Last year, I had an opportunity to visit the Bosworth Battlefield Visitor Centre near Leicester. It was, to say the least, an enlightening experience, and a good example of why I like to visit a pre-modern bgattlefield when the chance offers.
Let me summarize the "received version" of Bosworth, pretty much as told at the center: Richard III, last Plantagenet king of England, with approximately 12,000 men, formed up the evening before the batle on Ambion Hill (site of the present Visitor's Center, and about 600 yards across) with 8,000 men in his vanguard under Howard the Duke of Norfolk, himself in command of the mainward, and a reluctant Percy Duke of Northumberland with the rearward. The whole array was bounded on the left by a swamp running up the south slope of Ambion Hill, and on the right by the neutral but menacing Stanley contingent.
The army of the Earl of Richmond (subsequently Henry VII, first Tudor king)--perhaps 8,000, not counting about 4,000 under the Stanleys-approached the hill from the west with the sun at their backs not long after breakfast. Norfolk's contingent fought half-heartedly, and Northumberland's not at all, but the Earl of Richmond's forces were being nonetheless worn down. When Richmond rode north toward the Stanleys to force their hand, Richard III charged after him with 1,000 mounted men at arms, and was driven into a marsh and slain when the Stanleys came down on Richmond's side, in time but a little late for Henry's taste. Richmond was subsequently crowned on the nearest hill, now known as Crown Hill, about a mile and a half south and west from the traditional place of Richard's death near the base of Ambion Hill.
Does this strike anyone else as funny? Does it strike anyone else as the verbal equivalent of one of those "what's wrong with this picture" illustrations? I don't say this to denigrate the Leicester County Council, which isn't exactly a Wars of the Roses round table, and has done its best to follow established naratives and put together a first rate visitors' center, but there may be room for improvement in the narative. Our sources are scanty, but I used to do terrain analysis and order of battle for a living, so let me suggest a few things.
First, let's state some principles: 1) the sun rises in the east, even in 1485. 2) water continues to flow downhill, and accumulate in low-lying areas. 3) the contours of the land remain unchanged, except where we can document serious later digging, such as railroads and canals, and 4) unless we have evidence to the contrary, the armies involved behaved like other English "bow and bill" armies.
Richard camped for the night on Ambion Hill.
This I believe. It's on the road out from Leicester, it's higher and consequently drier than the surrounding countryside, and a premodern commander needed to have his banner flying from a point his scounts and lieutenants could see for miles.
Richard had 12,000 men.
Well, probably. Using the figures per great noble, lesser magnate and town established for Towton, 12,000 might have been a bit low, but matters were rushed and there was a desertion problem. Say 12,000 for the sake of argument.
Richard toploaded his vanguard, and formed up 12,000 men on Ambion Hill.
Not for one moment! This is Richard's first battle as an independent commander, but he served under his brother Edward IV, a notably successful soldier, at Barnet and Tewkesbury. In both cases, Edward's army was divided into three roughly equal parts, vanguard to the right, mainward in the center under the king, and rearward to the left. Edward, a genius by Wars of the Roses standards, was known to keep a small reserve, probably mounted. I think Richard did exactly the same. All our evidence about overstrength vans comes from later Tudor battles, and some of that's doubtful. Richard in his first major battle in independent command, and with a very hastily mustered army, would have gone with what he and his subordinates knew and had succeeded with before. They'd have marched van, mainward, rearward, and, given the opportunity executed a sort of column right and then a left face (to use later drill terms) to bring the army to face the enemy-van to the right, main in the center, and rearward on the left, as one faced the enemy, and the enemy would have been to the west. And now trouble starts. My statistical base is a bit limited, but except for Towton, where I can gauge the size of a late medieval English army and measure it's frontage, it works out to 5-6 men per yard. Richard's 12,000 men would have needed about 2,000 yards to deploy. I could be off by a bit, but I defy anyone to seriously imagine a 12,000-man English late medieval army deployed on a frontage of 600 yards.
If we center Richard's army on Ambion Hill facing west, and give Richard the mainward, a rather different battle takes shape. Suddenly Howard's van is so far north that's it's actually in the parish of Market Bosworth, which is where Howard's son would later state that his father died.
If Richard's mainward takes up about 600-700 yards on the west slope of Ambion Hill, not only is Norfolk north of the present battlefield site, the area of Richard's immediate command includes both "King Richard's Well" where he is said to have drunk for the last time, and "King Dick's Field", where he is saiid to have been killed-- notably lower than the area around-a potential 1485 marsh?
If Northumberland's rearward then extends roughly in line with the other elements of Richard's army, but south of them, the Percy contingent has to move through the lowest land in the vicinity; a draw running east-west just south of Ambion Hill, and extending west of it. It's pretty rough terrain even today, and was undoubtedly a swamp prior to more recent canals and enclosures. Henry VII is known to have had a marsh or swamp to his right, and is generally held to have had a smaller army. If that draw was the marsh Henry VII used to protect his right, it's just possible that Northumberland, on Richard's left. was trying to move through a swamp or soft ground to reach the battle. The comment that Northumberland was commanding "where no blows were being exchanged" loses it's political implications, and becomes a tactical description.
Henry had the sun to his back.
No. Henry, facing east, couldn't possibly have had the sun at his back, as his court historian wrote, but he might very well have had the wind at his back, an important factor in Wars of the Roses warfare, and in the northern hemisphere temperate zone, the prevailing winds are from the west.
Richard's men fought half-heartedly.
Not credible. A modern soldier might simply go to ground under fire and refuse to advance. A 15th Century fighting man might desert, or simply be late for muster, but no one fights half-heartedly while his opponent is trying to lay him open with a halberd. Wars of the Roses armies fight, desert to the enemy, or run Those were the choices. But if Richmond really did have 8,000 men and the Stanleys 4,000, the sides are roughly equal, and with Northumberland struggling though that swamp, the Tudor forces have a substantial edge in manpower, and a real edge in position. Howard might have died randomly in the fighting, but he could also have been killed with Stanleys rolling up his flank If Richard led a mounted reserve in a desperate counterattack, he could well have been driven south, to be bogged down and killed in the traditional low ground. Certainly the dead included men with personal ties to Richard, and it's easy to see them as a personal reserve, used tactically like the "clump of spears" his brother had commanded.
Henry was crowned on Crown Hill.
Yes! Now it makes sense. If Richard's army has been rolled up from the north, every step taken in pursuit moves the Tudors away from Ambion Hill, and closer to Crown Hill. If the Tudor army had been moving east from Richard's death, they'd have marched up Ambion Hill, and would have had to march back to Crown Hill. Northumberland would be no trouble. Richard was dead, and the Percys had no affection for lost causes.
So where does this lead, exactly? Well, for me, a battle is worth understanding for its own sake, and this is both an important and an interesting battle. Might I also suggest that a battlefield isworth looking at to explain the naratives, and that both the naratives and an understanding of the tactics of the period are necessary in order to understand the battlefield. Take a critical look at your sources. You'll be a better wargamer for it.
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© Copyright 2003 Hal Thinglum
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