By Terry Cabek
An Article from Don Featherstone's Wargamer's Newsletter Recently, my attention has been drawn to a booklet published (by Bickers and Son, London) just after the turn of the century, titled "Tactics and Military Training" by Major General George D'Ordel (late Director-General of Military Instruction). On reading the material, it soon became apparent that it contained military information of a nature so revolutionary as to confound many of our previously accepted theories as to the management of warfare at the end of the last century. Careful study of what follows should enable wargamers to attain a standard of realism and accuracy in their rules that has apparently been hitherto lacking. Given here are verbatim extracts from the manual, commencing with certain military definitions, a knowledge of which are invaluable in understanding that which follows. Alignment: The line in which troops are formed (see Line). Battalion: A battalion is composed of two (not three) half battalions. Front: "The direction of the enemy, real or imagined." (The Drill Book 1896, page XXV.) The real direction of the enemy should approximately coincide with this supposed direction. It is said that owing to the fact that the Boers refused to conform to this rule, constantly allowing a variation between their real and supposed direction, that the "front," that most vital and important of all military ideas, is to be abolished. This is an excellent example of the appalling result of acting upon experience derived from irregular warfare to the detriment of the art and science of war. High Hills: Are hills that are higher than mounds but not so high as mountains. Line: The alignment of troops (see Alignment). Parapets: Are sometimes called breastworks. Similarly breastworks are sometimes called parapets. Unit: Are any number of troops exceeding one. Woods: Are often places so covered with trees that troops cannot see them. Part one of the manual concerns tactics - extracts from it are given herewith. Page 15, sub-para 2: "Generally speaking" (as the Drill Book of 1896 so aptly says on page 112) "an engagement between two hostile forces, be they large or small, begins either by one side in motion attacking the other while stationary or by the collision of both sides when in movement. "The exceptional case of troops meeting when both hostile forces are stationary is, I regret to say, omitted in the Drill Book, and will be found more fully dealt with on page 30. ("Two armies meeting when both are stationary" This is the exceptional case not dealt with in the Drill Book. The best position for the troops to adopt at the moment of meeting will be that in which they happen to be. Page 30) Sub-para 3: The point or spot in the enemy's line or position at which it is easiest to inflict the most serious injury is often, if not usually, its weakest point or spot. Sub-para 4: With no great disparity between the opposing forces except in respect of numbers a commander in deciding whether to attack or defend will bear in mind the question of numbers. Sub-para 5: Where there is no great disparity except in arms he will bear in mind the question of arms. If, for example, the enemy be unarmed, a commander would be well advised in attacking the enemy, unless, in deed, he can provoke the enemy to attack him. Sub-para 6: If a commander intends to attack a position, he should generally not omit to select a time and a place for his attack. These are both important considerations in an attack upon a position. Sub-para 7: The tactics to be adopted in defense or in attack must, to a certain extent, depend upon the nature of the ground and upon the numbers and nature of the forces at the disposal of the commander and of the enemy. For example, the tactics adopted by a single private soldier operating against an army corps in virgin forest will not be the same as those of the commander of an army corps acting against a baggage wagon in the open. The Arms and Their Uses Infantry: Infantry are combatants who are not mounted upon horses or other animals and who are not directly in charge of guns. In the absence of horses and other animals their mobility is derived from their haunches (see Drill Book 1896, page 13 S.11 "The movement ... must spring from the haunch and must be free and natural."). They are employed in combating the enemy, sometimes in attack and sometimes in defense. The commander should remember that the infantryman has nothing to fear from a single cavalryman or from a single gunner, and that if he keeps his head he will have them at a decided disadvantage. Cavalry: Cavalry are combatants mounted on horses and armed with maces, swords, or lances. The javelins employed by cavalry during the best part of the Roman Empire are no longer in use. The only use of cavalry in regular engagements is that of charging the enemy and subsequently harassing their retreat. It is not advisable to adopt the modern plan, employed with such signal failure by some foreign generals of wasting cavalry by breaking them up into ridiculously small units for the purpose of observing the enemy's movements, a purpose that can be so much more effectually served by the commander himself and his staff, trained as they are to realize the meaning and importance of such movements as they may see. The commander should remember that the cavalryman has nothing to fear from a single infantryman or from a single gunner, and that if he keeps his head he will have them at a decided disadvantage. Artillery: Artillery are combatants directly in charge of guns. Garrison artillery should never leave its appointed place, i.e., the bastion of the fortress to which it belongs, and should never be put to so theatrical and unconventional use as to be dragged across country to oppose field guns inferior to it in range. Field artillery is employed for silencing the field artillery of the enemy, and until this has been effected should never be brought to bear upon infantry or cavalry. The commander should remember that the gunner has nothing to fear from a single infantryman or from a single cavalryman, and that if he keeps his head he will have them at a decided disadvantage. Ammunition supply: Strict fire discipline an economical use of ammunition must be enforced. This is most easily ensured by one round of ammunition only being issued per man. The remainder should be carried in carts or on mules at the base, and in no case should be issued. Troops are not supposed to be in possession of any ammunition not actually carried. (Drill Book 1896, page 253 S.205 - 15.) This would be fatal. Selection of a position: The manner in which a defensive position is occupied will, to a certain extent, depend on the nature of the ground, and the strength and composition of the forces available, so that it is impossible to lay down precise rules on the subject. The chief requisites for any defensive position whatever may be taken in the following order:
b. There must be a clear field of fire or glacis sloping away from the front of the position for a mile or more. c. In front of this there must be a deep river with a high bank on the side away from the position and a sloping bank on the nearest side of the position, which will serve for the counter-attack. d. The right flank should rest upon an impassable marsh, which should extend for at least 30 miles and the left flank upon the sea. It has been suggested that these flank defenses may be reversed (the marsh being upon the left flank and the sea on the right) but this is liable to lead to confusion in the issuing of orders and in the mind of the commander. e. For the first line shelter trenches should be dug unless they already exist, and for the second and third lines there must be adequate folds in the ground. f. The ground on both sides of the river should be carefully prepared with entanglements. g. The ground on the other side of the river must slope gradually down to the river from a height inferior to that of the position and should be quite devoid of cover. h. There must be a high hill on the right of the position, and protected by the marsh, from which the artillery may enfilade the enemy's advance. There must be a promontory upon the left of the position for the same purpose. i. There must be no good position for the enemy's artillery. j. There should be three or more double lines of railway leading to the position from the rear, and good roads leading to the artillery positions. k. There should be a sharp depression in the ground in the left rear of the attacking enemy capable of completely concealing some 400 or 500 cavalry in ambush. l. There should be trees or some other cover behind the first line of the position and behind the artillery, so as to prevent them form appearing upon the skyline. The Positioning of artillery in attack: The artillery will advance to the distance of 600 yards from the enemy, where the guns will be trained upon the enemy's artillery, and the artillery duel will be begun. As the artillery will now be "in the presence of the enemy" it will send out a "combat patrol" of two men to the front and flanks to perform the duties of a cavalry escort (see Field Artillery by Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt, R.A. page 116) and to protect the guns from counter attack. Conversely, when defending, the enemy will push forward at first the whole of their artillery in this manner. This will mean that it will only be protected by two or at most three men acting as a combat patrol, assuredly within easy rifle range, this will probably afford the defenders an opportunity of making a successful attack on the enemy's guns and capturing them (Drill Book 1896, pages 123, 118, and 2). Infantry in defense should have ammunition served out to them which cannot fail to give them an advantage over the enemy. At the moment of the enemy coming within effective range a convergent fire of all the batteries and all the available rifle power should be brought to bear upon him. This, coupled with the disorganization created in his ranks by the entanglements, the efforts of crossing the river, and the alarm caused by the loss of his artillery, will throw him into complete confusion. At this instant, the 400 or 500 cavalry in ambush in the sharp depression in the ground in the left rear of the attacking enemy will emerge and charge the enemy's left rear, while the cavalry and infantry in the third line of defense will charge across the bridge upon the retreating enemy and complete his rout. The manual has much to say upon the importance of mapmaking, a necessary art well known to wargamers. "It is of the utmost importance that every officer should have a knowledge of mapmaking; he should not be fettered by abstruse mathematical calculations, nor should he waste his valuable time in learning the use of complicated instruments. Let him learn practical topography as it was taught in the old school where the only requisites are a sharp pencil, a clean sheet of paper, and a keen eye. With these an officer should always be able to give a simple and comprehensive sketch of the ground. The actual sketch may be made to vary the nature and character of the ground sketched. A well drawn map may be used on many occasions as a standard form and is vastly preferable to a totally unintelligible map of an area made with the help of some instrument such as a Mercantor's Projection." The training of officers: "The attainment of perfection by an officer must depend not only on the training he receives but also to a certain extent upon the nature, the character and physical development of the officer himself, but there is no doubt that a man with a great natural aptitude or genius for military matters, such as Marlborough, Frederick the Great, or Bonapart or Wellington may, with this training make a very effective officer." The position of the soldier on active service: "The normal position of the soldier is the position in which the soldier should normally be, that is to say, that unless any contrary order is given, the soldier should permanently stand in the position in which he is originally placed." Modern weapons: The nature of modern weapons is at the present moment undergoing a remarkable change owing to the supersession of the old musket of British infantry, with which Blenheim, Vittoria, and Waterloo were won, and which we used with no little success during the early months of the Crimean War, by a series of more complicated and "scientific" weapons, culminating in the so-called "Lee-Metford" rifle. (Now follows a long description of the Brown Bess musket including such valuable advice as "...it is advisable in discharging a musket to close both eyes, as the discharge from the touch hole is second only in violence to that from the muzzle, and not so accurate in direction." "We will now contemplate the later, but therefore not necessarily superior weapon, the Lee-Metford rifle. In outward appearance it generally resembles our old musket.") The writer includes in his description many useful hints and suggestions and one pertinent query, "It will surprise the military student as much as it surprised me to learn that the makers of the rifle had not provided a ram-rod, so that in the case of the breech failing to open there is no method of introducing the charge." "It is true that the soldier can fire ten or even fifteen shots in a minute with this "rifle," but it is clear that this would not be compatible in strict fire discipline, and even if it were so, would undoubtedly lead to wild and unsteady firing, which would destroy all accuracy and regularity, and lead to gross waste of powder and ball." "The fact cannot fail to be admitted that the Lee-Metford, loaded with smokeless powder, is capable of carrying its projectile, such as it is, to distances greatly in excess of those within the powers of our own Brown Bess, but we still have to see whether this is an advantage when we consider the cost at which this greater range is, and always must be attained. In the first place, the smokeless powder, leaving as it does the firing line naked before the enemy and deprived of its natural shield and protection is a grave danger to troops employing it. Far more serious objection to the "rifle" lies in the puny and meager nature of its projectile which is well compared to a slate pencil. When the pretended advantage of the rifle in the matter of range proves so doubtful it is time to look for such points as the extreme complication and confusion of the mechanism constituting it as compared with the strength and simplicity of the musket, the difficulty of cleaning the bore produced by the rifle, and the neat and sober appearance of the senior weapon. But this question of the rival merits of the "rifle" and the musket can be decided by time alone, and it is that tribunal which will decide whether our Army will or will not revert to the weapon to which it owes its triumphs in the past." There is no doubt whatsoever that these remarkable assertions, coming from the authoritative pen of a senior and experience officer, will bear heavily with wargamers when they completely revise their rules for Horse and Musket warfare as, in the light of such vital information, they must surely do. 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