unmercifully punished Japanese artillery, armor and reinforcement assets, making them a nonfactor. General Cho, like so many other Japanese officers, firmly believed that offensive spirit alone would overcome. This is seen in his commitment of the assault troops through their very own artillery barrage. Japanese were killing Japanese even before the US had a chance to fire in retaliation.
Once battle was joined, Cho had no communications or plans to support success except for the highly suspect smoke signals. That, in turn, caused the withdrawal of the 22nd Regiment from its first day gains instead of supporting the penetration that they found. In retrospect and in spite of the advantages the US tried to give him by dismissing signs of the attack, General Cho was not honestly dealing with a realistic appraisal of the US forces. He failed to take them into account at all and the 32nd Army suffered the consequences. General Ushijima understood that the failed offensive was a turning point. If sustained offensive action was not possible, defeat was inevitable, and all the 32nd Army could hope to do was its duty-by inflicting maximum casualties on the invaders. This the remnants of the 32nd Army did with relish. It would take until June to finally subdue the Okinawa defenders, but their tenacious legacy left another. Stunned by the fierce resistance and trying to win the war without suffering massive US casualties, the 509th Bomb Group dropped two Atomic bombs on Japan in August, barely two months after Okinawa was declared secure.
Bibliography
1. UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II - The War in the Pacific.
2. OKINAWA: THE LAST BATTLE by Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens.
3. RYUKYUS 1945.
4. Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa. 5. The Okinawa War by Gordon Warner.
6. http://www.historycoop.org/journals/ht/34.1/tzencl.html
7. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa-battle.htm
8. http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq87-3r.htm
9. http://www.jahitchcock.com/okibattle.html
10. http://japanupdate.com/previous/98/02/27/feature7.shtml
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© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
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